The Semiotics of Conceptual Structures

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Illustrations and realisation by
Sandrine, Anila, Eric.

for my
students, friends, foes.

Introductory Note
Overview

ABELARDIAN DISCOURSE

CARTESIAN DISCOURSE

CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE

STRUCTURAL DISCOURSE

POLITICAL DISCOURSE

MYTHICO-LITERARY DISCOURSE

INTERPRETATIVE DISCOURSE

EPILOGUE

Introductory Note

This collection of essays represents Professor Harjeet Singh Gill's preoccupation with the semiotics of conceptual structures in language, literature, art and culture since 1964 when he joined the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris. The theoretical reflections begin from the twelfth century philosopher, Pierre Abélard, through the Age of Enlightenment of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries with Port Royal Logic, Condillac and Destutt de Tracy, to the modern French theoreticians of conceptual constructs. This eight hundred years long tradition has been reflected upon, interpreted and applied on specific European and Indian, oral and written texts, by the author, and by his students in a number of doctoral theses. There have been different perceptions but the reactions and responses of the students and colleagues, both Indian and French, have helped crystallise his theoretical position, without necessarily altering the basic hypotheses. The search for this epistemological continuity was the main theme of the International Seminar on Theories of Signification since the Middle Ages that Professor Gill organised in Paris in November 1993 on the invitation of the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme. These reflections in a new unified conceptual structure are presented for another look, regard, another critique.

Paris
January 13, 1995

Danielle Gill

OVERVIEW

Subha Chakraborty Dasgupta

The texts reviewed here are the products of Professor Gill's engagement with the twelfth century French philosopher Pierre Abélard, renamed "l'oubli de la France", by way of research, teaching and writing. Professor Gill reads Abélard as a contemporary, in the light of modern semiotics throwing open a vast range of issues with immediate validity, and at the same time he retraces the definition of the sign in his works, reading him as one of the originating sources of the philosophy of language who brings a third synthesizing term to the dialectic between Platonic Universalism and Aristotelian Nominalism. The core of each of the three texts is formed by the Abélardian discourse and so one comes across the central chapter in slightly different from in all the texts. Abélard draws on the existing theory of the three degrees of knowledge – sensation, imagination and intellection – and shows that it is through these stages that the word is apprehended. It follows then that the correlation between 'word' and 'thing', 'signifiant' and 'signifié', is a matter of intellection and there is a clear distinction between the mode of existence and the mode of conceptualization. The sound or the utterance of the word is of the "order of nature" while the signifié is created by the addition of something else, which is produced by the particular social state. The first can be individual and isolated and have a physical identity while the latter is based on correlate analogies and "abstracted parameters". Also in the constitution of language there are thinking beings who reflect upon the nature of things and exchange their intellections or analyses. In the process, the word will take in several intellections and hence the possibility of multiple significations. Professor Gill stresses at this point that the multiplicity of reference is the crux of the problem of signification and this is not sufficiently emphasized in modern semiotics. It may also be important to remember Volosinov at this point who had stated that the forms of sign are conditioned by the social organization of the participants involved and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction.[1] Without falling into determinism, this observation may lead to very different areas of engagement. But to go back to Abélard, the third important point in his discourse pointed out by Professor Gill is that the relationship between different objects is established metaphorically in terms of other objects or by a correlation of the conceptual elements of signification and metonymically, that is by their sequential correlation. In trying to concretize his notion Abélard applies it to the concept of the Trinity and comes to the conclusion that an object conceived metaphorically bypasses time and space or metonymic

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relationship. With the metaphoric relationship achieved, he says, the metonymic is lost. Professor Gill extends this notion to various spheres of man's activity showing him to be capable of being at liberty in the midst of determining forces. That the very signification of his being is contained in the working out of this liberty is a running motif in many of the chapters of his text.

In *Abélardian Semiotics and Other Essays* Professor Gill uses the framework of Abélardian theory to analyse various cultural phenomena; the creative process in literary discourse where discourse is seen to be a synchronic structure of simple and frozen signififers interacting dialectically with one another; "The Myth of the Great Professor and the Good Student" where he gives the 'folklore' history of the French University system and traces the 68 movement to extreme centralization and the institution of the Cours Magistral with no communication between the teacher and the taught; Sartre's existential method and its bearings on biography and the conflicts of the period. In this context Professor Gill also looks at Sartre's reading of Flaubert in *L'Idiot de la famille* and going through the intricacies of the femininity of Flaubert and the masculinity of Emma arrives at the teasing conclusion that in *Madame Bovary* Flaubert secretly avenges his class, his "bad faith", his "non-relations" "He gave to the people what they thought they liked and within the internal structuration, he metamorphosed realism into absolute irreality." The femininity of Flaubert or the masculinity of Emma need not necessarily mean that the man-woman being had lost its identity in the milieu it flourished in thereby playing a game of illusions with the components of realism. There could be more positive readings to the text which is shown in the light of negation because of the rupture of the artist with his class. The issue is perhaps larger and may be worked out in terms of relations of production, of desire having no base and the logic of 'Néant' emerging from the centre of the hollowness that follows.

The next chapter in the text is on Althusser who advances the notion of the Marxist approach which he thinks is opposed to the analytico-teleological approach and which may be worked out within a certain structural framework of modern semiotics. The development of the Marxian discourse, his beginning within a contingency of ideology, the complex network of relationship with the given contingency that follows and the gradual moving away from it that evolves from Althusser's approach is highlighted as exemplary of all "constituting ideological structures which arrive at establishing independent conceptual totalities". In the chapters that follow we have the semiotics of myths studied with reference to the works of Claude Lévi-Strauss whose works according to Professor Gill may be seen as historiography par excellence as it aims at reintegrating man in his nature; the application of a linguistic model by Lacan in the study of the individual subject's relationship with knowledge; Foucault's distinction of "the history of ideas" and the "archaeology of knowledge"; and with the form, content and praxis of our communication system. As one goes through these sections one encounters new insights into familiar scholastic terrains but at the same time one wishes the analysis had been more prolonged in each case and more elaborate on the implications of the findings.

The Semiotics of Creative Process in Eighteenth Century France looks at Destutt de Tracy's *Elémens d'Idéologie* in the first section. The text appears at the end of the eighteenth century in the tradition of Condillac where the different stages of human perception leading from the sign to the idea through sensation, memories and correlations are worked out. In the course of the text Professor Gill points out the chief differences between the school of Condillac and that of Descartes. It lies in the fact that the former looks at the origin or the generation of things to understand their nature to arrive at their properties and the latter believe in the principle of innate ideas. The interaction between signs and ideas at each stage is studied to arrive at an understanding of the structuration of the linguistic discourse. The implication of such an interaction is that our language and our knowledge move together. But there is the danger of moving into zones of the politics of power when the thesis is taken further to the proposition that "a relatively more perfect language is used by more enlightened people". It has often been said that a philosophy of language presupposes a philosophy of history and eighteenth century codes are well evident in the analyses offered in the second half of the text. The author takes cognizance of the issue and in the last section deals with the role of intellectual nationalism in eighteenth century language philosophies.

Apart from the importance of the text to students of linguistics and specially of the French school – the latter has to be stressed for not only this but all three texts are distinctly French in idiom, in syntax and sometimes in spellings betraying a French formation which is a source of strength but which may also pose communicational difficulties – its contribution lies in underlining certain issues in the philosophy of knowledge and in the domain of semiotics. The prime metaphor in the philosophy of knowledge for many a school has been one of difference or distance, between the signs and things, representation and reality. Starting from this premise we also see a prerogative for relational studies, a 'journey towards rapprochement'. A large segment of the text deals with propositions and syntactic constituents, the role of each component isolatedly and in relation to each other in the development of ideas or in ideology (science of ideas). In order to understand the process of signification, two supposedly unrelated spheres, that of metaphysics and grammar, one studying the relation of ideas with things and the other studying words inasmuch as they are used to express thoughts, are brought closer. As the author states, metaphysics now has to take into consideration the role played by language in the formation of ideas and grammar to go into the relations it has with the ideas because words are signs of ideas. The point made here is also that the sign cannot be understood by its own existence alone. "It is only when an element enters into a relation with another element that it receives the status of a sign". As this line of thought is developed, semiotics or the science of signs also receives a defintie connotation. Speaking from within the syntactical preoccupations of the eighteenth century, Professor Gill states: "The field of knowledge where questions such as what is thinking? what is language? how can knowledge be generated with the help of words and phrases etc. are addressed and their operational mechanism is called semiotics." What we have in this definition is basic recognition that at the core of the semiotic object "is a specifically semiotic

system which is language"[2]. It is further elaborated in the definition where it is a reflection on knowledge taking into account its relationship with language. Elsewhere in the text the author speaks of semiotics as "an autonomous discipline of investigation". We know that the author is not really referring to a set of methods, but implied in it is definitely the idea of reflections upon knowledge . The problem may lie with the very concept of semiotic analysis in general. As has been stated, one of the main problems of semiotics lies in the epistemological contrast between "extremely specific data and extremely abstract and general hypothesis, inserted in a (philosophical) system, explicit (Peirce) or not[3]. There can be the semiotics of a very concrete analysable phenomenon on the one hand, and on the other, semiotics of cultural activities or aesthetics, such as semiotics of the creative process. Semiotics has also been divided by Morris into "pure", "descriptive" and "applied" categories. But there too the distinctions overlap in any pragmatic consideration. In Professor Gill's account the history of semiotics is Peircean in its occupation with pure grammar and rhetoric and also pre-Peircean as it is found in the decoding of Abélardian philosophy. The field in which he works is vast and amorphous but there is a constant return to the semiotic object which is mentioned earlier, language. There is often a preoccupation with semiotics itself, a metasemiotics as it were, but that again may be inevitable given the fluid state of the concept or discipline as it may be understood.

In *Structures of Narrative in East and West* Professor Gill looks into the semiotics of narrative. Starting from Abélardian premises his focus is on a level where nothing is understood literally or as it stands in a metonymic progression of events, but where everything is submitted to an imaginative and intellective reconstruction, transforming words, gestures and events to highly charged semiotic signs. From this he goes on to make a detailed sequential analysis of Flaubert's *Saint Julien*, Qadiryar's *Puran Bhagat* and Waris Shah's *Heer Ranjha*. The French structural school is evident in the analysis but other dimensions are added to his work with its strong emphasis on codes of cultural archetypes or anthropology. At first the text is divided into sequences where the discourse is revealed in a specific progression. The sequences are further divided into sub and microensembles which are analysed as propositions and ideograms in the form of prefixes, suffixes and infixes. The syntactic order of the narrative is the semiotic order from the reader's point of view, while a second order where the reader has to correlate signifiers and reconstitute links across the linear sequences is the semiologic order. It may be recalled at this point that the terminological ambiguity between semiotics and semiology had never really been satisfactorily resolved in the Western tradition. Saussure's semiotics could be Barthes's semiology which could again be Kristeva's semiotics and so on. Nomenclatures are not really very important here, what is the working model and that the author differentiates between the two levels in a very consistent manner. There is also a third level which is that of mediation, the transformation brought to the stained-glass window version of the Julien story seen by Flaubert at Rouen. A typological comparison is then made with the legend of Puran Bhagat and as the author states "this section deals with an historical progression in the creative process and also penetrates into the cosmological

conceptualization across time and space and across cultures, achieving indirectly *a certain universality of the Becoming of the Being."* The dimensions are over-extensive, speaking again of a tradition of scholarship which is distinctly French. But then extensions are preferable to constrictions evident in different areas of scholarship and imposed by invisible institutions of power. The human concern is also extensive, preoccupied with the vast contours of the human condition on the one hand, and implicitly with smaller social configurations on the other. What is a little puzzling to this reader is that the author, a scholar with such human substance, should define the human condition in terms of violence. "The human condition, the subject of every literary discourse, is the condition of violence, man constantly being 'violé', raped in every socio-political individual situation." True he reacts and does not merely submit to "the catastrophic avalanche of history", or even to the gods, but the reaction is so violent in the case of Julien, of Puran Bhagat, of Oedipus that it seems to tear apart the very human fabric. But then again the author has the last word. It is important, he feels, not to stop with *Oedipus Rex* but to go on to *Oedipus at Colonus.* The protagonists he looks at "follow different manifest traditions, different overt psychic paths, but after a series of destabilizations, all these three achieve a certain existential equilibrium whose conceptual corresopndence acquires a centrifugal precision which cannot be altered either by gods or by men. They seem to have located the Centre from where they are now able to move both Earth and Heaven, and, gods give in."

The texts in themselves are excellent examples of what linguistic discourse can achieve in the realm of the social sciences. And as for semiotic studies, the texts prove a dictum made famous by Morris that the sign is the main agency in the development of individual freedom. Only the author would go back to Abélard to substantiate the statement.

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NOTES

1. V.N. Volosinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language,* trans. L. Matejka and I. R. Titunik (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).
2. Thomas A. Sebeok (ed.), *Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Semiotics* (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyere & Co., 1986), p. 893.
3. Ibid., p. 897.

ABELARDIAN
DISCOURSE

Pierre Abélard

"We have in France a monk without regulation, a preacher without solicitations, an abbot without discipline, a serpent who moves around in his cavern... This persecutor of our beliefs, an outsider, a heretic is surrounded by a crowd of innocent people; he reasons on our beliefs in the streets and the squares, seduces children and women, and signs with his plume the most detested heresies on our sacred dogmas."

St. Bernard de Clairvaux

"The teaching is an affair of the youth. The students have the right to choose their own masters and they have the right to accept or criticise them. Knowledge is discovered and elaborated progressively, and none has the monopoly of verity."

A student of Abélard

Pierre was the eldest son of a noble, Berenger and his wife, Lucie. He was born in 1070 at Pallet near Nantes in Brittany. It was for his native place that his admirers later called him the Aristotle of Pallet. After his early exercises in reading and writing Latin with the priests of the local churches and then getting whatever education was possible in the "schools" of the region, Pierre renounced his rights of the eldest son and headed for Paris.

In Paris, Pierre followed the lectures of Guillaume de Champeaux who taught at Ile de la Cité in the precincts of Notre Dame. Following the custom of the day, Pierre Abélard began to ask inconvenient questions at the end of the lectures of the famous theologian who felt ridiculed by the dialectical incisions of this young man.

As Abélard realised his intellectual capacities, he left Guillaume de Champeaux and established his own school at Melun. Soon the students deserted the old master and joined the rising star of dialectics. From Melun, Abélard shifted to Corbeil to come closer to Paris. One of these days, he goes to the lecture of Guillaume, engages him in a long disputation on Universals and with a series of logical arguments which demonstrate the sophisms of his adversary, literally dethrones the great Guillaume, who leaves Paris in utter humiliation. Abélard is offered the Chair of Dialectics by the successor of Guillaume where the young master reigns without any rival. But Guillaume has his connections, he manages to expel Abélard from the Cloître of Notre Dame. Abélard crosses the river and walks over to the hill of Sainte Geneviève (the later Latin Quarter) and all the students who have assembled from the different parts of the western world follow him.

Until now, Abélard had been teaching dialectics, he would now like to discourse on the sacred texts. The great Church theologian of the time is Anselme who teaches at Laon. Abélard goes to Laon and listens to the disourses of Anselme. After a short while, there is a

repeat performance. After a disputation, Anselme is humiliated, and in spite of all protestations, Abélard is offered the Chair of Sacred Texts, Pagina Sacra (the term, theology, was coined by Abélard later). Abélard is now at the height of his career. He is called the Aristotle of Pallet. The students flock from all corners of Christendom. They cross the channel and the Rhine, they traverse the Alpse and the Pyrenées – and they are all there to listen to master Abélard.

At the same time, there is a young girl, Héloïse, the niece of Chanoine Fulbert, who is very much interested in intellectual pursuits. Impressed by Abélard's reputation, Fulbert requests him to give private lessons to Héloïse and even offers him hospitality at his residence. Abélard develops an affectionate liaison with his pupil and the love affair soon becomes the talk of the town as Abélard composes songs for his beloved Héloïse and sings them on his harp before the bewitched students of dialectics. The rumours end up reaching the uncle who hires a couple of bandits to physically assault Abélard and castrate him. Abélard is humiliated. Héloïse, whom Abélard had married in a secret religious ceremony, is sent to a convent. This union resulted in a son, Astralabe.

And Abélard becomes a monk at Saint-Denis. After some rest and some minor controversies with the local monks, Father Adam, the incharge of the Abbey allowed Abélard to continue his discourses at Maisoncelles en Brie. It is here that Abélard writes his *Theologia summi boni*, a treatise on the Holy Trinity, which lands him in trouble, first with master Roscelin and then with the two old students of Anselme, Alberic and Lotulphe le Lombard. Innocent that Abélard is, he himself offers to explain his thesis. A Council is held at Soisson in 1121 where Alberic and Lotulphe physically prevent him from presenting his argument. Abélard is forced to throw his books in fire with his own hands and is sent to Saint-Medrad as a prisoner. After spending some time at Saint-Medard, Abélard is sent back to Saint-Dennis where he runs into a controversy with the local priests on the origin of the Abbey. Father Adam had had enough of this inquisitive scholar. He expells Abélard.

In search of peace and tranquillity, Abélard arrives in the domain of Comte Thibaud II de Champagne. Thibaud was a highly cultivated noble of the kingdom. He was a great admirer of Abélard. He offers Abélard a vast terrain on the banks of Arduzon. Soon the old disciples of Abélard gather at Arduzon and a new university emerges in the deserted and dangerous jungles. Abélard builds a Church and consecrates it to the Holy Trinity, and names the place, Paraclet, the Consolator.

The ecclesiastic authorities again catch up with Abélard, and in a bid to terminate his academic and theological activities at Paraclet, nominate Abélard as incharge of Saint-Gildas in Britanny where the monks try to poison him.

Meanwhile there was trouble in the convent of Argenteuil where Héloïse was staying. As she needed shelter and the news reached Abélard, he gifted Paraclet to Héloïse and her sisters. It is here that Abélard and Héloïse exchanged the now famous "letters", and, Héloïse got her sisters to calligraph the manuscripts of Abélard to preserve them for posterity.

Abélard with his student, Héloïse.

Harassed by the monks of Saint-Gildas, Abélard fled Brittany and once again reached the Montagne Sainte-Geneviève in Paris, and once again, the master of dialectics, the modern Aristotle, dominated the intellectual field of Christendom, and once again, the long hand of the Church caught up with him. This time it was Bernard de Clairvaux, the future saint of the Catholic Church, who haunted him. It was June 1140 when the Council of Sens was called to pass judgement on the writings of Abélard.

At first Abélard decided to contest but he soon realised the futility of an intellectual disputation before a fanatic clergy and their henchmen. He remembered very well what had happened at Soisson when he was physically prevented from presenting his argument. So Abélard gave in, got condemned once again, spent the last days of his life in the monastery of an old friend, Pierre Le Vénérable, and, died there in 1142.

Abélardian Linguistics

1. In the beginning of the twelfth century, the French philosopher of language, Pierre Abélard (1079-1142), defined the words of language as a resultant of a certain mental activity. Even though the institution of language has nothing natural about it, as it is primarily due to human imposition, human will, *positio hominum, voluntas hominum*, its evolution follows a logical progression.

One can imagine a zero state of language when for the first time some names were given to certain objects. This state of human imposition is *arbitrary* in the absolute sense of the term, for each linguistic community arbitrarily followed this name-giving operation. There is no reason why a given object has a certain name in one language and another in the second language. But after this *first imposition*, the historical evolution follows a specific logical path. The process with which we begin to *classify* objects when we call a number of similar but not identical objects, tigers or lions or leopards, is not at all arbitrary. This process implies a certain mental activity which is based on analogy, *proportio*, resemblance, *similitudo*, and the ensemble of rapports, *similitudo habitudinum*. The words of our language then do not simply correspond to the relation of a name and an object, but to propositions charged with significance: *vox innunes institutionem, non simpliciter essentiam vel prolationem, sed significationem.*

A large number of animals are called tigers only because they resemble each other. We ignore all the individual differences and give them one general name based on our judgement that enables us to put them in one group. It also means that the word, tiger, then does not refer to all the characteristics that a given tiger has, its size, its colour etc., but what is considered to be common to all the tigers, the so-called "tigerness" of the tigers. Similarly, the word, man, corresponds only to the "essence of the being of man" common to all men. In other words, such words are *general* and *classificatory* and the significative function, *officium significandi*, is only *conceptual*. It does not refer to any "concrete" reality.

In the Middle Ages, the famous controversy of *Universals*, involved the *realists*, the so-called Platonists, who believed that only the universal categories like, man, tiger are real, the individuals have no independent existence, and the *nominalists*, the so-called Aristotelians, who believed that only the individuals are real, the abstracted characteristics like man, rational, mortal have no tangible existence. Abélard resolved this predicament and proposed that although individuals have a manifest reality, to understand the signification of this universe,

we have to posit a conceptual reality for these abstracted resemblances. This is why for Abélard, the words of a language are supposed to *generate intellection*. They first lead to the idea of a thing and only across this idea to the thing itself. The object of a given utterance is not any specific object, *cum nullum habeat rem subjectam*, it refers to a certain perceived idea of that object. The relation with the object or thing is only indirect, based on the analysis, understanding or intellection of that object: *nam et res et intellectus per voces quodammodo proferri dictuntur, id est significari.*

2. This process of intellection follows two paths. The first consists of perceiving a common denominator in a number of objects like the "essence of tiger (tigerness)" or the "essence of man (the being of man)" in a number of objects to give them a general, classificatory name, tiger, man; the second consists of abstracting a number of characteristics within one given object followed by perceiving resemblances with other characteristics within other similar or dissimilar objects. One of the characteristics of an apple is considered, soft. Then a certain resemblance with this characteristic is perceived in cotton and also in a certain attitude as in, she has a "soft" corner for him. The first step here is to look for resmeblances or analogies in concrete objects like apple and cotton. The second is to move from the physical identity to a purely conceptual, abstract level of a mental attitude.

In the evolution of language there are two possibilities. Either we specify and note all differences and whenever we have a slightly different object or a characteristic, we give it a new name or we follow the classifactory schema and ignore these minor differences and give only one name to all objects where we perceive resemblances. All languages have followed the latter solution. But it must be noted here that these classifications are based on individual or collective perceptions and may or may not have any validity in another language or culture. Such classifications of "tiger" or "leopard" may seem arbitrary from the point of view of another linguistic community but this arbitrariness is not of the order of the first imposition where there is no question of any perception. The *second* and *third impositions* are based on intellections though the validity of these logical steps may not be testified elsewhere.

3. The basic hypothesis is that with the least number of words we try to express the largest number of ideas. The expression *to eat*, is used in Punjabi, besides for eating food, to say, do not bother me (do not "eat" my head), he is feeling dizzy (his head is "eating" circles). The Punjabi linguistic community perceives a certain resemblance in the act of eating in these states just like the English linguistic community perceives a certain analogy in "run" out of money, "run" over, "run" down etc. The conceptual progression is always from a given specific physical act to its conceptualisation in the abstract universe.

In French, the word, *petit*, in the expression, *un petit garçon*, corresponds to a physical reality, a little boy. It is followed by the perception of one of the characteristics of the word, *petit*, as dear, and the French linguistic community creates such expressions as "*mon petit*

père", (my little father i.e. my dear father) and even "*mon tout petit père*" (my very little father i.e. my very dear father). Now this perception of affection in the utterance, *petit* (little), may be arbitrary from the point of the English linguistic community but this creative process corresponds to the second imposition in French based on certain perceptive logic. It is based on Abélardian hypothesis that what corresponds a proposition is not the reality of the thing, it is the reality of the composition of the words *res autem propositions cum nullum habeat rem subjectam, ex rebus vocabulorum non constat;* this correspondence is with the state of the object: *quidam rerum modus habendi se,* the way this object is understood: *oportet per propositiones non dicta intellegi, sed res in intellectu compecti.*

4. We always begin from physical distinctions. For example, there is the physical male and female or masculine and feminine as man and woman, boy and girl etc. It is followed by linguistic perceptions. Some linguistic communities like Punjabi and French attempt at conceiving the whole universe, all the objects, whether they are animate or inanimate as masculine or feminine. But what is perceived in one langauge as feminine may be perceived in another as masculine like, for example, the word for "wall" is feminine in Punjabi and masculine in French. For the English linguistic community, it has no *sex.* Where such distinctions are made, they may not cover every object of their universe. For example, the number "one" in French must be conceived as masculine or feminine as *un homme* and *une femme.* But interestingly, it is only this number where such a distinction is made. No other number is inflected for this correspondence. Then we have the case of pronominal forms. In English, there is a distinction between "his" and "her" but this dinstinction refers to the subject and not the object as "his son or daughter" to father and "her son or daughter" to mother. In Punjabi and French, the correspondence is with the object as in French "*son fils, sa fille*" we do not know whether the subject is father or mother. Both of these grammatical agreements can be logically justified but this logic is only internal, confined to the language concerned. The gender classification can be understood at three levels: the *physical* gender, the *grammatical* gender and the *metaphysical* gender. This process of conceptualisation is a move from *nature* to *culture.* We have a physical, natural gender. We extend this gender to all the objects of our universe to be able to include them in our animate world. When all inanimate objects are perceived as male or female, they are conceptually *humanised,* they become a part of our intimate world, a world of men and women, a world we can apprehend in a close personal relation. We may not apprehend this relation when a verb is inflected for gender but when a wall, a house, a garden become male or female, there is already a certain attempt at esablishing an understandable relation. This conceptualisation enters the metaphysical world when we perceive our earth or our country as feminine.

The same phenomenon is at work when we extend the semantic domains of the expressions, father or mother. We have physical father and mother. We analyse their characteristics, and, by analogy, we enter the conceptual world, and, we perceive God as father, earth as mother. Our conceptualisation is based on certain existential, cultural, economic

conditions. The epithets of all powerful, omnipresent, authoritarian father emerged from a certain feudal family structure where the old man held all the reigns. God is perceived in this situation as a bigger father, the real father multiplied several times over. Abélard says that all creative activity follows the three states of *sensus*, *imaginatio* and *intellectus*. We always begin from a real sensuous experience which is reconstituted in the realm of imagination. This domain of imagination is the vast space of conceptualisation where the earlier real images are rearranged, altered, enlarged. We try to comprehend the metaphysical world of the abstract, spiritual universe in terms of real relations of father, mother and son. But while this conceptualisation explains abstract relations in simple familiar terms, it poses its own problems. After all, the statement, Jesus is the Son of God, is only a conceptualised proposition. It is based only on a perceived analogy. And, when Abélard tries to explain it in terms of the process of conceptualisation, in terms of a certain unity based on the concepts of *time* and *nature* or *metonymy* and *metaphor*, he gets into trouble, and the eccelesiastic authorities vote for his excommunication. Abélard's commentary was very lucid and very logical. One cannot be a father without a son or a son without a father. This transformation is simultaneous. In other words, it is the birth of a son that bestows on a being the epithet of fatherhood. One derives one's being from the other. This interdependent conceptual opposition or relation is the cause of their unity and identity. One can posit the same relationship in the domain of the metaphysical world because this is the only way we can comprehend the mysteries of our universe. On the one hand, the proposition, God so loved the world that He gave it His only Son, brings the abstract, spiritual, metaphysical universe closer to our real physical experience, on the other, it requires a certain conceptualisation and intellection to attribute a gender and a term of family relation to an entity, a power that is supposed to create not only human beings but also mountains, oceans, stars etc.

5. This problem of understanding continues in all forms of conceptualisation. As the all authoritarian feudal father helped imagine a certain configuration of God, the nuclear European family with father, mother and children enabled Sigmund Freud to constitute a conceptual world of paternal and maternal relations and conflicts. These psychoanalytical undercurrents could not possibly be conceptualised from a joint family structure where the roles of the physical father and mother are of entirely different order. The linguistic phenomenon must be understood in its universe of signification. The words, father, mother, refer to physical realities. To that extent they are universal. But these words also refer to their *semiotic structuration* where their signification will depend upon the role they play as *signs*. First of all, one becomes father when a child is born. This most fundamental fact implies that the child bestows on a given individual the role of "fatherhood" as the father bestows on the other the role of "sonhood". They derive their beings from each other. Each of them triggers the process of the acquisition of their becoming in a progression of *simultaneity*. And, this becoming will be conditioned by socio-economic-cultural contours of the society. As these contours vary from one historical situation to another, these becomings will differ accordingly. There can be no universality of this conceptual constitution.

Similar is the case of Indian "sisterhood". All the linguistic and the related cultural expressions in the Indian folklore evolve from a historical situation of feudal economy where the sisters never inherit anything. They are entirely dependent on fathers and brothers for their protection, for their prosperity. This acquisition of "sisterhood" and this acquisition of "brotherhood" are cultural phenomena embedded in the conceptual world. First of all, a girl "becomes" a sister only when there is another child in the family. It is at this moment that the boy and girl bestow "brotherhood" and "sisterhood" on each other. Then begins the process of the acquisition of their specific roles which will be governed by the way the socio-economic structures of the society evolve. The linguistic words will simply follow this progression of *semiotic configuration.*

As family is the most intimate physical reality, most of our metaphysical universe is constituted in its familiar terms. In mediaeval Bhakti literature, the relation of bride and bridegroom is extended to the relation of God and the mankind. Obliterating the distinction of gender, all men and women are perceived as brides of the Lord, God. The Sufi poets employ the semiotics of "in-laws". They conceptualise all human beings as girls to be married and ask them to prepare their dowry (of good deeds) for they have to go to their in-laws (to the House of God after death). This shift from the physical world to the metaphysical universe is possible only under specific family and cultural structures. But it must be underscored that these conceptualisations also articulate the contours of our physical world. The intellective reflections are reciprocal. There is a certain dialectical interaction between the two levels of this semiotic development. We must understand the nature and function of linguistic propositions within the domain of signification where the words as signs not only replace the objects they refer to but also serve as parameters of invocation in the universe of psychic interpolations. This process follows the doctrine of multiplicity, *multiplicitatis sententiam,* advocated by Abélard. The mode of signification, *ex modo significationis* depends upon the manner in which the objects are conceived, *modus concipiendi.* The linguists and the sociologists whose analyses are hermetically sealed within the grammatical categories or kinship classifications within closed family relationships do not realise that the physical world cannot be apprehended without its correlative conceptual world. These semiotic relations or oppositions are dialectical and reciprocal.

6. One can also understand this phenomenon in terms of the acquisition of language. After the preliminary stage of imitation and repetition, the child begins to realise that the words father, mother are being applied to all kinds of animate and inanimate "beings". These terms are used not only for his physical father and mother bound by daily routine but also for gods and goddesses, rivers and mountains. He begins to perceive analogies of relationships and understands that the linguistic words may cover a number of analogous beings. Another level of analogies is when the expression, hard, is used to enunciate such characteristics as hard stone, hard wood, hard task master, or the expression, soft, for soft cotton, soft drink, soft corner. As the relations between these analogies are quite abstract, these words according

to Abélard generate intellections, they refer to the fact that these "arbitrary" analogies are not so arbitrary, they are the resultants of a certain mental activity. Their ambiguities are within the domain of logic even though this logic is only perceived as such. This phenomenon defies our popular notion that within a language, words signify distinct objects. As the significance of each word of language must be apprehended in its conceptual universe, its realisation depends upon individual experiences. The imitative being, the child, grows mentally, and his innate thinking faculty forces him to evolve his own semiotic contours within the general collective framework. But no child can escape the dilemma, the dilemma faced by the realist and the nominalist philosophers of the Middle Ages that if a mountain, a sky, a god can also be called, father, what is "meant" by this word? What kind of "reality" of father it refers to? If the word, soft, can be applied in contexts like soft corner, soft drink, soft wood, what is really meant by this word, soft? In most ordinary terms, it requires a lot of stretching of one's imagination to establish these corollaries. In linguistic analysis dealing with signification one cannot avoid references to the conceptual universe of perceived analogies and intellective abstractions. After recognising masculine and feminine in human male and female, the child is told that the "wall" is feminine and the "fan" is masculine, the child begins to wonder, what is going on. The explanation for this "irregularity" may be that it is all "arbitrary". There is no specific reason. But the same argument cannot be applied to his country or his river, for their being feminine is an extremely important cultural phenomenon and the child is supposed to acquire a certain mental attitude of respect and awe and affection following this distinction in gender.

The effective use of language enables a child to understand his culture but this understanding is quite ambiguous. A speaker of Hindi learns to use expressions such as *dharti mata* 'mother earth', *Ganga mata* 'mother Ganges', *Bharat mata* 'mother India'. He conceptualises these "beings" as his mother, and more important, in a reciprocal dialectical relation, his own mother as these objects of worship. The Bhakti literature transforms all men and women into the "brides" of God, and following the same pattern, the husband as the "God" of every bride. The semiotic extensions continue. When a heroic death is conceptualised as a bridegroom marrying a bride, the reciprocal relation transforms a bride into "death". So is the case with "in-laws". Following Sufi literature, after death one goes to his or her "in-laws", hence the reciprocal dialectic conceptualises in-laws as "death". Even though these correlations are "obvious", it requires a considerable intellective effort in the domain of Abélardian *imaginatio* to conceptualise such correspondences.

The problems of ambiguity and understanding arise from the fact that the words of our language correspond not to specific objects but to *classes of objects*. The word, man, does not refer to any given man, but to a class of *similar* and *non-identical* objects (beings), the word, soft, to a class of "similar softnesses" which are perceived in a number of objects like cotton, drink, corner, etc. Naturally, what a given word of a language corresponds to is not so obvious. Hence, the controversy between the "realists" and the "nominalists". Let us follow Abélard's argument in *Tractatus de Intellectibus*[2].

7. Abélard begins with a five-way division of different human faculties responsible for the evolution of language: *sensus, imaginatio, existimatio, scientia, ratio.* As we shall see later, the last three, estimation, science and reason can be grouped into one faculty, *intellection.*

Intellect or the faculty of conceiving things, says Abélard, is related with senses. As one of the five senses apprehends a thing, it leads to a certain conceptualisation. It is based on a real sensuous experience of feeling or seeing or touching, while intellect does not require corporeal realisation of a thing, it can conceive of things present or absent, past or present. Secondly, by means of senses we cannot judge the quality or the characteristics of a thing. Intelligence, on the other hand, operates by means of rational conception of the nature or the property of a thing.

The faculty of "conception" or conceptualisation differs also from imagination, for imagination is only a *souvenir* of a sensuous experience. It is a faculty with which we can retain the experiential moment in the absence of that experience or the thing experienced. With senses we can conceive only the things which are present, with imagination, the things which are absent, and with conception, the things which may be present or absent. But our conceptualisation must follow our imagination. It is through imagination that we arrive at a comprehension of the nature of things without the obstacle of corporeal conditions. It is in the realm of imagination that we can conceive man as animal, rational, mortal, for here we apply a process of abstraction and crystallisation of specific characteristics. In a way, there are three levels of comprehension: *the level of senses,* the level of the first contact with the things of this world; *the level of imagination,* the level of the second contact where we have a "confused" image of the thing experienced; and *the level of intellect,* the level where we conceptualise the true nature or properties of the thing experienced and imagined. Abélard insists on the crystallising faculty of conceptualisation. He says that what we want to know is not what an expression "means" but what is its '*concept*', how it is conceptualised by our intellect.

The concepts are considered simple when they are not constituted of successive parts. When we say, the man is walking, we have a series of significative parts but there is only one concept, for an enunciation or concept may be composed of several units. But we can have a simple enunciation with several units within it as, man, may designate rationality and mortality. It also implies that the same object may be conceived as *simple* or *complex* following a *single conceptualisation* or as *several attributes in a succession.* There is a unity of the concept, if our intellect apprehends it in one act, when there is no succession in the intellectual operation.There is one simple concept as long as there is only one mental impulsion. There may be a succession of objects but they are discursively, *discurrendo,* taken as one, referring to one essence. When we say, rational animal, the hearer conceives animal and rationality as one unified concept. In the concept, the house of Socrates, there is a unity of the expression, the Socratic house. Within one concept there may be several *junctions,* several *divisions* but the unity of the concept depends upon the *intellective act.*

We follow the operation of abstraction when we take only one nature or characteristic independent of the form of the object or where a certain characteristic is conceived *indifferently* without any distinction between individuals to which it belongs, for example, the colour of a body or the esprit of a being[3]. If we consider indifferently the human nature that is within every man without making any distinction between different men, we consider man as a man, as a mortal, rational, animal, and not as this or that man. We abstract the *universal* from the individual subjects. Abstraction consists of isolating superiors from inferiors, universals from individuals, subjects from predicates, forms from matter. On the other hand, we have *substractio* (subtraction) when our intelligence subtracts the subject from what is attributed to it and considers it separately as we may conceive the nature of a subject independent of any form. The significant point here is that in both cases, whether we abstract or subtract, we conceive a thing in a way other than it really is.

When we think of a thing we cannot think of it with all its characteristics, we conceive only some of them; we are forced to think of things in a way they really are not. Thus, this body is body, man, white, warm and a number of other things. However, considered as a body, it is considered *separately* from all other things, in other words, different from what it really is. The concept of body, independent of every other form and quality, is that of a certain nature conceived as universal, i.e., indifferently, without application to a given individual. But this pure body does not exist anywhere, for in nature nothing exists indifferently, in an undetermined manner. Everything is individually distinct. The substance, corporeal, is nothing other than this body itself as the human nature in this man, in Socrates, is nothing other than Socrates himself.

If this is the problem with things which are present, which can be physically experienced, we can imagine the problem of conceiving things which can never become the object of our sensorial experience. The distance between their reality and their conception must be enormous. This is what happens when we try to conceive God, we end up conceiving Him in a certain form, in a certain body, even though God is supposed to have none of these attribtues. It is based on the unavoidable fact that all our kowledge is due to our senses.

There is an essential difference between *the mode of conceptualisation* and *the mode of existence*.[4] This is why the proposition, the concept is just and valid only if the thing is conceived as it is, is true only if we add, as it is in the manner in which it is conceived. Everything depends upon what we mean by a given conceptualisation. Depending upon our manner of conceptualisation, the same proposition can be true or false at the same time. For example, man is a donkey, can be conceived as: if we consider that man is an animal like a donkey, man is a donkey. We have here the famous example often quoted: If Socrates is a stone, Socrates is a pearl. To constitute a concept is to signify or to enunciate that a thing is. This does not imply that the fact of signifying a thing constitutes the concept of the thing, for every word signifies both the thing and the concept of the thing.

What is then the significance of the expressions designating universals which are the objects of these general or specific conceptualisations? Abélard says that these expressions

designate universal conceptualisations, and to be valid or true, need not correspond to sensible or determined objects, for they are due to intellection and not due to "sensibility". It is only the sensibility which requires specific, real individuals. Intelligence operates otherwise, for it conceives what is absent, insensible, indetermined, what is not. The general conceptualisations are not necessarily our words, but can be true concepts, for they do not correspond to individual objects. For example, we say, every man even when we do not conceive every man, for in that case, we will have to conceive every man, which is impossible. One can thus conceive a concept without its exact correspondence. To conceive every man, is not simply to conceive the expression, every man, but any man, Socrates or Plato, even though Socrates and Plato are included in "every man".

We now see how *nominalism* is different from *conceptualism*. The former not only did not accept the general essence but also general or specific conceptualisations. The universals were only words for the nominalists. For the advocates of conceptualism, they were not realities, but words and ideas. This position mediated the third category of *realism* which believed that the universals were not only ideas and words, but they were the only realities. The nominalists could have ideas only of the sensible things. Their psychology was reduced to sensation and memory.

Abélard accepts that all knowledge evolves from senses. In nature there are specific things, all reality is individual, and the genres and species are not real by themselves. All the same, our intelligence is distinct from our senses. It is distinct even from imagination which is only a faculty of representing sensible things. With senses and imagination we have only a confused perception. Our intelligence has very distinct perceptions, very clear ideas and concepts which become more and more independent from sensible and imaginative perceptions in successive intellections. These perceptions can reach a level of *pure intellect*.

Our intellect not only transforms sensible perceptions into ideas, but also constitutes ideas whose object is not physically experienced, whose object does not exist. In other words, with our intelligence, we have sensible or *representational idea*, and ideas which are only *intelligible* or *intellectual*, of things which are visible and of those which are not, of things which are individual and, of those which are universal. Thus, man is not only in communication with physical nature, but across it, it also arrives at a purely abstract, conceptual level.

8. This faculty of going beyond the sensible and the imaginative is the basis of all linguistic creativity. It is primarily a surrealistic activity where only conceptually correlated analogies are accepted. At a fairly early age, a child begins to realise that every word of his language can be used to signify objects which are either very different as "soft" for cotton and drink, or "love" for a number of similar but not really identical sentiments. Moreover, the same word is used by different persons to cover different intentions. Very often, he hears the expression: I do not know what he means, or, I know what he means. In other words, to understand the significance of an expression, it is not enough to know the usually accepted

meanings, one must also know the intention of the speaker. Abélard says that language is a vehicle of communication which is used by two *thinking* beings. While our expressions belong to the common linguistic community, their specific use in the ever-changing contexts is the resultant of a certain mental activity. In this process, naturally there will be a *hierarchy of significations.* It will all depend upon the level of the discourse. Some of the expressions will always be simple, following closely the collective norm, others, more personal, where a given individual makes an attempt at formulating a personal view of this universe, *his universe,* the expressions will be highly charged *semiotic signals.* These structures of signification are highly deceptive for their semantic contours undergo subtle changes situated within the domain of individual existential experiences. This is why we have to make a very clear distinction between the rules of *grammatical constructs* which are generally fixed within a language and the rules of *semiotic constructs* which have a very wide scope of internal variations due to *the state of the object* being described, due to *the state of the person* who perceives this object, and due to the *intellection* that has been applied to a given perception. And, this process is highly *surrealistic.* Nothing could be more surrealistic than conceiving a wall, a river, a country as female, as a woman. At the most colloquial level of his language, a Punjabi speaker expresses the state of dizziness by saying that "his head is eating circles". Once one begins to realise the semiotics of this surrealistic statement par excellence, one understands the contours of linguistic creativity at the level of pure conceptualisation. These contours are not fixed, they are fluid to the extreme. A thinking being has the right to individualise the semiotics of a language to any degree.

Abélard insists that language is not only a vehicle of *speaking*, it is also, and at times primarily, a vehicle of *thinking*. The expressions we inherit are supposed to have a fairly well delineated configuration in both form and content but as they cover a large number of analogous concrete as well as abstract objects or concepts, one begins to use these expressions as *pure forms* to arrive at conceptualisations at variance with the collective norms. It is an affair of finding new contexts in the domain of ideas. There is always a point of departure. The beginning is always familiar but in the process of conceptualisation, our expressions acquire new contours of signification. In other words, with familiar expressions, one ends up presenting unfamiliar concepts. And, obviously we have what are generally called, the generation gaps, or more specifically, a series of "misunderstandings" followed by the emergence of new ideologies. As the ideologically charged expressions present highly complex semiotic structures, new cultural contexts are created. We move from isolated expressions to logically constituted discourses where Abélardian concepts of *time* and *nature* or metonymy and metaphor are exploited to the extreme. The concept of *time* refers to chronology, historical progression, linearity, proximity, where the cause and effect are immediate and transparent, identifiable within a given time and space, where there is a certain conceptual visibility. The concept of *nature* refers to the so-called analogous correlations where the deciding criterion is the *nature* of the objects perceived, a nature which is highly abstract, which is situated within the domains of *imaginatio* and *intellectus.* A dialectical interaction between these

two aspects of linguistic activity leads to discourses whose semiotic density cannot be ignored. A theory of signification must take account of this highly complex phenomenon, for in this *ideological space,* the simple one to one correspondence between the signifier and the signified would escape the hierarchical structuration of our languages. This is due to Abélardian affirmation that our words not only correspond to things but also to their concepts. And, while a thing is a numerical unity, a concrete totality, there can be a series of different concepts of the same thing due to different perceptions of different persons and also due to different perceptions of the same person at various existential and intellective states. First of all, the intellective act reconstitutes the object of conceptualisation in the fluid space of imagination which already presents a certain differentiation between the real individual object of the nominalists and the object of study in Abélardian formulation of conceptualism. Secondly, as we always inherit ready-made conventional concepts, our intellective process necessarily creates what may be called meta-concepts whose ascending hierarchy has no definable limits. A philosopher or a mathematician deals with expressions which are already the resultants of a series of previous intellections. And obviously, each ascending conceptual order will have its own level of *time* and *nature*, of metonymic and metaphoric correlations.

It is the misunderstanding of these meta levels that creates all the problems for Abélard when he attempts to explicate the reciprocal unity and identity of Son (Jesus) and Father (God). In the Punjabi legend of Puran Bhagat, when Puran's mother, Ichhran, pleads that if he executes his son, who will call him, father. In other words, Salwan will continue to live as a king but with the annihilation of his son, Salwan, the father, will also be annihilated.

This is why Abélard makes a clear distinction between the *mode of existence* and the *mode of conceptualisation.* The mode of existence can be individual and isolated, it can have a physical identity. The mode of conceptualisation is based on correlative analogies and abstracted parameters where there must be reciprocal rapports of perception and intellection.

9. We can summarise Abélardian reflections on the nature and function of language as a *human institution* where the words are *imposed* on things by human will, by human convention. At this stage they may be considered arbitrary but in the evolutionary process, the words not only refer to things, but also, and at times primarily, to their concepts, hence, they are not so arbitrary. Their semantic ranges are extended on the basis of analysis and analogy. These analogies are based on our perception of similarities as "soft" in soft wood, soft iron, soft cotton, soft drink, soft colour etc. We always begin from a physical sensuous experience which is then reorganised, rearranged in the domain of imagination. It is this imaginatively reconstituted concept of the thing (experience) that is the object of our intellection. Our expressions have three levels of articulation: the *physical,* the *grammatical* and the *conceptual.* We first proceed from the physical to the conceptual as we call "mother" Ganges on the basis of a certain perception of our own mother, then reciprocally, our mother acquires the characterstics of mother Ganges. Furthermore, all conceptual relations are *reciprocal* as father and son derive their "fatherhood" and "sonhood" from each other, or

metonymic and metaphoric relations, where chronological, syntagmatic, sequential and non-sequential, metaphorical concepts play a major role. Finally, language is a vehicle of communication between *thinking* beings where the interlocutors exchange words or expressions which are the resultants of their *mental activity*. They represent conceptual realities which are different from both Platonic universal realism and Aristotelian individual nominalism.

NOTES

1. J. Jolivet: *Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard*, Paris, 1982.
2. V. Cousin: *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard*, Paris, 1836.
3. M. de Gandillac: *Oeuvres choisies d'Abélard*, Paris, 1945.
4. C. de Remusat: *Abélard*, 2 volumes, Paris, 1845.

10. Abélard on Language

a. The signification of things is different from that of the words, *voces*. The letters represent sounds as a statue, its model. They signify by resemblances. Finally, there is the suggestive signification of the signs. These three types of signification depend upon convention, *institutio*, but the things, independent of all convention, can signify due to habit, *consuetudo* or due to rapport, *habitudo*.

Super Peri ermenias, ed, B. Geyer, Munster, 1919, 335, 33-37.

b. There are six modes of signification:
- by *imposition* as the word, man, was imposed on a mortal, rational, animal.
- by *determination* as the words, rational or man determine a certain quality within an object.
- by *generation*, for an utterance generates intellection, *intellectus*.
- by *exclusion*, what is defined by a definite noun is in some way signified by the corresponding indefinite noun as man by non-man.
- by *designation*, according to the adherence of characteristics to the subject or the coexistence of facts, *quaedem... secundum adhaerentiam vel comitationem demonstratio:* if we say that he is the father of that man, it is understood that that man is his son.

Dialectica, ed. L.M. de Rijk, Assen, 1956, 112, 21.

c. The written words are the symbols of the words emitted by voice; they are the immediate signs of the state of our mind, which in turn are the images of things. Words signify first of all our intellections and only secondarily the things.

Peri Hermeneias: Victor Cousin: *Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard,* Paris, 1836, 1, 16, a, 2.

d. To signify is to constitute an intellection.
Super Porphysium, ed. B. Geyer, Munster, 1919, - 36, 31-32.

e. Words signify intellections but they are based on things. We can also say that the things are also signified by the words, for they are represented by them *nam et res et intellectus per voces*

quodammodo proferi dicuntur, id est significari. . . words are meant to signify intellections, these intellections that they generate are analogous to what they express. . . It presupposes, other than a theory of signification, a theory of the correspondence between ideas and things.

Super praedicamenta Aristotelis, ed. B. Geyer, Muster, 1919, 179, B-9.

f. If a word signifies, it is because something is added to its physical being, *erssentia*; this something is its significative function, *officium significandi. . .* The sound, just like the things it represents in a given language remains the same from one community to another, it belongs to the sphere of things, which is natural, the significance, on the other hand, is lost, due to the diversity of languages; it depends upon human institution, human convention, *positio hominum, voluntas hominum.*

Sup. Per., 320, 12-27.

g. Words generate intellections and thereby shed light on the nature of things. One can infer a double series of correspondences between words and intellections and between intellections and things, and consequently, a correspondence between words and things . . . It is possible to consider a proposition either as a verbal object, or as the intellection it generates, or according to the thing on which it is based . . . The rapport between the word and the thing is mediatory . . . The word leads to the idea, the idea to the thing.

Dialectica, 390, 8-13.

h. It is in language that we find genres and species; they are not "things", but it is on the basis of these things that we establish them . . . Things exist by themselves, separately, and can be considered in another thing only by designating a universal name . . . There are no universal things . . .ʲIndividual beings are called, men, even when they differ in their existence and in their form, *tam essentiis quam formis.* But they correspond (meet) as men, in the "being of man", in *esse hominem.* This is not where Socrates and Plato will meet, no more than a horse and a donkey will meet in "not-being man", *in non ess hominem.* But it should not be concluded from this that the things which exist meet in "nothing", *in nihilo;* this "being-man" is a state, *status hominis,* but a state is not a thing.

Super Porph II, 22, 7-24.

i. It is a matter of transferring the rapport of matter and form from the sphere of things to that of language. When we say that genre is matter, it is matter in the domain of words, not in that of things . . . The decomposition of the universal, man, in matter (animal) and in form (rational) has nothing in common with the analysis that would separate, even only in thought, the distinct realities . . . A genre is a word to which we join other words to constitute expressions to designate species . . . In that case, we may talk of a resemblance, *similitudo,* between man as species and of the composition of matter and form as analogy, *proportio* or as resemblance of rapports, *similitudio habitudinum.*

Sup Porph II, 79, 13-30.

j. We must distinguish between the order of intellection and the order of existence.
Sup Praed 142. 20.

k. Commenting upon Aristotle's ten categories, Abélard states that his division of predicates isdue more to the signification of words than to the nature of things. If Aristotle had taken care of the nature of things, he would have considered more or less than ten categories corresponding to the real nature of things, certainly following the signification of all other words, generic or specific, that he

placed them above all others, for they are more universal. The reason is based on language when one sees the ten terms signifying all others.

Sup Pread 126, 35.

l. The function of words is to signify; it is their raison d'être and a logician who deals with language deals with significations. But the words have their own proper nature. Logic, therefore, must correlate the study of signification with the study of the signifiers, not only inasmuch as they are signifiers, but also as they are submitted to regulations which are not those of things signified. The correspondence of language with the real is global. Logic does not bypass it but it must take care of all the aspects, of things and words; hence, the integration of grammar with logic which also gives rise to what is called, the *speculative grammar.*

Sup Praed 223, 29.

m. Nouns and verbs have double signification, of things and of intellections, for they signify things in instituting intellections, orienting towards a nature or a property of the thing. However, the principal signification is that of intellection, *intellectus.* The world of things is accompanied by the world of intellection which enables us to comprehend it. This mental world enlarges the real in the sense where each intellection has for its object, a nature or a property present in the thing. On the other hand, it goes beyond it, for a word or an expression can also generate intellection of what does not exist or what does not exist any more. It all depends upon the mode of conceiving the objects, *modus concipiendi.* The study of the propositions shows us that the real may present aspects which are irreducible to things, to the state of things, which are expressed by the so-called *dicta propositionum* which can neither be assimilated to things nor to intellections.

Sup Per 366, 13.

n. The theme of the transfer of significance, *translatio*, is explained in detail. Even though the definition of the universal, genre or species, includes only the words, after other terms are transferred to things which they designate, *haec nomina ad res eorum transferuntur.* For example, when we read that the species is constituted of the genre and the difference, it implies that the "thing" of the species comes from the "thing" of the genre. Thus, when one explains the nature of words according to their significance, it is at times due to words, at others, due to things, and often the terms of the one are transferred to those of the other and reciprocally. . . Abélard's opposition to realism brings him to insist on the error where one sees things where there are words but he does not forget that the reverse is also possible. This reflection on *translatio* is a reflection on the content of language, on the rapports between the structures of sentences with reference to the words which constitute them and with the structure of the object.

Sup Praed 127, 17-24.

o. The problem of *translatio* in a way goes beyond the contents of the words, we are more in the domain of "metalanguage" which attempts to reveal the levels of understanding of the structures which are more real than what we can find in the usual practice, in real grammar, where ordinary language is replaced by an entirely "rational" language, elaborated only from the point of view of what it is supposed to express.

Dialectica 568, 31.

p. Universality should neither be attributed to things nor to *voces* but to *sermones.* The *sermo,* the name, is instituted by man, while *vox* is the creation of nature. In its being, in *essentia,* it is identical with *sermo,* but this identity is of the order of a stone and a statue. One can attribute it to the latter without attributing it to the former, which as a thing, is necessarily individual... Universal is a human creation.

Sup Proph III, 518,9.

q. To say that the words are of human origin is to insist on their non-substantial character, it is also to emphasize the fact that neither genres nor species are things. According to Jean Jolivet this derealisation of the universal is essential to the doctrine of Abélard. But it must also be noted that expelled from the domain of things, it is not reduced to arbitrariness. It is the sign of a nature of a *status.* By defining the universal as a word (*vox* or *sermo*), Abélard plays a double role in philosophy. On the one hand, by the derealisation of genres and species, reducing them to the signs of natural states, he opens a line of enquiry in the direction of the study of signification and abstraction, on the other, he emphasizes the formalisation of logic and raises questions of language around the problems of meta-language.

Sup Proph 11, 27-35.

r. To the first question of Prophyre whether the genres and species exist, Abélard replies that they signify real things which exist just as individual names signify individuals, *re vera significant per nominationem res vere existentes easdem scilicet quas singularia nomina,* and in this sense, they exist, but in another manner, they constitute - "unique, naked and pure intellection". The treatment of the second question is more complex, for it is susceptible of several interpretations? It could signify, do they have body or not? Or, are they sensible or not? Abélard prefers the last statement and he replies that the universals are "corporeal" as to the nature of things they designate, and "incorporeal" as to their manner of signification, for they designate things which are separated but not separately. For the second alternative, Abélard says that as the universals subsist on the sensibles, they signify an intrinsic substance, existing in a sensible thing; the intellection of genres and species is separate from sensations. Abélardian theory relies upon the distinction within *words, intellections, things* and *ideas.* The universals are words, words turn our esprit towards one of the three domains, their existence (by their signified) is not incompatible with their non-existence, for there is an intellection of the universal but there is no real existence of this universal.

Sup Porph III, 524, 25.

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Abélardian Theory of Mental Images

"Abailard's treatment of mental images (as we now refer to the "likenesses" of "imaginary forms") is extraordinary and has, so far as I know, no precedent in the history of western philosophy". Martin M. Tweedale in *Abailard on Universals*, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976, p. 173.

1. This assertion of Tweedale is based on Pierre Abélard's discussion of the subject in his *Logica Ingredientibus* which presents the argument in the following terms.

Sense and intellection both belong to the soul but they are distinct from each other. Our sensuous experience is realised by means of corporeal instruments and can perceive only the bodies or what belongs to bodies, for example, we see a tower and the visible qualities of this tower. Intellection, on the other hand, does not require a corporeal instrument, it need not be situated in a corporeal substance. All it needs is the *similitude* of the object that the esprit constructs *on its own* which then directs its intellectual activity. Even when the tower is destroyed or removed and its sensible vision disappears, its intellection stays as long as the soul conserves its similitude:

"Cum igitur tam sensus quam intellectus animae sint, haec eorum est differentia, quod sensus per corporeatantum instrumenta exercentur atque corpora tantumvel quae in eis sunt, percipiunt, ut visus turrem veleius qualitates visibles. Intellectus autem sicut neccorporeo indigens instrument est, ita nec necesse esteum subiectum corpus habere in quod mittatur, sed rei similitudine contentus est, quam sibi ipse animus conficit, in quam suae intelligentiae actionem dirigit. Under true destructa vel remota sensus qui in earn agebat, perit, intellectus autem permanet rei similitudine animo retenta." p. 20. (20-28).

Abélard continues to explicate this problematics of the reality of the mental images and says that as sensuous experience cannot be confused with the object experienced, intellection is also not the form of the object that it conceives. It is entirely a spiritual activity and this intellectively constituted form is a *fictive and imaginary* reality which the esprit constitutes when and how it wants. It is just like the form of a building that an artisan conceives in advances as a *model* :

"Sed intellectus actio quaedam est animae, unde intelligens dicitur, forma vero in quam dirigitur, res imaginaria quaedam est et ficta, quam sibi, quando vult et qualem vult, animus conficit, quales sunt illac imaginariae civitates quae in somno videntur vel forma illa componendae fabricae quam artifex concipit instar et exemplar rei formandae".p. 20 (28-36)

Abélard registers a note of caution and thereby clearly differentiates his theory of mental images from that of Aristotle proposed in *Peri hermeneias* where these mental images correspond to the sensuous likeness of the objects perceived. Abélardian mental images are constituted by the esprit in the domain of *imaginatio* without any relation to any given, empirical object. They are like the imaginary cities that one perceives in a dream. They are the forms or the models which are the previsions of the artist:

"Sed fortasse dicetur illud instar ipse intellectus esse iuxta illud Aristotelis: Et quorum hae similitudines, res etiam eaedem. Sed nec id recipimus. Ipse enim intellectus esse iuxta illud Aristotelis: Et bilis, subiectum suum non potest excedere, u t esse ad quantitatem omnium rerum possit accommodare vel in omnes formas transfigurae, sicut nec anima. Unde nil penitus esse concedimus huiusmodi imagines vel simulacra rerum, quas sibi animus fingit, ut in eis res absentes, contemplari queat." p. 314 (25).

The nature of these images or models constituted by intellect becomes clear if we reflect upon the images that one constitutes to comprehend the characteristics of an abstract object like "rationality". The same idea or intellection of rationality may be conceived by two persons by means of two entirely different "images" of rationality. Also, the same image may lead to two different intellections:

"Cum enim de rationalitate ergo et alius cogitamus eamque in eo attendimus quod animam potentem discernere faciat, vera est utriusque attentio et eadem, licet diversas imagines pro eadem constituamus et, prout quisque aliquo signo utetur, ipsum ad voluntatem suam instituere debet. Et saepe in eadem imagine diversae attentiones variant intellectus. . ." p. 329. (6-220)

2. Abélard continues his argument and he says that an image is a similitude of a thing. And, at the same time, we can also say that the object of our intellection is in a way a similitude. However, intellection and similitude should not be confused. For example, separated from body, the square form or the real height of the tower cannot become, even by a fictive qualification, either the form of intellection or of any other essence. As it is a question of a fictive quality, the substance is also equally fictive. The same is true of an image on a mirror that appears as a thing for our vision but which does not really exist, for often on the white surface of mirror, qualitatively contrary colours appear. We have also the case where an object is apprehended both by our senses and our intellection, as for example, when we see a stone. Does our intellection alone work on this stone or our senses and intellection work together? In this case, it is reasonable to accept that our intellection does not require an intermediary image of the stone as the stone is present. In other words, a certain disjunction in time and space is necessary to constitute mental images which will form the objects of our intellection.

The nature of mental images is then explained in terms of the intellection of universals and individuals. When our intellection arrives at a universal term, we constitute, from the plurality of things, an image, which is common to all, but an image that is confused. On the other hand, when we have the form of a given individual, it is clear, based on the reality of the individual. When we hear the word, man, a certain representation is apprehended which is common to all men but specific to none. When we hear the word, Socrates, a certain form appears in our esprit which expresses the similitude of a given person. It is real, certified and determined. For the vocable, man, on the contrary, the common form that is represented to our esprit does not correspond to any given man. The word, man, signifies neither Socrates nor any other man, even though it covers all men. A real thing abstracted by intellection may signify either the substance of a thing, when our intellection corresponds to a sensible perception, or, a *mental conception* of the form corresponding a thing in its absence, whether it is common or individual. A common form is a form that has a common similitude of a multiplicity of beings, but which in itself is considered a *unique* thing. In this way, we can have an image of a lion that is supposed to represent all lions, and another, that represents a given lion, a lion wounded by Hercules. Thus, our paintings could be representational or individualised configurations. The representational common form does not correspond to any given reality, it is only mentally conceived as such.

3. The constitution of mental images can be compared with the pre-vision of the artist. And, here we can differentiate this process in God and an artisan, both of whom mentally conceive a form before it is realised in a given body. But there is a qualitative difference, says Abélard. While God has what may be called, pure intellection, man's conceptualisation has to have some basis in this empirical world. The natural structures are created by God, not by man. God creates man, soul or stone. Man creates a house or a statue. Neither house nor sword are natural works, their names do not designate their substance, they refer to their accidents. Man knows the real things only due to his senses. Very rarely, he reaches the divine heights of pure intellection. He creates forms within the natural substance that already exists.

This is true also of such abstract intellections as the concepts of rationality, mortality. Even though conceptualisation of these mental images is a highly abstract affair, and at the manifest level, does not give the impression of any intrinsic reality, they are all the same due to our intellection bound within our senses. They are based on certain characteristics of natural properties of things.

The controversy over universals or mental images common to a number of individuals in the Middle Ages presents two opposing propositions. The *realists,* following Plato, believed that these universals like rationality and mortality have an intrinsic existence outside our bodies. They have a separate, real existence. The *nominalists,* following Aristotle, insisted that the universals subsist always in the sensible. It is a question of substance in act. This nature of animal that is designated by a universal word, which due to a certain transfer, is

called universal, is found nowhere other than within a sensible body. For the realists, this universal conserves its being even outside all sensible substance. Abélard says that we have to assign to these universal terms a third signification, other than the one which is based on the real thing and the one that is based on its intellection. This reality that Abélard assigns to these universals is a *conceptual* reality. It has neither the Platonic independent existence nor the Aristotelian reality confined only to the individual, sensible beings.

4. Abélard then explains the process of *abstraction*. Matter and form do not exist in isolation from each other but our esprit has the faculty to consider either one or the other in itself, paying attention, at times, to form only, at others, to matter, and even if it so desires, to consider them both in a certain combination. In the first two cases, it is an affair of an abstractive operation, an act with which our esprit abstracts an element from a synthesis to consider it in its own nature. In the third case, it is an operation of *synthesis*. For example, we have the substance of man. It is body, animal, man, it is covered with indefinite number of forms. When we pay attention to this substance in its material essence avoiding all forms, this operation is abstractive. Inversely, when we pay attention only to the corporeality that we relate with the substance, our operation of comprehension is synthetic with rapport to the one that consists of considering only the nature of the substance, but it is at the same time, abstractive with rapport to other forms of corporeality like animation, sensibility, rationality etc., to which now we do not pay any attention.

These abstractive intellections could be considered false and empty for they conceive things in a manner other than they really are. Paying attention to either form or matter in isolation when neither form nor matter subsists in isolation, we conceive things different from the way they really are, and consequently, they are completely false. If our intellection considers a thing in a way it really is not, in the sense that we assign to it some characteristics which it does not possess, our intellection would be false. But this is not the result of our abstractions. If we consider this man as a substance or a body neglecting the fact that he is animal, man or grammarian, it is not denying these characteristics, it is simply an affair of ignoring some and paying attention to others. And, when we say that we pay attention to this being as having only this quality, the restriction concerns only our attention, and not at all, the manner of existence of this being. We do not consider him in a structure other than the one he has. This quality is being considered separately and not as separated. It perceives matter in its purest state and form in its simplest representation. This purity and this simplicity do not correspond to the real subsistence of the object but to the intellect that conceives them as such.

Our intellect follows the correct path of analysis when it considers these realities in separation or in relation with each other. This union and division can be considered in two ways. Some are related by similitude, these two men, for example inasmuch as they are men or grammarians, others are related by by apposition or by aggregation as is the case of form and substance or wine and water.

The question that is raised in this context is whether the pre-vision of the artist where he conceives of a form of a work that does not yet exist is false or true. If we deny every reality to these pre-conceived forms, these mental images of the artist, simply because they do not yet have any intrinsic reality, the accusation can also be applied to God, for He is supposed to have conceived all forms which were later realised in our universe. All we can say here is that the future state of things do not exist substantially but they exist intellectively.

In our conceptualisation we can also relate several states of a being corresponding his present, past and future. One can conceive Socrates as he was a child and also as an old man. All intellectual creation requires a certain process of abstraction and condensation of form and matter in their simplest and purest representation.

In the context of universals, genres and species, Abélard says that even though their definition is based on words, very often they extend to the domian of things which are real. This is the case when we say that the species is composed of genre and difference, in other words, the specific reality is formed by the generic reality. When we deal with natural significance of words, it refers at times, to words, and at others, to things, and often there is a confusion between these two domains. It is an important task of the logicians and grammarians to take note of this confusion.

In his Commentaries, Boece, according to Abélard, has committed a mistake in giving incorrect definitions to genres and species. Boece believes that what appears to be genres and species does not correspond to any word that could signify either real things or that could enable us to comprehend them. There is no real thing, singular or multiple, which could be universal, that could be attributed to a plurality. There is nothing universal which is also unique, for all that is unique is numerically one, separated in its proper essence. However, genres and species are necessarily singular and can be common in three ways: either by possessing common parts, or remaining totally common in the succession of times, or finally, remaining totally common in a given time. Neither genre nor species can follow any of these hypotheses, their community is of the fourth order: simultaneously they are totally present in each of the singulars and constitute the substance of these singulars. The universal nouns do not correspond partially to the diverse realities they designate, they constitute simultaneously, form each of these realities, which are common to them, as "animal" designates, in man and in horse, what is their matter, and at the same time, the beings which are inferior to man. They constitute the substance of things in a way that they define it in a certain manner, and this is why, they are called substantial with rapport to things, for "man" denotes all that is animal, rational and moral Boece then advances the second part of the argument. He shows that species and genres cannot constitute a multitude of separate realities and he criticises the opinion that all the substances considered collectively would constitute the genre, substance, as all men, the species, human. It amounts to saying that if we suppose that every genre corresponds substantially to the plurality of things in agreement with each other, every plurality of this genre would then naturally have a reality superior to it, and so on, until infinity, which is obviously impossible. Thus, the universals do not appear to be universal

nouns as far as the signification of the real things is concerned, for they do not signify any universal reality that can be attributed to a plurality of beings.

As far as the intellectual signification of the universals is concerned, he considers it empty, having a mode of subsistence other thant that of real things. He takes the word, thing, in the sense of the real thing and not as a word, for a common word, even if it constitutes in itself an essence in the manner of a unique reality, is common only insofar as it denotes several realities, and it is in this status only, not in its proper essence, that it can be attributed to a plurality. It is the plurality of the real things which is the basis of the universal character of nouns. No universal possesses a plurality. *The universality that the thing confers on the word, in itself the thing does not possess.* It is not the thing that gives a word its signification. One considers the noun as appelative following the plurality of things that it designates even though the things themselves do not have this signification and are not appelative.

5. This close reading of Logica in the idiom of the twelfth century scholastic tradition enables us to perceive the remarkable brilliance of Abélard with which he crystallizes the highly complex issues of abstract forms and universal ideas. In the Abélardian conceptualisation of mental images, our intellection apprehands forms and substance in their purest and simplest representation. They are purer and simpler than they are in reality found in any given thing or a plurality of things. They are abstracted from these real objects no doubt, but this is only a point of departure, our imagination and our intellection crystallizes them further and we are able to perceive them in a form which is the purest form, a form beyond all forms. We begin with perceiving similitudes in the "softness" of wood, iron, drink etc. This word, soft, this mental image of a universal category that we now designate with a universal noun, soft, is related with all of these softnesses but corresponds to none. It is softness in its purest form whose reality is intellective and conceptual. It is more real than any given softness, for it helps us comprehend the reality of the universe of conceptual softness. It is this purest and simplest state of a concept that is the object of every philosophical, literary or artistic discourse. It is this conceptualised image of love or anguish that is projected in a poem or a painting. In its universality, we realise a certain specificity. We respond to it, for it is the form of love or anguish in which we all participate, which is an integral part of our existential experience, and yet it does not correspond to the constraints of any individual configuration. It is not a universality of the Platonic order. Its universality lies in its abstractive character which has undergone a series of crystallisations in the domain of Abélardian imagination, a domain where one constitutes forms, the way forms are constituted in a dream. They are, in a way, surrealistic forms, the forms which correspond to sur or super reality, the purest and the simplest forms of reality.

6. We move from the physical world to the conceptual world. From a given experience of love or hatred, rationality or irrationality, we conceptualise the universality of these feelings and then articulate them in specific discourses. The purest and the simplest form is realised

in a given configuration but this artistic configuration does not reduce the universality to a specificity. The painting of a lion may then represent any and all lions. The discourse on love or hatred may constitute the perceived reality of each and every sentiment of love or hatred. This purest and simplest form of love or hatred is then beyond all possible forms, universal and eternal.

Abélard insists that the conceptualisation of universality in not due to a certain plurality or an aggregate. All men put together do not constitute humanity. All experiences of love do not add up to a universal abstraction. It is not at all an affair of a common denominator. No doubt, the point of departure is a sensuous experience, for according to Abélard, all human knowledge is based on empirical sensuous experience, but this experience, this Aristotelian likeness, is not the object of our discourse. It is not the subject of our intellection. The similitude that we perceive between different analogous situations is due to intellectus. This similitude has no physical basis. The similitude between soft wood and soft colour has no physical configuration whatsoever. The conceptualised form of love or anguish, the purest and the simplest form, is beyond all possible forms of love and anguish of the empirical world. Yet, it is more real than the physical reality of these feelings and we respond to this super reality in a painting or a poem.

This purest form has no intrinsic existence. This is why a painter has to realise it in a given form, in a given individualised configuration. But a form of the discourse of a painting is not a specificity. A very interesting example is a painting by Henri Matisse, *The Family of the Painter* 1911, where the daughter and the wife of the painter have their individual configurations while the two sons, dressed alike, have lost their identity. They are represented as two halves of the same model. This double aspect modifies the real form in abstract signs. The real forms and the conceptualised forms end up having different manifestations. It is said that Greta Moll and others who served as models for Matisse could not recognise their own portraits. Obviously, the conceptual model of Matisse was only realised in a physical configuration, it represented his mental image.

7. This process of the constitution of model that the Abélardian mental image ends up being is possible only, for it first isolates a feature, nature or characteristic from the complex configuration that any given object would represent. As Abélard had rightly pointed out, rationality or humanity is not the only characteristic of man. It is only intellectively abstracted to the exclusion of all other characteristics. In the domain of imagination, the isolated abstracted nautre is further crystallised until an author or an artist arrives at its purest and simplest form. It is this rarefied form that is then given a certain empirical form in a literary or pictorial discourse. This discourse configuration gives only the impression of specific, individual realtiy, for this is the only way, a narrative or a painting can be executed, it is never a representation in its ealier non-abstracted complexity. This linguistic or artistic form then obviously corresponds to neither a specific figure nor to a figure in general. It is only a figurative realisation of a mental image of love or anguish to the exclusion of all other features

of a complex nature. Obviously, the models of Matisse had difficulty in recognising themselves in the portraits that the artist had painted of them.

The extreme example is found in the painting of his family where his two sons in fact represent only one model. Figuratively, they are two beings but they correspond to one mental image, to only one purified, simple conceptual form.

It is natural that when one constitutes an image of anguish in isolation of its normal corporeality, it will be a surrealist image of the order of the forms of imaginary cities that Abélard refers to and that one sees in a dream. In the process of universalising the nature of anguish, the artist arrives at its purest and simplest form, but obviously a form that cannot possibly have any correspondence in the Aristotelian real world. The similitude is perceived in the domain of conceptual imagination. Our intellection works on this object model and simplifies its form. It is an analytical process of intense incision, for in this process, the artist has to provide a form to an abstracted, isolated nature which, in fact, can have no form in isolation. What is considered purest and simplest is an imaginative form. Abélard says that these forms are fictive, constituted by our esprit solely for the purpose of intellection. And here, Abélard differentiates God from man. God, according to Abélard begins from absolutely pure forms, for before God's creation there is no nature. Man can function only on the basis of some pre-existing material. He can only abstract natures in isolation and constitute conceptual images which are then realised as statues. It is a process from the physical to the conceptual and back in the physical world. But this is a transformational, creative process. What takes the form of a discourse-object is certainly not what it was before this configuration is realised. In this process, a familiar material is transformed into a non-familiar object charged with a significance to which we respond in both its specificity and its universality.

We can understand this conceputalisation in the various images of Durga which are made every year by hundreds of artisans. Each of these images is different from the others in their specific configurations yet they are perceived as a realisation of the purest form of the goddess that must be conceptualised mentally as a pre-vision before any specific form is presented to us. In a sense, none of them is Durga and yet all of them are. In Abélardian terms, the signification that each image, the real thing, bestows on the universal Durga, the mental image of the goddess, the specific image, the thing itself, does not possess.

The main reason of this disjunction between the manifest and the immanent discourse is the abstractive process. What is constituted intellectively in the domain of imagination is a given abstracted nature isolated from the compelxity of a corporeal configuration. In a statue of a goddess of wisdom, only the conceptual image of wisdom is projected while in reality wisdom is only one of the attributes.

The complex nature of a being is also a specific nature within a specific corporeality. If the sentiment of anguish is abstracted, and, in isolation from its related elements, a mental image is constituted of this anguish, it cannot but be in a pure and simple form, a fictive form. When this imaginary pure form is realised in a given corporeality, in a given painting of Jesus

on the Cross, it will necessarily be a figure in conceptual disjunction with its normal reality. Since what is aimed at is a certain universality, the figurative configuration is of no importance. There will be incessant attempts at according a concordance between the conceptual and the figurative, and, nobody is bothered about how Jesus looked like, for what is being presented, and what is being responded to, is an abstract form of anguish, which cannot possibly have any empirical form. The manifest form in this case is only an illusion, a positive hindrance in comprehending the reality of anguish. No wonder, in modern art, these manifest forms have been dispensed with and the artist draws upon the mentally conceived forms in their absolute simplicity and purity. It took eight hundred years for Abélardian conceptual images to establish the necessary intellective disjunction in human, creative mind.

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Abélardian Discourse

1. The Abélardian discourse is constituted in the vast space of *imaginatio* where the earlier sensuous experience is subjected to intense intellective activity. In this creative domain of abstraction and synthesis, a given object of love and hate or hunger and thirst is reflected upon in the tranquillity of the disjunction of time and space which confine an existential experience in a formal configuration. In this ideological field, unhindered by spatial chronology, the creative artist constructs *mental* images in fantasmatic surrealistic analogies where only the immanent inner sur or super realities matter.

We can posit this ideological time in three manifest categories: *the synchronic time, the historical time*, and, *the mythical time.* Conceptually, the synchronic time is realised with personal participation. We understand the proposition, V.P. Singh met Vajpayee, for we participate in the ideological field of political references of October 30, 1989. If we read the newspaper column, Hundred Years Ago, our understanding will depend upon our knowledge of the socio-politico-historical cross references of the period. As we move back in time, even in historical time, our hold on those references will become less and less sure until this time merges with the mythical time whose ideological field of references is extremely fluid even if we have any notion of its contours at all.

But whatever category of time we may be dealing with, the constitution of mental images, the basis of every discourse, depends upon a certain selection, a certain re-arrangement of the elements of the empirical, sensuous experience. Even when a Flaubert presents the luxurious and lusty scenes of the nineteenth century bourgeoisie in *Madame Bovary*, this extreme realism reaches the heights of the "myth" of the mental reality that haunts a certain class as Jean-Paul Sartre has interpreted it in *L'idiot de la famille*. The constitution of this discourse is in the domain of imagination, in the reflective state of perception, even when the camouflage is "realist" and contemporary. The synchronic confinement of time and space is only the background, the canvas where are drawn the images of fantasmatic, surrealistic dreams. The psychic movement of Emma is from one dream to another, the contact with the earthly realities is only its de-realisation. As Sartre has put it, it was so real, it just could not be. This constant suspense between her non-being and being finally ends in her tragic psychic avalanche. The literary discourse is not confined to the sumptuous descriptions of the salons of the bougeoisie, it is constituted in the mental space of desires and despairs. A literary discourse is created only when *the universe of things* is transformed into *the universe of signs*.

2. The universe of things, the world of empirical facts, is like a natural, savage jungle. The reflective state of imagination crystallizes this world into a discourse-object which is subjected

to the author's intellection. The ordinary facts of life, the experiences of love, hate, cruelty and poverty are then transformed into a system of signs for the universe of signification. In this process, there is already a certain condensation of time and space. In Abélardian conceptualisation, the chronological time comes under the impact of existential perceptions and a réseau or a network of significant relations. The constitution of the text presupposese a series of linear contextual juxtapositions with a specific interlinkage in the ongoing movement of the narrative. This manifest, linear progression then spreads its significative network in differentdirections with simultaneous, multiple layers of discursive significance. This process follows what Abélard calls, nature. It establishes metaphoric, paradigmatic correlations based on natural affinities, where both the manifest form, the semoitic contours, and the immanent undercurrents of content, the semiologic perceptions, interact. In this conceptual condensation of time and space, a given text generates its discourse, the problematics, which is embedded in the ideological field of contextual references. In these hierachical condensations, we can envisage a typology of texts of fiction, drama, epic narratives, etc., leading to different forms of Persian, Chinese and Japanese verse.

The actantial model of Propp and the model of transformations proposed by Greimas remain well within the linear progression of chronological time. Even the critique of the *Morphology of Russian Folktale* by Lévi-Strauss takes note only of other cultural typological possibilities of the semantic comportments of the actants or the actions. All these structural approaches identify formal progression with conceptual structuration. There is hardly any methodological realisation of the multiplicity of the narrative strands which interact in a certain *simultaneity.* These formalistic propositions do not take account of the phenomenon of *conceptual condensation* of time and nature.

This condensation is due to *the ideological disjunction* between the physical world and the conceptual universe where the discourse is generated. The latter is based on the former but the similarity between the two is *analogous.* And, *the universe of analogies,* the universe of signification par excellence, is further and further crystallised as we compose one mental image after another. This is a movement from the universe of things to the universe of signs whose main role is *evocative.* This is not at all a domain of information, of communicating the facts of the world. It is primarily a universe of *semiotic signals* which together in *significative ensembles,* like their analogous musical ensembles, create signification in and over a certain harmonious blending of the various disparate elements of this profane world where they do not have any conceptual signification whatsoever.

3. The analogy with the musical composition is very instructive. In the beginning, the solitary notes enter into micro ensembles in a linear progression. It is followed by what may be called, a *progressive-regressive* series of permutations and combinations. Even at the manifest level we have a number of ensembles of the order of *a, b, c, d, e, f, b2, g, d2, e2, h, a2* etc. In other words, after a certain sequential movement of micro ensembles, a, b, c which are already smaller units of a number of notes, we have, at different intervals, the

development of the ensembles already initiated in the composition. This may be considered its *semiotic form*. But the micro ensembles of a musical composition also have a network of interrelations across each unit linking notes of the various individual sections. It is these interlinkages which generate the *musicality* of the composition. This *immanent* musicality is its *semiologic content*. A literary discourse is constituted in the same manner. In the beginning, a number of sequences, events, images, ideas are introduced for the first movement. It is followed by both a progressive constitution in the form of new elements and progressive-regressive interlinkages with the development of all these earlier elements. But the significant aspect of this structuration is that it is controlled by the over-all semiologic pattern of the discourse. This is why a discourse is an open-ended constitution as far as its field of signification is concerned. We have to posit a hierarchy of semiotic forms and semiologic contents. It is an affair of a series of meta levels of comprehension. Abélard had very aptly stated: *quidam rerum modus habendi se.*

An extended network of relationships of this sequencing may be presented as:

a. b. c. d. e. f. c1, g, d1, h(b c), f1(a d), i, e1, j, k(d f h), l, m(a c), n, o(h f1), p (e1j), q (d e), r (k l), d1, b2, s (ab! cd2e)

This hypothetical schema clearly shows that even in the linearity of the text, the discourse is woven by the interlinkages of the strands where there is a progression from one unit to another, followed by the *selective development* of earlier units at different intervals. Moreover, as the composition gets more and more complex, there are cross references to some of the elements of the ensembles initiated in the progressive movement. In our example, a1, b1, c1 are extensions of a,b,c but h has b and c as its components; f1 is an extension of f and it also includes *semantic features* of a and d; o includes h and also the extended form of f as f1. The component b is a common denominator of b1, h and c. Similarly, c is common to c1, h 1 and s.

Naturally, these relationships and these condensations will depend upon the type of text we are dealing with. This classification will help us set up a typology of discourses from the extended sequencing of the novel and the epic poem to the extreme brevity in the Chinese or the Japanese verse.

4. We may now review the tripartite division of synchronic, historical and mythical times which determine the manifest form a given discourse. A priori, the synchronically delineated discourse is characterised by the participation of the reader in its general ideological field, hence, no overt contextualisation is necessary. At the same time, it must be underscored that a discourse, synchronic or otherwise is not a simple juxtaposition of a given empirical reality, it is primarily concerned with a specific perception of the text-object, it administers a certain rearrangement and selection, and above all, a series of juxtapositions of concepts correlated conceptually both in the present and in the past. In the process of the transformation of a universe of things into a universe of signs, there is an inevitable link with the historical progression whose resultant is presented in the form of synchronic contradictions. Synchrony

is not a flat reality, independent of its past and the generating process of its future. Synchronic time is a time sandwitched between what has been and what would be. As such, a synchronic discourse can only be perceived as a dynamic structure of uneven interrelations with contradictions juxtaposed in its centre and its periphery. This will also depend upon who has perceived and articulated a given discourse, and also, who analyses and interprets it, for both of them are situated in their respective socio-economic, existential contexts.

This is equally true of the *historical discourse*, for whatever may be the pretensions of the *historicity* of factual details and dimensions, there is no such thing as empirical history, there is always a *history for, the history of the historians*. No historian will change the date of the fall of the Bastille from July 14, 1789 to any other day or year, most of the graphic details will be a common denominator of all the histories and yet each historical discourse will be different from another. And, this perceptual transformation is a continuous process. Apart from the differences within the so-called eyewitness accounts, the understanding and interpreting of the events of the French revolution have also been conditioned by the progressively changing political environment in France and elsewhere, for not only we have various interpretative historical discourses during the ninteenth and the twentieth centuries, we also have French and non-French perceptions of those turbulent times since the end of the eighteenth century. The most remarkable about-turn may be seen in the present bicentenary celebrations sponsored by the French government, highlighting a political process against the very same class the revolution generated such a tumultuous upheaval.

5. The semiotic significance of the historical discourse is not its historicity, its descriptions of details and dates but its crystallisation over a period of history embedded in the unconscious of a people. As such, the survival of the historical discourse depends upon its synchronisation. The historical time continues to transform itself to be an integral part of the present.

The mythical time and its resultant *mythical discourse* is the extreme example of this process. In this case, there is obviously no pretension of any historicity. A myth is always presented in its simplest form; bereft of all details, it is nothing but an outline of a narrative. In other words, there is hardly any text of a myth. A myth is the most highly crystallised form of a discourse. It is beyond time and space. It is articulated at an immanent level of pure perception. Hence, a given "author" of a myth, the one who writes or rewrites a myth, has all the liberty to provide any text conditioned by his time and space, his synchrony, his history. A myth as such is most distant, in absolute remote past, and also, it is most contemporary. As it is based on a universe of signs even to begin with, its further articulations sharpen its process of crystallisation to any imaginable meta level of human comprehension. Its absolute past surcharges its power of invocation in the domain of imagination, and its perceptive synchronisation transforms it into the most immanent reality of contemporary contradictions. As gods and goddesses are transformed into men and women, they participate in the most profane life of a culture, and yet their divinity, their absolute distance, is not lost. Thus, the mythical time and the synchronic time merge with each other without losing their identity.

6. If the "becoming" of a discourse, whether it is synchronic, historical or mythical, is such a complex phenomenon, its understanding could only be archaeological. In this context, the mythical discourse is the most difficult to comprehend. In its barest form, it presents only the problematics of desires and despairs, life and death, man and woman, man and the universe etc., it is most enigmatic in its conceptual structure. As it traverses centuries of transformations and crystallisations, it is always replete with what Lévi-Strauss calls, the frozen images, the conceptual knots which are not easy to decipher. They are open to endless interpretations without any constraints of historicity. As there have been cross references in the vast space of historical and pre-historical, mythical times, only an archaeological approach of correlating broken pieces together can give us any clue of its semiotic constitution. This is not at all a procedure of deconstruction or destructuration in the ordinary sense of the term, it is a proper semiotic approach where the reconstitution of the ideological domain alone can lead us in the right direction of a synchronic comprehension. But it must be underscored here that it can only be a synchronic comprehension, it still does not reveal the progressive layers of structuration without which no semiotic field can be envisaged.

The mythical discourse is saturated with dense layers of the ideological history of a people. It is the purest form of semiotic structuration where only the significative gestures matter. And, conceptually, it defines other forms of discourse within a culture. In spite of all historical "evidence", what really matters today is the myth of the revolution that sustains both French polity and French culture. This is also true of such literary discourses which pretend to be "realistic". As Jean-Paul Sartre has analysed the immanent contours of Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*, in the absolute realism of the nineteenth century salons, Flaubert created a myth of false culture which nourished the imagination of the rising bourgeoisie of the period. The extremity of details functioned as frozen images where those men and women brought up on a camouflaged, false reality, found a proper condensation of their time and space, their desires and despairs. As such, everything was both most transparent and most mysterious. In other words, in *Madame Bovary*, they found their perfect mythical discourse.

Typologically, these three discourses are distinct from each other in their forms, in their field of cross references, in their process of structuration. At the same time, conceptually, their ideological constitution has a certain correlation of the *semiotics of synchronisation; historicity* and *mythology*. A proper archaeological identification of these significative ensembles leads us to the comprehension of their manifest and immanent levels of composition. This reciprocal movement from the physical to the conceptual, from the sensuous to the *imaginatio* defines the semiotics of all cultural discourses, be they synchronic, historical or mythical.

7. And, this raises the basic issue of intertextuality in terms of a certain thematic configuration in this conceptual condensation of time and space. It is not only a question of a condensation of the mythical time in the historical time or the mythico-historical time in the

synchronic time, it envisages a conceptual condensation of the ideological field, a space surchaged with Abélardian mental images, the images which are both frozen and lucid. They are frozen, for their ideological references are lost, and, they are lucid, for they provide a telescopic projection on the present. What is not understood in the juxtapositions of the so-called oppositions and differences is that the emergence of signification, whether it is of masculinity or femininity, depends not upon contradictory opposing forces, but upon reciprocal generative relations. There is no such thing as solitary identities. The becoming of the one, masculine or feminine, depends upon the being of the other. The pitfalls of feminism are the same which were historically the pitfalls of masculinism which did not realise that the development of the one depended upon the development of the other. The evolution is reciprocal.

In terms of our trans-spatial textuality, we have to envisage an analogous phenomenon. There is a certain intersection where different conceptual times and spaces meet and interact. In most ordinary terms, intertextuality refers to a context of texts, be they oral or written. One can envisage a text with reference to another analogous text either from the point of view of form or from the point of view of content, for this contextual interaction is at both levels. One can also envisage a text as a response to the general cultural text, a text condensed in time and space. Then there is the problematics of the text within a text, a text constituted of a series of sub-texts. But these are all formal categories, the classifications based on overt manifestations. Conceptually, intertextuality is an affair of ideological condensation along the tripartite divisions, already mentioned, of synchronisation, historicity and mythology. In both form and content, the semiotics of a text is determined by the discursive intersection of these conceptual states whether the manifest parameter is synchronic or historical. These two axes are juxtaposed at various degrees of prospection depending upon the exigencies of the discourses. Typologically, in each of these discourses, the main tendency will be manifest, for example, mythical in mythological discourse, and the other two will operate at immanent level. The level of manifest and immanent contours will also determine the hierarchical gradation within each category. Thus, we can have mythico-historical discourse or historico-mythical discourse, and various other combinations all along the line. Such a hierarchical classification is also possible in the ideological field of the feminist discourse, political discourse, religious discourse etc. In each case, there will be the so-called intertextuality of more than one discourse.

This intertextuality is also due to the fact that in the process of the transformation of the universe of things into the universe of signs or in other words, the transformation of the universe of the empirical facts into the universe of a conceptual discourse, the so-called original text interacts with other texts in the domain of imagination where the discourse images are constituted. In this process of reconstitution, a number of mental texts confront each other. Some of these texts are derived from the synchronic, manifest universe, and others are due to the undercurrents submerged in our sub-conscious, our individual subconscious and also our collective, cultural sub-conscious, representing a certain condensation in time and space, a certain synchronic diachrony.

8. In the end, all intertextuality and all types of mythico-historical condensations lead to what may be called, the *political discourse*.

We are told that Pierre Abélard was not at all interested in politics and yet he was twice condemned by the ecclesiastic authorities in the Council of Soisson in 1114 and the Council of Sens in 1140, and his writings were burnt in public. Abélard was dealing with intertextuality. While interpreting the ancient texts of Christianity he proposed a theory of language which emphasized the role of intellection. Interpretation or understanding of a text is an affair of ideas which play a mediatory role between the universe of things and the universe of words. *Words lead to ideas, ideas to things*, said Abélard. And, thereby we cannot have a direct correspondence between the words or utterances and the object-things they describe. To signify is to generate intellection and this intellection depends upon our individual perception, our individual mental images of the objects perceived. Hence, a text is not a hermetically closed unit, it must be deciphered in its context, in the ideological field, it generates. A given text is a world of facts, its signification is both generated and comprehended at the level of the conceptual transformation where the historical lineage interacts with synchronic, individual perceptive incisions. Naturally, as the text, sacred or profane, moves in the historical progression, the significative domain follows suit. Of course, there is a certain universality, there is a certain common denominator, but even this universality or this unalterable truth becomes transparent only when it is crystallised through individual intellective reflection. This would amount to saying that each synchrony has its own synchronic-diachrony. The conceptual condensation in time and space does not take place once for all, it is an incessant thinking process, a process which invariably leads to the emergence of political discourses, the discourses which do not accept the materiality of the text as the only signifying structure. And, naturally philosophers like Abélard, whether they are manifestly interested in politics or not, will be in trouble, for a reinterpretation of the universe of ideology that a text, written or oral, cultural or religious, represents, is a political act par excellence.

To prove his point, Abélard wrote *Sic et Non* where he showed how on the same theme there were contradictory statements in the texts of the classical ecclesiastic authorities duly canonised by the Church. And at times, even the same commentator presented different interpretations depending upon the text and the cross references he was dealing with. Now, the interesting point there was that while the Church considered such a research as heretical and disrespectful to the ancient authorities, Abélard insisted on the validity of these so-called contradictions, for he considered them simply different intellections due to the context of the concept being examined, for according to Abélard, the linguistic propositions did not correspond to things or to the facts of this world, but to their concepts, and, in the conceptual universe, these manifest contradictions resolved themselves. Abélard was trying to prove that such differences in intellections have always been there and his interpretations of the Holy Trinity were only due to the twelfth century intertextuality, there was no fundamental contradiction with the universality of the dogma of the Church, but obviously such logical distinctions could not save him. The historical intellectual contingent was simply not acceptable to the powers

which wanted to control both the physical and the spiritual evolution of their flock. They could not envisage a mental condensation of time and nature in the metaphysical space of human mind, and naturally, the generation of intellection was ruled out.

9. The contours of political discourse can be discussed in the context of Sophocles. *Oedipus the King* ends with the following utterance of the Chorus:

> People of Thebes, my countrymen, look on Oedipus. He solved the famous riddle with his brilliance, he rose to power, a man beyond all power. Who could behold his greatness without envy? Now what a black sea of terror has overwhelmed him. Now as we keep our watch and wait the final day, count no man happy till he dies, free of pain at last.
> (from Penguin edition, 1982, translated by Robert Fagles)

The most significant proposition here is: count no man happy till he dies. And, we will see in the following play of Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, how Oedipus dies. Before his death, Oedipus confronts his old adversary, Creon, and makes a clean breast of his entire past, his past as was concevied by Creon, and in modern times, by Sigmund Freud. He peeps into the vast domain of his unconscious and with a conscious, archaeological effort, reconstitutes the basic network of cosmological relationships to construct a discourse that is diametrically opposed to what he had himself accepted in a rush of anger, in a metonymic, emotional sequence of events. Let us hear Oedipus himself:

> Unctuous, shameless, where do you think your insults do more damage, my old age or yours? Bloodshed, incest, misery, all your mouth lets fly at me, I've suffered it all, and all against my will! Such was the pleasure of the gods, raging, perhaps, against our race from ages past. But as for me alone, say my unwilling crimes against myself and against my own were payments from the gods for something criminal deep inside me... No look hard, you will find no guilt to accuse me of, I am innocent!

> Come, tell me: if, by an oracle of the gods, some doom were hanging over my father's head that he should die at the hands of his own son, how, with any justice, could you blame *me*? I wasn't born yet, no father implanted me, no mother carried me in her womb - I didn't even exist, not then ! And if, once I'd come to the world of pain, as come I did, I fell to blows with my father, cut him down in blood, blind to what I was doing, blind to whom I killed. How could you condemn that involuntary act with any sense of justice?
> And my mother...

> Wretched man, have you no shame? Your own sister! Her marriage, forcing me to talk of that marriage! Oh I'll tell it all, I won't be silent, not now, you and your blasphemous mouth have gone so far. She was my mother, yes, she bore me, Oh the horror, I knew nothing, she knew nothing!—and once she'd borne me then she bore me children, her disgarce. But at least I know one thing: You slander her and me of your free will, but I made her my bride against my will, I repeat this to the world, against my will. No, I'll not be branded guilty, not in that marriage, not in the murder of my father, all those crimes you heap on me relentlessly, harrowing my heart.
> (1095-1140)

In a metonymic psychic sequence of the order of stimulus/response, Oedipus lapsed into absolute guilt and pierced his eyes to avoid a glance at the manifest structure of the universe around him. In metaphoric, Abélardian reconstitution of the *imaginatio*, he dwells in the transparency of historical divine scheme of things and situates himself vis-à-vis the entire suffocating weight of diachrony and makes an effort at redrawing the contours of his

conscious acts, with the declaration: I am innocent. There is absolutely no question of any guilt or "something criminal deep inside" him. In his conscious, archaeological search of his unconscious, he found no guilt to accuse him of. It is simply a question of divine or historical contingence at the time of one's birth. The tremendous power of this contingence cannot be ruled out. One cannot easily deny or brush aside all that one inherits in terms of one's religion, culture, language, history. The initial period is always the period of submission to do what is ordained, to act the way the collective contingent socio-economic cultural contours force you to. This is the lot of all human beings, but the son of man is also a conscious being. He reflects upon his contingence and with a tremendous individual, conscious effort throws away this yoke of divine history, and one day, not only absolves himself of all that was not his doing, but also begins to generate his own universe of signification. Abélard had repeated in several of his treatises that the guilt cannot be established on the basis of the sinful act, it is only the intention that matters. Hence, Oedipus is NOT guilty. Nothing is then considered arbitrary. Signification is a generative process. It is a human institution, depending entirely on human will: *positio hominum, voluntas hominum.* And, once that is achieved, Oedipus dies as a happy man, and, the same gods who had condemned him to such misery welcome him to heaven. Once Oedipus has overpowered his unconscious, once he has rectified the TRUTH, the truth of who he is, and, who the gods wanted him to be, he acquires the powers of prophesy and his blind eyes foresee the most transparent vision of state and society that now frightens the darkness within Creon. In this absolute condensation of synchronic, historical and mythical times, in this crossing of the threshold from the unconscious to the conscious, the ideological field is crystallised in the most humane act of father Oedipus towards his beloved daughter, Antigone.

10. We come back to our author, Pierre Abélard, who was twice condemned by the Church for heresy. It is argued that it is a mistake to consider Abélard as a revolutionary intellectual and his discourse had nothing to do with Church politics. Of course, at the manifest level that is indeed the case, for Abélard always swears by Jesus Christ and His Church. All the same as Jean Jolivet asserts, after every condemnation, Abélard rewrote his exegesis, apparently to appease the ecclesiastic authorities, but invariably reinforced with ever-increasing logical rigour the argument he had proposed earlier. Physically, he repented several times. Intellectually, the severity of his logical incision increased with every episode. The Middle Ages is not twentieth century. Abélard has to operate within the ideological contours set by the scholastic tradition. But what can be more revolutionary than considering human intellection based entirely on one's own sensuous experience as the motive force of every discourse. From this universe of signification, this garden of Eden that human intellect has cultivated, God has been expelled. From now on, Man occupies the central place in all occidental, rational reflection. There is as such a certain ideological interlinkage of the mythical past and the immediate present through the immanent reflections of an Abélard standing in the Middle of this intellectual horizon.

Abélardian Tradition

1. As we follow Abélard's analysis of signification in his *Dialectique* we see that in many ways he was the true precursor of modern semiology.

According to Abélard the signification of a word implies that it manifests an intellection of the one who pronounces it and it generates a similar intellection for the one who hears it. *To signify is to generate intellection.* The *Dialectique* distinguishes between the sounds which signify by *nature* as the barking of a dog, and, those which signify by *convention*. There is signification as soon as an intellection is generated by a sign. Language thus becomes a means of communicating intellections of one person to another. This is the level of the science of logic where only linguistic enunciations matter leaving aside both the impressions and the things. But these divisions do not exclude specific rapports. The words signify intellections but they also refer to things. We can also say that even the things are signified by the words. The words are meant to signify intellections but also to treat things by means of these intellections. We have, thus, apart from a theory of signification, a theory of the correspondence between ideas and things.

If a word signifies, it is because something is added to its physical being (essentia), this something is the signifying function (officium significandi). A Greek hears very well the sounds of a Latin word but he does not understand it. The sound, as the thing it represents in a given language, remains the same from one place to another, it belongs to the sphere of things, but the significance differs with the diversity of languages: it is due to institution, to human convention (positio hominum, voluntas hominum).

2. Abélard distinguishes between *vox* which belongs to the category of things and is considered a product of nature (naturae creatio)[1] in opposition to *term* which is due to human institution. In their physical being, vox and term are identical. However, they differ in their origin (nativitas) as a statue is both a stone and an image but the stone is the work of God and the image is created by man. This distinction between *natural* and *instituted* becomes central to Abélard's theory of signification.

Words create intellections, and with them, we know things. There is thus a double correspondence, between words and intellection, and, between intellection and things, and consequently, between words and things. These are three different but interrelated spheres.

Language is *invented.* Its origin is human and not natural. This is the problem of etymology, for the one who composed the names (appelations) followed the nature of things known to him. If the inventor of a name constituted a name with reference to the specific characteristics of a thing, we will know very well the origin of this constitution by historically going back in time but this knowledge will not be complete. We will not know all that is in the nature of the

thing. A name is *imposed* on a thing, for it is *considered* to have a certain quality, and not for the real qualities of the thing. It is obvious then that an etymological analysis would clarify only the nature of the word, and, not the nature of the thing. It cannot serve as a proposition on reality. Such a study is more instructive for the constitution of the words, or, the nature of language, than for the nature of the signified things. With this analysis, Abélard completely changed the definition of langauge and etymology. In the seventh century, Isidore de Seville stated that when we know where a word comes from, we easily understand its significance, the knowledge of etymology facilitates the study of all things. Abélard's position is quite different. He does not see in language an exact transposition of the real universe. For him, language is, in many ways, independent of things. *Other than the thing and its idea, is the significance, the intellection of the word. This leads us to two distinct sciences, the science of langauge and the science of things.*

3. The differentiation between words and things is due to the fact that the words do not, in the first instance, designate things, but intellections, as the same thing can be an object of two different significations. With the real, the word has only a *mediatory* rapport, but with intellection, its rapport is immediate. As such, from words and sentences we cannot understand the world. The formation of words is a resultant of a certain mental activity, it is not an adequate translation of the nature of things. This leads us to the conclusion that language is a fruit of an institution, it is not a natural fact. It reflects, above all, on the mental structures, and only secondarily, on the real structures. From language, we cannot go directly to the reality of the world of things, we reach there only through the sphere of esprit and the world. The sentence has a significance but this significance is meant to reach the things of the world; except in very specific cases, we do not have an intellection of this significance, but only of the things. *The word leads to the idea, the idea to the thing,* says Abélard.

4. The Port Royal Logic (seventeenth century) begins with a reference to Saint Augustine, which serves there more as a homage to the ecclesiastic tradition, and, as a safe camouflage for what follows, that since the original sin, man is used to consider everything through corporeal images as if this was the only manner in which man could conceive of and think. This reference to Saint Augustine has led some writers[2] to believe that the Port Royal logicians were more indebted to Saint Augustine than to Descartes even though all that follows is based entirely on the faculties of esprit[3] and intellect. For Descartes, faith is equivalent to reason which is entirely a product of individual human thinking. The only proof of the existence of a being is that he thinks: I think, therefore, I am. The implications of this revolutionary hypothesis did not escape the Church when it banned all Cartesian writings in France even though Descartes also tried Abélardian device when he declared in his Discourse on Method that in matters of religion and customs, one should follow the rules of one's own country[4].

5. Thus the Port Royal Logic[5] continues with its attack on corporeal or sensualist approach that man conceives of many a thing without any image, and, that there is a clear difference between *imagination* and *pure intellection*. For example, man not only imagines that a triangle is a figure ending in three straight lines but also conceives there three lines present by the force and the application of his esprit. Similarly, one can conceive of a triangle composed of a thousand angles, a figure one can never imagine even, so to say, with the eyes of esprit. If one tries to imagine a figure of a thousand angles, it would be only a confused image, not any different from the figure, for example, of two thousand angles. However, with one's intellect one can conceive of a figure of one thousand angles demonstrating all its properties, as for example, that all its angles are equal to 1966 right angles. Thus, our ideas which relate their signs to the objects are neither based on corporeal images nor on any imaginative fantasies, but on our esprit and our pure intellect. This and almost all other examples discussed in Logic will also be presented in Condillac to refute the same argument, but, as I hope to demonstrate, there is an essential convergence.

Our signs never correspond to certain existing objects but only to the manner in which they are conceived, or, more precisely, to the conceptualisations or the compositions of the idea about these objects. This is why while differences in words or signs may be arbitrary, the ideas which constitute them are not, and hence, the signs are also not so arbitrary. For example, the word, God cannot be arbitrarily replaced by another word of another linguistic or religious tradition unless the two words in question have exactly the same attributes or ideas. In the proposition, I think, therefore, I am, one can never have certitude of this statement unless one can intellectively conceive of "being" and "thinking". We cannot have any certitude of these notions unless we conceive clearly and distinctly what it is "to be" or "to think". These terms cannot be explained, for they are amongst those which will only be confused if we try to explain them. They are *innate*. They cannot be seen, heard or touched. They have no taste, they are neither cold, nor hot, neither soft, nor hard. Our soul or esprit has the innate faculty to comprehend these ideas. They are not derived from any corporeal image. As far as the sign or the word that signifies a certain object is concerned, the image of the sound (word) or the thought that we imagine is not at all the image of the thought itself but only of a sound, it can help us conceive of that thought only because our esprit is used to evoke a given thought. It has absolutely no specific rapport with the thought itself. The Port Royal Logic argues that it is seen that the deaf who do not hear can all the same think and can reflect upon their thoughts. As we shall see later, Condillac would go to a considerable length, with an example of a deaf and dumb young man from Chartre, to refute this argument.

6. After emphasizing a purely intellective nature of the sign, the Port Royal Logic presents a certain classification which brings it closer to the later reflections of Condillac. If we consider an object in its own being, it is a *thing*. If, on the other hand, we consider an object as representing another, it serves as a *sign*. *Thus a sign encloses two ideas, of the thing that represents and of the thing that is represented, and, the nature of the sign consists*

of invoking one by the other. (We shall see later how Lacan defines the function of language as "to invoke" and not "to inform"). There are three classes of signs : certain signs which correspond to specific objects as respiration is the sign of life, and others, which are probable signs. There are signs which are joined to things as the complexion of the face corresponds to the movements of esprit, or certain symptoms which correspond to specific illness. This means that we cannot conclude with precision either the presence of signs from the presence of things, for there are signs of things which are not present, nor the presence of signs from the absence of things, for there are signs of the things present. We should judge each sign from its specific nature. The classification is continued but what it really implies is that there are signs which are created by pure intellect, and there are others, which have bases in the things or objects of this world. However, one thing should be clear here, and it applies to the Condilliacian position as well, that the sign is never the thing, it is always *instead* of the thing, and, it is instead of the thing or the object as it is *perceived* in a given situation. This perception is then intellectively conceived leading to the composition of the idea that links the sign with the object. The Port Royal Logic devotes four entire chapters, from V to VIII, to the different ways the ideas can be composed or constituted. The classification of signs presents a hierarchy of abstractions, from the signs which correspond very closely to the objects in their materiality to extremely abstract spiritual signs which are based entirely on the operations of pure intellect. The process of conceptualisation, at all levels, is, however, squarely based on conceiving relations through esprit, soul and pure intellect which clearly distinguishes Condillac and Destutt de Tracy who depend upon senses for all intellective reflection.

7. For Port Royal, the relation between the sound or the word and the object depends upon the way the idea of the thing (object) invokes the idea of the sound (word), and, the idea of the sound that of the thing. What is significant here is the idea that is central to all reflection of the nature of the signs or the object. Ideas play a mediatory role. There is no such thing as a direct relationship between the signifier and the signified. This conceptualisation also places the notion of arbitrariness at an altogether different level. Words or signs or signifiers do not really matter, what is important is the composition of the ideas to which certain designations are given to refer to a very specific, intellectively perceived reality of the object. As such, since the perceptions are situated, i.e., they are different from one situation to another, or, form one linguistic-cultural tradition to another, words or signs are different in different languages, they simply do not refer to the same objects or the same objectivated realities.

Words are used to signify what passes through our esprit. And, as what passes there is reduced to *conceive*, to *judge*, to *reason* and to *order* (Logique II, I), the words serve to note all these operations. The Port Royal Logic then defines nouns, pronouns and verbs as constituents of thought based on these operations. The nouns uncover in a way the things to the esprit, and, the pronouns present them as covered even though the esprit may feel that

they are the same things. The principal usage of the verb (Logique II) is to signify affirmation. According to this idea, the verb should have no usage other than of marking the liaison, that we form in our esprit, between the two terms of a proposition. But there is only the verb "to be" which is called, substantive, which remains so in its simplicity, and that too only in the third person of the present, *is*.

After having conceived things through our ideas (Logique II, III), we compare these ideas together, and we find there that some of them accord well, others do not, so we assemble them, i.e., we affirm or we deny, or, generally speaking, we judge. This judgement is called, *proposition*. It is easy to see here that there are two terms : the first with which we affirm or deny, called, the *subject*, and, the other which is affirmed, or denied, the *attribute*. It is not sufficient to conceive these two terms, it is necessary that our esprit either unites them or separates them. And, this action of our esprit is marked in the discourse, by the verb, *is*. Thus, when I say, God *is* just, God is the subject of this proposition, and, just, *is* its attribute, and, the word, *is*, marks the action of my esprit which affirms, i.e., which puts together these two ideas of God and of just as in accord with each other. There are different types of propositions: affirmative, negative, specific, universal etc., but in each case, they are logical, i.e., based on a certain clear conceptualisation of the subject and the attribute; the words or phrases are there only to correspond to what "passes through our esprit".

8. Even though in its classification, the Port Royal logic recognises a close relationship with the material objects, the so-called things, at least for some categories, its main thrust is emphatically the purely intellective constitution of ideas and their logical propositions; the signs and the grammatical sentences play a secondary role. Condillac, on the other hand, in his *Traité de l' art de penser*, 1796, reprinted by Vrin, 1981, presents this process of knowledge of the things of the world on the basis of our senses, but he admits that the objects would uselessly act on our senses and the soul would not acquire any knowledge if it did not have the faculty of perception (Chapter III). However, as we perceive only on the basis of the impressions made on our senses, the extent of our knowledge will depend upon the way we are organised, situated, to receive different sensations. A blind, deaf and dumb person will receive no sensation, hence no knowledge of the world. Secondly, it depends upon how attentive we are in a given situation. We are not always sensitive to perceive all our sensations. We also forget a part of what we perceived earlier, the impression made on our senses. If we become conscious of a certain perception, we try to fix it in our memory, we extend its traces however light they might have been at the time of being perceived.

According to Condillac (Chapter II) it is certain that nothing is more clear and distinct than our perception when we have specific sensations Nothing is more clear than the perception of sound, colour and body. There is no confusion. But if we do not look for their nature, do not try to know how they produced, we will naturally be mistaken. We will neither know the nature of our organs, nor of the objects which act upon us, nor the rapport that there may be between the movements of the body and the sentiments of our soul. If we

make mistakes in the judgement of these things, it is not the senses which put us on the wrong track, it is because we judge them on the basis of some vague ideas. The order of our sensations continuously puts us in the necessity of going out of ourselves, it shows that we exist in a milieu of a multitude of different beings, and this order does not allow us to know the nature of these beings, it presents us with the phenomena which are due to our sensations, the phenomena which correspond to the system of the real beings which form this universe. There are three things to be distinguished in our sensations: the *perception* due to them, the *rapport* that we have with things, the *judgement* we make thereof. When we say that all our knowledge comes from our senses, it should not be forgotten that it is only to the extent that we derive from them clear and distinct ideas that they enclose. It is evident that I have an idea of a triangle even when I cannot be certain that the body I see or touch is in fact a triangle. Thus, to dissipate obscurity and uncertainty of the sensual ideas, we consider them by abstracting them from the bodies, we then find in our sensations the exact ideas of their size, figure and rapport. Other abstractions lead us to discover from our sensations, the ideas of duty, virtue, vice and of the whole science of ethics.

9. The liaisons of several ideas cannot have causes other than the attention we pay to them when they are presented together. But the objects attract our attention by the side that has more intimate rapport with our temperament, our passions, the state of our mind. It is these rapports which effect us with the greatest force and we become highly conscious of them. It is due to this that when they are changed, we see the objects quite differently. All our attentions or needs are held together. We can, as such, consider our perceptions as a succession of fundamental ideas to which we bring all those which are a part of our knowledge. After one series of ideas who have another which form a chain whose force would lie entirely *in the analogy of the signs, in the order of their perceptions and in the liaison of the most disparate ideas*. To every need is related the idea of the thing which is sought for; to this idea is related that of the place where this thing was found; to it, that of the persons seen there; to this last, the ideas of pleasure or pain that one had at that time. It can also be noted that as the chain is extended, it is subdivided into different sub-chains, and, as one is farther away from the first event, the knots multiply. The first fundamental idea is related to two or three others, each one of them to an equal number or maybe to even more, and so on. The different chains that I suppose for each fundamental idea would then be related to a succession of ideas with some of the knots seemingly known to several people, for the same objects and consequently the same ideas would be related to different needs. Thus, all our knowledge would make a single chain where specific interlinkage would reunite in certain knots to be distinct from others. This formulation or perception based on the senses and chain that it constitutes in our memory and imagination may be compared with that of Lacan.[6]

Condillac then attacks the notion of innate ideas. It is evident, he says, that if our experience had not taught us that we were mortal, far from having an idea of death, we will be highly

surprised to see the first man die. As such death is an *acquired* idea. It is not at all natural or innate. What is not realised is that the same senses, the same operations and circumstances produce the same effects.

10. Without senses one cannot reflect or judge. Condillac gives an example of a young man of Chartre who for his first twenty-three years remained deaf and dumb. When he suddenly began to hear and speak, he used his words and gestures to indicate his minimum needs. He did not know the words to designate what was not necessary for him, he was not interested in supplementing them. A small number of objects completed his universe. He was incapable of reasoning, for *to reason is to apprehend rapports with which several judgements are related.* We cannot reflect upon all of them at the same time, we separate them into parts, we develop them one after the other, in a certain order, we accord signs to each idea, each judgement, to each rapport. This *decomposition* becomes necessary for our complex reasoning. The young man of Chartre could not distinguish these operations *in a sucession*, for him, everything happend in one instant. It seems that to know what life is, it is sufficient to feel it, but this young man could not have any idea of it, for a being who does not reflect, only vegitates: *the sensations are only sensations, they become ideas only when our reflection makes them consider as images of certain things.* The signs are the resultants of our judgements and rapports. If they are not frequently used for finding liaisons between ideas and things for conveying significant messages, they do not progress. It is the reciprocal communication that enriches our signs and contributes to the progressive development of the operations of our esprit. Condillac thus explicates the development of signs and language on the basis of *reciprocal commerce* within a speech community. When the young man of Chartre suddenly began to hear and speak, the theologians interrogated him on his ideas of God and religion. As he was born of Catholic parents and he regularly assisted the Chruch services, he could make use of the religious gestures but he did not comprehend their significance, for he did not have occasion to exchange his few ideas with others, and, he did not draw or abstract the right conclusions. The esprit of man devoid of "commerce" or exchange with others, maintains Condillac, is so little "exercised" and so little "cultivated" that he thinks of them only to the extent he is forced to by the external objects. *The greatest richness or fertility of the ideas of man is in their reciprocal commerce.*

11. Condillac insists on the necessity of signs for the progress of our knowledge. If after having given a name to a unit, we do not follow the order in which we form all other ideas by multiplication, it would be impossible to make any progress in the knowledge of numbers. We can discern different "collections" only if the numbers we have are quite distinct. If we do not have these numbers or these signs, we could not conserve our ideas. We could have the notions of only very small numbers. For the numbers two or three, we can imagine two

or three different objects. When we go on to four, we are obliged to, to facilitate our task to imaging two objects by the side of the two others; for six, we cannot dispense with distributing them in two and two or three and three, and, if we want to go further, it would be necessary to consider several units as one single unit, and, unite them for this purpose, into one single object. Condillac cites Locke who gives an example of the American Indians who had no idea of the number, thousand, for they could not possibly count even twentyone. The reason is that once we have the primary signs, we have the rules to invent others. Those who do not know this method would be obliged to have signs which have no *analogy* amongst themselves. They would have no direction to guide them in the invention of others. This was possibly the case of the American Indians, thinks Condillac, who not only could not imagine the number, thousand, but also were not able to go beyond twenty. The progress of our knowledge of numbers depends entirely on the exactitude with which we add a unit to itself, giving to each progression, a name, which distinguishes it from the one that precedes and the one that follows. There are three important things to remember: the idea of the unit, of the operation with which other units are added to it, and, the memory of the order in which the signs are presented. It is not just by the ideas of the unit, or by the operation of multiplication that the number, thousand, is fixed, but because the sign, thousand, belongs only to this collection, it is this alone that determines it, that distinguishes it. We have thus the ideas of "thousand" for we can retrace that a thousand is a unit composed of ten units of hundred, a hundered is a unit composed of ten units of tens, and, ten is a unit composed of ten simple units. The esprit of man is so limited that it cannot retrace a large quantity of ideas to make them a subject of his reflection all at once, and yet, we need to consider them together, hence the complexity and the necessity of the signs. What is true of numbers is equally true of metaphysics, ethics and other human sciences. We could never reflect in these domains if we could not invent new signs, from new collection of ideas, and, subject them to a successive order of composition. We can reflect upon the objects to the extent that we have signs which determine the number and the variety of the characteristics we have noted in them which we want to unite in complex ideas. If we forget for a moment the signs or the words which designate them, we would realise that they occupy in our esprit the same place that the objects themselves occupy. As the qualities of things do not co-exist outside their perception, without the subject where they are reunited, their ideas would not co-exist in our esprit without the signs which group them together. *If we try to reflect upon civil or ethical laws, upon virtue or vice or any other human action without the signs which represent collections of ideas attached to each of them, there would be chaos.* This usage of signs facilitates our reflection, and, the faculty in turn contributes to multiply the signs. Thus, the signs and reflection are the two causes which help each other leading to their reciprocal progress.

12. Beginning with the perception of the objects, the composition of ideas depend upon our method of analysis. To analyse, for Condillac, is to *decompose*, to *separate*, to *abstract*. With abstractions, we discover the rapports of resemblances and differences which lead to

general ideas. The word, triangle, refers to all the triangles of whatever type they may be. An abstract name or designation becomes a general idea each time it is a *denomination of several things which have something in common*. The words, colour, sound, odour etc., are both abstract and general ideas : abstract ideas, for they are the partial ideas which we have abstracted from certain objects; general ideas, for each of them designates a certain number of sensations due to the same organ. But it should be made clear, asserts Condillac, that it is not so much with reference to the nature of the objects as with the manner in which we know them that we determine their classes and species. If our knowledge of their properties increases or if we perceive them under different circumstances, we change the classifications. According to Condillac, the English philosopher, Locke, believes that the animals cannot abstract which differentiates them from human beings. Condillac says that to abstract, it is sufficient to have senses, and, as the animals have all the necessary organs, they do have abstract ideas but what they do not have are the signs or the faculty with which we compose or constitute several partial ideas into one single unit—sign which is further used to multiply our ideas to infinity. This constituting process is our real creative faculty. To the process of *decomposition* there is a parallel process of *composition*. Destutt de Tracy builds his whole theory of semantics or semiotics on this principle which he calls, abstraction and concraction. Analysis, for Condillac, is not only to decompose but also to compare and comprehend the rapports or relationships. The purpose of analysis is to show, as much as it is possible, the origin and the generation of things. Thus, our analysis must present the partial ideas in a way that we see the reproduction of the whole that is being analysed. The one who decomposes haphazardly deals only in abstractions; the one who does not abstract all the qualities from an object, gives only incomplete analysis; the one who deos not present these abstract ideas in the order which facilitates the understanding of the generation of objects deals in analyses which are not very instructive. Analysis is thus the entire decomposition of an object and the distribution of its parts in the order in which its generation becomes easy.

Condillac thus seems to have given the most precise method of analysis of human sciences in the French tradition. The role of Descartes is more like that of a yeti whose traces are everywhere but whose presence is not easy to establish. *The notions of decomposition, composition, arbitrariness, abstract and general ideas, binary rapports of resemblances and differences, the constitution and development of the ideological chain and the role of memory are all due to Condillac*. Their traces may be found earlier but their precise application in a given methodology is most systematically presented only by him.

13. Desutt de Tracy continues this tradition in the eighteenth century. Let us begin with his notion of rapport in *Elémens d'idéologie*, 1817, reprinted by Vrin, 1970, Chapter IV. The rapport is that point of view of our esprit, that act of our faculty of thought, with which we bring one idea to another, with which we relate them, compare them in one way or the other. We should have not only two ideas to feel a rapport but it should *never be more than two*, for in each rapport, there can only be two terms, the idea that is brought to another and that of the other, the *subject* and the *attribute*. On the basis of these rapports we make judgements.

The *judgement* is a necessary consequence of our sensibility, for as soon as we feel distinctly two sensations, we feel their *resemblances*, their *differences*, and their *liaisons*. The judgement is a part of our faculty of thinking just as are our sensibility and our memory.

14. Destutt de Tracy explicates his th.eory of ideology or of the constitution of ideas in Chapter VI on the basis of two principal notions of abstraction and concraction which I consider to be one of the most fundamental processes of semiotic signification. Like Rousseau's hypothetical historiography, Destutt de Tracy postulates a zero state of language to demonstrate the generation of ideas and signs. Suppose we see a peach for the first time, it gives us a sensation of a certain colour, taste, form, size etc. From all these ideas we form an idea of this peach which is a unique idea, an idea of only this peach, for we have not yet seen others. At this stage, this idea is individual and specific and the sign or the designation that we will give to it will be applicable only to this peach. After that we see other peaches, which all have more or less the same qualities, which have several characteristics common with our first peach, but at the same time there are several differences, for there are no two things absolutely similar in nature. All these peaches do not have the same colour, the same figure, the same size, the same taste. We neglect these differences, or, we abstract, we consider only those which are common to all the peaches, we call all these by the word, peach. This word or sign has now become general, it is composed only of those features which are common to all the peaches. This operation is called abstraction. To *abstract* is to draw from all the individual ideas what is common to them by rejecting all those which distinguish them. It is very important to note here that when we abstract certain parts of a specific idea to generalise it, it is no more the same idea. To this notion of abstraction is opposoed the notion of concraction. The operation of concraction helps us form ideas of the beings which exist, and, those of abstraction, to compose the group of ideas whose model does not exist in nature but which are necessary to make new comparisons and to perceive new rapports between the results of the rapports which we already know. To have an idea of a specific peach that exists, we *contract* or group partial ideas of peach in general. On the other hand, a peach, in general, after having abstracted all the specific characteristics which distinguish all the peaches from each other, does not exist in nature. It refers only to a class or species of peaches but this general abstracted idea helps us differentiate, for example, peaches from apricots.

15. This operation of abstraction not only helps us to group real beings in classes, to generate their specific ideas, it also helps us to do the same for each of their qualities, i.e. for each of their impressions. Thus, we feel that several things do us good, we call them good. It is already a classification, a generalisation, for all these things are not good in the same manner. We move on further. We abstract these qualities of good or beauty from certain beings and treat these notions as if they existed independent of the beings which gave us

these impressions. On the basis of these qualities, we often constitute ideas of the beings or beings which exist only at an intellective level, but it must not be forgotten that it is due to the impressions on our senses that we abstract the constituents of these new ideas.

Our signs or words thus always refer to a class of objects and not to a given object. We abstract the sign, red, from the objects which are perceived by us as similar to our first red object, we abstract the characteristic, round, from several objects which we perceive to be of the same form as our first "round" object. This poses a very serious problem. As all our words are general, it is difficult to restrain their significance to accord to the specific object we are talking about. To the extent an idea is general, it refers to a large number of beings. it covers only a very small part of each of them. The specific idea of an individual encloses all the ideas which belong to it, the idea or a name of a class encloses only those which are common to all the individuals of that class, and consequently, a very small number of ideas of a given individual, especially when the number of individuals in a class is very large.

At each degree of generalisation, the significance of the sign or the word changes. The bounty of a fruit, a man, a horse, the bounty in general, is not the same thing. The word, bounty, is applied to three different individuals, and, to one general idea. Rigorously speaking. as the ideas change, the words for them should also change, but no language is rich enough to have this abundance of words. All the same, we should realise that the composition of our signs follows the process of receiving impressions, observing rapports, adding or subtracting, regrouping or dividing. And, this composition is a resultant of the efforts of successive generations where a large number of persons participate. There is also the question of perception. As a result, a given sign or a word does not have the same significance for the one who uses or pronounces it and the one who receives it, it expresses for each of us more or less the ideas that we have of that object.

16. After this short introduction to the *Dialectique* of Abélard, the *Logique of Port Royal* of Arnauld and Nicole, *L'art de penser* of Condillac and *Elémens d' idéologie* of Destutt de Tracy, we see that not only the concepts of signification and intellection, rapport of resemblance and difference between two terms, arbitrariness, speech community with reciprocal commerce, analysis with the operation of decomposition and composition, perception, abstraction and concraction, specific and general ideas etc., were very clearly presented and debated in the twelfth century by Abélard and in the Cartesian tradition in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, the theory of ideas within which the ralationship between the sign and the object is posited is also central to the theory of discourse. If we define discourse as a specific articulation of a specific perception of a specific human condition, we have a very complex proposition. The signs and sequences of signs or words and phrases with which we articulate a discourse are all general. They are already given, we inherit them from successive generations whose respective perceptions and concractions or generalisations naturally do not coincide with those of ours. In any case. the conventional signs of our culture refer to the classes of objects and we are interested in describing a very specific

object, a given human condition. The linguistic signifier is not a single unit, corresponding to a given signified, it is a highly complex ensemble of a number of ideological features of which only a very small part applies to our object in question. To specify a given human condition of pain or hunger, we constitute a discourse with the help of a large number of signs or sign-constructs, most of whose semantic features are not only not applicable to our situation, they also create hurdles in the comprehension of what we want to convey. But we have no choice. We have to use words or signifiers which the cultural heritage or the speech community puts at our disposal. Hence, our task of constituting a specific discourse is the most hazardous enterprise. The signifiers we use are only approximate, vague and general, the object of our discourse is precise and specific. Every sign refers to a large nunmber of chracteristics which have been perceived in a given class of objects by a large number of persons over a period of long time. The Port Royal Logic teaches us that it is the complex composition of ideas which evoke both the sign or the word on the one hand, and, the object on the other. How simplistic is the concept of the sign and the signifier in the twentieth century linguistics!

17. Constituting a linguistic discourse is thus a simultaneous process of abstraction and concraction as Destutt de Tracy explicates it. We continue to abstract certain samantic features, or partial ideas as Condillac describes them, from a large number of similar objects which are ideologically analogous to concract or concretise the constitution of a given impression of a human condition that our sensibilities perceive in certain circumstances, for our pain or hunger, though having enough in common with the notions of pain or hunger in general, is a very specific feeling due to very specific circumstances. It is related to a certain past, it emerges from a certain political, economic, psychic environment or ideological field, as Foucault would later call it, it is due to certain causes and effects, and, it would certainly give rise to a specific ideological movement within us and without us. This is the discourse of our hunger or pain. It is a specific discourse based on a specific perception, it requires a specific articulation with the help of the signs of which not even one is specific as Destutt de Tracy would put it. It is a specific discourse but it is set within the general cultural discourse. It is an individual discourse but as the young man from Chartre who was for a long time deaf and dumb could not articulate with the signs at his disposal which responded to his immediate needs, we require the signifiers which have been chiselled with usage within a speech discourse which should be understood by those it is addressed to. The progress and development of ideas depend upon the interaction between the individual and the general ideas, between the individual speech and the conventionally agreed language of the community as Condillac would insist. For Abélard, and, for Port Royal and Condillac, the ideas play a mediatory role between the sound and the object by constantly reconstituting and multiplying themselves. It is a dialectical process. Abstraction leads to concraction and vice versa, simultaneously and continuously. Both Condillac and Destutt de Tracy lay very heavy emphasis on the *generation* of ideas. This is why we have the concepts of perception, abstraction and operation or the specific order in which the ideas are generated. The generation of ideas leads us to their

origion but this concept of origin is not within the context of historical origin, it is purely an epistemological concept, an explicatory device to comprehend the complexity of the rapport between the sign and the object.

18. The constitution of the linguistic discourse requires that the articulatory schema should follow the schema of perception which means that only a part of the bundle of the ideological or semantic features could be used in this discourse. Secondly, with the help of these partial ideas, as Port Royal puts it, we have to constitute a conceptual structure which is specific and individual but this specificity and this individuality is not of the order of the deaf and dumb young man of Chartres. This individual schema of speech is derived from the linguistic heritage common to the speech community. The relationship between this individual and communal speech, which Saussure would later call, parole and langue, is dialectical. On the interaction of these two linguistic forms depends the progress of signs and knowledge.

19. In the process of the acquisition of language, we learn these communal words before we learn their ideas or significations (Condillac, Chapter VI); reason comes only after memory, and, it does not always correspond well with the signs at our disposal. Moreover, there is a considerable internal gap between the time a child begins to cultivate his memory, tracing the words whose true significance he does not yet understand, and, when he begins to be capable of analysing their notions. When this operation begins, it is too slow to follow the dictates of memory.

To carve out an individual discourse from these traces of memory acquired in the process of learning a given language is the task of every "thinking being" of Descartes. Three hundred years later, Merleau-Ponty would make a similar distinction between the "speaking" and the "thinking" subject[7].

The acquisition of language begins with the speaking subject who pronounces or uses words or signs without reflecting upon them or analysing them. The speaking being, however, grows into a thinking being, and, slowly begins to reason and analyse the fields of signification that each sign represents. Louis Althusser discusses the problem of the progressive acquisition of a proper Marxist language by Marx[8]. When Karl Marx began his university career, the German University ideological field was surcharged with neo-Hegelian and Feuerbachian thought. According to Althusser, Marx first learnt this language, then began to think through it. In the transitional period, he used Feuerbachian vocabulary or the sign system with semi-Feuerbachian and semi-Marxist significance. Marx struggled to slowly transform the prevalent ideological schemas into a specific discourse which is later called, the Marxist ideological framework. It is a question of the contradiction between the content and the form, or, between the content and its conceptual expression. The "materialist content" enters into conflict with the "idealist form" and the idealist form tends to reduce itself to a simple affair of terminology. When Marx is already materialist, he is still using the Feuerbachian concepts, he borrows Feuerbachian terminology though he is no more a pure Feuerbachian; between the

manuscripts of 44 and the works of his maturity. Marx found his definitive language. The first condition to fulfil to pose the problem of the works of the youth of Marx, says Althusser, is thus to admit that the philosophers themselves have a youth. It is necessary to be born one day somewhere to start thinking and writing. But one should not forget that before one starts thinking or analysing, one has already had a fairly long period of childhood to learn the language through which the thinking process begins.

20. What needs to be emphasized here is that the sign or the signifier or the enunciations not a static entity. Its nature is basically fluid. It is in constant flux when it is transformed from a specific or an individual sign to a general sign referring to a class of objects or when its significance is altered due to a change in perception. Michel Foucault states[9] that an enunciation at the time it emerges in its materiality, appears with a status, enters into the network of relations, is placed in the field of utilisation, is offered to the possible transfers and modifications, is integrated with the operations and the strategies where its identity is maintained or altered. It is constantly recommenced, re-evoked and reactualised. Foucault defines the enunciative function as the relationship between the sign and its adjacent field. One cannot actualise a sign without finding for it a collateral space. A sign has always margins filled with other signs. These margins are distinguished from what is ordinarily understood by 'context' real or verbal i.e., the ensembles of the elements of a situation or language which motivate a formulation. The associative field that forms an enunciation from a sentence or a series of signs which enables them to have a specific context and a specific representative content constitutes a complex network. It is constituted first with the series of other formulations within which an enunciation is inscribed. It is constituted also of the ensemble of the formulations, the enunciation referes to, either to repeat them, to modify them, to adopt them or to oppose them. Finally, it is constituted of the ensemble of formulations where its status is shared by the enunciation in question where it takes place without considering the linear order with which it is transformed or with which, on the contrary, it is valorised, conserved, sacralised, and, offered as a possible object for a future discourse.[10]

Now the fluctuations in the significance of the signs are due primarily to the fluctuations or the modifications in the constitution of ideas which unite the signifers with the signified, and, the constitution of our ideas depend upon our perception. Condillac teaches us (Chapters III, IV and V) that our body continues to evoke perceptions or receive impressions even when we are not very conscious of each of them. The liaison between a perception and an idea is realised according to our needs. When we see a spectacle or a map, we perceive a large number of elements, but we relate them to our specific needs in a very restricted domain. All our needs are interrelated. They hold each other in a succession of fundamental ideas. Over them are posed other preceptions stored in our memory. They make a chain whose knots are resolved or evoked according to our material or spiritual needs. However, since the perceptions are so numerous, we usually forget most of them, and, evoke them only when we want to realise a specific liaison of the idea and the object that was originally

the source of this perception. If the liaison is gone or removed, the memory is lost but the traces of the received perceptions always remain, so that whenever the need arises, they can be revived.

21. In modern times, M. Merleau-Ponty seems to be the most systematic thinker in the tradition of Condillac and Destutt de Tracy. He defines the acquisition of language[1] as a simple effective acquisition of verbal images, i.e., the traces left within us by the words pronounced or heard. The absolute importance and need of the signs is underlined by the fact that the significance of the words is introduced by the words themselves, or, their conceptual significance is formed by a gestural signification, which as Merleau-Ponty believes, is immanent to speech. In a foreign country, one begins to understand the significance of words by their place in a context of action, and, by participating in the communal life. Similarly, a philosophical text, yet not properly understood, begins to reveal to us a certain style, which is the first indication of its significance, when we try to understand it by placing ourselves in the manner of the existence of that thought and by reproducing the tone and the accent of the philosopher. *Every language is taught by itself and carries its significance in the esprit of the listener*. A music or a painting which at first is not understood ends up creating its own public, if it really has something to say, by releasing its own significance.

In the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, human thought does not exist ourside this world and outside our words. In a strictly Condilliacian tradition, he believes that it woud be a mistake to state that a thought could exist by itself, before its expression, and that we could recall thoughts which are already constituted through our internal silence. If anything, it is an internal language. The pure thought is reduced to a certain void of our consciousness. The new significative intention knows itself by covering itself with the significations already at its disposal due to the act of internal expressions. Thought and expression are thus constituted simultaneously when our cultural acquisition is mobilised to the service of this unknown law, as our body suddenly lends itself to a new gesture in the process of the acquisition of habits. Speech is a veritable gesture which contains its significance as the gesture contains its own. The word or the gesture reveals its significance through its intention, or in other words, the way the world is perceived by the one who speaks. As such, the conventional signs, the simple notations of pure and clear thought do not exist, there are only words within which is contracted the history of a language, which accomplishes communication without any guarantee in this milieu of unbelievable linguistic hazards. It is wrong to assume that the significance of words and sentences is detachable and can be defined in an intelligible world independent of the words themselves. *The phonetic gesture realises, for the speaking subject and for those who listen to him, a certain structure of experience, a certain modulation of existence, exactly as the comportment of my body invests, for me and for the other, the objects which surround me, with a certain signification.*

The linguistic sign never corresponds exactly to the significance already attached to it by the speech community, it is a gesture which derives its significance from the situation it finds

itself in, and.. form the intention of the speaker. As Destutt de Tracy has pointed out, if all persons at all times used the same signs or the words with the same significance, there would be no problem, but as it is never the case in communal and individual communication, there are all sorts of misunderstandings. The listener is forced to follow, not the objects being referred to in the discourse or conversation, but the way they are being perceived and articulated by the speaker in a given situation. In a given situation, for, as Destutt de Tracy insists, not only different persons perceive different objects differently, the same person does not always perceive the same object in the same manner. In this progression of different perceptions, words keep on changing their significance.

22. This leads us to reconsider the whole question of arbitrariness. The concept of arbitariness is about having x or y sign for the same object, but as x and y really correspond to two different perceptions of that object, x and y are not equivalent signs. Even within a given language, the same signs acquire different significance as our perceptions change, as the situations, where the linguistic gesture is realised, alter. These modifications and transformations are due to the specific faculty of our esprit in the domain of ideas. When we go from one language to another, where the notion of arbitrariness is supposed to be most valid, the situation is not fundamentally different. No object of nature is perceived in exactly the same manner by the members of two speech communities, hence their signs do not exactly refer to the same thing. They are two different signs. The remark of Merleau-Ponty is very pertinent here when he says that *a language teaches itself, it releases, by itself, its own significance*. The question of equivalence thus does not arise, or, if we follow the classification of signs in Port Royal Logic, we can say that at a very elementary level of facts, the different signs for the same object may refer to the most basic facts about the object, but as the process of perception begins, as the speaking being enters the stage of the thinking being, the signs are heavily charged with the perceived intentions in specific existential situations. As the signs arise from the most corporeal, material references to a perceptive, intellective level, x and y could never be the same again. What we have to follow, in translation then, is not the correspondence betweeen the so-called arbitrary signs, but the correspondence between the two perceptions of the same world. Every translation depends upon a certain reading of the text or discourse. Following the linguistic signs instead of the perceptions within the given existential situations is a wild goose chase which lead us nowhere. Saussure's concept of arbitrariness without a proper understanding of the ideologically perceptive composition of the linguisitc sign led modern linguistics to a very superficial study of languages. It is only due to the recent interest in semiotic analyses of linguistic discourses related to the theory of ideas in the Abélardian tradition that we are again on the path of phenomenological comprehension of our communication systems.

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CARTESIAN
DISCOURSE

The Evolutionary Theory of Signification

1. In the sixth chapter of the *Elémens d'Idéologie*, Destutt de Tracy discusses in detail the formation of our composite ideas. This argument is the culmination of Cartesian logic via Port Royal and the Encyclopaediests, and, presents the most coherent theory of semiotics of the period.

The constitution of our ideas is based on our sensibility, memory, judgement, and desire. It is a manner of classifying and recognising these four faculties. But we have to find out how all these feelings and sentiments about an object are combined to form unique ideas.

The sensations are the effects of different beings which exist in nature. We have to form individual ideas of the beings who cause these sensations, and then, the more general ideas of class, genre, species etc. We always compare only two ideas, and in the example: *the man who discovered a verity is useful to all humanity*, it is shown that the subject and the object, however composed they may be of several different ideas, formed, on each side, just one resultant idea. If for each of these two ideas, we give just one name, it remains fixed in our memory. And henceforth, we need not refer to the entire composition of the subject and the attribute to express what they are. Similarly, with all the sensations an object causes, and the properties and characteristics which we discover, we form but just one unique idea, which is the idea of that being.

Take the example of a peach. Suppose you see a peach for the first time. It gives you a sensation of a certain colour, a certain taste, a certain form, it resists when it is pressed, it hangs on a certain tree, it is situated at a certain place. Of all these ideas, you form a unique idea, which is the idea of the peach. It is an idea of only this peach that you have seen, and not of others, that you have not seen. As such, this idea is individual and specific. If there is no language, the peach itself will be its sign. If you give it a name, this name will be applicable to the peach in question. The name, peach, that is common to all other peaches, is not yet a part of your language.

The mental operation which consists of gathering several ideas to form just one idea to which a name is given to combine all, may be called, *concraction* as opposed to *abstraction*, which is exactly its inverse. This is why, we call, concrete terms, the adjectives, as *pure, good* etc. which express a number of qualities grouped around its subject, while we call abstract terms, the words, *purity, bounty* etc., which express these qualities, independent of every subject. We also say that "three meters" is a concrete term, and the word "three" is an abstract term.

The two articles in this section were first published by the Punjabi University Press, Patiala, in 1980.

Let us see how these specific ideas become general, applicable to all others. When you see other peaches, you realise that they have many qualities in common, but there are also several differences. In nature, no two beings are absolutely similar. All peaches do not have the same colour, the same form, the same size, the same degree of ripeness. But you neglect these differences. You make what is called, an abstraction. Others are also called peaches because they have several characteristics in common. The idea of the individual peach becomes general. It is not composed of the characteristics which can be assigned absolutley to all the peaches. By this process of abstraction, which consists of abstracting two or more individual ideas which unite them, and by rejecting those which differentiate them, we come to the general idea of peach. But it must be underscored that the ideas which were abstracted to form an individual idea, is not the same, which has now become general. This is an important issue in logic. We cannot go from particular to the general. If a peach is rotten, or if a man is sick, we cannot conclude that all peaches are rotten or all men are sick. The particular is not preserved in the generalised idea, but all that can be stated about general, can be stated about the particular, for all the general ideas must be abstracted from all the individual ones.

These two operations of concraction and abstraction are most frequently used. The operation of concraction helps us to form the idea of the beings which exist, and, that of abstraction, to compose the group of ideas, whose model does not exist in nature, but they are very useful for making comparisons, and for perceiving new rapports. The existence of each of the peaches gives us their individual ideas by the process of concraction. It will be extremely useful to us when we compare this general idea of a peach with that of an apricot. For this purpose, we do not need all the subtle differences which one peach has from another, or one apricot from another. We compare what is common to the one with what is common to the other, and with this operation, we set up two classes, or two types of fruits. Henceforth, we treat these classes as individuals, even when we know that in reality only isolated individuals exist.

2. This operation of abstraction helps us not only to group real individuals into classes and to generalise their specific ideas to form an idea which would be common to all, it serves also to abstract, from their qualities, the impressions which each of them leaves on us. Thus we see that many things are good for us. It is already a classification. We get general expressions of "good" and "useful", as all these are not "good" and "useful" in the same way. Moreover, from all these things, which are good, we derive the idea of "bounty". Henceforth, we use this word as if it were independent of the beings from which it was first abstracted. Similarly, we abstract words like, *utility, beauty,* from the things which are useful or beautiful. These are abstract terms or abstract ideas. All generalised names, all ideas of individuals extended to several, are already abstract words or abstract ideas, for in this process of abstraction, we have neglected several elements, which were applicable only to specific individuals and abstracted only those which were supposed to be common to all.

These two operations of concraction and abstraction go side by side. They are always united and operate together in the formation of our composite ideas. Whenever we constitute a new idea with the help of different elements taken from different places, we neglect those which are specific to a given situation, which are not necessary for our object. We abstract common elements, and at the same time, we concract these to constitute a new idea, which has its own specificity.

3. Take another example of this operation. Suppose we get a sensation for the first time, that we call, red. If we do not know where it comes from, nor, how it comes, if we feel it without the intervention of any other judgement, it is a pure sensation. It is a *simple idea*, which is necessarily specific and individual.

If, on the other hand, we correlate this sensation of "red" with the object this sensation comes from, this idea of red is no more a simple idea. It is composed of a sensation coming from all other objects with which we are not yet familiar. The same is true of the colour and the taste due to the same object. If we feel them, they are simple ideas. If we know where they come from, they become *composite ideas*, but all the same remain individual.

If now we gather all these three ideas, that of a certain colour, a certain taste, a certain odour, we constitute the idea of a being that causes them. This is already a fairly well composed idea. If we then designate this being which is responsible for all these sensations, "cherry", this name is that of the one specific cherry, and not, of cherries in general.

If we know this cherry only and these three characteristics, in a specific manner, this object is capable of giving us only these three impressions, and, nothing more. This idea of a being for us is never more than what the association of ideas we attach to it. This is why the same word has never axactly the same significance to all those who pronounce it. This significance varies according to the variations in the knowledge of the object. We could continue to enlarge the composition of our ideas of the object, cherry, if we add the knowledge of the tree to which it belongs, to the flowers its branches have, our idea of the cherry in question will be more and more composite, but it would always remain a specific and individual idea. Only, it would be more complete.

4. We give specific names to tastes, odours, and colours. We could do the same for the rapports that this particular cherry has with us, and consequently, causes the effect of this particular taste, odour, and colour. Every rapport leads us to three ideas: that of the rapport itself, that of its effect, and, that of its cause. If we do not frequently constitute these ideas, or if we do not designate them distinctly with specific names, it is because we do not need them. Or, that the names we gave to them in their individual capacity have since been extended to other similar objects. They are now common and general, and, we are not embarrassed by their differences with the specific object. But there is not even one of the innumerable rapports which each of these individuals has with us, which cannot be the source of these three specific ideas, which help us to constitute our expressions.

Thus, for example, the rapport between me and the cherry leads to three effects: the one I call, pleasure, the other, that it is good for me, and the third, that it renders me service. We express these three rapports by saying that it is beautiful, it is good, and, it is useful, and, the causes of these rapports with the words, beauty, bounty, utility, which represent three properties of the cherry, the three ideas which compose the idea of this being. But, when we generalise the words, pleasure, good, service, when we extend them to other effects produced by other beings, the effects which are analogous, but which are not exactly the same, there is no way I can express the exact pleasure or service that the given cherry renders me, the exact manner in which it is beautiful. As our ideas undergo series of transformations across the process of generalisations, we are reduced to this stage, when we have no means to describe each individual object. We have just these proper names which describe a given object to the exclusion of all others. At the same time, since we have examined only one cherry, not only its name is a proper name in the strict sense of the term, all the ideas which are derived from it are also individual. These words refer to only one fact.

It is important to insist on this individual fact, for without this we cannot understand the artifice of the composition of our ideas or our language, which is their expression, or the reasoning based on them. The main problematics is that we always lack words. By a prolonged use, we generalise them, and we have difficulty in explaining them to the auditor to take them in a restrained context of an individual, for which they are no more used. We have to place ourself in the position of a person who first combines these ideas, and invents words. We use his words, but we do no more use his combination of ideas. The science of ideas is intimately related with that of the words. Our composite ideas od not have any support other than words, any other relation which unites all their elements. It is the words which fix them and place them in our memory.

This is then the consequence of the observations of one being. We constituted and separated its different ideas, its rapports, its effects, its causes. We created words to express them, the words which we call a substantive or an adjective. All these words are strictly speaking, proper names of single beings.

After this we have the process of generalisation. We observe other cherries. They have many qualities in common, but they are not exactly the same. We neglect the differences between the first cherry and the others we observe now. We unite the constant qualities, and give them the name of "cherry".

The same procedure is continued for others, and the words, beautiful, good, useful, red, pleasure, service, beauty, bounty, utility, etc. do not express the rapports that the first cherry had with us, but the rapports, effects, and the qualities of the cherries in general. They are already generalised, but not quite, for these words of beauty and bounty will then be extended to other beings which are not similar to cherries.

After the cherries, if we see a strawberry, we constitute a general idea of a strawberry as we did with a cherry. These strawberries are also beautiful, good, useful, and red in a certain manner. If we keep these words, beautiful, good etc. with the extension of our

observation of new beings, it is with the same process, which constitutes of neglecting all the differences specific to one type of beings and circumstances, and retaining all those which are common to the new beings. Consequently, each time we generalise more, we extend it to more beings, we slice off several ideas, which are specific to any class, and, our words express less and less number of ideas. To the extent, an idea becomes general, it is applicable to larger number of beings, but it covers smaller number of ideas specific to each being. This is exactly what happens in the formation of ideas relating to species, classes, genres, which are composed on the same pattern.

We take another example. We recognise an individual. We call him, Eric. It is obvious that this proper noun is a complete expression of this individual. Then we begin the process of generalisation. We gather a number of ideas which are common to a large number of similar individuals, but which also differentiate him from others. With this process, we constitute an idea of a class, which we call, Parisians. This process continues. We extend our comparisons, and we have another more extended class with which we designate, French. The generalisation continues, and we have successively, the words and ideas of European, man, animal and finally of, being, which is the most general term in this context.

It is obvious that these highly composite ideas include a large number of individuals. This leads to their extension, but, at the same time, it is the small number of ideas which help us in their comprehension. When we say that Eric is a being, we imply only one thing, the way his being affects us, but it does not tell us how. All we mean is that he exists, and nothing more. When we say that he is an animal, we refer to the ideas of life and movement, that he eats, he reproduces, in a word, he does all that is expected of an animal. When we recognise him as a man, we specify the manner in which he affects us as a man. Similarly, when we use words like European, French, Parisian, we always add something to the previous knowledge. And finally, when we call him, Eric, we say implicitly all that we know of him, with all the characteristics which belong to him. There are naturally others, which can be added to this like, he is handsome, strong, gentle, healthy. We can keep on adding new ideas to this one word, Eric, and we will know more of him. This refers to the very important fact that *a word signifies more or less according to the knowledge of the one who uses it. All this reaffirms what we have said earlier that a specific idea of individual includes only those which are common to all the indiviuals of that class, and consequently, proportionately smaller number of ideas in correspondence with the larger number of individuals in a class.*

5. From the ideas of cherries and strawberries, apricots etc., we come to the idea of fruit, which does not include the specific ideas of each of these, but only those which are common to all. If we generalise this word even more, we can talk of *the fruit of hard work, the fruit of reflection* etc., and, this word, *fruit*, would then not include just any property of vegetal production, which is associated with fruits like cherries and apricots.

Similarly, from the ideas of red, yellow, orange, we get the idea of colour, which expresses only the quality common to the sensations felt by the eye, as the sounds heard by the ear. From the ideas of colour and sounds, we constitute the idea of sensation, which may originate from any source.

To begin with, the word, red, expressed only the manner of being red with reference to cherry, but progressively, is extended to the manner of strawberries and other similar objects, including what all "red" bodies have in common. The same thing happened to the word, good. At every degree of generalisation, the differences are sliced off, the word changes its signification. *It is obvious that the bounty of a man, a fruit, a horse, and, the "bounty" in general, are not at all the same thing. As the ideas change, the words should have changed also, but no language is so rich as to have a specific word for each specific idea. The words, as such, are only abbreviated marks, they do not faithfully represent their intended significance.*

What happens to these words or proper names, happens also to other elements of discourse, like verbs, propositions etc. The important thing to note is that all of them are constituted in the same manner. It is always a matter of receiving impressions, observing rapports, adding, subtracting, and reuniting, to constitute new groups. And, we need not be embarrassed to see how so many different combinations are the products of a small number of faculties that we have distinguished in our faculty of thinking.

The hypothetical process that we have outlined refers to the effort of one isolated individual, who, without the help of any other person, would constitute all these words for his personal use alone. In reality, the situation is quite different. Every language is a resultant of the efforts of a number of individuals for a number of successive generations, even centuries. But the fundamental problematics remains the same.

Most of the ideas are not created by us. We receive them from earlier genertaions. Their signs strike our ears in an irregular manner corresponding to the situation in which we apprehend them. We then follow the process of differentiating one from the other, classifying them, and, making use of the multiple experiences at our disposal, we try to understand them. This operation often remains incomplete, and, leads to all kinds of misunderstandings, false rapports, irrelevant interlinkings. *During the early years of our childhood, we receive a large number of ideas perpetuated over generations. We spend the rest of our lives in arriving at the comprehension of their proper, distinct significance.*

From Port Royal to Condillac

1. In this section, we will discuss the various hypotheses which were advanced to elaborate the logical constitution of linguistic discourse in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. There are significant differences in the theoretical propositions of the Port Royal Grammar and the following approaches by the encyclopaedists.

For Port Royal, grammar is the art of speaking. For the encyclopaedists, it is the science of written or oral speech. Even though both these definitions refer to the acts with which the vocal emissions are organised in language, for Port Royal, it is an affair of extracting universal rules with which these acts are formed in consonance with an immanent rationality. The reality of language, i.e., the sounds, the words, and the phrases are only a manifestation of Reason. For the encyclopaedists, on the other hand, it is a matter of describing the chracteristic features of this materiality with which this speech exists; the rationality of language resides not only in the linguistic act, that it expresses a primitive reason, but also in the fact that the linguistic reality is governed by laws, which are discovered by observing the linguistic phenomena.

The difference in the two points of view leads to important consequences. Port Royal emphasizes the synchrony of language, and limits grammar to the study of sentence. The concept of grammar is confined to the concatenation of the linguistic signs. The grammar and logic of Arnauld and Lancelot deal with the material of words and their significance, and the construction of the ensembles of words. With the encyclopaedists, grammar extends its field to the general study of objects: phonetics, etymology, figures of speech, synonymy, and syntax.

In this period, the notion of syntax implies the relations existing between the ideas expressed by the words. It presupposes an analysis of the notion of idea, and its rapport with language. It addresses itself to such general principles as, what is thinking? what is language? how knowledge can be generated with the help of words and phrases? etc. This field of knowledge, and its operational mechanism is called, Semiotics. The objects of semiotics are the phenomena of the sign and its signification. We come across such definitions of semiotics as the science of signs or words by means of which we acquire our mutual comprehension, and inherit the knowledge of those who have preceded us. Such definitions refer always to the process of signification. The eighteenth century does not have, or does not address itself to the definition of the notion of sign as such. The study of the linguistic sign is always a part of the study of the origin of knowledge, or of the origin of language.

Based on Sylvain Auroux's *La sémiotique des encyclopédistes*, Paris, 1979.

For Port Royal, the sign is everything that is supposed to represent something. The sign encloses two ideas, that of the thing that represents, and that of the thing represented. Its nature consists of evoking the latter by the former. If we take the word, *encloses*, literally, we cannot say that signification of a word is an idea. If the sign encloses two ideas, that of the thing represented, and of the thing which represents, it is not possible to fix the notion of the sign, for the rapport representing/represented is a rapport which would be interpreted as the rapport of the sign. The same is true in the reverse order: the rapport of the idea of representing/idea with the represented. What then is the sign? It is certainly not the idea of the represented. If it refers to the idea of representing, it cannot enclose two ideas. And, if it is neither one nor the other, a third being would be necessary, which would have its proper idea. Thus, we would have three ideas, and not two. Moreover, we will have to accept that the sign is an idea which encloses two other ideas. This is neither explicit in the Port Royal definition, nor does it take account of the specific rapport of representing/represented. The sign is not divisible into two ideas, but the word, inasmuch as it is a linguistic sign, is constituted of the relation of ideas. It refers to a process. The semiotics of the eighteenth century does not have a specific definition of the sign, it addresses itself primarily to *the process of signification*.

2. One of the greatest grammarians of the eighteenth century, Du Marsais, in *Traité des tropes*, Paris, 1797, presents this argument as follows:

As bread is given to us, the word, *bread*, is pronounced. On the one *hand*, the thing, bread, inscribes its image in our brain through our eyes, and evokes its idea; on the other, the sound of the word, bread, leaves a certain impression through our ears, in such a way that these two ideas, evoked simultaneously, could not be evoked one without the other.

For Du Marsais, it is an affair of the psychological origin of signification, as the acquisition of language and emission of speech. The psychological approach is in general Cartesian tradition. Two ideas are necessary: that of the sound, and that of the object designated, but this is acquired by means of its own idea. These are the two ideas which are related, and not a sound and an idea. The perception of the object, the sound, evokes in us, its idea-1, and relates this idea-1, with the idea-2, that of the second object, object-2. The veritable relation referred to is thus between the two ideas. As such, the fundamental structure of the process of signification would be *quaternary*, but this work as a whole seems to be based on a *ternary* definition, which is derived from the former: object-1—> idea-2—> object-2. It is obvious that this ternary definition is an interpretation of the quaternary structure. *The sound evokes its own idea, which evokes, by association, the idea of the object.* This is to justify that the sound is the sign of an idea, with which it has absolutely no rapport.

The choice of interpretation in each case is significant. The quaternary interpretation is based on idealism, the dualism that it allows, and the lien of the ideas that it allows to be placed outside the brain, serves those who indentify soul and the faculty of speech, excluding thus the possibility of animal language. These divergent views refer to the differences in the concept of idea.

The concept of the sign is due to the Cartesian tradition. However, even in Descartes, this notion is ambiguous. The idea is either the form of our thoughts, with whose immediate perception we are conscious of these very thoughts, or, the form of thoughts which have an objective reality. The first definition is psychological. It corresponds with the signification of words. According to Descartes, one cannot express everything with words, while one hears what one says, one is not certain if there is, in the self, the idea of the thing that is signified by these words. The use of the second requires a distinction between the signification of words, and a clear and distinct conceptualisation. The vertiable thought is confined to the second, keeping it away from language which expresses an ensemble of propositions.

Even though most of the eighteenth century grammarians stick to the first definition, its status depends upon the orientation of the theory of knowledge on which it is based, and in which it is employed. If one sticks to Cartesian dualism, the ideas are associated only with other ideas, the rapport of idea with object is only representative.

3. An important step in this context is taken by the psychological interpretation of Condillac. It is this interpretation which is the basis of further discussion by Destutt de Tracy, presented earlier. Condillac divides signs in three classes: the accidental signs, where the objects are related to our ideas which evoke them; the natural signs, like pain or cry, provoked by physical or natural phenomenon; and the signs of institution, which we have ourselves chosen, and which have only an arbitrary rapport with our ideas. Port Royal also gives tripartite division of signs, but it refers to the principles of division, and not to the three classes. For Port Royal, the signs are either certain or probable. Certain signs are the ones which like breathing of animals are certain signs of their life, and probable signs are like paleness, as the grosses of women. Further, the signs are either joined to the objects, like a dove to the sign of Holy Ghost, or those which are separated, like the sacrifices due to old laws. Thirdly, there are natural signs, as an image in a mirror, and the signs of institution, which may have either a very far-fetched rapport with the thing signified, or no rapport at all.

The classification of Condillac refers only to the third principle of division. It is confined to the field of knowledge and to the activity of the subject. With Condillac, the primitive or original perception of the thing is neither distinct from its consciousness, nor from the souvenir that it evokes, nor consequently, from its idea. The words for thought, operation, perception, sensation, consciousness, idea, and notion are almost synonymous. Thought is all that the soul absorbs either by varied impressions, or by the use of its reflection; operation, the thought, inasmuch as it produces any change in the soul; perception, the impression that is produced in us in the presence of the objects; sensation, this very impression inasmuch as it is due to the senses; consciousness, the knowledge that one receives as images; notion, all ideas which are our own products.

The process of accidental signification is only a repetition of the process of perception. The first rapport is the one which relates an idea with an object, and enables one to remember the earlier idea. This rapport is accidental in the sense that it is due to the appearance of the object, it does not depend upon the individual which is the subject of perception.

The natural rapport is identical except that it is based on universality and the organic necessity of certain relations, as the natural cry is related to certain sentiments. These rapports can be schematised as (a) object→sensation = idea;   (b) object→ idea;   (c) sentiment → cry;   (d) cry→sentiment. The last class, the most important, is that of the sign of institution. A sign of *institution* has an arbitrary rapport with the idea it designates. This may be presented as: (e) x→idea.

4. In the case of the sign of institution, it is the distance, in time and space, that is often responsible for its creation. This is the liberty of the individual. As long as an individual does not have arbitary signs, he is not the master of his thought. His ideas will be conditional. The arbitrariness of the sign gives an individual his liberty to compose his thought with the help of his imagination and memory. He can make use of the psychological distance to compose his thought. This is not possible if he has at his disposal only the natural signs. The sign is arbitrary only when its use is free from all the external stimuli. The arbitrary sign is chosen. Man exercises his faculty of choice and organizes the sign of institution to facilitate the task of his memory and imagination. In the process of the genesis of language, man first had the accidental signs, then the natural signs, and finally, at the stage of higher mental development, he evolved the arbitrary signs. The first language of man is the *language of action*. Every sign is a response to a cause. The second language, the language developed over a period of several centuries due to the successive use of the natural signs, is the *language of habit*. Man begins to correlate an idea and an object without always depending upon its physical conditioning. The arbitrary language is a natural development from the earlier step in the mental development of man. The arbitrary signs are generally artificial signs. They do not depend upon the physical constitution of human environment. There is no natural reason for their choice. They are unmotivated. These arbitrary signs of institution follow two main principles: *analysis* and *analogy*. Analysis allows man to decompose his thought. The natural sign is not capable of this operation as it presents simultaneously the two components of an idea. The artificial language develops with the help of the names given voluntarily to the ideas, which are, in fact, not given arbitrarily, but analogically. The notion of analogy is highly complex. It relates the sound to the signified thing, but it is extra-linguistic. The ideas which are only variations of an idea are presented by the signs which are similar to them. They follow the principle of analogy, which is both natural i.e., physical, and psychological. There is always an effort at deriving new signs from the old signs or the ensembles of signs but in this process, man exercises his faculty of choice and rearrangement. As such, the natural and the arbitrary is born with man. The arbitrary use of language traces the history of his development. The language of action is automatic, it depends upon the process of stimulus/ response. The articulated language of institution goes through a long process of analysis and analogy, of arbitrary choices and responsible social behaviour. The conditions for these two types of language are different. Once the natural signs are established by accident and by habit, they create conditions which are responsible for the creation of arbitrary signs.

To begin with, it is always the physical conditions which are responsible for the creation of the first signs, but their successive use begins to depend more and more on the will of the individual. Between the natural and the arbitrary, what changes, according to Condillac, is the immediate cause of their appearance. On the other hand, between the natural and the artificial, what changes according to Port Royal, are the conditions of the installation of the sign. In both cases, the human will, is never the first principle of the creation of the signs. The liberty involved in the arbitrary choice is also conditioned by the determination of the circumstances. It is the use of the sign, the distance from its origin, the change of conditions, and the human faculty of imagination and memory, which are responsible for the displacement of significance, for new rapports, for new relationships that man continues to have with his environment. Between the natural and the arbitary, then, there is essentially a difference of quality. *In the eighteenth century, the debate does not revolve around the question, what is a sign, but rather around how man thinks, how he constitutes his language, how he relates himself to the world, to other men, and to himself.*

5. Another significant approach to the study of signs is that of De Brosses. In his *Traité de la formation méchanique des langues et principes physiques de l' étymologie*, Paris, 1765, De Brosses discusses the construction of words, but his researches always lead to the etymology or derivation of words. In this study of the evolution of languages, the main concern is the nature of evolutionary or creative process.

Writing is a complex phenomenon. It is supposed to be independent of oral speech. It has its own system of signification. On the one hand, we have the sound, and on the other, the figure. Figure can be a sign of the object. Originally, it appeared in the form of painting. It is the representation of the object that evokes the idea. The process of signification is: figure-object-idea. This schema defines figurative writing. It may correspond to a simple painting, or a succession of paintings like the Mexican writing. In the symbolic writing, the figure evokes directly the idea, either allegorically as in Egyptian writing, or with the help of certain keys as in Chinese writing. The process of signification in this case is: figure-idea-object. To relate speech and writing is to integrate figure and sound within the same process of signification. This involves the multiplication of mediations. We can have several other processes. De Brosses presents two of these: sound-figure-idea-object; and, figure-sound-idea-object. The last formulation is the most prevalent. It covers all systems of syllabic or literal writing. It implies that writing is representation of a spoken language which exists before it. It also refers to the independent nature of writing. Apart from the Chinese figures, De Brosses gives the example of Roman numerals, which have different sounds in different languages.

In any case, the writing systems are studied only to be able to explain the origin of languages. The paintings of things are natural signs of the object. They do not require any previous knowledge. No external causality is necessary to comprehend their correspondences. The original or primitive form of the rapport of signification is this resemblance. In the

beginning, speech and writing are two completely independent systems. During the course of their respective developments, the notions of arbitrariness take over. From painting to alphabet on the one hand, where the letters and their combinations in words and phrases have direct rapport with the object in question, and from the natural cries to articulated speech, where the earlier, primitive immitation does no more serve as the guiding principle for the new linguistic creations. De Brosses moves from painting to writing in the same way Condillac moves from the language of action to the language of institution. The displacemnet from the sound to the object, with or without the intermediary figure, leads directly to idea. In the *Traité*, De Brosses treats the notion of etymology in a highly complex manner. The study of the origin replaces the study of primitive language. There is no emphasis on the discovery of an ancient language, which was the preoccupation of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. The study of etymology addresses itself to the internal mechanics of the first elements from which a given language might have evolved. The primitive stage is not a given fact, it is reconstructed. And, this effort at reconstruction is to discover the principles of the evolution of languages, their sounds, their words, their signification.

Etymology is based on a non-empirical reflection. It is concerned solely with rationality under the form of abstract principles which enable us to explicate different phenomena. It is a sort of an archaeology, which has been dealt with by Destutt de Tracy, in detail, in the former section.

6. The study of the origin of languages has an epistemological function. It deals with the formation of languages by reconstituting their genesis from the ensemble of primitive signs which owe their installation only to nature. It defines the process of signification. These processes lead us to logical successions, where the general causes can be described, and where finally the linguistic sign attains the status of the arbitrary being. This description of the origin of linguistic formations is always an interpretation, which differ s from one author to another. With Condillac, it is purely psychological. With De Brosses, it becomes an objective analogy. In both cases, it is an affair of the basis on which the relation between the idea, the sound, and the object is established.

7. The problem of the conditioning factors was debated at length is this period. This involved the study of the language of animals and men. For the traditional Cartesians, represented by Port Royal and others, linguistic activity was a free activity. It depended on the soul of man, a faculty not possessed by animals. Condillac, on the other hand, and as we have seen in Destutt de Tracy, deduced the liberty of man from the conditioning factors, which were not always so fixed as claimed by those who studied only the language of animals.

It was a matter of two points of view: either construct a general concept susceptible of denoting an ensemble of phenomena within which external classifications are possible, or, attach the linguistic domain to a specific ontology, to a certain region of the being, where all

originality dwells. The second proposition is more pertinent. Man speaks and lives in a universe of signs. The specificity of this phenomenon is reduced to the human soul. This specificity is derived from natural causality, which gives it its content.

In his *Cartesian Linguistics*, N. Chomsky has not been able to differentiate between theories of language in the classical age. For him they all believe in the Cartesian innate faculty. This is due to his casual familiarity with the various texts and the schools of thought prevalent in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. During this period, there were different schools debating the earlier, rather primitive propositions of the Port Royal tradition. The debate engages such theoreticians of language as Beauzée, Condillac, De Brosses, Du Marsais, culminating finally in the *Elémens d'idéologie* of Destutt de Tracy, which became the main text-book and the theoretical treatise of the French Revolution.

The innate approach addressed itself only to the quaternary structure of signification. The concept of Cartesian linguistics relates the conceptual richness of linguistics to the refusal of animal language, asserting that the specificity of language depends upon characteristics of human Reason. For this tradition, the acquisition and the use of language do not depend upon any given conditions. The thesis of Condillac is no doubt based on the theory of condition, in its refusal of the Cartesian conception of liberty, but it does not fall into absolutism. Even for Descartes who again and again insists on absolute liberty of the soul, the human physical mechanism is a relative factor. Reason is not a universal instrument, and man is not a machine. Only a machine can attain absolute universality. Man has to function within the specificity of his conditions, which are obviously not only physical, but also mental or psychological. The word is the sign of an idea; the idea is, however, universal. The thesis of Cartesian idealism states that universality cannot be born of a particularity. The sensualism of Condillac, and of Destutt de Tracy, rejects this thesis. However, it is not true, as Chomsky would like to interpret, that for the classical age, the specificity of human language is in its being consituted of the signs whose use is free of all identifiable stimulus. For the eighteenth century, the century after Port Royal, one cannot talk of creativity with reference to language without noting that the only creation possible is that of language, i.e., the institution of signs. It is always an affair of inter-linguistic creation, for an artificial language necessarily presupposes a natural language. It is not the idea that is created, what is created is the liaison between a sound and an idea. It is a matter of elaborating a general concept including all linguistic phenomena, and, differentiating animal language from human language. The discussion of this epistemological hypothesis is fundamental for the knowledge of the organisation of semiotics.

8. This difference is discussed in detail. Father Bougeant in his *Amusement philosophique sur le langage des bêtes*. Paris, 1739, presents an interesting thesis. Like Condillac he admits that a sound emitted by an animal is a natural sign of a corresponding sentiment. One can study the external factors, and analyse animal language just like human language. This thesis supposes a certain identity of human and animal sentiments. It is also an affair of the

soul of animals. The signification of the sign is the cause of its appearance. It also means that the language of the animal is limited to the expression of their needs, it does not designate the ideas of things.

The point made here is that a dog does not have a soul, thus it does not have ideas. An impression for him is the same as that of a seal on a wax. It is conditioned. If we use speech for an animal, it must always be the same, and be employed as sound and not as sign. The sign or a word is defined in its non-material properties, in the relation of the idea of the thing signified with the idea of the signifying thing, following the quaternary definition of the sign. This is what we find in the *Logique* of Port Royal. Bousset presents this argument forcefully. Nothing in simple nature can become a sign by itself. The animals do not possess *arbitrary* or *conventional* language. Their language depends upon external conditions and their instincts. That there is an animal language does not mean that it is identical with human language. Animal languages are natural, they are not acquired. The language of convention belongs only to man. All authors seem to agree on this point.

But there is a difference of interpretation, especially in the degree of liberty that man has in this context. What distinguishes man from animal is not *the possession of language*, it is the *possibility of creating a language*. For Rousseau, this possibility is inscribed in the liberty of man. For Condillac, it is not so simple. Man and animal are both some kind of animals. What differentiates them is that they do not find themselves in the same type of organisations, needs, and circumstances. In other words, it is the different psychological apparatus of man whose extreme complexity is responsible for this distinction. It is not only the quality, but different conditioning factors which make man a superior being in organisation, and in the creation of institutional languages.

For semiotics, the specificity of linguistic phenomenon neither depends upon a general concept nor upon an ontological particularity, it depends above all on the ternary structure of signification. Human language has an essential property. It is constituted of the arbitrary liaison of sound and idea. Animal language does not possess this relation. The notion of linguistic arbitrariness is the main contribution of this period.

9. The arbitrariness of the sign may mean that the designator has no rapport with the desingated. There is nothing that indicates *a priori* that they have any relation with each other. Almost all the authors of the eighteenth century agree on this point that the word is arbitrary.

The second implication is that the relation is unmotivated and without any cause. A word is arbitrary if there is no cause, no motive to be in rapport with this idea rather than with another. This interpretation is generally not accepted. If language was arbitrary to this extent, there are no governing rules, it cannot be an object of scientific study.

The third point of view is represented by Condillac and his followers. For Condillac, a sign is arbitrary if it can be used at will.

In any case, whatever may be the precise or general significance of the notion of arbitrariness, it is opposed to the natural sign. But even here there are several implications.

A natural sign may be the one that is constituted of the operation of nature alone i.e., on a certain given causality, independent of human will. And, also, there is the genesis of the natural sign. A sign may be natural, if it is a sign by its very nature or characteristics, i.e., the characteristics of resemblance.

If we accept the hypothesis of the universality of thought, i.e., the ideas signified by words, the arbitrariness of language is recognised in the first sense of the word. At the same time, if the word is arbitrary in the first sense, it is not so in the second or the third sense. It is essentially conventional. For the *Age of Enlightenment*, the first character of the conventional aspect of language is not to be constituted by the absolute freedom of human will. If language is instituted by man, it does not mean that it is absolutely unmotivated, and that man is absolutely free to choose his language.

The problematics of the arbitrary nature of language poses certain paradoxes. How does a convention take form? How does one begin to communicate? Rousseau wanted even to know what was at stake, the society related to an institution of language, or a language already invented to establish a society? For Condillac, it is more serious. It is a matter of understanding the rapport between the thought that enables one to use signs at will, or the arbitrariness of the signs which enables one to think. What is generally accepted in this discussion is that a minimum natural language has to be there to enable the creation of a conventional language. The arbitrary notion in the second sense is thus excluded.

The theory of the beginning of a linguistic communication as natural phenomenon is not accepted by all. If it were so, this minimum would be universal like the cries of the animals but it is not so. Even the onomatopoeia is not the same everywhere. If at the beginning, language is neither an absolutely natural phenomenon, nor due to absolute arbitrariness of man, it is argued, it must have been given to man by God, with the faculty of further creation. This is one of the solutions of the paradox. Thus Beauzée refuses to study the origin of languages. For him, there is a sort of a tacit convention, the words are created and become universal by usage. But as we have seen in Destutt de Tracy, it is precisely the process of the use of language from one situation to another, from one individual to another, that institutionalizes language.

In this debate, there seem to be three common points. The first is that the specific character of language is not due to its creation by a Reason present by itself. On the one hand, the nature, and on the other, the usage, is responsible for it. Secondly, there are causes which explain the formation of languages and their characteristics. This second point marks the distance it has covered since Port Royal. It posits language as a concrete object of study. Thirdly, the fundamental feature of our languages is their arbitrary character.

Whatever way the notion of arbitrariness is posited, it leads to the question of origin. Even for those who believe that in the beginning God created the elementary forms of language, the question of origin cannot be excluded, as they also want to explain the historical development of the formation of words and their significance. The notion of arbitrariness is quite vague. To the three interpretations already presented, one more can be added: that the

arbitrary is also variable. From the absolute origin, we go to the relative origin, where none questions the active part played by man. This may or may not be as an individual, i.e., as representative of will and reason, but it is certainly social and conventional or institutional. The diversity of languages is at times attributed to contingence. Here again, the role of contingence is also relative, the relationship between man and his contingence is dialectical.

10. The problematics of the origin of language is primarily concerned with the description of its formation. This research of the origin is mostly abstract. There are the steps of the logical order, and the ideal genesis. For both, there has to be a beginning, whether it is absolute or relative. In both cases, there is an effort at justifying and explaining the given sequences of development and the functioning of human language. Hence,the questions and the responses in this context depend upon a particular orientation: psychological for Condillac, idealist for Du Marsais.

All this revolves around the idea of genesis. This question relates to the problem of the origin of language with the empirical theory of knowledge. With the genetic orientation, there is a refusal of assigning a given temporal correspondence to the elementary terms of the formation of languages with the help of a distinction between the logical order and the genetic order. Condillac explains that when he talks of an original language, he is not trying to establish what men actually did, but he is thinking of what they could have done. Even Rousseau talks on the same lines when he warns in his *Discours* that his researches should not be taken as historical truths, but as hypothetical and conditional reasonings, meant to elucidate the nature of things, and not to demonstrate the veritable origins. Genesis, as such, is a restitution of the development from real phenomenon with the bias of an experience of thought. The object of the experience of thought is derived from real phenomenon by limiting it in a conventional manner, in a laboratory. The genetic order is the order of reason. The historical order is only the order of facts, in other words, a chronological order of what actually took place. These two have neither the same function, nor the same cognitive value. Diderot says that when the historcal facts do not clarify a situation, we have to go to genetic abstraction.

To understand the mechanism of the origin of language, several experiments were conducted. Thus we have the studies on child language, on the language of deaf and dumb, and the famous case of the development of the child, Victor of Aveyron, found in a jungle. When Doctor Itard tried to teach language to Victor, he realised that Victor could not go beyond the words of his bare needs. It was always a question of stimulus and response. This is not the case with human language where the distinctive feature is the arbitrary rapport of sign and significance. To learn to speak is not to learn to repeat sounds, it is to be able to use the signs at will, and to comprehend the arbitrary functioning of these signs. Victor was not able to achieve this.

11. The study of the origin of language is the study of the *essence of language*. A beginning has to be postulated for the study of the essence of language. It must be based on

the hypotheses on the nature of this commencement, and on the value of the knowledge that may be derived from it. As this approach recognizes in language, the factors of mobility, it is necessarily in rapport with effective history of the linguistic phenomena.

The nature of commencement and the rapport with historicity depends upon different theses. There are three possible attitudes. To admit that God has given us the primitive language, and consequently the study of its constituting process is refused (Beauzée). Secondly, to admit that God has given us the primitive language, but we do not know it, hence we should hypothetically study it. (De Brosses). Thirdly, all theological considerations are refused, as in Condillac and Destutt de Tracy, an effort is made to directly study its constituting process. The divine origin refers to a reality but it finds itself caught in a fact that is unknown to man. On the other hand, the human origin of language refers it to its genesis, which transforms its reality into a hypothesis, but it ensures its knowledge. However abstract it may be, the genetic orientation corresponds directly with the thesis on the effective origin of language. It implies a class of linguistic phenomena, and not just an event of commencement.

These different approaches have essentially an epistemological value. The genetic study of language assigns to language a mobility which is supposed to be found in the derivation of words caused by daily use. For the study of diachronic dimension, where every historical variation implies installation of a new sign, one has to have a thesis on the formation of the linguistic sign. Where there is no study of the first formation of linguistic signs, there will have to be the study of the second formation. When the first origin is assigned to God, the second is necessarily attributed to man. The first and the second origins are different in that the one connects the linguistic elements with each other, the other connects linguistic elements with non-linguistic elements. The first origin installs a *continuity*, the second implies *discontinuity*.

For the *Age of Enlightenment*, the word is a sound which is a sign of an idea representing objects or their properties. Each of these three beings has an independent existence which is perfectly heterogenous to the other two. De Brosses thinks that the use of speech consists of rendering by voice what the sound receives by senses, to represent again, the external form, what is in fact, within, but which came from without. There is an effort at reconciling four opposites: the real being, the idea, the sound, and the letter.

It is because of this heterogeneity that one has to accept the notion of arbitrariness. Thus the problematics of the origin of language becomes that of the independence and the contingence of the elements of language. *As such, the search for the origin of language is not even the search for its essence, it is an attempt at explicating the essential properties of human language. For the eighteenth century, the problematics of the origin leads to the role language plays for the comprehension of thought. This also includes the role of ideas in the process of signification.*

The empirical approach develops a theory of the origin of idea from sensations, and the problem of the origin of language is situated in the origin of knowledge. The idealist school does not accept this problematics. The idea, for them, could not be born of sensation, there

must be, within us, some innate ideas susceptible of founding a basis for our reasoning. These opposing approaches are presented by Turgot (1750) and Maupertuis (1748). Maupertuis believes that in the beginning, man had more or less complex perceptions. Language is constituted by a conscious operation of our esprit where the signs intervene only to designate our perceptions. Turgot, on the other hand, sticks to his empirical position, and asserts that languages are not constituted by a reason existing by itself. The faculty of reasoning presupposes the pre-existence of signs. The aim of language is not to mark for itself its own sensations, they are meant to communicate. Language is born of a double contact of man with other men, on the one hand, and man with the world, on the other.

Condillac tries to present a solution to this complicated problematics. The arbitrary nature of language implies that the propositional structure has nothing in common with the structure of facts. Obviously, this means that all the properties of language are conventional. But the arbitrariness of language also implies that they are imperfect. They cannot totally express an idea. It is all based on *analogy*, and analogy is, after all, a rapport of resemblance. As one thing may resemble several, there are many ways to express the same idea. It all depends upon the specific rapports that the authors or the speakers try to establish.

12. If metaphysics studies the rapport of ideas with things, it cannot do so without considering the role played by language in the formation of ideas. On the other hand, if grammar studies words inasmuch as they are used to express thoughts, it could not help describing the relations that it has with the ideas whose signs are these words. In a complete psychologico-grammatical parallelism, language will be understood as a method of analysis, and the discourse as an imitation of judgement. If grammar and logic have different aims, one concerning speech, the other, thought, they are not so as the sciences of the fields of essentially different objects.

Neither the study of truth, nor that of esprit, constitutes an autonomous domain with its specific objects. All these are related in a unique field, determined by the sound, the idea, and the object, and their relationship in the process of signification. This is the veritable unity of semiotics. All the researches on the origin of language and its constituting process in human communication aim at this unity. The ternary structure of signification is, above all, the limit of the cultural field, in other words, the field of semiotics.

This is why the notion of sign does not stand by itself. The sign cannot be understood by its own proper existence. It is the rapport between different elements where one being receives the status of a sign, by the fact that it enters into rapport with others. Its significance is purely operatory. It always refers to the process of signification, the objects that it denotes may vary. It follows that the problematics of the origin and the theory of the process of signification not only gives unity to semiotics by relating the elements which constitute it, it also distinguishes semiotics from all other disciplines where no such relating constituting process takes place. Semiotics, thus, becomes an autonomous discipline of investigation.

13. The ternary structure posits the independent existence of each of its terms which are placed in a certain relation by the theory of signification. The idea is placed in the esprit. The object exists in the word. The sound has·a physical existence with its own internal rules of formation. The sign is not a being constituted by the relation of these terms. It is an empty concept applied to one of these three terms due to this relation. There are three basic postulates:

(i)   The function of language is to represent thought and to communicate it.
(ii) The word is a sign of one or several ideas, or, one or several parts of thought.
(iii) The linguistic sign is arbitrary, i.e. it is not natural.

These postulates based on the realist hypothesis of the existence of things outside ideas affirm the ternary structure of the linguistic sign. The second is only an application of the first, where the word is considered as an element of language and the idea is conceived as an element of thought. It also explains the fact that neither language nor thought exists outside its elements. This is the hypothesis of what is called, the language-translation theory.

14. The postulate of language-translation theory presuppoes a direct correspondence between words and ideas. Two theses follow from this hypothesis: (a) the signification is based on one to one correspondence, (b) the terms have independent existence. This means that (c) there is a reciprocal independence of definition of terms, and that of the correspondence. There is as such a reciprocal independence of the significations (d). It is obvious that (c) leads to (d), for if the meanings of a word depend upon that of another word, its signification depends upon the correspondence between meaning and sound. For the eighteenth century linguists, the presence of a word is not due to another word, it is only an indication of the growing knowledge of the people. The vocabulary of a people is a reflection of their progress.

15. The hypothesis language-translation implies a general universality of ideas amongst all people. The ideas are universal, only the words are arbitrary. The arbitrariness is in the relationship that the ideas have with the words. This argument is not followed by all. There are linguists who do not believe that every language is a translation of a classical language. Different people have different set of ideas, sequence of their reasoning, and as such, the hypothesis of language-translation is falsified. This is the line that separates the idealist position of Descartes from the contingence position of Condillac.

But the argument continues. The sounds form a successive and divisible ensemble, whereas thought is a purely intellective object, which is·necessarily indivisible. Thought is both continuous and indivisible. This indivisibility lies in the very process of thinking. The act of the esprit can be analysed. The ideas can be considered separately, but this analysis is of different order. The words of the sentence correspond to the act of thought, but this

correspondence is with the entire utterance. For language, the rapport is that of the multiplicity of words with the unity of the sentence. Thought, on the other hand, is unitary and instantaneous, conceived in one act of the esprit. It is a global idea which is composed of other ideas. The expression of this thought can be formulated in language, either by one word, a noun, or a sequence of words, whose elements correspond to the constituents of this thought.

To the continuity of the act of thought is juxtaposed the discontinuity of language. Maupertuis believed that there can be no translation from one language to another as each language represents different ideas. By and large, the eighteenth century rejects this hypothesis. It is believed that the ideas pre-exist logically, and as such, are universal, the function of language is only to communicate them. Language is discontinuous. There are, in each language, a number of words which cannot be defined, but which help define others. They are, in a way, the first atoms of the signification of words. This fundamental discontinuity introduces an incommensurability between the representation and its objects. Diderot shows that there is necessarily a non-represented aspect of reality. Its nature is continuous, its representation is not necessarily so. This is why we do not have a separate sign for every significance. This leads to the hypothesis that the determination of a language in terms of the undefinable can be made in several ways.

16. Thought has to be enunciated to be communicated. And, the communication of thought requires that the thoughts be decomposed, i.e. analysed. *The analysis of thought is thus the immediate object of our speech. Analysis is the main function of language. It also impiles that without language, this analysis is not possible.* This is far more significant than to say that the function of language is to represent the analysed thought. Language is the vital instrument of the analysis of ideas. Condillac considers that every language is an analytical method, and conversely, every method is a language. Beauzée thinks that the words are the resultants of the analytical decomposition of our ideas.

The main problem is to know what is meant by the unity of the act of the esprit in correspondence with that of the sentence. It could be an original given concept whose decomposition or analysis reproduces the genesis of our ideas, or, it could be a thought, we ourselves constitute, but whose decomposition or analysis is all the same represented by an utterance. It is to admit that the words of a sentence represent ideas which come to the esprit only in the original unity of a thought.

The general ideas are abstracted by decomposition or analysis. As such, perception presents simultaneously several ideas to the esprit, and this simultaneity is given *a priori*. The exercise of thought necessitates its decomposition. Some are due to the active composition of our esprit. Analysis, as such, does not depend upon decomposition alone, but upon a sequence of compositions and decompositions. When we talk of a method or an analytical order, it does not mean that scientific approach consists primarily of the decomposition of our notions, it is to follow the natural order in which we apprehend ideas. In linguistics, we deal with the understanding of the unity of the significance of the words which compose it. In this

case, then, the analysis which corresponds to the multiplicity is opposed to the synthesis which is concerned with unity. Our signs are the resultants of our elementary ideas. Our sentences, on the other hand, bring together several words to express a single total idea, they represent synthetic operations, which take us to more complex (composite) ideas, and to the nature of things. The fundamental function of language is thus to present, successively, to the esprit, the ideas which are partial, but this is done in order to compose a total significance, i.e., just one idea.

17. The hypothesis of language-translation confuses the notions of representation, meaning, and denotation. The ideas are considered to be universal. They do not depend upon subjective determinations. Futhermore, the words do not designate the facts of the world, but the ideas of the facts of the world. A word is a noun, not because it designates a general idea. This is why it is difficult to distinguish the individual from its idea. There is only the concept of the class which designates either an ensemble of ideas or an ensemble of real beings. This ambiguity covers the definition of the identity of denotation, but the reverse is not true. The "evening star" and the "morning star" are the expressions which denote the same star, but they do not refer to the same meaning or significance.

The referential function of language is thus reduced to its analytico-synthetic function. In putting together several general ideas, the sentence reconstitutes a concrete idea of a thing or of a fact. As such, the significance of the sentence is identical with perception, the words of language are signs of general ideas. The perception formulates a concrete idea, but this concrete idea is a complex idea composed of general ideas. The sentence which composes the general idea is equivalent to a complex and concrete idea, projecting a specific perception.

18. In the case of true propositions based on facts, the comprehension of the linguistic mechanism as decompositon and recomposition of a global thought can be followed. But the next problem would be to see if a few words of a sentence can signify all the determinations which compose the perception of an individual. Condillac gives an example of a sentence; *the justice is always good*. For Condillac, the notion of justice is not abstracted from the composite ideas of real individuals; it is an artificial idea which has been constituted by us by means of several diverse ideas. This composite idea is then not a "given" idea, and the words of the sentence cannot be considered as decomposing a thought whose elements appeared initially in an ensemble to the esprit. The sentence can be taken as an analysis, for in composing the ideas to form a complete significance, it reproduces the genesis of the ideas. More so, if we consider the linguistic mechanasim, the words, *justice, always*, and *good* present successively to the esprit the ideas which compose the global idea constituting the significance of the sentence. As such, they represent an analysis of the significance. With this treatment, Condillac proposes an opposition between the analysis as concerned with the genesis of the idea, and the analysis as an explication of linguistic mechanism. It is admitted that every thought is not an already given, and the linguistic analysis is not a fractioning

of an initial given, it is a discrete presentation of the elements constituting a complete significance. Once we are in possession of ideas, we can compose them.

19. There are three types of propositions. The first are those whose significance is identical with a perception, which are true.The linguistic mechanism, decomposition and recomposition, reproduces the genesis of the ideas. The second are those whose significance is not identical with a perception. In this case, the sentence reproduces the genesis of the ideas, the linguistic mechanism does not play this role. The third are those whose significance is not identical with a perception, but in this case, the linguistic mechanism reproduces the genesis of the ideas.

In the treatment of propositions, three levels of semantics are posited: *the symbol, the thought* and *the object*. It is the idea which functions both for significance and denotation, but there is a distinction between the *idea as it is in the esprit,* and *the idea as it is in the object*. Every proposition shows an intellective existence of a subject. No proposition posits real existence which takes ideas out of nothing. It is within our comprehension, our understanding. For example, the notion of a "square circle", which cannot have a real existence, has in our comprehension an intellective existence. The propositions represent our thought. Their rapports with the objects, their denotation, are derived from the nature of these thoughts. The analytico-synthetic mechanism of language enables us to constitute an idea. This idea possesses an intellective existence, but it can also be an image of a real object. As such, on the one hand, the proposition is true, and on the other, the idea represents the thing. This means that only true propositions have denotation, and that to denote an object of the external world is not an essential property of an elementary sign.

Language has its own texture. The phenomena which are derived from it have the value of facticity. On the one hand, a word can be considered simply as a sign of an idea, and on the other, the application of ideas to things is to be considered with the bias of the words. This quality of the point of view constitutes a dividing line throughout the semiotic movement. Words must be stated, must be analysed.

20. The *nominalism* of the period consists of three basic theses. If is affirmed that without language, certain ideas are impossible. *Some ideas are only words*. And, some of our opinions or propositions are due only to language. The first step towards nominalism is taken when the universals in nature are not accepted, and the existence of the individuals is posited. This affirmation is at times posed as a corollary of the process of abstraction, and at others, as the genesis of general ideas based on sensations.

Rousseau states that the general ideas can be introduced into the esprit only with the help of words, and there can be no understanding without propositions. The general ideas are purely intellective. As soon as imagination is introduced, the general idea becomes specific. The abtstract beings are conceived only in a discourse. This implies that language is necessary for the development of thought. Rousseau asserts that linguistic relativism leads to ideational

relativism. *When the languages change signs, they, at the same time, modify the ideas they represent.* Reason is the only common factor. The esprit of each language has its specific form. But as reason is universal, thought cannot be placed in a veritable relativism.

Condillac emphasizes this thesis with the example of mathematics, where there could be no progress without signs. He asserts that there are people who do not have certain ideas because they do not have words to express them. One cannot keep on counting with just one word for the unit one, and keep on repeating the same for all calculations. But this thesis gets blurred when Condillac states that, on the one hand, the idea is a being that is distinct from the word, and on the other, that these representative properties are independent of language that expresses them. Thought pre-exists its expression. Condillac clarifies that the decomposition of thought presupposes its existence. It would be absurd to say that one begins to judge and reason only when one begins to represent to oneself successively what one knows. The main proposition is that *thought presents ideas simultaneously, and language or proposition, in a succession. On the one hand, there is confusion, on the other, there is order.* The absence of language is the absence of a distinct idea. Language enables us to analyse thought in two ways. The first is the way it represents an analysed thought, i.e., decomposed in elements which are expressed in succession. And, the second is the way it makes it possible to analyse thought by means of its arbitrariness, i.e., a succession of compositions and decompositions, which while obeying the natural order, constitute the veritable reasoning. If every language represents an analytical method, and every method, a language, it is because every language repressents, an analysed thought, and inversely, the analysis of thought is possible only in the elements of language.

21. The formal approach to language requires the use of variables, or at least, the codification of the procedures of substitution. The syntax of a formal language is defined by specifying the classes of variables, the connectors, the rules defining the classes of well formed expressions, and those which allow their derivation. The definition of different classes of variables already provides us with semantic information, but generally, the syntax is considered free from all semantic considerations in the context where the two types of rules are defined, and function, totally independent of the terms which can be substituted for the variables.

Syntax is thus conceived as an ensemble of procedures which regulate the formation of expressions with the help of a basic vocabulary. Its object is essentially the concatenation of the elementary expressions. Since it depends upon variables and substitutions, it leads to two necessary consequences. One can consider that the domain of substitution is constituted of objects (individuals or predicates) and study the rapport of the possible syntactic formation. This gives us the logical syntax, which cannot serve as a basis of a linguistic semantics, as it takes into account only the reference of expressions. We can then consider that the domain of substitution is constituted of the expressions of a natural language, and the rules of substitution are the rules of re-writing, one may leave aside the variables.

This conception of syntax is not possible in the eighteenth century. The rapport of the general to the particular is always conceived as that of the content with the container. This means that syntax is far from being independent of semantics. It depends entirely upon the theory of ideas. The primary concern of grammar, both in Port Royal and in the following century, is the analysis of content. Port Royal defines syntax as the construction of the ensemble of words, i.e., as the establishment of rapport of the signs of our ideas. Syntax is considered exclusively as the operation of concatenation. The preoccupation of General Grammar is the elaboration of the classes of words on the basis of the modes of their designations, the functional categories occupy very little place. There is no discussion of morphology.

In the eighteenth century, syntax is given a very important place in the study of grammar. Du Marsais and his followers develop the various notions of the period. The object of synatx is not the operation of concatenation as in Port Royal but its resultant becomes the aim. Syntax is concerned with the grouping of words to express a thought, in other words, a proposition. Secondly, syntax is not an appendix of classification of words. On the contrary, it is syntax that determines their respective function. The point of departure is not the categories of words, it is the complete expression of thought. Thirdly, an important place is given to morphology in the study of syntax. But it is made clear that it is not the form of words which classifies them in different categories, it is the use of the words, and not the differences in sounds which places them in different classes. Fourthly, the understanding of syntax is necessary for the understanding of the functioning of languages. Just as the individual significance of words does not suffice to understand a sentence, one should comprehend the nature of their rapport which the words have amongst them. It is due to this rapport that words acquire significance.

22. Language is the image of our thought. As such, a proposition must be the image. The proposition corresponds to the one unique act of esprit, the linguistic expression transforms this simultaneity into succession, i.e., into several words signifying different ideas, translating a unique thought. This implies firstly, that the unity of thought is a primitive term with rapport to which all must be explained. Secondly, that these ideas designated by the terms of the linguistic proposition must have amongst them certain rapport to restitute the unity of thought. Thirdly, to be the image of this thought, the linguistic proposition must have the signs of these rapports. The development of the study of syntax in the eighteenth century thus corresponds to the point of view of the proposition considered as a given totality. This point of view also clarifies the distinction between the universal categories of reason, and the concrete elements of contingence in each language. The rapports are: *identity, determination,* and *order*. The contingence of linguistic facts depends upon the arbitrainess with which are instituted the signs of these rapports. The syntactic arbitratiness is only an example of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign. As the rapports between words refer to the three types of possible rapports between ideas, the linguistic procedures to which they correspond can be brought to the three main relations: *concordance, regime. construction.*

23. The theory of linguistic proposition depends upon the identification of the significance with that of an idea, pre-existing in esprit with the expression that is realised by it. Beauzée states that our words are the resultants of the analytical decomposition of our ideas. Our sentences, which bring together several words to express a unique total idea, are as many synthetic operations, which bring us closer to more composite ideas, and to the nature of things, and which consequently, render our discourse intellectively more intelligible. From this point of view, the grammatical theory, or theory-2, can be presented as: a proposition is an addition of serveral ideas to constitute one single idea. Condillac refers to a similar definition when he states that a proposition corresponds to a single global perception. Theory-1 and theory-2, differ in the definitions of the verity that they enable us to constitute. For theory-1, a proposition is true if the idea of the predicate is well enclosed in the subject. For theory-2, a proposition is true if the global idea, which is its significance, corresponds to a fact, i.e., either to a perception, or to a part of a perception. Every proposition that is true for theory-1 is also true for theory-2. The proposition, *the dogs are white*, is not true according to the criteria of theory-1. If we are in the presence of white dogs, this proposition is true from the point of view of theory-2, The two classes of true propositions coincide only if we accept that the cases similar to this given example, the expression, the dogs are white, does not designate the nature of the individuals or the species of dogs, but only of those who are before us, i.e., the sentence is not interpreted as "the idea of dog encloses the idea of white". In any case, one has to explain how the expression of a general idea joined to an expression of another general idea, enables us to designate an idea which is neither one, nor the other. This is the aim of theory-2. As such, it is more general than theory-1.

Since the proposition is conceived as the expression of a pre-existing idea, theory-1 poses sentence as the object of its study This also implies that a sentence expresses a complete significance. This notion of completeness signifies three aspects of the sentence. Firstly, the absence of an element renders the significance of the sentence incomplete. Consequently, the elements responsible for this complete significance are obligatory. Secondly, there are in a sentence certain elements whose function is to complete its significance. Thirdly, the elements which serve to complete the significance cannot be used on their own.

The main chracteristics of theory-2 is that of *determination*. A linguistic element determines another. It does not delimit a class of objects. What theory-2 asserts is that the elements of a sentence coordinate with each other to complete significance. Consequently, each of them determines the other. This determination is not a specific rapport between words. It is the relation that constitutes the concatenation of words in a sentence.

The theory-2 of the proposition explicates the mechanism of determination at the level of *designation*. Du Marsais explains that common nouns become proper nouns with the help of the words that are joined with them to make a specific application. Beauzée interprets a proposition, whose subject is in plural, as a conjunction of propositions of the same attribute, but having subjects with the proper nouns, individuals, constituting the extension of the words to plural. It is the rapport between *comprehension* and *extension* that is the basis of the

theory of designation, for if a group of ideas constitute a correct image of things, it is because the ensemble leads to better comprehension. This is possible if all the linguistic relations are conceived as the application of ideas to things, and syntax is a tributary of the law of Port Royal on the correlative variations of extension and comprehension. This is possible if all the linguistic relations are conceived as specific forms of determination, and that all these relations be susceptible of being derived from different characteristics of determination, i.e., their differences can only be due to the characteristics of the terms used where there is a relation of determination. Consequently, for each syntactic phenomenon that can be empirically recognised, there is a corresponding rapport of *determination*.

24. Words are classified in different categories on the basis of their use or their function in a sentence. The category of adjectives refers to a word which serves to reduce the extension of another word It also enables us to differentiate between two catagories of adjectives on the basis of the ideas designated by them. Thus the *physical adjectives* are those which designate undetermined beings by a precise idea, which added to another of determined nature, constitute with it a totally different idea, whose comprehension is increased with this operation. The *metaphysical adjectives* are those which designate the undetermined by a precise idea, which added to those whose nature is determined, constitute with it, a total idea, whose comprehension is always the same, but whose extension is restricted.

There are however two points where the aspect of determination does not seem to be susceptible of dominating directly. On the one hand, the composition of ideas with which the linguistic expression forms an image of things, the restriction of extension with which this image is made more precise does not affect just any elements of this composition, not even each of them. Thus in the expression, *pious man*, it is not the idea of man that restrains the signification of pious, neither each of the two ideas which restrict each other reciprocally, but only that of pious, which restricts the extension of man. On the other hand, in a sentence, the terms receive differentiated functions, where the simplest are those of *subject* and *predicate*. Thus, in the expression, *that man is ignorant*, the two terms do not have the same function of restricting reciprocally their extensions. All these issues are supposed to be taken care of by the following criteria.

Firstly, there are ontologic criteria. The applicative nouns signify beings by the idea of their common nature. The proper nouns express individual natures, and other words designate a being by its precise nature, which may be general, accidental, or applicable to several natures.

Secondly, there are logical criteria. They enable us to assign specific roles to words in a sentence, like subject and attribute. The subject is a part of the proposition which expresses a being whose existence is perceived by the esprit with a given relation, with certain modifications of the manner of being. The attribute is a part of the proposition that expresses the intellective existence of the subject, with a given relation, with certain modifications of the manner of being.

Thirdly, there are morphological criteria. With this principle, the first opposition is maintained between the declinables and indeclinables. It enables us to differentiate between the interjections, nouns, pronouns, adjectives and verbs, on the one hand, and prepositions, adverbs and conjunctions, on the other.

The first criterion is compatible with the theory of ideas, since the classification follows the order from the general to the particular. The second is compatible with the first. The ontological distinction, essence/accident functions also in the case of noun/adjective or verb, and for subject/attribute. There are thus two ways of considering a sentence, either as an *affirmation*, or as a *composition of ideas*. The third criterion serves explicitly in the cases where the first two do not function, as where the words designate the ideas of rapport amongst ideas.

25. This analysis leads to the distinction between the *determinative* words and the *indeterminative* words, depending upon whether they can be subjects, nouns or pronouns, or adjectives or verbs in a sentence. The subject is determined, i.e., the word that is used first determines what follows; it denotes an object.

The global term of *determination* is used in two ways. The first is reserved for the fact when the extension of a word is reduced by the addition of another. It may be termed as *a-determination*. A word is more or less *a-determinated* as its extension is more or less marked. The other is for the word that denotes an object of a subject, *b-determination*. Only the proper noun is *a-determinable*. And, only the nouns and pronouns are *b-determinable*. These two aspects are not derived from the same level. The first is based on the theory of ideas, theory-2. The second results from the consideration of the role of words in a sentence, or the being they are susceptible of designating.

The role of the structure, subject-predicate, is defined by two features. Firstly, these categories appear to be liberated of the Aristotelian ontological import. Even though the *subject* designates a nature or an essence, and the predicate, an accident of this nature, the two do so by the intermediary of ideas. The main aspect of determination is thus applicable to them. Secondly, even though, for their definition, and for the definition of the proposition in general, reference is made to the characteristics derived from theory-2, the categories of subject and predicate are employed in an antonomous manner. It is only after the division of the sentence into subject and predicate that the grammar of the Age of Enlightenment is primarly a *syntagmatic grammar*. It also means that far from being a theory of concurrence, the analysis of a sentence into subject and predicate takes place within theory-2. The proposition is posited as object by this theory, the categories of subject and predicate allow the first division (po—>S+P), and the other follows:
(S—>article+noun+adjective)

Syntax must examine the matter and the form of the propositions. The matter of the proposition is the totality of the parts which enter into composition. They can be of two types: logical or grammatical. The logical parts are the total expressions of each of the

ideas the esprit perceives in the analysis of thought, as the *subject*, the *attribute* and the *copula*. The grammatical parts of the proposition are the words which are included here by the needs of the enunciation of a language to constitute the totality of the logical parts. And, the form of the proposition consists of the specific inflections and the respective arrangements of the different parts which compose it.

The rapport between the logical parts and the grammatical parts confirms the syntagmatic aspect of the syntax of this period. The first decomposition is obviously into subject and predicate. The different types of propositions are due to the manner in which the grammatical parts constitute the logical parts. The *composite propositions* are those which express the rapport of one subject with several predicates, or of several subjects with one predicate. The *complex propositions* are those whose logical parts include, other than the article, more than one word. A sentence has logical parts if its rapports can be analysed at their own level, and which are thus within the order of the fragmentation of grammatical parts.

26.The difference between ideas can be of two types. They are either based on the representative content of the ideas placed in rapport with each other, and can thus be deduced from the theory of ideas alone, or, they require other criteria. The distinction between *explication* and *determination* is based on the first type. Beauzée states that a proposition is explicative when it serves to develop the comprehension of a partial idea with which it is related. It is determinative when it adds an accessory idea for the comprehension of the partial idea with which it is related. He provides three tests for the verification of each of them.

For the *explicative*, firstly, instead of connecting incident with antecedent and a conjunctive meant for this purpose, one can make it the principal element and connect it with another principal proposition with one of the two causative conjunctions.

Secondly, one may separate the explicative, *incidental proposition* from the *principal proposition*, without changing its significance.

Thirdly, one may also without changing the verity, substitute the antecedent of the conjunctive, to transform the explicative, incidental proposition into a *principal proposition*, by submitting the antecedent to the same syntax as that of the conjunctive, whose place it takes.

For the determinative, instead of connecting the incident with the antecedent and a conjunctive, one may convert it into a principal element, and connect it to another principal element with a conditional conjunction, *if, when, while,* or some other equivalent pharse.

Secondly, one cannot separate the determinative, incidental proposition from the principal proposition without changing its significance and its verity.

Thirdly, one can neither transform, without falsifying the determinative, incidental proposition, into principal proposition, nor by substituting the antecedent with the conjunctive of the incident.

The distinction between *explicative* and *determinative* reposes on the rapport of the semantic value of the relational with that of the nominal group with which it is related. It depends upon the theses on the structure of the word, i.e., its knowledge.

In the sentence, (a) *the dogs who are white are noticed easily at night*, the incidence is determinative. This sentence is pronounced in the circumstances that the dogs in question are those of my neighbour. The replacement of the article with the deictic enables us to recognise the incidence as an explicative, as in the sentence, (b) *these dogs who are white are noticed easily at night*. The second feature corresponds to the use of verity amongst the criteria of distinction, or the verity of the proposition, constituted by the subject of the principal element and the verbal group of the incidence. The explicative or determinative character of the incidence depends upon the relation recognised between the class corresponding to the subject, and the one corresponding to the characteristics expressed by the incidence.

In the following examples:

(c) The swans who are white are noticed at night.
(d) the man who laughs is above simple nature.

It is clear, that depending upon whether one knows the existence of black swans or not, the test enables us to classify the incidence as explicative or determinative. For the sentence (d), the application of this criterion is ambiguous, for only man laughs, but there are men who do not laugh. Consequently, the incidence will be considered explicative or determinative depending upon one of the following contexts applied to it:

(d i) The animal is only a part of nature.
(d ii) The man who is always sad submits himself to nature.

The distinction between explicative or determinative incidence thus depends upon the context, and, is relative to the rapport of the linguistic elements with the known structure of the world. In this study, three levels of analysis are recognised. Firstly, a level related to the relative autonomy of language, which by means of morpho-syntactic features, appears on surface, and authorises this distinction. Secondly, a level, where the criteria connected with enunciation or presupposition intervene. Thirdly, a level, where the interpretation of the sentence is guided by the intervention of a discursive formation. The "relationals" thus cover a frontier region between the linguistic level and the discursive level. *General Grammar operates exclusively with the notional content of the words. It is thus a grammar of discourse, and not of sentence.*

Beauzée treats both the isolated sentence and the connected discourse in the same manner. The first presents a significance that is complete and finite. The second is the expression or complete and finite significance with the help of several propositions which

are not intergral parts of each other, but which are related to each other in such a way that the ones presuppose necessarily the others for the plenitude of the total significance. In this sense, explication is understood as a sort of neutralisation of determination and not as its negation. It also means that the earlier definition of language, as an application of ideas on things and of the proposition, as a more correct image of things, is not considered sufficient; language and proposition, with the help of explication, serve also to define things and their ideas, and consequently, the words which designate them.

27. The opposition between determination and explication enables us to handle linguistic phenomena which are concerned more with the expansion of elementary sentence than with the sentence itself. This is due to the opposition between identity and determination. There are fundamental explicatives and rational categories in the syntax of the eighteenth century.

Du Marsais explains that there are two types of rapports between words; the rapport of *identity,* and the rapport of *determination.* One does not exclude the other. Both are expressed in a sentence by the concordance of different inflections of the words in question. There is as such the same sign for both these rapports. This is evident from the sentences: (1) *Sandrine is the sister of Eric,* and (2) *Anila loves music.* The identity is thus concerned with the relations of the subject with the attribute, and, of the subject with the verb. The determination is concerned with the relations of noun and verb with their respective complements. The first part of these sentences expresses identity, and the latter, the determination.

Beauzée explains the notion of identity. The noun and the adjective are one, and it is the same with the verb and its subject, expressed by two different types of words under different aspects. The characteristics of identity of the beings, denoted by different expressions, enables us to specify the relation of *a-determination* between the two terms. The characteristics require that one of the terms of the rapports denotes something. This can be interpreted as the intervention of an ontological criterion. At the same time, denoting something is a fact of a specific class of ideas, whose specificity is brought out by their representative content, which is their common nature. The rapport of identity can thus be considered as a specification of a rapport of determination by the internal characteristics of the terms of the rapport.

For the rapports of determination, it is not sufficient to accumulate words indifferently to express a thought. There must be, amongst them, a universal correlation, which covers the expression of total significance. The appelative nouns, the prepositions, the relative verbs, have vague significance, which must be determined. This determination is based on the nouns, which are related to the determined words. It is the undetermined words which govern the determined words.

This conception of syntax of the elementary sentence is used at least at three levels of analysis: the terms (different types of words), their relations (identity and determination), and the marks of these relations (concordance, inflections, order, prepositions). This approach can be compared with modern functional grammar. Both try to assign a correspondence between different marks and semantic features. In the eighteenth century, however, there is no criterion of functionality. There is no realisation of the need of identifying the reality of

each mark with its distinction.The effort is to repeat a semantic feature and to assign to it a class of marks, whose diversity and functioning are left to the arbitrary use of language.

These categories of identity and determination, even though they are independent of marks, enable the grammarians to elaborate what may be called, the grammar of constituents. This confirms again the syntagmatic aspect of the syntax of this period.

There are two types of relations functioning within a sentence. The ones are internal, in the different syntagmatic groupings, and the others, which have these different syntagmatic groupings between them. All these relations, of identity and determination, are binary relations. The function and utility of the structure, subject/predicate, are situated at this level. This enables us to recognise the first fragmentation of the sentence into nominal group and verbal group. The structure, subject/predicate, is indispensible to this analysis as they describe essentially the existing rapports within the syntagmatic groups. Every syntagmatic grouping takes place with only one of these terms of the other group. And, the different groups are thus constituted in two principal groups by means of the respective relations. Thus, even though the basis of this syntax is primarily semantic, it functions with morpho-semantic categories.

28. One of the main problems debated in the eighteenth century is that of *construction* and *inversion* of sentences. The term construction is almost synonymous with syntax. The construction of sentences concerns the rapports of the ideas signified by words, and the signs of these rapports. In another sense, construction implies the arrangement of words of a sentence. With the same words, and the same rapports, we can have several arrangements. This notion of construction allows them to present a natural arrangement of words, and another order as inversion, with rapport to the former. The problem of inversion becomes the principal problem for the grammarians. It is considered as central to the study of semiotics. To understand the various implications of this problematics, the following operations of the emission of the sentence are considered.

Ai   to conceive of a thought,
Aii to take an ensemble of ideas which constitute a decomposition of this thought,
Aiii to see the rapports which these ideas may have to constitute this thought,
Bi   to take the (arbitrary) signs of ideas,
Bii to join them with the (arbitrary) signs of their rapports,
Biii to arrange these signs in a successive order.

This operation takes place at two levels: at the level of (universal) thought, and at the level of the signs of the (arbitrary) thought. The first hypothesis, h i admits that the general grammar is constructed at the first level, and the specific grammar of each language is constructed at the second level. The general grammar would thus need another hypothesis, h ii, with which it becomes relevant to a specific grammar. It is also accepted that one of the

main characteristics of language is to present in temproal succession what comes to the esprit in just one act, h iii.

The operation B iii corresponds to hypothesis h iii, it also serves as a basis of a more general hypothesis where there are rules of arrangement of words in sentences, h iv. The problem then would be the exact status of these rules, or how to take account of the construction of sentences.

If these rules are derived from general explication, they have to be based at the level of ideas, h i and h ii. Therefore, a universal order of the rapports of ideas will have to be posited, h v. The order of the sentence corresponds to a temporal succession. The order of ideas can be temporal or logical. The simultaneity of the act of the esprit with which we comprehend the significance of a sentence poses a problem for the definition of the temporal order of ideas. The hypothesis h iii forbids us to have the order of words at the level, A i. The universal order is possible then at the level, A ii. At this level, the theory of concept gives us a certain concept of order: the specific terms precede the general terms, the ideas of substance precede those of their quality. This would imply that in the analytical construction of a sentence, the words should be classified from more specific to more general, and every predecessor in linguistic expression be a predecessor in the flow of ideas.

The operation followed at the B iii level and the fourth hypothesis, h iv, imply that there is a usual order of construction in a given language. The arbitrariness of language implies the arbitrariness of this order. The definition of universal order does not negate this arbitrary order. The second hypothesis, h ii, of the pertinence of general grammar states simply that there are codified manners, which are based on contingence, which can elude this order. The distinction between general grammar and specific grammar is that of universality and contingence. Consequently, a universal rule, as that of the arrangement of words, cannot depend upon arbitrary determination.

29. Du Marsais states that in every language, the determining words are preceded by determined words. When this is not so, it is called inversion, h vi. This hypothesis does not contradict the fifth hypothesis, h v, nor even the idea with which the rules of general grammar are to be based on the level of thought, for its formulation reposes on the conception of ideal rapports (the *a-determination*).

The reason for considering the notion of inversion as an important concept arises from the fact that certain languages depend more upon the order of words in a sentence, others, less. The grammarians admit that the signs of the syntactic rapports are arbitrary, i.e., they vary according to different languages. The order of words is thus considered both arbitrary and universal.

Condillac presents the syntax of French in terms of the sixth hypothesis. He gives six rules:

R i.   The order of words in a simple proposition is subject-verb-attribute.

R ii.   The object must immediately follow the verb, or at least, it cannot be

separated from it except by the modification of verb itself.

R iii.   The noun, complement of the adjective, must follow the adjective.

R iv.   The noun, complement of the substantive, does not have a fixed place.

R v.   The incidental or relative propositions follow the substantive.

R vi.   The subordinated propositions do not have fixed place in a sentence.

The principal chracteristics of these rules is their obligatory aspect. The obligation is derived from two sources: the first is the source of usage, and the other is that when in a language the syntactic rapports are indicated elsewhere, there is no need of a specific order. What is arbitrary, is, on the one hand, the importance of order to indicate the rapports, and, on the other, the existence of rules concerning the place of words when their rapports are already indicated elsewhere. If in the last case, there are no rules of usage concerning the order of words, their arrangement in a sentence is free.

The problem of inversion is not directly raised by Condillac. He is not interested in the question whether construction of a sentence is simple or figurative. His definition of direct order serves him to derive grammatical rules, like R ii, but generally he talks about inversion only when there is no obligatory syntactic rule concerning the place of terms. This is why for him there are more inversions in Latin than in French. The question of inversion has been shifted from the grammatical level to the level of stylistics. The universal order of ideas is not invoked to justify the order, subject-verb-object. On the other hand, he states that there should be no inversion when the rapport of words is marked by the place they occupy. The distinction between syntax and construction ensures the independence and the discovery of the domain of stylistics.

30. One of the reasons of this concern for the notion of inversion in the eighteenth century is an attempt to assign an order to different languages, and to see which is more adequate for the expression of thought. This is why this problematics takes a central position in semiotics. The discussion is organised around three points: the ambiguity of the adjective; natural in the expression, the natural order; the criteria of the definition of this order, and *nationalism*.

The adjective, *natural*, signifies, universal, primitive, original, habitual, or spontaneous. The notion of inversion depends upon the significance attached to this word, and consequently, different grammarians will take different languages which would be considered to reverse the order of ideas. For Condillac, the natural order is the one that we follow as a consequence of our habit. This enables him to exclude the problem of inversion for his analysis of syntax. Du Marsais is ambiguous. Others take natural as confirming to the universal order of ideas. Abbé Batteaux defines the order of words in three ways: relative to the reciprocal rapport of words as governing/governed, or what he calls, the grammatical order; relative to the reciprocal rapports of ideas (the metaphysical order); relative to the aim of the one who speaks (the oratory order or the order of objects). The *grammatical order* is the order of the determining words with the determined words. The *metaphysical order* is the order of science that

analyzes ideas. Only the *oratory order* is natural. It presents to the esprit, the objects according to the degree of interest or importance for the one who expresses. As such, French would be considered as an "inversion" language for the grammatical functions are marked by the place the words occupy in a sentence. For Batteaux, the inversion language is Latin. Diderot recognizes the diversity of criteria. There are the grammatical order, the order of institution (convention), the order of syntax, the order of the invention of words, and, the *scientific order*. What is inversion for one is natural for the other. This order depends upon the development or the progression of a language.

The three states of the constituting process, the origin, the formation, and, the perfection, are responsible for the scientific order, and the order of harmony of thought. The way these are derived or reconstructed depends upon the importance one attaches to one's own language. French, thus, becomes the most scientific language of the world. Intellectual nationalism plays a significant role in this analysis. Ideology and science go together.

CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE

The Semiotics of Parole and Langue

Parole and langue are the two most misunderstood concepts in modern linguistics. From Saussure onwards we are told that parole refers to the individual's speech and langue corresponds with the social, collective norm. Parole is disparate, disintegrated behaviour depending on a given individual's mental vicissitudes and langue is the system, the controlling structure. Parole is performance of this unpredictable, unbridled behaviour and langue is the underlying competence that is supposed to make some sense of the innumerable variables of a large number of individuals. These and various other attempts at describing the reality of these two parameters which in fact can not be described in any varifiable framework lead us nowhere.

The reason of this absolute confusion is the positivist obsession with scientific empiricism that wants to juxtapose these two conceptual categories in the straightjacket of data-based investigation. The American scholars wanted a clearly delineated object of study, the speech behaviour, to be able to derive descriptive, transformational or generative rules. For this purpose they invented the notion of ideolect, sometimes called, the dialect of the idiot, and for good reason, for no individual speaks in isolation.

There is always a speaker and an auditor in any communication system. What is spoken must be understood or misunderstood, and it is in the dialectics of this understanding and misunderstanding that lies the key to the understanding of the concepts of parole and langue, of the human communication system as such.

The constitution of signification according to the twelfth century French philosopher, Pierre Abélard, depends upon the correspondence between the word and the idea on the one hand, and the idea and the thing on the other. We experience "things" like father, mother, love, hate, affection, attention, jealousy, sincerity in specific situations. The names or words for these experiences and what they are supposed to approximately convey are already there in the language we are operating. However, we begin to have our own permutations and combinations of the ideas or the characteristic features of these experiences. In other words, our exeperiences are both physical and mental. Their constitution of signification depends upon our faculties of *perception, imagination* and *memory*. And, we begin to use linguistic words not as physical entities with one to one correspondence with their supposed objects but as veritable semiotic constructs to participate in our own existential, semiotic universe which is subjected to the same perspective projection. Abélard also says that language is a means of communication between different "thinking beings." Every individual thinking

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* Paper presented at the Twenty-fifth Semiotics Reunion, Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1993.

being wants the other to understand not what the other understands of a given situation but how the being perceives that situation. There are thus two parameters at work, the social, anthropological parameter and the individual, existential parameter. At this stage of our argument, the former may be called, the parameter of langue, and the latter, the parameter of parole. If in the dialectics of these two poles of langue and parole, there is a tolerable correspondence, or what is generally called, understanding, the being and the other get married, and if after five, ten or twenty years of daily use or misuse of these two aspects of human communication system this correspondence becomes fuzzy, the being and the other get divorced. And, in common parlance, we even say that they do no more speak the same "language", and the word, language, is used here in the same way as the word, wine is used when we say that they drink from the same cup but not the same wine.

It is obvious that the words, same or different, here do not refer to any physically manifest reality that the positivist linguist can transcribe in vowels and consonants or nouns and verbs and derive rules therefrom. The paroles of the being and the other can neither be absolutely the same nor absolutely different. There is no point in talking if we have nothing different to say and we better avoid talking if our thoughts are diametrically opposed to each other. Human communication is thus realised in a very delicate balance between the same and the different.

Existentially speaking, the being and the other derive their "beings" from each other. While explaining the relationship of paternity and filiation in the context of the Holy Trinity, Abélard demonstrated the reciprocity and simultaneity of Father(hood) and son(hood). There is a man and a woman. They marry each other and "become" husband and wife simultaneously due to this mutual act of marriage. Then there is a child. The birth of the child confers on husband and wife the epithets of father and mother. In other words, the child and the father or the child and the mother give "birth" to each other. This relationship is reciprocal and mutually dependent and there is absolutely no question of hierarchy. In terms of the semiotics of conceptual structures this is true of any two poles of relationship, and only in such a relationship there is correspondence and communication. The Freudian Oedipus construct posits a system of relationships of hierarchy and conflict, and consequently of the break of communication. Modern binary notation of plus and minus for voiced/voiceless, man/woman consciously or unconsciously accept this hierarchy.

The semiotic conceptualisation of parole and langue tells us that while all paroles must be different from each other, representing individual, personal perceptions, they must also coexist in a certain harmonious correspondence to enable the community, the group, the family to hold together. If parole is the personal linguistic parameter of the being, langue is that of the other. Parole is different from langue, for it represents one's existential experiences, but the consciousness that this parole must be understood by the other, keeps the parole within the general parameter of langue. However, parole and langue are not empirically identifiable. As the being and the other are the being and the other of each other, so parole and langue are also parole and langue of each other. Both of these operate within the domain of cognition. Their semiotic functioning is autoregulatory.

Whenever a society ignores this autoregulatory aspect of parole and langue and imposes a given parole in terms of the standard norm of linguistic. religious. cultural. ideological behaviour. the communication breaks and the system stops functioning sooner or later. There is outright conflict and collapse. We see it in the Freudian universe of the Oedipus construct and in the more recent attempts at the ideological dictatorships of the parole. I was very happy to listen to the BBC the other day when it was stated that there are more than twenty varieties of the RP. The English language will live. for there is no such thing as " the" English language. If there had not been "the" Marxist doctrine. Marxism today would have been alive and kicking.

Every year I observe this dialectics of parole and langue within the JNU students community. When some students arrive from small town Bharat, they have a cultural shock but soon the process of adjustment and negotiated communication begins. There is no official code of dress, of relationships between the students of the two genders, of political affiliations. The Academic Council has never deilberated over what the students should wear or how the students should behave socially or politically. and yet all of them are decently dressed every morning. demonstrate civil and cordial behaviour in the evening and very mature political consciousness at every election. The system is perfectly autoregulatory.

When the students arrive on the JNU campus. they perceive the langue of the students` dress and flock to the Cottage. Gujarat and other emporia and the various ethnic boutiques in the town. It is a highly complicated. drawn out mental process, for it is not at all a simple affair of imitation and of wearing what the others wear. Very soon one realises that the so-called norm. the langue is only an illusion. What one confronts with is a series of paroles interacting with each other and one has to make a very serious personal effort to be an effetive and acceptable part of this very illusory langue. This process is highly creative. One has to have a very discerning sense of designing to be existentially situated somewhere in this overall pattern. and we see that in spite of their best efforts with all the money at their disposal. it takes a fairly long time for the students to achieve the desirable integration. Some show a visible frustration and some transcend and contribute to the ever evolving parameter of langue. Some are able to dialectically interact with their own parole. their own personal. creative ideas and give fillip to the dynamacity of designs. As the langue of dress is only a matter of perception. there being no one given parole representing the langue, the participation in this phenomenon has to be personal and creative.

The dialectics of relationship between the two genders of students is slightly more complicated but here also the autoregulatory network functions in a quite harmonious atmosphere. The apparent. unbridled absolute freedom of parole is soon confronted with the dialectics of langue. The being and the other are the controlling and constricting factors. The most important ingredient here obviously is the respect of the other which prevails invisibly but surely under different behaviourial parameters. The langue of extreme hard work and obsession with career in the form of qualifying for JRF and civil service exams also inflects this parameter. It is often said that the rate at which the JNU students are joining Indian Civil Service. very soon the whole Bharat will be colonised by the JNU alumni. And. if after

midnight the students leave the library to go to Ganga Dhaba to have tea with their girl or boy friends, the parents should not worry too much, for they are morally and socially far more balanced than the girls in captivity back home in the small towns. In any case, the ever increasing inter-faith and inter-regional relations are probably the most important contribution to true secularism and national integration.

This does not mean that there are no lapses, but the autoregulatory system is strong enough to absorb occasional shocks. In this context one can say that like parole and langue, freedom and responsibility are the two sides of the same coin. These four concepts must be juxtaposed within the semiotics of human communication.

An interesting example of this autoregulatory dialectics of the being and the other is given in Jean-Paul Sartre's play, Huis Clos (No Exit) where in the hell there are no instruments of torture or the executioners but it is the other who tortures the being and the play ends with, L'enfer: c'est les autres, Hell: it is the others. One can say the same thing about heaven. Whether it is hell or heaven, it is existentially situated within the dialectics of the being and the other, within the dialectics of parole and langue.

Jacques Lacan once said, *la femme n'existe pas*, and the feminists were upset. He however added, but, *les femmes existent*. There is no such thing as "the" woman, empirically, there are only different individual women. "The" woman conceived as an archetype or average woman is only a conceptual reality. Similarly, there is no such individual as the archetype or the average JNU student one can emulate or look upon as a model on the parameter of langue. As all men do not constitute "humanity", there is no such thing as the common denominator of the JNU students. Human beings are not numbers whose addition and factorisation can help us arrive at the ideal average. And, if langue is not a visible reality, the visible manifestation of the individual, the parole, is also an illusion, for the elementary structure of signification that every parole represents is constituted in the collateral juxtaposition of (word → idea) ↔ (idea → thing) in the tripartite domain of perception, imagination and memory. A given parole is as much a conceptual construct as any other. Its constitution is a heavily charged creative activity that is in constant dialectic interaction with other conceptual constructs, other paroles. It is existentially situated in the dialectics of perception and imagination, present and past, metonymy and metaphor, subconscience and conscience. It is the understanding of this dialectics that enabled Lacan to state that our subconscience was structured like language. The movement from parole to langue is the movement from perception to imagination with the constraint of the consciousness that this movement is dialectically related with other similar movements. This is the only way the human creativity and the human communication can have perfect correspondence.

This leads us to the problematics of the correspondence between the creation and the model. There have been innumerable attempts at locating the model of Mona Lisa. Semiotically, this search is futile, for whoever might have been the model, the created painting transcends her empirical reality. The painting represents the conceptual construct of the artist. It is only in this context that such a rhetorical question can be asked: is Mona Lisa a man or a woman? Recently, there have been some psychocritique attempts to prove that Mona Lisa is after all

de Vinci himself. In a similar psychocritique Jean-Paul Sartre has analysed the realism of Gustave Flaubert's Madame Bovary. In European fiction, Flaubert is considered to be the father of realism but Sartre says that the presentation is so real, it just could not be. In other words, this realism of the nineteenth century bourgeois France is constituted in the imaginaire of Flaubert. And, Sartre poses similar questions when he asks: is Madame Bovary a woman or a man disguised as a woman? Is she in fact Flaubert himself ? And, in the juxtaposition of psychocritique and Marxism, Sartre asks: what do we understand by the feminist experience by a man in the nineteenth century bourgeois society of metropolitan France? These are rhetorical questions. They cannot be answered. They are not supposed to be answered, for in the very ambiguity of these propositions presented in grammatically interrogative forms, are located their responses. In both these cases, of Mona Lisa and Madame Bovary, the empirical models are both represented and transcended. All human creativity is situated within this dialectics of representation and transcendence, in other words, of parole and langue.

To conclude, to the dialectics of representation and transcendence there is a corresponding dialectics of existential and anthropological consciousness, on the one hand, and that of anthropological and cosmological consciousness, on the other.

Let us take the two examples of the statues of Jesus on the Cross and Shiva Natraja. They have iconographic formal representations which are socially, culturally, anthropologically accepted. Every artist has to adhere to these forms. The creativity of the artist however lies in the existential understanding of the conceptual constructs they represent, the divine agony and suffering in the case of Jesus and the cosmic dance in the case of Shiva. In other words, the artist must transcend the iconographic representation. Without giving the impression that he has violated the so-called anthropological consciousness, the artist must rise to the cosmological consciousness, for the creative act is situated within this dialectics of cosmological transcendence of our universe, our very personal, existential, and, social, anthropological universe. Thus the journey from parole to langue takes place in the domain of cognition where the conceptual constructs of parole are successively crystallised on the higher and higher planes of langue.

Form and Substance

1. In the domain of signification Saussure distinguishes between the empirical phonetic realisation of an utterance and its *acoustic image*. The phonetic form is physical and is subjected to phonetic or phonologic analysis in concrete entities. The acoustic image, on the other hand, is a form that is a reflection of the *imaginaire*. It leaves a certain resonance in one's memory that serves as *evocative* gesture. It is an acoustic trace on the psychic comportment. It is a point of departure for the future constitution of formal discourses.

In the acquisition of language, the phonetic substance of utterances serves only as a base. As language is acquired in specific existential situations, the acoustic images of the utterances are embedded in these psychic moments. We acquire and remember them in the very signifying ensembles where they were pronounced to communicate a whole set of linguistic and cultural entities. As the acquisition of language is not independent of the acquisition of other communication channels of cultural behaviour which include all the patterns of relationships, food and dress habits, cultural and religious attitudes, we cannot study language as an independent phenomenon. Hence, the importance of the acoustic image that carries with it the *associational field* where the utterance is realised.

Saussure's concept of sign as the reunion of the signifier and the signified should be taken as a collateral concept. Sign as such is neither the physical form of the signifier nor the directly correlated signified. It is the *reunion* of the two. In fact, this acoustic image or sign is the image or form of the signifying ensemble. It refers to the complex existential situation where the sign is created. It is the form of the mental image, the impression that a given signifying ensemble leaves on our mind, our psychic comportment. This image is not identical with the exact physical form of the situation. It is an *impression*. It is a *perception*. It serves as a *gesture* as Merleau-Ponty would put it, and it interacts with similar or dissimilar gestures to constitute formal discourses in the domain of imaginaire.

The photographic image of an object is almost identical with the physical configuration of that object. But a mental impression of that object is only a *souvenir*, a form that has passed through the sieve of perception. As this mental image is constituted in the domain of signification, its form follows the contours of psychic impression, the impression that strikes one as a gesture, as a subtle modulation of a musical construct.

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* Presidential address for thematic panel, *Deconstruction and Destruction : Literature and Aesthetic Theory*, XVI Indian Social Science Congress, Pune, 1991.

This *conceptual image* can be understood in terms of a musical composition. Physically within a musical composition, a note follows another but its rhythmical movement puts them together in a signifying combination where we hear only units of music, the so-called musical ensembles, sub-ensembles and micro-ensembles. And as we slowly *enter* into the musical composition, the resonance manifests itself only in the form of acoustic images.

2. The twelfth century French philosopher, Pierre Abélard, explained the creative process in terms of *sensus, imaginatio* and *intellectus*. We have a given sensuous experience which is recollected in the domain of *imagination*. This recollection constitutes forms which are *mental images* due to *memory* and *reflection*. They are crystallised forms which have no empirical substance. A given experience of love or hate leaves on our memory a psychic trace, a mental image, a *pure form*, an *evocative form*. It is constituted in the rarefied ambiance where we make a mental effort at universalising a particular. A simple example would be to have a crystallised, pure form of the notion of "soft" derived from the sensuous experiences of soft wood, soft corner, soft voice. It is the acoustic image of the vocable, soft, that resounds in our ears to comprehend its physical configuration. Every "softness" will have its specific situational image, an image of the elements which constitute an ensemble of signification.

These mental images are the images of rarefied moments like a certain gesture of your beloved that stays in your memory in its crystallised form. But this gesture is not independent of the situation where it was realised. If it is to be presented in the form of a peom, the poet will delineate that given situation in the manner of an impressionist painter. This linguistic description will then create an acoustic or mental image to which the reader will respond.

We deal here with a series of transformations. After a given sensuous experience, a certain impression is formed which is, after some distanciation in time and space, reflected upon in the domain of the imaginaire. It is this crystallised mental image that is the object of articulation in the form of a given linguistic or artistic discourse.

3. A narrative, whether it is articulated in poetry or prose, presents a series of situations where the concrete linguistic utterances delineate specific images. The linear syntagmatic chain of these situations has superimposed mental images that the reader responds to. These images are then subjected to a global perception of the entire structure of the narrative, its discourse. The independent units, the situations, which follow each other like the notes in a musical composition, are apprehended in a structure of the signifying ensembles. The separate ensembles, subensembles and micro-ensembles all present one formal mental image. Physically, the separate images keep their singular entity but in the process of perception they all lose their individual beings to be a part of the whole. A narrative as such is like a painting, a tableau, where there are a number of smaller images, but which is perceived as one image. First of all, even in delineating each small image, each element, there is a transformation from the empirical substance of the same image; a tree in a painting or a narrative, is never exactly identical with the physical configuration of that tree, secondly, the

paysage as a whole further dissolves all individual forms. This dissolution, however, is entirely of the order of perception. It is almost an illusion. As we mentally enter into a musical composition, especially the one that is well performed, we hear less and less of the physical, distinct level of the notes or even smaller ensembles of notes. We are so carried away by the acoustic image of the musical composition that we become completely oblivious of its physical constitution. In exactly the same way, we perceive the acoustic image of a poem or a narrative.

As we syntagmatically follow a narrative, we keep on mentally accumulating images which interact with other related forms. The manifest patterns of the narrative are presented like the slowly evolving images in a carpet. In the beginning we perceive only partial images or some contours whose complementary forms appear later. As we move further, as we follow the syntagmatic chain, new formal combinations appear and we mentally conceptualise the interrelated images. In the process, new illusions are created in the progressive dissolution of physical forms. As we approach the end, we have an entirely different picture than the one established purely at the physical level. And if we re-read the narrative, we mentally establish new correlations, thereby constituting new mental images. This process is most apparent in the cinematographic medium. Like a musician, the film director operates at a number of acoustic levels. The images that we see and perceive on the screen pass through a series of transformations. *And as we enter into the discourse of the film, we get lost in the surcharged ambiance of the fast moving images. We move from the physical to the imaginary. We begin to reconstitute our own discourse, our own mental image of what we see. Like the crescendo of the musical composition, the higher echelons of cinematographic composition lead us to a level of pure forms without any correlation with empirical substance. The purpose of rapid juxtapositions of one image against another is to create a mental state of perceiving pure forms. It is like those children's games where moving round and round makes one dizzy; the complexity of images creates an ambiance of extreme velocity where the perceived forms not only lose all correlation with the empirical substance, but literally create new forms, over and above the forms constituted by the linguistic descriptions or the specific tableaux of the cinematographic chain.*

4. The constitution of mental images can be illustrated by a narrative of Saint Julien by Gustave Flaubert. First it is presented in the form of a series of images in the syntagmatic chain, as the narrative unfolds itself to the reader. The entire narrative is divided into twenty-two signifying ensembles or images with, wherever necessary, each ensemble being further divided into sub-and micro-ensembles or sub-and micro-images. It is almost the same kind of division that a director would follow to transform this narrative into a film. After the linear syntagmatic presentation of the images, a series of paradigmatic correlations between images are established to demonstrate how these mental forms keep on interacting, bypassing all time and space in quick succession to constitute new mental images which enable us to enter into the *discourse* of the narrative. As we read the narrative, we follow one description or

constitution after another. These literal, linguistic, linear images leave their *impressions on the film of our mind.* As these impressions multiply, there is an essential crisscrossing, interlinking of disparate images. In the progressive rapidity of these correlations, some aspects of these mental forms get *dissolved.* In other words, this *progressive regressive* movement leads to *conceptual transformations.* Let us follow the syntagmatic progression of these images:

1.a	The palace on the top of hill.
1.b	The peaceful atmosphere in the palace.
1.c	The ancestral arms, the feudal household.
1.dm	Julien's father recounting his adventures during crusades.
1.dn	Julien's mother, the grand lady of the palace, very pious and religious.
2.am	The festivities at the "coming" of Julien.
2.an	The vision of Julien's mother (your son would be a saint).
2.ao	The vision of Julien's father (your son will have glory, bloodshed, life of an emperor).
2.ap	Julien resembles baby Jesus.
2.bm	Training of prince Julien as a hunter and a fighter.
2.bp	Julien's father sees in his son a great conqueror, and his mother, an archbishop.
3.m	Julien kills a mouse in the church.
3.n	Julien kills a pigeon (the persistence of life in the bird "irritates" Julien).
4.abc	Julien learns the art of hunting.
5.a	But Julien likes to hunt "far from (this princely) world".
5.bc	Julien follows the savage lands; covered with mud and thorns of the jungle, he "becomes" one of them (the beasts).
6.amn	The first great hunt begins. Julien kills a cock with the reverse of his sword, and, "without picking it" continues his route (the absurdity of the hunt).
6.bm	Julien "falls on the corpse" of a beast.
6.bo	Julien is "not tired" of killing. He accomplishes this massacre with the "ease of a dream".
6.d	The hope of such a carnage "suffocates him with pleasure". The stags die with "saliva in their nostrils, the intestines bulging out, the stomachs sqeezing; finally, all was "immobile".
6.em	Julien contemplates on the enormity of the massacre, "not understanding how he could do it".
6.enop	Julien kills the stag family : the child, the mother and finally the big black stag.
6.eq	The big black stag with sixteen antlers curses Julien: one day you will assassinate your mother and father.
6.f	Julien is afraid: the Devil may not inspire him to kill his parents.
7.b	Julien's parents in anguish and agitation. Julien on sick bed.

7.c   Julien recovers. His father gives him the gift of the big Sarrasine sword which
        was kept in the attic. Julien climbs to bring it down. The heavy sword slips
        through his hand and narrowly escapes hitting his father.
7.d   Julien is afraid of all arms and the very sight of iron makes him pale. The
        desolation of the family.
7.f   Julien's master, the old monk, invokes the honour of the family and Julien again
        exercises like a nobleman. He tries his hand at throwing the javelin.
7.h   Julien perceives a bird with two white feathers. He throws his jevelin which
        hits the white spot. A shrieking cry resounds. It was Julien's mother. The
        javelin had hit her white hat. Julien leaves the palace.
8.a   Julien leaves the palace of his parents and suffers hunger, thirst and fever.
8.b   Julien's exploits in various battles against the infidels.
8.c   He always protected the people of Church, orphans, widows, and primarily, the
        "old".
8.d   He is afraid of killing his parents by "mistake".
9.a   Julien composes an army of rebels, bastards, and all sorts of vagabonds.
9.b   He becomes famous. The princes look for his help.
9.c   The various adventures of Julien in far away lands: Jerusalem, Parthes,
        Abyssinia, Scandinavy, Calicut.
9.d   Julien saves the emperor of Occitany from the infidels; his acts of a Christian
        soldier.
9.e   Julien destroys the armies of the infidels and cuts off the head of the Calif.
9.f   The emperor presents Julien his daughter.
9.g   Julien marries the princess and lives in a palace.
10.a   The description of the most luxurious, marble palace.
10.b   Julien does no more hunt. He does not fight.
10.c   Julien remembers the good old days of hunting expeditions, of the deserts, of
        the wild beasts.
10.d   Julien dreams of father Adam surrounded by all the beasts of the jungle.
10.e   Julien always refuses invitations to hunt, for he believes, his parents' fate depends
        upon killing of the animals.
10.f   His wife tries to distract him with love, dance and music, but Julien is always
        sad.
10.g   One day Julien confesses his horrible secret.
11.a   Julien perceives one evening while praying the shadow of a fox. He is tempted
        to go out.
11.b   Julien's wife is afraid. She is scared of a "funeste adventure". Julien leaves for
        the second hunt.
12.a   Meanwhile an unknown old couple arrives at the palace and announce
        themselves to be Julien's parents.

12.b   Julien's parents are astonished and mighty pleased with their son's palace and the princess wife, the daughter of the emperor of Occitany: the glory and empire.

12.c   The princess gives all hospitality to the old man who, with his long beard and tall figure, resembles a statue of the Church, and the old woman, whose long white hair reflect the beauty of her youth. She gives them her bed to sleep.

13.a   The beginning of the second hunt. Julien is nervous. He hesitates. There is silence all over.

13.b   Julien sees a baor, a wolf. Julien tries to shoot but to no effect. The wolf turns, "looks" at Julien, and, walks away.

13.c   In this manner, Julien covers an interminable plain.

13.d   He sees a furious bull. Julien strikes with his spear, which rebounds as if the head of the bull was made of brass.

13.e   Julien is ashamed. A superior power has destroyed his force.

13.f   He enters the forest where panthers and serpents surround him.

13.g   The monstrous animals look at Julien. The savage eyes sparkle like stars and stare at him.

13.h   In exasperation, Julien soots his arrows, throws stones. None touches the beasts.

13.i   The animals encircle him. He is "frozen" with terror, incapable of least movement.

13.j   With supreme effort, Julien takes a few steps. The animals follow him, surround him.

13.k   The animals mock at Julien. An irony pierces the atmosphere.

13.l   Julien throws his coat on two red patridges. When he takes it off, he finds only one, "dead since long".

13.m   Deceived and exasperated, Julien's thirst for carnage takes over. Since he cannot kill beast, he would massacre men.

14.a   Julien thinks of his wife.

14.b   Julien arrives at the palace, enters her chamber, and bends over to kiss his wife.

14.c   As he perceives two bodies, Julien believes that a man is sleeping with his wife.

14.d   Furious with jealousy and lust he becomes mad, and shouting and yelling, he kills his parents.

14.e   In this most cruel moment, he recognizes, in the final breaths of his parents, the breath of the dying big black stag.

15.a   His parents are before him with an eternal secret hidden forever. Their blood touches the ivory Christ suspended on the wall.

15.b   Julien is suspended between belief and disbelief.

15.c   With a burning torch in his hand Julien recognizes the bodies of his parents.

16.a   Julien recovers his composure. He orders his wife to follow his instructions for
        the funeral. He commands her not to question him, not to touch him, not even
        to see him.

16.b   Julien's wife must now pray for his soul, for he does not exist any more, for he
        has decided not to exist any more.

16.c   A monk follows the cortege of his parents and disappears towards the mountains.

17.a   Julien begins his life of a beggar, his face is so sad, nobody refuses him alms.

17.b   As he recounts his act of parricide, people shut their door on Julien.

17.c   Rejected, Julien avoids men.

17.d   The urge of mixing with others' existence forces Julien to come to the town.

17.e   Even the birds and animals, once his own kith and kin, run away from him.

17.f   Julien looks for solitude.

17.g   Julien visits churches.

17.h   In spite of everything, Julien does not revolt against God, the God who made
        him commit parricide.

17.i   His own being horrifies Julien.

17.j   As the suffering becomes intolerable, Julien decides to kill himself.

17.k   When he attempts a suicide, Julien perceives the reflection of his parents in the
        fountain, and never thinks again of dying.

18.a   Julien arrives at the bank of a large, stormy river in the wilderness.

18.b   Julien repairs a boat. With tremendous physical effort he builds the departure
        platform for the boat. He suffers hardships, transports heavy stones to the other
        side. Many a time, he almost perished.

18.c   Julien builds a little hut.

19.a   The new routine begins. Travellers call for Julien's help.

19.b   The image of Julien's hut. There is a small table, a bed of old, dead leaves. Two
        holes in the wall serve as windows. On one side is a vast, sterile plain, and on
        the other, the great river in all its majesty and violence. The humid land and the
        odour of rotten plants and the dust storms entered everywhere. The mosquitoes
        bit him day and night.

19.c   Julien dreams of the corpses of his parents.

20.a   One night Julien hears a voice calling him from the other side of the river: the
        voice has the intonation of a "church bell".

20.b   A hideous leper is waiting on the other side of the river.

20.c   Julien welcomes the leper with the majesty of a king. He makes a superhuman
        effort to steer his boat through the fast running currents of the river in storm.

21.a   Julien brings the leper to his hut and gives him food and drink.

21.b   The leper wants Julien's bed.

21.c   The shivering leper asks for Julien's body to keep him warm. Julien obliges.

22.a   As the lips of Julien touch the lips of the leper and he is held in his embrace,
        there is fragrance of roses in the hut.

22.b   The roof of the hut gives way, and Julien rises to the skies to be received by
         Lord Jesus Christ.

5. These hundered odd tableaux are unfolded to the reader in a syntagmatic, linear chain. In this progression they are juxtaposed against each other in metonymic sequences and derive their signification from this arrangement. Each image leads into the following image and the narrative progresses both in its *formal* and in its *conceptual* structure. After the description of the palace of Julien's parents, we have the image of Julien's father and mother, the setting of the arms, the barns, the rendezvous of old comrades of Julien's father, the dreams of father and mother, the training of Julien as a prince hunter with the paraphernalia of horses, dogs, servants, and then suddenly, the image of Julien who likes to hunt far away from this world, this world of the prince, followed by that of Julien coming home covered with mud and thorns, smelling like the beasts, he becomes one of them and does not respond to his mother's hug, for he is thinking of other profound things. This is a linear progression of the narrative and we slowly begin to follow *the process of the becoming of the being* of Julien.

As we proceed with the narrative and as we enter its discourse, the phenomenon of what is generally called, *flash backs*, begins. For example, when we read the description of the second palace in the tenth ensemble, we mentally juxtapose it with the first palace and perceive differences and similarities. Julien was born into the first palace, the second palace was given to him by the grateful emperor. In the first, he grew as a prince child with his parents around, in the second, he has the company of his princess wife; in the first, he was "innocent" but in spite of peace and prosperity, he never felt at ease and decided to become a solitary hunter, in the second, his mental state is that of the one who is under the curse of the big black stag and who has consequently renounced all hunt, and so on and on. The *mental image* that one forms when one reads the description of the first palace alone is not the same as the one that is formed when it is juxtaposed with the second. When the two images are juxtaposed, we perceive them as one overall image of contradictions which help us comprehend their signification. There is further transformation when these two palaces are juxtaposed with the last resting place of Julien, the hut, in the most forlorn, deserted place. The differences, being perceived in the two palaces are no more relevant here. It is now a case of the palaces versus the hut. But the juxtaposition is not just physical, what is being compared is primarily the states of mind of Julien in the three locations. The flash back series of 1, 10, 19 presents a radically different mental image.

6. We can posit a few series of such flash forwards and flash backs or *progressive-regressive* combinations and see how in each set a new mental image emerges.

(1)   1,10
(2)   1, 10, 19

(3)   2 ap, 11 a, 17 g, 11 b
(4)   2 b pm 12 b
(5)   3, 6, 13
(6)   5, 13
(7)   6, 14
(8)   5, 8, 17
(9)   6 10
(10)   6, 13
(11)   5, 10, 13
(12)   4, 6, 13
(13)   5, 8, 13, 17, 19

In the first set are juxtaposed the first and the second palace.

In the second set, we have the two palaces, the palace of child Julien and the palace of mercenary Julien with his princess wife, and the hut of Julien after the parricide.

In the third set, we have the images of child Julien resembling baby Jesus, Julien praying in the evening, Julien visiting churches and the last image of Julien rising to the heavens to be received by Jesus Christ. We perceive here a common denominator, we also follow a progression, and of these four images, we form another image of this conceptual whole where the individualising contours of singular images are dissolved in the ongoing formation of the new mental image.

In the fourth set, we have the images of Julien's father dreaming of his son as an emperor juxtaposed with the arrival of Julien's parents in the second palace where Julien's father is astonished to see the predicted glory and empire.

In the fifth set, child Julien kills a mouse and a pigeon and when the pigeon does not die immediately, the persistence of its life irritates him. These two images are juxtaposed against the massacre of the beasts in the first hunt, when Julien cannot understand how he could do all that, how he could massacre all these beasts with the ease of a dream, followed immediately by the killing of the stag family, the child, the mother and the big black stag. We have next the most frustrating scene of the second hunt where Julien is not able to kill even one animal and when they, the beasts of the jungle, his own kith and kin, surround and ridicule him, he is frozen with terror. At each progression, we are introduced to a new state of mind, to the fast moving film of crisscrossing images.

In the sixth set, the last scene of extreme helplessness in the second hunt is juxtaposed against the image of Julien who likes to hunt far from the princely world and who comes home covered with blood and mud and smells like the beasts. These are two entirely different states of Julien the hunter and juxtaposed against each other present a highly complex image.

In the seventh set, we perceive the juxtaposition of the two images of the dying stag cursing Julien that one day he will kill his parents, and in the fourteenth ensemble, Julien perceiving a résemblance between the breath of the dying stag and that of his father. This

juxtaposition shows most clearly how the *substance* of the two images *dissolves* to form *one mental image* of two old beings breathing their last. From the physical description, we are immediately mentally involved in a highly crystallised image of absolute cruelty and tragedy. These are the two most opposing violences, both leading to extreme frustration and loneliness. They are diametrically opposed, yet they clearly form one mental image of the conceptual structure of the discourse.

In the eighth set, we have 5, 8, 17 as against 5, 13 of the sixth set. In the sixth set, the image of the solitary hunter, covered with blood and mud is juxtaposed against Julien's mental state at the beginning of the first hunt, the hunt he sought after, the great hunt of his life. Now the same image is presented with the image of Julien as a mercenary suffering hunger, thirst and fever, and, that of Julien rejected even by the birds and the beasts of the jungle, a Julien shunned by all mankind. These three images of "suffering" in this conceptual correlation present entirely different universe of signification. It is no more the same mental image. *Each time the juxtaposed set of images is different even with reference to one of its images, the conceptual world that the new juxtaposition creates is different from the earlier and there is a certain dissolution of formal aspects. The substance of the forms undergoes a major transformation. The mental images follow the new contours of perception.*

In the following five sets, we have several common denominators. In the ninth set, we have six juxtaposed first against ten and then against thirteen. In the eleventh set, the three images, five, ten and thirteen have all been parts of other conceptual wholes. As a matter of fact, the thirteenth image is common to six of these thirteen sets that I have set up to explain this phenomenon.

The sixth image is that of Julien being cursed by the big black stag that one day he will kill his father and mother. Julien is enveloped in solitude, for indefinite perils threaten him. In the tenth image, Julien is obsessed by that curse and is extremely restless. The second image is a direct consequence of the first. When the same sixth image of Julien being cursed is juxtaposed against the thirteenth image of the beginning of the second hunt, we constitute an entirely different mental image, for this is the hunt that Julien had been trying to avoid all the time, and we are anxious to see what will happen now.

In the eleventh set, we have the fifth image of Julien, the solitary hunter, who smells like beasts when he returns home juxtaposed against the forlorn Julien dreaming of father Adam with his beasts and the paradise lost, followed by the most frustrated, helpless Julien in the midst of the second hunt. This flash-back series is highly complex. It focusses on some very specific aspects of each image to establish new conceptual correlations.

Even more complex set of juxtapositions is that of the last example here of five images, 5, 8, 13, 17 and 19 flash-backed, coalesced into one mental image. We begin with Julien smelling like beasts and becoming one of them juxtaposed against the image of Julien the mercenary, suffering hunger, thirst and fever, followed by Julien surrounded by the animals in the second hunt, frozen with terror, and the image of Julien after the parricide, frustrated

and thinking of suicide, leading to the final image of Julien's hut in the vast, sterile plain where the humid land had the odour of rotten plants and the dust storms which entered everywhere. *When these five similar images coalesce to constitute one mental image, it can only be a highly crystallised image, having passed through the sieve of one single perception. This harmonising process dissolves the contours not supposed to be related with this specific conceptualisation.*

In my example, I have divided this narrative into hundred odd small images and have presented only thirteen sets of progressive-regressive mental images. A proper detailed study would require at least two hundred divisions in the syntagmatic chain of this "cinematographic" progression and about fifty sets of progressive-regressive complex mental images. And, one can very well imagine the highly complex nature of the process of the constitution of the universe of signification. But our brain has the innate faculty to coalesce innumerable images instantly and simultaneously. *As we read the narrative or see a film, we mentally keep on going back and forth, in progressive-regressive unions until we arrive at the cresendo or the overall mental image of the discourse.*

7. These mental images are very much like the Saussurean signs which represent the reunion of the field of the signifier with the field of the signified. This is where the signifier and the signified simply coalesce into each other. It we consider an individual's life as his narrative, there are innumerable signs or the mental impressions of the existential situations. The signs acquired there leave their impressions on our subconscious, which as Jacques Lacan has stated, is structured like language. It progresses slowly in a syntagmatic chain but it functions in progressive-regressive movements. *Continuously and simultaneously it establishes metonymic and metaphoric relations where the various mental impressions acquired at different occasions, in different spans of time and space, coalesce to form new images. Our memory is a long cinematographic film where the images keep on criss-crossing each other.* The theory of mental images underscores the phenomenology of perception in memory, comprehension and articulation in terms of these images. Every linguistic, cultural or religious experience takes place in human conditions which are remembered in the form of images. As these images function as signs, the signifier and the signified coalesce there. Their significance is not independent of the way these images are preserved in our sub-conscious. At any given moment we can and do coalesce a series of "similar" experience-images and form new mental images which are then articulated by means of language or any other medium in further crystallised forms. This is the creative process. The analytical process is in reverse order but fundamentally its unfolding follows the same progression. We read a narrative or we see a film and we accumulate mental images in linear progression. As we move further, as we enter into the "intrigue" of the discourse, we begin to follow the progressive-regressive correlations and slowly we move to a level of mental images transformed by our perceptive reunions. The same process is involved in the "appreciation" of a painting. We *see* a tableau, we note the various small

images which constitute the whole and we begin to *observe* their correlations, first at the *syntagmatic plane*, the plane of physical proximities, followed by constituting mental images on the *paradigmatic plane*, the plane of correlations perceived in the imaginaire. We then *perceive* this overall mental image and *reflect* upon it to arrive at a certain comprehension of the *discourse* that a given tableau represents.

8. This configuration shows most clearly the significance of mental images. Even the most realistic painting is only an approximation, a *resemblance* of reality. The problematic of painting is exactly how this resemblance is acquired and what is the exact relation between it and the empirical object whose resemblance it is. Now comes the most fundamental question. What is being painted, what the object is supposed to *represent* and what the object is supposed to *convey*? Obviously, this is a process of a series of transformations in the imaginaire where the so-called mental impression of the object is subjected to perception and reflection before it is articulated or painted. And, in case we are dealing with the inner conflicts of a being that is the object of the painting, the tableau will necessarily have formal contours on the visible canvas which are in fact invisible. So *what we see in a tableau is not what we see in the figurative aspect of the object. The painter attempts to coordinate the world within with the world without, the sub-conscious with the conscious by means of formal correlations on the canvas which must be posited by the viewer in the immanent universe. In a way, what we see in a tableau can never be seen in empirical reality. Seeing and perceiving coalesce to form images which can only be sur-realistic. Conceptually, they are there. We participate in their almost obscure formation which becomes visible only to our perception. As such, in a painting, it is always the invisible that becomes visible and the empirical visible recedes into background.*

9. Then there is the question of the *narrative* of the tableau. At the manifest level, we have a narrative in fiction and in film that moves, that provides it with its dynamicity. The tableau is just an image, a static description, suspended in time and space. However, we realise that a tableau represents a situation, a moment that *is* but that has also gone through a process of its *becoming* to arrive at this moment that is. As we move from the state of seeing to the state of observing, perceiving and reflecting, we follow the becoming of the being or the "condition humaine" that a given tableau represents.

Every tableau as such represents a highly dynamic configuration and the perception of the correlations of its different contours reveals its being and how it came to be. We are then able to participate in the imaginaire of the artist, his creative process and his articulation.

A tableau is like a *frozen image* that needs to be deciphered. We can perceive it only in its *ideological field* where its form and content interact, where the Saussurean signs are created. A tableau is not a signifier with a corresponding signified. It is a sign where the

signifier and the signified have coalesced, where there is a complete fusion of the manifest and the immanent.

Like the text of the narrative, there is the *text* of the painting. The tableau is constituted on a given surface, the canvas, which has to be divided, organised to comprehend the entire universe of signification. In a way the infinite forms are compressed in a finite space which can be achieved only by a series of manipulations of the colours and the curves, by establishing new relationships, by creating new thresholds so that the empirical small, *finite space of the canvas* may lead us to an *infinite space of the imaginaire.*

10. Let us see how a French painter, Henri Matisse (1869-1954) operates. Matisse used to organise his space between the external world, the paysage, and the room of the hotel or the house, he was staying in to paint his tableaux. In a tableau named, *The interior of a box of violin* (1919), the bright light of outside penetrates the room by the open window of the balcony, extending the limits of the room. The interior of the room reflects the blue of the sky and the sea. And, the oblique lines of the construction lead us towards the exterior. And in this internal-external correlation, the wall in the back forms the threshold of the vision. We have as such both the infinity of the prespective and the clear limits of the habitation. It is an attempt at establishing a relationship between reality and abstraction.

In another tableau, *Laurette with a cup of coffee* (1917), the resting young girl presents an extremely relaxed and supple body rendered by undulatory lines. And, in the other corner of the composition, the vertical position of the table where the cup of coffee is placed immobilises the floating aspect of her horizontal position fixed in space. The black colour of her hair, the table and the contours help her to escape being absorbed in the green and grey colours. This contrast is further accentuated by the position of her head.

In *The view of the Garden of Issy* (1919) the pond with red fish is transformed into an abstract painting charged with brown and green colours. The motif is presented in such a way that it gives the impression of being seen from a window of a higher building. Very often, Matisse pushes the subject to the plane of image. The rapport with the surface is always established with the help of dividing, contrasting lines and surfaces. The different sections keep their entity but also lose themselve into each other. As such, a certain harmony with the world without is established without sacrificing the focus on the world within. A certain aspect of the real surface slowly merges with the abstract surface of the composition.

In another tableau, *The lesson of painting*, of the same period, we have the painter before his canvas while on the other side of the table is the model, the young girl reading a book. On the table are a mirror, a vase, fruits and a painting brush. With light brown colour and very simple lines, the painter himself passes to the plane of the irreal and the presence of the young girl reading her book is reinforced. With her open book, she becomes a part of the "still life" constituted of the vase of flowers, fruits and the brush on the table. The back colour of the pages of the book and brush relate with that of the wall behind The painter has

also reproduced on the surface of the mirror (within it) a paysage which is, at the same time, not outside the room. Distinguishing itself clearly from the back surface of the background, the mirror becomes a tableau within a tableau and evokes the activity of the painter. At the same time, it serves as an intermediate between himself and his model. With the help of this repartition of colours and light, the different planes of reality of the linear representation and of reflection in the mirror are reunited on the same plane of bidimensional image.

A tableau is a composition where each form, each colour, each surface, each plane is carefully studied, and with the help of certain set of juxtapositions, a universe of signification is created. Within the limits of the canvas, a whole world of signifiers and the correlating fields of signifieds are encompassed as a mental image, as a sign. The inifinity of the imaginaire that it represents is indivisible. The image that we observe on the tableau is a mental image of the painter. It transcends the physical contours to lead us to the creative plane, the plane of absolute inner, immanent, sur reality.

Structuralism and Literary Critique

1. Every literary discourse whatever its genre may be appears as a certain unit of existentialist significance. Its composition necessarily follows a system of psychic transformation from one human situation to another. The function of literary critique thus is to unfold the basic layers of the structure of a given literary creation in such a way that each underlying current leads to a better comprehension of the emerging patterns of significance.

There are three fundamental levels of literary structuration. The first level is that of *semiotics* that follows the normal syntactic organisation. The emergence of literary significance is controlled by the syntactic artifice of a system of signs or symbols or signifiers. This is the semiotic organisation of a discourse and it follows the linear progression of events in a narrative with a superposed level of existentialist reflection. The order or the sequence of signifiers is the first interlinking mechanism with which any unit of signification takes form and gets fixed in the general semantic universe of the discourse. At this level each sequence lends itself to an analysis of the main itneracting characters, tendencies or reflections within a micro-universe that is necessarily incomplete and serves only as the initial set of relationships. *The first step in literary critique thus constitutes of determining the factors which delineate the contours of turmoil or alienation and bring in the dialectics of conflicting psychic attitudes which will probably be resolved as we follow the generation of one set of pulsational forces into another.*

The progression of these situations of human interaction - meditative or physical - follows a well defined line of emergence. The literary critique attempts to bring out the various knots of the unity of these existentialist happenings by the process of decomposition. This procedure also lays bare the hitherto undefined relations and the potential generative significance of each element. The most elementary moral of this analysis is that one must read one's text carefully and each sequence be not just taken as a set of human compunctions but primarily as a device to transform its existentialist being into another. In other words, it is only the dynamics of the situation that matters.

2. The second level of analysis is that of *semiology*. The semiotic organisation is the organisation of form. The semiological significance emerges at the level of content. Though the basic process of structuration and comprehension remains the same, the semiological patterns can be understood only through the interplay of the basic psychic components of each human situation. It must however be underscored at the very outset that it is not the

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psycho-analysis of biological interpolations of the anglo-saxon variety that can be the basis of structuralist critique. This psycho-critique that is the bed-rock of structuralism follows the Marxist dialectics of interacting human traits which do not necessarily correspond to the physical configurations. There may be feminine men or virile women, challenging daughters or docile sons. There may be characters with or without sex, with or without any desire. Moreover, these tendencies may or may not be fused with given individuals. They may manifest themselves at the collective level. And most significant of all is the fact that they are not fixed in a given individual or an element in an existentialist situation. There is no such thing as a static trait. *A literary discourse is possible only if there is a fundamental problematics or tension. One situation of alienation must necessarily lead into another transformed human comportment.* There must by definition be a constellation of forces with a certain tendency for reintegration which of course, may or may not be achieved. At the semiological level we try to comprehend this process of psychic generation. It is a superposed level of existentialist reflection. Its method is both progressive and regressive, both analytical and dialectical. It conforms to the deductions of pure logic, and at the same time, adjusts itself to the compulsions of induction—of the text and the discourse. In other words, both the semiotic and the semiological levels go side by side without having a rapport of direct correspondences.

3. The third level of comprehension which follows the progressively higher level of intellectual incision is both historical and anthropological. It emerges from the associative field of the ideological bed or the field of pragmatics. Thus after semiotics and semiology we come to *mediation*. Every literary discourse is a link in the historical chain and must be understood in its proper ideological background that is there due to a number of dialectical interactions between the diachronic reflections which are directly related to the basic theme of the discourse. *History is an amorphous mass and only those elements can be considered to structurate a given discourse which filter through the vicissitudes of time and space in the temporal order.* An event whether it is political, as French revolution, or literary, as Flaubert, is a resultant of a unique semiological structuration. This is why the collective nature of the dialectics ends with its first movement or its initial emergence. Then onwards its thrust is unique for the mere fact that its adventure follows a unique set of anthropological and psychic interrelations.

The logic of development or its internal cohesion may be universal but its structuration is due primarily to its anthropological composition. *A discourse is an authentic testimony of the cultural dialectics of a given people both at the level of collective consciousness and at the crossroads of individual mediction that interacts very actively with it.* Its vagaries are steeped in the anthropological currents of its culture. Hence the structural method is not only applicable to a literary discourse as such but also to its singular development. This insight is obviously due to the model of linguistics where language is not only a system of logical correlates of sounds and grammatical categories but also of a cohesive structuration

of significant features or semes which determine a given semiology. Unfortunately, the linguistic studies in the anglo-saxon world never went beyond the limits of phonology and utterance. The context of discourse was ignored and as a result the linguists who followed this approach are left completely out of the mainstream of structural literary critique. They are in a hopeless predicament of having to find the meanings of words and sentences in singular generative framework where no such significance takes place.

4. An utterance presupposes another and a discourse is set in an historical relationship of other discourses which define its transformations, *for it must emerge from the vast network of the ensemble of significance where both history and anthropology must interact to generate new structures of signification.* The study of these structures is the study of semiology and mediation. This is indeed the veritable pragmatics of a literary discourse.

5. The structural critique is both quantitative and qualitative. The dichotomy of physical and human sciences followed in the anglo-saxon intellection is not valid in structural analysis where both semiotics, the study of form or the manifest level, and semiology, the study of content or immanent level, are not contradictory but complementary. No discourse is possible without a well defined form or a system of syntagmatic unfolding of a semiotic linkage. But what is generally misunderstood is the fact that the semes by themselves do not carry any significance. The field of signification is based squarely on anthropological perceptions where the relationship of the signified with its signifier is both immediate and reciprocal. It is the ensemble of binary relations in dialectical interpolations which present a given semantic universe. The logical form, the style, the rhetoric, the expression, are all there only to accelerate the emergence of significance which is in no way independent of either the form or the content of the discourse.

6. The central problem in structural literary critique thus is the defintion and delineation of the object of our analysis that goes under the epithet of a literary composition. The problematics will undoubtedly move around the historical progression and the anthropological structuration that is responsible for its unique adventure. *The literary critique has no choice but to follow this existentialist adventure where the individual being makes a tremendous effort to delink himself from the vast network of innumerable strings of historical compunctions. This is the basic problematics of freedom and choice that vascillates between the diachronic inevitability and the synchronic options.* Of course, there has never been nor probably there will ever be a crystallised direction from this fusion but this is certainly not the concern of the structural critique. Its ideal remains well within the semiological universe of contextual probabilities.

7. The main thrust of structural critique came with the studies of the *Mythologiques* of Claude Lévi-Strauss where the most prominent French structuralist could demonstrate without

any possible ambiguity the semiological universe of a system of mythical reflections. The myths represent the structures of semiotics par excellence. It is the only genre of collective anthropological reflection where the human beings meditate on their destiny without any pretension of social materiality. No doubt that Shakespeare, Racine and Kalidasa transformed this medium of expression to reflect on the cultural meditations of their respective people, for it is only the semiotic system of the myths which afford the purest forms of symbolic representation. The existentialist critique of Madame Bovary by Jean-Paul Sartre and the structural critique by Roland Barthes of contemporary French mythological universe have also underscored the relevance of this point of view. Thus it is obvious that no matter what form a given literary discourse adopts, the literary ideal remains the same — the presentation of an immanent universe of signification. And, less ambiguous the form of the content, the less confusion there will be in terms of its realisation. However, in both cases, the revelation of significance must follow the same fundamental progression of semiotics to semiology. The collective consciousness must lead to individual consciousness and vice versa. In other words, *history and anthropology must interact in an existentialist situation of human reflection. Whether the myths are old or new is immaterial. What matters is the fact that the only way a discourse of human mediation is possible is the way of mythological universe.* And, this is so even when we pretend to realise extreme realism as in the works of E. Zola and G. Flaubert. The cloak changes but the basic contours of mental activity remain the same. Since Lévi-Strauss we know that this is after all the only valid criterion of all humanistic studies. It is not only the conclusions of scientific investigation which are our primary concern, we are involved above all in the process of intellection that suggests certain universal features of psychic problematics no matter with which anthropological background we indulge in such an enterprise.

The Semiotics of Conceptual Discourse

1. *The Creative Process.* The creative process in literary discourse is basically an intellective process. It is based on the faculty of man that defines him to be a thinking being as distinct from animal whose reactions remain well within the stimulus/response parameter. This faculty of thinking or reason allows man to analyse the socio-economic, political, cultural or any other individual existential situation he finds himself in, to underscore the immanent contradictions in the ongoing dialectical process. With this analysis inspired by a consciousness of his being and a desire to resolve the predicament he is caught in, man tries to transpose the manifest empirical reality that surrounds him into a certain specific constitution of the signifiers which lead to a creative dialectic, a dialectic which plays a mediatory role in the cultural continuum, transforming its inherent contradictions into a revolutionary process of cultural change.

The human condition, the subject of every literary discourse, is the condition of violence, violence in the French sense of the term. The word for rape in French is "viol", which implies acting against one's will, to do violence to the other's desire. Man has been, and is being, raped, or violated, if I am allowed to use this expression, in every socio-political, individual situation. His desires, his dreams, his aspirations are constantly violated. Within the history of an individual or a society, we perceive a continuous sequence of this multipronged violence leading to a network or a réseau of physical and psychic comportments which is not easy to decipher. But man is not animal. He does not simply cry when he is in pain or bite when he is angry. In spite of the tremendous pressure of socio-economic conditions, he does not submit himself to the catastrophic avalanche of history. No doubt, the terrible intolerable conditions of society push him to react, but man transforms this physical reaction into human consciousness, and, with the help of his innate faculty of reason, he perceives the basic contradictions of the agents of violence. He anlayses them like one analyses a game of chess where the value of the pawns, at a given stage of the game, is determined by the new relationships with all their pulls and pressures. We all know that not every one perceives the manifest contradictions in the same manner. There are several levels of comprehension of a given human condition exactly like several levels of interpretation of a given game of chess. The player who comprehends the nature of relationships of the pawns in a certain manner makes a better move and wins the game. In homeopathy, the clinical analysis depends upon the comprehension of the proper relationships of the manifest symptoms. If the analysis is correct, the latent disease is known, and, the right dose is prescribed. The violence or the sequence of violence of which man is a victim is constituted of a network of signifiers, or the

agents of violence, where diachronic progression leads to dynamic synchrony leaving literally no room for individual action. But somehow man surpasses his biological mechanism, and his awareness leads him to the creative act, the act of dialectical transformation. His certain specific perception of empirical reality is transposed into a literary discourse with the help of a new constitution of the signifiers which haunt him throughout his life. He creates a new discourse, like a new game of chess, transforming the original individual significance of the signifiers by introducing them in new relationships, new contradictions, exactly like the process of the loss of so-called original values of the pawns in a fast moving game of chess. *In other words, creating a literary discourse is in fact creating a new structure of significance, a structure which is not a simple imitation of human reality, but a structure which presents a specific perception, and what is more important, a specific interpretation.*

The constituents of a structure of significance that a literary discourse is supposed to represent, the cultural signifiers, the words of language, archetypal representations etc., are not like the signifiers of mathematical language. The value of a mathematical signifier, for example, the numeral four, remains always "four" no matter how many times and in how many situations, I use it. It is always "four" and never four-and-a qurater or little less than four. On the other hand, the semantic value of a cultural signifier like love, hate, man, woman, oppression, torture, violence, light, darkness, red, black, etc., is at best, approximate. Each time I use any one of them in a certain context, I make a specific use of its semantic range. This is why no one signifier serves my purpose. I always make use of a certain combination of the signifiers to make a specific proposition. For example, if I want to signify the poverty of a woman, I employ a large number of signifiers, like her clothes, her dwelling, the misery of her children, probably the cruelty of her husband, the darkness of her dungeon, the dirt and squalor around her, and on and on and on. In my effort to underscore the poverty of a woman, I try to present a certain image, a certain network of signifiers, which together, in a specific dialectical ensemble, present not only the so-called reality of the situation but also, and for me primarily, the cruelty, or what I have termed earlier, the violence of the situation — the rape of the desires and the dreams of a being.

A literary discourse is like a proper noun, like for example, that of my colleague, Claude Hagège. We constitute this discourse named Claude Hagège with the help of a number of adjectives, qualificators or signifiers, like, he speaks several languages including French, English, German, Arabic, Chinese, he went to Ecole Normale, he is an agrégé de grammaire, he has a charming wife and a very well-behaved lovely little son, he lives in a spacious and cozy apartment on Boulevard Kellermann in the thirteenth arrondissement of Paris near our small and simple apartment in the rue des Orchidées. Both of us together listened to and suffered Professor Martinet for a number of years at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes and, now as a professor, he occupies the same Chair of Professor Martinet, and, in the same room, at the same time, on the same day, he makes others listen to and suffer his discourses on typology etc. Now, each of these signifiers, like going to Ecole Normale or having a charming

wife, however restricted its domain may be, refers to a class of individuals but the unique discourse, Claude Hagège, is constituted of this specific combination where each constituent is derived from, and, integrated with, the other.

Here we run into another problem. If we are interested in a total comprehensive image of the object named, Claude Hagège, it would be necessary to have all possible information about the psychic and physical comportment of this person beginning from his childhood to this day. But the important question here is, do we really need all this. No structure of significance is independent of the one who perceives it. The structure of significance that Claude Hagège presents to his students is obviously not the same that is presented to his ·colleagues, his friends or those who have been his playmates. In each of these structrues, the combinations of certain signifiers are more dominant than the others. There are, in each structure, certain inter-linkages, or certain contradictions which are primary, and others, secondary, and, maybe, still others, tertiary. In other words, the structures of significance are also situated. The ideal model for such an understanding is obviously that of phonology, where the Prague School emphasizes the role of central and peripheral oppositions with more or less functional load. This is also the lesson we learn from different reflections on the nature of contradictions, from Engels to Mao.

To say that a literary discourse is like a proper noun, then, implies that with the help of an organisation of a number of signifiers, which individually refer to a class of objects, we constitute a discourse which is unique, and refers, with this specific structuration, to only one unique object. The fact that the cultural signifiers are only approximate referents, unlike the precise correspondence of mathematical language, poses a problem of ambiguity and perception. Every signifier has a number of semantic features. When I use the word, apple, I oppose it to all non-apple like fruits, but what kind of apple I have in view, is not obvious. A word or a signifier always refers to a bundle of semantic features. In my semantic organisation I make use of some of the features of a given signifier, and combine or relate them with some of the features of another signifier. I continue to exercise my faculty of choice and arrangement or rearrangement according to the dictates of my discourse.

The literary discourse that I am constituting has a certain sequence. This is its *syntactic* manifestation. However, the constituting process of this discourse is not syntactic as the logical positivists once believed. The syntactic progression or the metonymic constitution is actually based on metaphoric, paradigmatic choices. At each progressive step, I reflect, I use my intellective faculty of choice, and I inflict on my discourse, a certain relationship. This constitution, even though it is a resultant of a metaphoric operation, remains metonymic, and imposes on the discourse, a syntactic order. This becomes more and more evident as I go along the line of progression. The metonymic chain becomes longer and longer, leaving no possibility of going back and forth to establish new manifest relationships. I am then left with no choice except to establish latent semantic relationships, correlating signifiers or sequences which do not find themselves in close physical proximity of metonymic combinations. The person who wants to comprehend this discourse of mine will now not only have to follow my

metaphorically constituted metonymy expressed in the syntactic order or the unfolding of the discourse, but also look for the immanent relations purely at the semantic level which combine signifiers in a non-sequential order. The awareness of this constituting process is one of the reasons why in modern cinema, or even in some modern literary discourses, sequences do not follow what is called, a natural order.

They are put together in an ensemble on the criterion of the correlation of their semantic combinations. But what I want to emphasize here is that whatever form of correlations I present in a given text, once it is presented, it enforces its own order. Whatever form of a jigsaw puzzle of the discourse may be, the reader has to exercise his faculty of further rearrangement to comprehend the semantic correlations which appeared when certain progression of the text had already taken place. The second reading of the text invaribaly leads to a different understanding of the discourse for the simple reason that the overall view acquired by the first reading allows a person to establish certain new *semantic relations* in a heterogenous paradigmatic order.

The literary discourse at this level of semantic correlations is like a game of chess left at a certain stage of the game. *The metonymic relations are manifest. The metaphoric relations are latent*, or, are established at an immanent level. Like the game of chess, this structure of significance that the discourse represents, can be interpreted or understood at several levels, in several ways. One cannot even go to the author who constituted this discourse, for some of the semantic correlations are introduced in the discourse unconsciously, maybe due to psychic associations, or, due to collective parameters, also hidden in the unconscious. One who interprets a discourse may observe dialectical relationships different from the one who composed it just like the one who played the game of chess may not perceive the correlations of his pawns the way another player does on the basis of the game that is not of his own making. But he may be able to predict a winning move, or in other words, a dialectically creative progression, demonstrating a better understanding of the dynamics of the discourse.

We also know that a given game of chess can be understood only in terms of another game of chess which is on the other side of the table. Exactly in the same manner, no literary discourse is created in a void. Every discourse presupposes another discourse or even a field of discourses where the forms interact with other forms, and, where the ensembles of significance play mediatory, revolutionary roles, both in form and in content. Human perception is not simply meant to understand a given situation but the main purpose of constituting a new discourse is to be able to control it. The understanding of the mechanism of the natural process leads to its domination by man. We proceed from nature to culture. We proceed from a certain perception to a composition of a new discourse to be able to resolve the manifest contradictions by establishing new semantic relationships. With the faculty of choice and rearrangement, we constitute new dialectical ensembles, which are related to other ensembles, which are creative, whose dialectical thrust is sharper than the perceived reality. In other words, perception leads to interpretation, which leads to change with the revolutionary

role of the literary discourse. This is the *mediatory* aspect of the discourse based on praxis. From the violated human condition to the violating creative manifestation of the discourse, the movement is from the acute consciousness of extreme helplessness to the pulsational force of interacting dialectics resolving the supposedly unresolvable contradictions. Here the correspondence between the signifier, the *signifiant*, and the signified, the *signifié*, is not binary but quarternary in the earlier Cartesian tradition. Neither the sign so-called nor the field of significance has a unitary conceptualisation. There is the sign and the idea, or etymologically speaking, the image of the sign, which corresponds to the image of the signified object. The correlation is established between these two images by means of a network of relationships of integrating features of the images to create a new image. The significance is thus created by the reunion of the *field of signifiant* with the *field* of *signifié*. And, this reunion, where the significance emerges, is simultaneous and immediate. Hence, we have the praxis or the pragmatics of the discourse where the approximate semantic referents acquire a certain precision, a certain direction of creative movement. *As such, every literary discourse is a revolutionary discourse whose constituting being not only transposes the perceived reality of a given human condition but also transforms it by bringing into sharp focus, the hitherto hidden contradictions. It is not just a translation of a certain image of violence but a conversion into a new generative process of the same violently suppressive forces. As in the fairy tales, the author makes the demon work in the service of the suffering humanity.*

Lastly, I would like to point out that whether we are dealing with metonymic or metaphoric relations or the pragmatic aspect of the discourse, we remain well within the constituting form of the discourse. The text is a network of signs from whose latent relations we unfold the discourse exactly like from a certain correlation of symptoms, a homeopath arrives at the correct diagnosis of the disease. But this manifest form of the text is controlled by the immanent design of the discourse. In other words, what is manifest is dominated by what is not so manifest, or, what may be called the contours of rationality, or reason, which have an overview of the ensemble whose individual parts appear before us at a given time. As such, syntactics, semantics and pragmatics are simultaneously interacting in the constituting process of the discourse. To understand such a structure of significance, we must decompose it to observe its sequential functioning, and, to later on reconstitute it to see if it remains the same composition we began from. Obviously the creative process of a literary discourse, both in its making and in its interpretation, is an intellective process.

One of the problems of deciphering the code structure of the discourse is the heterogeneity of the signifiers. While there are signifiers with a simple one to one correspondence with their significance, there are others whose density requires a comprehensive knowledge of the field from where they emerge. They can be called frozen images, like the images of the myths referred to by Lévi-Strauss, whose referential correspondences are lost in the metonymic progression. It is not the last straw that breaks the back of the camel. It is the cumulative effect of all the weight put together. The psychic history of a being represents a series of violences done to him. The last violence that triggers the avalanche of consciousness

into the unfolding of a discourse is only a point of departure. The complete structure of human condition includes a large number of earlier violences frozen in psychic knots whose strands are not easily visible. *Every synchronic structure includes several residues of the diachronic progression which settle down in the unconscious of every being. Some of them remain frozen in the successive movements but there is every possibility of their reactivation under the pressure of new pulls and pushes. This dynamic activity of the structures of significance is very important, for contrary to what is generally believed, synchronic structures are structures of tension, or as I would like to emphasize, the structures of creative dialectical process.* A synchronic structure is like a given stage of a game of chess. It has entered into this composition due to an earlier move, and, will undergo another transformation with the next step. However, there is no such thing as "the right" next move. It all depends upon the perspective with which a given structure has been understood or the way the interacting relationships have been interpreted. This comprehension is the key to all human creativity. With this creative faculty, man constitutes literary discourses whose constituting mechanism includes a hierarchical heterogeneity of simple and frozen signifiers, interrelated in a réseau of dialectical linkage, for the historical progression of human condition is constituted of a series of synchronic structures of significance, each deriving its motor force from, and leading into, the other, at every successive step.

2. *The Conceptual Opposition.* The next most important question is: What is a conceptual opposition, with its ensuing inquiry into its realisation, its constituting units, the so-called linguistic signs with their formal and substantial roles, the mode of their correlative and spatial oppositions etc. In traditional linguistics, we have been dealing primarily with the concept of binary opposition. Even though this discussion took place within the methodology of the fundamental notion of discourse as a conceptual whole, whether consciously or unconsciously, it was considered that a number of binary oppositions, with unitary linguistic signs on each side, could ultimately explain the constitution of the entire structure. This was possible in syntactic analysis where metonymic, serial combinations held primacy over all other conceptualisations. Roman Jakobson's distinction between metonymy and metaphor did not solve this problem as this differentiation was only unitary and individualistic: both syntagmatic and paradigmatic criteria followed the same line of progressive analysis, taking two units at a time. There was no serious consciousness of the unity of the discourse as an ensemble, as an indivisible whole of significance. Most of the Lévi-Straussian analyses follow this pattern.

The divergent views in France on this notion of binary opposition, such as that of A.J. Greimas in his proposition of semiotic square, with four-way oppositional structure, and an improvement proposed by Bernard Pottier, where the square is not considered as a closed notion but a continuous process, remain well within the problematics of the original binary process. While one cannot but agree that both positive and negative terms can have their own negative and positive correspondences, as the notion of believing and not-believing, (there is in such cases also a problem of finding exact terms), and while we agree with

Bernard Pottier that the process of continuity is a fundamental notion, not taken care of in the theoretical framework of Greimas, we insist that both of these logical premises either ignore the unity of the signifying ensemble, or at least, do not attach sufficient importance to it. The French scene is stuck in its fundamental Saussurian dichotomy of signifiant/signifié, and, the theoretical speculations of Jakobson/Lévi-Strauss or Greimas/Pottier do not cross this basic threshold.

A similar situation has prevailed in American linguistics. All the developments from descriptive to generative linguistics have been of the order of methodology. All these scholars believed in the early notion of synchronic homogeneity of the linguistic structure, and, sentence always remained the highest unit of linguistic performance and analysis. There was never even an indirect, unconscious, realisation of the conceptual whole of the discourse. Of course, the French field of theoretical speculation has been very different. Linguistic structure was never taken as a homogenous entity. Its interacting, conflicting substructures were always taken into account for all linguistic descriptions. It was also due to the heavy emphasis on the methodological relationship between diachrony and synchrony. While following Saussure, synchrony was given an independent status, the emergence of a synchronic state was considered to be the resultant of a series of diachronic movements. Moreover, it was recognised that there is no such thing as absolute synchrony, it is only a methodological device. Hence, in empirical analysis, synchrony can never be divorced from its diachronic mechanism. André Martinet and Emile Benveniste are the two outstanding examples of this theoretical thrust.

The method proposed here is based on the theory of "ideas" delineated in the seventeenth century *Port Royal Logic* of A. Arnauld and Pierre Nicole (1662), the eighteenth century treatise of Condillac, *Traité de L'Art de penser* (1796), and *Elémens d'Idéologie* of Destutt de Tracy (1817). This theory deals with the evolutionary hypothesis of language. Like Rousseau's attempt at understanding the inequality in social structures on the basis of a hypothetical zero state of culture, the evolutionary approach posits a zero state of language. In the beginning, objects were named. Then followed adjectives and adverbs. The adjectives or the manner of their being were abstracted as qualities from the objects. As such, different colours were deduced from the objects which were actually red or black. The colour which was observed in a specific object was seen in other objects. Similarly, if the object was considered sweet or good, these characteristics were transferred to other objects. In other words, in the beginning, the word cherry included all the possible meanings which could be attached to this object, but progressively, its different characteristics, colour, taste, manner of being, were abstracted and general statements were made about other such objects. These abstracted qualities were "partial" signifiers, which could refer to a given object with a combination of all the signs required to describe one object. This process is called intellective process in Port Royal Logic.

It differentiates clearly, the simple signs, which refer to a given object, and, complex signs, which are due to intellective abstraction or analysis, and follows the progressive

formulations of analogy. The complexity of signs begins when "things" are transformed into "signs", when the word of the speaker invokes in the hearer both the image of the thing that "represents", that acts as a sign, that is there "in place" of the thing, and the image of the thing that is "represented". Human communication is possible only on the basis of the process of "invocation", which is obviously based on the "experience" of the hearer in the "field of signification". As such, all signs are "adjectives" which refer to the "mode" or manner of being, which is obviously based on the "experience" of the hearer in the "field of signification. These adjectives or qualificators are always "approximate". They are abstracted on the hypothesis of "resemblance". They are only conceived as such. As no two red colours are alike in nature, no two objects are good or bad exactly in the same manner, communication depends entirely on the two corresponding conceptualisations of the speaker and of the hearer, which, as we know, never coincide. Hence, with the help of a number of "partial" signs, one attempts to arrive at a complete description of an object. Or, in other words, a number of complementary signs correspond to one unit of significance.

There are two processes simultaneously working in human communication : of "abstraction" and "concraction". From given objects, we abstract, analyse, or decompose their characteristics and use them as signs to concract or compose other objects. A proper noun is a concraction. The name Eric, refers to all the semantic features that this boy is supposed to have, that he is French, he is handsome, he is naughty, he quarrels with his sisters etc., etc. If we want a specific description of this boy, we will need a large number of qualificators, which, "all together", will refer to this "one unit of significance". A simple proposition, emphasized again and again in the seventeenth century theory of discourse, referred to the fact that the larger the number of objects a sign covers the less it will be applicable to one object. The simplest example is again that of a cherry. When this word, cherry, designated only the first such object seen by man, it was a complete description of this object. As the word, cherry, referred to all "similar" objects (fruits) called cherries, it neglected all their internal differences of colour, taste, size etc. When the abstracted qualificator, good, covered only one object, man knew what it meant. He had a specific experience of this quality. Later on, when this sign, good, was used to describe such "objects" as good cherry, good boy, good tree, good day etc., it could at best be "approximate" and "partial". As the process of abstraction and concraction, or, intellection, analysis and analogous composition was carried on to invoke the images of the things "representing" and the things "represented", the human communication became more and more complex, and, we reached the stage, where we are. Hence, the problem of method.

What is diametrically opposed in the seventeenth century Cartesian approach, debated in the Port Royal and Condillacian tradition, is this transformation of a thing, "*chose*", into "*signe*", sign, which only "resembles" the thing "representing", and, never coincides with it as we have in the Saussurean tradition. Since in natural language, there is no word (sign) which refers to only one object, there can, by definition, be never a one-to-one correspondence between the so-called signifier and the signified. The signifier is an abstraction. It is general.

It covers a large number of objects. Its signifactory role only "refers" to them, it only "resembles" with the referents. Hence, it acquires the status of a "sign". Otherwise, it would be a "thing". This is the basic hypothesis of the seventeenth century semiotics which does not find any echo in the Saussurean tradition. This is why even when Saussure talked of the general science of semiology, it could not lead to the semiotics of language because the Saussurean signifier was as "concrete" as the signified it referred to. It dealt with a "binary" opposition. The Cartesian theory of significance, on the other hand, is "quarternary", it invokes the "image" of the thing "representing", which "resembles" it, but does not "coincide" with it, in conceptual opposition to the "image" of the thing "represented", which, again is only an "invocation", a "resemblance". Furthermore, as the Cartesian conceptualisation emphasizes the "partial" characteristics of signs, the signification is realised by a complementary structure, by an "ensemble" of significatory elements, corresponding to a "totality" of significance.

3. *Ideas, Objects, Signs.* In the second chapter of *Port Royal Logic*, we have the following discussion on the nature of ideas with reference to their objects.

Everything that we conceive is represented to our esprit either as a thing, or as the manner of the thing, or as the thing modified.

A thing is what one conceives as subsisting by itself, and as the subject of all that one conceives. This is what is called, substance.

The manner of the thing, or mode or attribute, or quality is what is conceived as the thing, as not able to subsist without it, determines it to be in a certain manner

But we must note that our esprit being used to know most of the things as modified, because the things are known only by their qualities, we often divide the substance in its essence in two ideas, the one as subject and the other as mode. This is why one often considers man as the subject of humanity, and consequently, as a thing modified.

And thus we take mode as the essential attitude, which is the thing itself because one conceives it as such in the subject. This is what is properly called abstraction from the substances, like humanity, corporeality, reason. It is however very important to know what is really a mode, that it is not just appearance; often substance and mode are confused with each other. It should be made clear that the mode is that without which one cannot conceive clearly and distinctly the substance of whose mode (manner) it is, and, that one cannot reciprocally conceive clearly the mode, without, conceiving, at the same time, the rapport that it has with the substance, and, without which, it obviously cannot exist.

It does not imply that one can conceive of a mode without paying express and distinct attention to its subject, but what it shows is that the rapport of the substance is "enclosed" in that of the mode. For example, one can ignore prudence without paying a distinct attention to the man who is prudent, but one cannot conceive of produdence by ignoring the rapport it has with man.

This is with reference to the subject of the modes, which can be called, internal, because they are conceived in the substance, as round, square; and others, external, because they are taken from something which is not in the substance, as loved, seen, desired, which are the terms taken from the actions of the other.

If these words are derived from the manner in which the things are conceived, they are called, second intentions. Thus, to be subject, to be attribute are second intentions because these are the manners under which one conceives things which are derived from the action of the esprit, which has united together two ideas, affirming one with the other.

In the fourth chapter on things and signs, Port Royal Logic argues that when one sees a certain object as representing an other, the idea that one has of it is the idea of sign enclosing two ideas, the one of the thing that represents, the other of the thing represented, and its nature consists of invoking the second by the first. One can never, with precision, note the presence of the thing signified, for there are signs of things which are absent, nor the presence of the sign from the absence of the things signified, for there are signs of things which are present. It has to be ascertained from the specific nature of the sign.

A thing in a certain state cannot be a sign of itself in the same state, for every sign requires a distinction between the thing which represents and the one which is represented. It is quite possible that a thing can be in a certain state, a figurating thing, and in another, a figurated thing. It is also possible that the same thing both hides and discloses another thing, for the same thing can be, at the same time, thing and sign, and, can hide as a thing, what it discloses as a sign.

One can thus conclude that the nature of the sign consists in invoking, in the field of significance, by means of the figurating thing, the figurated thing, and, as long as this effect subsists, i.e., as long as this double idea is invoked, the sign subsists.

In the following chapters, there is a discussion about the simplicity or complexity of ideas, and, the signs which transmit them. It shows clearly the difference between the Saussurean approach of arbitrary nature of the sign and the extreme complexity considered in all its ramifications in the Port Royal tradition.

It deals primarily with the problem of abstraction of the signs from the so-called substance of the things or objects. As the things are differently "composed", and, there are some which are really distinct, but which are, all the same, integral parts, as the human body and its different parts, it is quite easy that we may consider one part without considering another as these parts are really distinct, but this would not be called abstraction. Another way of our understanding depends upon when we consider a mode without paying attention to the substance, or two modes which are joined together in the same substance, considering each one of them separately. The more we can "separate" things in "different modes", the more our esprit is capable of comprehending them. Thirdly, when the same thing has several attributes, we may think of one without thinking of another, even when there is between them no specific distinction. For example, the reflection that I think, consequently, I am he who thinks. In the idea that I have of myself who thinks, I can consider a thing that thinks without paying attention to the fact that it is me, within me, me and the one who thinks are one and the same thing. Thus the idea that I would conceive of the person who thinks, could represent not only me, but all "other" persons who think. Similarly, having a figure on a paper of an equilateral triangle, if I consider with all the incidents which determine it, I will

have an idea of only "one" triangle. But if I consider all the specific circumstances, and, that I think only that it is a figure composed of three equal lines, the idea that I would then have would represent, on the one hand, more distinctly the equality of the lines, and, on the other, would enable me to represent "all" the equilateral triangles. In such abstractions, one always notices that the lower level includes the higher level with some specific determinations, as "me" includes the one who thinks, as the equilateral triangle includes the triangle, but the higher level, being determined, can represent more things.

The principle of abstraction leads to the classification of ideas and the signs which carry them. Even though, by themselves, all things can be considered singular or unique, there are ideas which represent only one thing, as the idea that each has of himself, and the others can represent several, as when we conceive of a triangle without considering any other thing except that it is a figure of three lines and three angles. This idea can serve to conceive all other triangles.

Words can be general in two ways: the ones are called, univocal, when they are related to general ideas in such a way that the same word covers several; the others are called, equivocal, when the same sound is related to different ideas in such a way that the same sound covers several, not because of the same idea, but because of the different ideas with which it is related in usage. Within the framework of the universal ideas, we can distinguish between "comprehension" and "extension". In comprehension, the attributes are enclosed in such a manner that one cannot take out one without destroying the whole, as the comprehension of the idea of triangle includes three lines, three angles, equality of its three angles to two right angles etc. In other words, the unitary signifier refers to a complex content or signification. The extension of the idea relates to the subjects which are covered by this idea, as the idea of the triangle extends to all the different types of triangles. There are two types of extensions. The first restriction to this extension is acquired by means of another distinct and determined or specific idea, as to the general idea of triangle, the idea of only one type of figure, the rectangle.

The second is acquired by the application of an indistinct and undetermined idea of a part, as when we say, a certain triangle, in this case, the common term becomes a specific term.

The universal ideas can be furhter divided into five types, explaining the transformation of things into signs on the basis of the anlaysis of their substance or in the manner the different characteristics of the substance are conceived.

When the general ideas represent their objects as things, and, when they are marked by the terms, substantive or absolute, they are called genres or species.

They are called genres when they are so common that they are extended to other ideas which are even more universal as the quadrilateral is genre with reference to parallelogramme or trapezium. The substance is genre with reference to the extended substance called, body, and with reference to the substance that thinks which we call esprit (intellect).

The common ideas within an even more common and general idea are called species, as the body and esprit are the species of the substance.

Thus the same idea can be considered genre when it is compared to the ideas that it extends, and, species, compared to an other which is more general.

The most important point here and in all the discussion in this context is that it is not necessary that the objects and these ideas be effectively the things and the substances, but it is sufficient that we "consider" them as things even when they are only modes and we do not refer them to other substances but other ideas. In other words, once we consider a thing as a sign, we may relate it to another sign purely on the level of mode, and, not on the level of substance which would be irrelevant in this conceptualisation of semiotic relationship. These relationships are called, *differences*, when the object of these ideas is an essential attribute which distinguishes one species from another. They are called, *proper*, when their object is an attribute which belongs to the "essence" of the thing. The last distinction refers to common incidents, when their object is a real mode which can be "separated", at least intellectively, from the thing whose incident it is, without destroying the idea of the thing.

4. *Complex Perceptions and Nominal Combinations.* After a hundred years or so, Condillac continues the argument in *Traité de l'art de penser,* 1796. The earlier conceptualisation is crystallized here even though the process of abstraction and composition remain the two most important issues of reflection.

To abstract is to separate one thing from another, whose part it is. Consequently, the abstracted ideas are "partial" ideas "separated" from their "whole".

Our senses decompose each object. The sight separates the colours, the hearing, the sounds, and, our soul (intellect) receives only partial ideas. The touch is the only sense (faculty) which forms these "collections", where we find "complex" ideas.

By means of abstractions, we discover the rapports of "resemblance" and "difference" among different objects. But, argues Condillac, it is less with rapport to the nature of things (objects), than with rapport to the "manner" in which we "know" them, that we determine their species and genres, and, we distribute (classify) them in classes. It is with our intelligence that we operate abstractions and generalisations. But if we proceed with a "method", the "order" would supplement the limitations of esprit (intellect). To analyse is to decompose, to separate, i.e., to abstract.

Abstraction leads to decomposition which enables us to formulate propositions. In discourse analysis, a proposition is the basic unit of study, and, here we have an excellent definition of proposition by Condillac. A proposition is nothing but a "development" of a "complex" idea in whole or in parts. It enunciates what is supposed to be "enclosed" in this idea. A complex idea is a reunion or collection of several "perceptions", and, a simple idea is one single perception.

A man who would begin to build a language for himself, and who would not talk to others until he had fixed the significance of his expressions by means of the circumstances in which they occur, would not have any pitfall of understanding. The names of simple ideas would remain clear because they would signify exactly what he perceives in the selected

circumstances (situations); those of complex ideas would remain precise, because they would enclose only those simple ideas which are collected in certain situations in a specific manner. When he would like to add to his first combination, or subtract by deleting some features, the signs he would use, would conserve the clarity of the former, if the addition or subtraction is marked well with the new circumstances (situations). This is obviously an ideal position, like a laboratory experiment, which never takes place in actual circumstances. And, Condillac adds that the obscurity and the confusion arise because while pronouncing the same words, we believe to have accorded to them the same significance, even though we ordinarily add or subtract partial ideas to form a complex idea. And, we have one and the same sign for "different combinations". The same words, in different mouths, and often in the same, have very different significance.

The names of simple ideas or those of sensations or of the operations of intellect could be determined by the situations. One must avoid two errors: the first is to believe that the sensations are in the object, the other, that the same object produces in each of us the same sensations.

As soon as the terms which designate the simple ideas are exact, nothing forbids that we determine others which belong to other ideas. It is sufficient to fix the number and the quality of simple ideas whose complex notion we have. The actions of men have infinite variations. We often want to have their ideas before we have their modes. If we form notions only when we have specific experiences, it would often be too late. Thus we are obliged to group together or separate, according to our choice, certain simple ideas, or, sometimes we simply adopt the combinations of others which are already made.

When we form a complex notion of a substance, our aim is to know that substance as it is. It is this that determines the number, quality and the order of the simple ideas which we put together in one single word (proposition). This is true of all complex notions. When I pronounce, for example, the word, virtue, I consider man with rapport to religion and society, and consequently, by virtue, all the habits which render us religious and citizen. Even though this notion may be sufficiently specific in general, it cannot be so in every case. It is susceptible to different accessories following the obligations of every state. It varies continuously. It is never exactly so in one case, what it is, in another.

In chapter four, Condillac presents his method of analysis. *To analyse, he says, is to decompose, to compare, and, to apprehend the rapports between objects. But, analysis decomposes only to show the "origin" and the "generation" of things (objects). Thus, it must present the partial ideas in a domain, where one can see the reproduction of the "whole" that one analyses. The one who decomposes without this concern (for the whole) deals only with abstractions. And, the one who does not abstract all the qualities (semantic features) of an object, presents only incomplete analyses; the one who does not present the abstracted ideas in the "order which could easily show the generation of the object" presents only obscure analyses. Analysis is thus the "entire decomposition" of an object and the "distribution of the parts in the order in which the generation (of the whole) becomes easy"*

5. *The Discourse.* In the context of discourse (and there is no linguistic manifestation outside linguistic discourse) I consider the structure of significance like the structure of a musical composition. There is an overall unity divided into a number of broad sequences, each related and integrated with the other, leading to further subdivisions. At the lowest level, we have individual notes, which have some preliminary musical connotations, but which "enter" into the musical composition only when they are combined or composed in a definite unit. As such, in different combinations, the same notes enter into different musical compositions or ensembles of musical significance. Individually, bereft of this composition, they are all partial signifiers. Their musical significance emerges only when they form a part of the whole, however small the structure of that whole may be. The process of decomposition, as an analytical device, only destroys the structures of significance. Its validity lies in the fact that the unit as a whole cannot be understood without knowing how this unit is constituted, for the constituting process is the key to the understanding of the creative process of signification. If the decompositional process is understood as only a "strategy" and not a replacement for the whole, one can follow the interlinking sequences beyond metonymic and metaphoric relations. All sub-ensembles of significance are only structures, interrelated and integrated with each other, both as one structure with another, and also with interlinking process of introducing elements as "infixes" which would find their relationships beyond the metonymic sequences. Hence, there are two problems in this process of sub-ensembles arranged in a given sequence whose layers of significance can be analysed one at a time. As some of the elements can find their significance only if we ignore the sequential order, we can comprehend their significance with an overall comprehension of the macro unit of signification. In a discourse, at times, we may have a simple one to one correspondence between a signifying word, a signifier, and its significance, as in the sentence: even Julien did not "know" these beasts. The signifier "know" is related to Julien's previous knowledge of all sorts of animals of the jungle, and, in this context, it is enough to refer to this knowledge, and, no further extension is necessary. On the other hand, while describing the castle of Julien's parents, a number of words are used as in the sentence: on the other side were the kennels, the stables, the bakery, the wine-press and the barns. Within the context of the setting of the castle, each of these words, kennel, stable etc., is a partial signifier. They act as an ensemble of indivisible significance of "prosperity" of the castle as compared to any other small house. The number of these partial signifiers could be "more or less", or in any "order", it would not make any difference. On the other hand, if the discourse context concentrated on any one of these signs, as something happening in the stable, then this signifier, stable, would be a complete and "simple" signifier. In the context of our discourse, the signifer castle, is what may be called the "comprehensive" signifier, and the description thereafter, which is only qualifying, is a series of sub-ensembles in "extension". These sub-ensembles have no independent significance. The Port Royal theory of ideas made it clear that once a "thing" is transformed into a "sign", only a fraction of its conceived reality is used as a qualitative signifier. This signifying transformation deals with the "complexity" of the substance

of a given object, and, its signifying essence is completed as a unit in complementation with all other congruent signs. As such, "comprehensive" signifier may be simple, or, in "extension". In a linguistic discourse, the process of decomposition is related to this process of comprehension of significance. The individual notes convey a musical significance through their complementary ensemble transforming itself into a tune. If we try to analyse each note separately, or even, each micro unit of significance individually, we can never understand the creative process. The conceptualisation of the whole "comprehends" or includes the conceptualisation of its parts. These parts, or partial signifiers, can never be given the status of "simple" or selfsufficient signifiers. This is the main reason why the differentiating process which deals with differences and reslemblances cannot depend upon the assemblage of unrelated binary oppositions.

This argument is based on the premise that the signifying reality is a perceived reality. Hence, the so-called substance of the object which is converted into a sign undergoes a fundamental change. As the substance is a complex phenomenon, in a given combination of partial signifiers, the semantic features which are supposed to be grouped in that unit of significance, depend upon the "perceived resemblance".

It is also to be noted that there is no such thing as a fixed perception, or, a given perception even in one single discourse. The one who participates in this discourse can exercise his own perception. After all, a discourse or a subensemble of discourse is nothing but a given state of mind, a given "human condition". This human condition is not only within the discourse, but also, outside it, within the state of the mind of the one who perceives it. As such, there are two perceptions involved in this affair, the "creative perception" and the "analytical perception", the one deals with the "composition" of the discourse, the other with its "decomposition"

The mere fact that a sign is "instead" of a thing, it is "not" the thing. But what it becomes in this process of transformation depends upon the context of human condition analytically decomposed into resemblances and differences of the perceived reality at that given moment. This perception is not emotional or even auto-regulatory. It is analytical, or, what is called, intellective, in the Port Royal tradition. Both the constituting and the analytical processes of discourse will show how consciously and deliberately a given discourse is constituted. The interlinkages of specific elements of discourse in non-sequential order will demonstrate the consciousness of the unity of the discourse. The more harmoniously a discourse is constituted in terms of its micro-ensembles and sub-ensembles, and, in terms of its non-sequential, non-syntactic relationships, the greater is the awareness of structuration of the author. A note of caution here: the harmonious constituting process should not be taken as a move towards a static structure. The very function of micro- and sub-ensembles is to generate new ensembles by interrelationships and by deliberate integration. Integration is indeed the key concept in the constituting process of the linguistic discourse. But integration is only a tendency, a move, a sequential order, it never leads to a concluding phase. That would be the death of the discourse.

A discourse is an "open-end" manifestation of human communication. A discourse is conducted both within and without. This is why there is a continuity of transformations and metamorphoses. The sequences of perception keep on changing, and, at every new step, new interlinkages are established, new perceptions are evolved. But it should be very clear that it is not metaphysics we are dealing with. We are invovled in the analysis of an empiricial reality which can manifest itself only through a series of human percceptions emerging from a concrete reality of a linguistic discourse. Both the substance and its transformation into a sign are "complex" phenomena, yet this complexity can be analysed scientifically following the norms of semiotic logic.

6. *Concraction and Abstraction.* In Cartesian tradition, the binary relations acquire a new perspective. It concentrates primarily on the notions of rapport and judgement. To judge is almost equivalent to think, and, it always refers to finding relationships, assigning specific qualities, essence, nature, to specific objects, to locate their differences and resemblances in such a way that the binary relationship of "inclusion" is established. "Every circumstance, every particularity (specificity), of our ideas could be the subject of a rapport between this idea and all the others". states Destutt de Tracy. "The act of judgement consists always and uniquely (only) to see that an idea is "included" in another, is a "part of the other". "The rapport is this view of our esprit, this act of our faculty of thinking with which we approach one idea with another, with which we relate them, compare them together in a certain manner". In this process of comparisons of differences and resemblances, the notion of "liaisons" is very significant, for this whole anlaytical operation is meant to "unite two ideas to form another", the "third idea". This notion of forming the third idea which is supposed to be "complete" and "unique" however "composed" it may be, is based squarely in the context of discourse. The so-called binary relations are not solitary and isolated. The analytical process continuously organises the disparate elements of language into a coherent discourse. The rapproachment and liaisons are meant to help in the forward progression of the discourse, which is based on a series of propositions or judgements interlinked with each other. As in the semiotic functioning of language, the "things" or objects, or even words designating them do not have specific significations, their function is only to be a "part" of a given signifying proposition. This is how the notions of subject, attribute and copula are also understood.

According to Destutt de Tracy, there are two things to be considered within an idea (the porter of an idea), its "extension", or the number of objects it covers, and, its "comprehension", or the number of ideas it includes. The more general the idea, the larger number of objects will be covered by it, but, proportionately a small number of ideas (semantic features) composing each of them. Thus, the general idea includes the specific idea in its "extension" and the specific idea includes the general idea in its "comprehension". This point of view also explains the nature and the relationship of "subject" and "attribute", but it must be underscored that these notions of subject and attribute refer to those of a proposition of a discourse, which may or may not correspond to a linguistic sentence. This is very important

because in the Cartesian tradition, it is not the grammatical sentence that is being debated, but the proposition of discourse where the notion of extension or comprehension of "idea", and not, the words, are the basic premises. It is in this context that Destutt de Tracy states that every judgement (proposition) consists of noting that the idea of the attribute is one of the composite ideas of the subject, and a circumstance (context) that belongs to it. As such, the idea of this attribute, however general it may be, is a part of the subject, even though it is specific, and for this, and for this only, we can confirm it to be the attribute of the subject. Moreover, as soon as two ideas are composed, as soon as they are subjected to our judgement, they are different only in their comprehension, they are always perfectly equal in their extension.

There are three important factors in the formation of ideas, the first is to know how we perceive that the sensations we have are caused by a given object. Secondly, how they help us form a complete idea of that object. Thirdly, how we abstract several of these ideas, supposedly similar to each other, to form other more general ideas. The whole semiotic exercise of linguistic communication deals with the innumerable ideas emanating from the objects of our daily experience.

The creative process of discourse follows the two operations of "concraction" and "abstraction". Concraction consists of gathering several ideas to form one unique idea. Its reverse operation is called abstraction. Concraction helps us form ideas of the objects which exist. On the other hand, with the help of abstraction, we compose groups of ideas whose model does not exit in nature. With the faculty of abstraction, we make new comparisons, arrive at new perceptions, formulate new propositions. This also helps us propose new classifications, and, hitherto unknown levels of understanding.

As we follow the argument, the correspondence between the signifier and the signified is the crux of the problem of signification. If we concentrate on the etymological hypothesis of idea, or the sign which carries the idea, being a complex image, we come quite close to the projection of the sign, in the object perceived. The most pertinent analogy could be that of the traditional spirit of the object, as for example, one talks of the spirit of a lake, a mountain, a tree, fire, water etc. The spirit-goddess of the tree embodies the ideal totality of the perception of the object, tree. It penetrates all the trees. It is a representative perception of all the trees, but it never "coincides" with any given tree. It is the spirit, the essence, the being of the tree. It is not the substantial empirical reality of a tree. The conceptualisation of the spirit-goddess of the tree is man's effort at comprehending what a tree represents in all its substantial and ideological manifestations. With the help of this "abstraction" into spirit-goddess, man tries to circumvent the individual variations to arrive at the immanent reality of the object.

Even when we use such a simple word as, cat, we employ it as a sign, as a spirit-goddess, for it never refers to a given cat, each cat being different from another. It corresponds to what may be called the "catiness" or the "spirit-goddess" of the cat, both substantially and perceptively. The word, cat, invokes in us the image of a cat, the idea of a cat, which is "partially seen" in every cat. If this indeed is the role of the sign, we have no choice but to depend upon an ensemble of partial signifiers to semantically configurate one given cat, the

object of our discourse. The abstracted sign refers to all possible cats. To circumscribe our object, cat, we have to follow the process of concraction based on the two propositional components of comprehension and extension.

An idea, or an image, in the etymological conceptualisation of idea, is realised in a proposition, which may be expressed in a grammatical construct of a sentence, or a series of sentences, acting as complementary elements of a "complex" significance. As the significatory role covers, very often, several minor statements, the notions of comprehension and extension, explained in detail in the earlier discussion, are referred to again and again. There are *kernel propositions*, the *propositions in comprehension*, and, others which are partial and *complementary*, the *propositions in extension*.

The syntagmatic analysis demonstrates that the constituting process of the narrative-discourse is not an affair of one sequence following another. In the beginning, a number of strands are presented which find their interrelationships and integration with other strands of units of significance much later, bypassing the sequential order. A narrative discourse as such is a steady weaving of a network of signification and is not at all based on an actantial model of Propp, or even of Greimas in a modified form, of syntagmatic, obligatory sequential order.

Another important point in this analysis is the notion of *ensemble*. As has been amply demonstrated and discussed in the preceding sections, the process of signification is carried on by means of the process of abstraction and concraction. It is the assemblage of a large number of abstracted semantic features from a number of objects that a "concrete" significance emerges.

This is why the smallest unit of significance, the so-called signifier, is an "ensemble", which alone corresponds to an "idea", an "image", of significance.

Once the syntagmatic analysis is complete, the narrative discourse is presented as a series of semiotic conceptualisations in a crisscross of the strands of significance. This gives us an overall view of the unity of the discourse, and, also demonstrates, how the various interlinked strands were perceived in the context of the discourse as a single comprehensive unit of significance. This analytical process also shows how the manifest form and the immanent form are interlinked, and, how they inflect the content of the discourse in a fusion of syntagmatic progression and paradigmatic interventions. A narrative-discourse is like a gammelan composition based on the principle that a nuclear theme is to be played simultaneously with several layers of elaboration of the theme in different registers and at different paces.

STRUCTURAL
DISCOURSE

Critique de la Raison Dialectique

1. In *Critique de la Raison Dialectique* Jean-Paul Sartre wants to found a sort of existential anthropology incorporating the methods of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. He tries to situate man in his environment, conditioned by material factors of class struggle and the means of production. And, throughout his work, he takes, for example, various aspects of the French revolutionary process. The problematics moves around the notion of "group" and that of "individual". He believes that this extended theoretical framework enriches Marxist thought and gives man his due place in the scheme of things. The obvious contradiction of this human mechanism is with the so-called Marxists who have dehumanised Marxism, and thus, deviated from the path and the "project" outlined by Marx himself. The whole polemic is about historical interaction that is responsible for social change. What is the motive force of internal structuration? What triggers change? And, what are the factors which determine a given conditioning?

2. As far as contemporary Marxism is concerned, Sartre has his own misgivings. He believes that historical materialism has a paradoxal character. It is the only verity of history, and at the same time, a total indetermination of verity. This totalising thought, asserts Sartre, has founded everything, except its own existence. A devastating attack on the basic hypothesis of historical materialism, if there ever was one. He continues with his argument : Marxism presents itself as a demasking of a being, and at the same time, as an interrogation that stays at the level of exigence that does not tell us enough about its significance.

3. As far as dialectics is concerned, it is a method, and, a movement within an object. It is founded on an affirmation of the base which is an affair of both the real structure and our praxis. There is no doubt that the process of our understanding is of dialectical order. The movement of the object is itself dialectical, and, these two dialectics form a single whole. This ensemble of propositions has a material content which defines the rationality of the world. However, the dialectical reason is neither a constituting reason, nor a constituted reason. it is the reason which is being constituted in the world, and, by means of this reason, dissolves in it all the reasons constituted to constitute others, which it continuously surpasses and dissolves as it moves along. It is thus both a type of rationality, and, the surpassing of the

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rational types. It affords the possibility of ever unifying its objects of study, and, becomes a permanent necessity for man to totalise and be totalised.

4. Sartre thus accepts the concept of totality and the totalising process, common to both Marxism and structuralism. His main problem is to secure a proper place for the individual, who is a product of his socio-political structuration, but whose individual reaction of praxis must inflect the course of history. The human conscience, maintains Sartre, is the conscience of the Other, and the Other is the being-other of the conscience. There is a basic contradiction between the knowledge of the being, and, the being of knowledge. Marx defined his ontological monism by affirming the irreducibility of being to thought, and, by reintegrating thought in the real as a certain type of human activity, says Sartre. In a word, materialist monism suppressed the dualism of thought and being in favour of the total being. But, this re-establishes the dualism of Being and Verity.

Sartre asserts that contemporary Marxists have not been able to overcome this paradoxal difficulty. And, they have preferred a simple solution. They simply refuse to consider thinking as a dialectical activity, and, dissolve it in the universal dialectics. They suppress man by disintegrating him in the universe. Thus, they hope to substitute Being for Verity. There is no such thing as knowledge. Being does not exist. They posit a Nature without men. They do not need certitude or criterion, for knowledge, in whatever form it appears, is based on a certain rapport of man with the world that envelops him. If man does not exist any more, this rapport obviously disappears.

5. The object of our analysis is Nature, and, the study of History is its specification. We have to follow the movement that generates life from matter, man from the elementary forms of life, and, social history from the earliest human communities. But, this external materialism, argues Sartre, imposes dialectic as an exteriority. In this process, man is kept out, and, the analysis follows the course of things to comprehend idea as a thing signified by others, and, not as a signifying act. But, to think and to suffer is to act, and, this signifying act cannot be ignored.

The materialist idealism is nothing but a discourse on the idea of matter. Its opposite is the realist materialism; to think of man as situated in the world, traversed by all cosmic forces. This reflection presents the world as it is revealed across a "praxis in situation". Sartre continues : dialectical materialism makes sense only if it establishes, within the human history, the primacy of material conditions, such as are discovered by the praxis of the situated men. In other words, if there is such a thing as a dialectical materialism, it must be "historical" materialism i.e. a materialism from within.

According to Mrax, men make History on the basis of internal conditions. The dialectical rationality of this affirmation is presented as a unity of necessity and liberty that is both dialectical and parmanent. In a sense, man is subjected to the dialectical process, almost as the force of enemy, but at the same time, it is also true that he "makes" it. If the dialectical Reason is to be the Reason of History, continues Sartre, this contradiction must be dialectically

engaged. If we do not want that this dialectic becomes a divine law, a metaphysical fatality, as most of the contemporary Marxists would like us to have it, it must be derived from the individuals. Dialectic is the law of totalisation that evolves into collectives, societies, history, i.e. realities which are imposed on the individuals, but at the same time, it must be projected by millions of individual acts. Sartre concludes his arguments with the final affirmation that it is not the dialectic which obliges men to live their history across terrible contradictions, but it is the men under the empire of want and necessity, who confront each other under the circumstances that History of economy can enumerate, but dialectical rationality alone can render them intelligble.

6. As far as the problematics of the "situated" man is concerned, Sartre admits that his position in, what he calls, series (syntagmatic relations), can give rise only to immediate praxis or immediate reactions, which can be quite deceptive. The paradigmatic or associational relations are necessary to understand the dialectical movement of any human confrontation. At the former level, the human praxis and its immediate ends can appear only in "subordination"; they are subordinated to the direct and dead exigence of a material ensemble. In a series, each becomes his self inasmuch as he is other than the Others i.e. just as Others are other than him. No "concept" can be formed of this series, because each member is serialised by his place in the order. Each is the Reason of the Being-Other, just as the Other is his reason of being. We come back to the material exteriority, which is not surprising,for the unorganised materiality decides the nature of the series. On the other hand, as the order was produced by a given practice, and, this practice included reciprocity, it has a "real interiority". It is in its "real being", and, as an integral part of a totality, which is totalised outside it, that each is dependent on the Other in its reality. As such, the pratico-inert objects must first produce, following their "own" structures and their passive action, the direct or indirect relations, and groupings of the members of this multiplicity. Such a group is defined by the co-presence of its members, not as the relations of "reciprocity", or a practice that is common and organised, but as a "possibility" of this praxis, and reciprocity, which are responsible for it. Sartre continues to insist on the dichotomy of the group and the individual, which is the basis of his *Critique* and his analysis of the "situations" of the French Revolution. He believes that in reality there are two distinct dialectical undercurrents : that of the individual practice, and that of the group as praxis. The moment of the practico-inert field is in fact that of anti-dialectics.

7. This structure of alterity is constituted of the action of the "common lot" as totality. In threatening to destroy the seriality by the negative order of massacre, the troups as practical unities, present this subordinated totality as a negative force of each of the possible negations of seriality. Thus, with the coexistence of two structures, the one being the possible or future negation of the other, each continues to see in the other, but it sees, in it, itself i.e. as a totalisation of the Parisian population. It does so by means of the sword or the gun which will exterminate it. In this situation, each sees in the Other, his own future, and, discovers his

present immediate action in the action of the Other. In such a group, obviously, there is no unity of action. It is elsewhere, in the past or in the future : the group has acted and the collective realises it with surprise as a moment of its passive activity. It was, once a group. This group is defined by a revolutionary act, which is an irreversible act. As far as the future is concerned, the arms by themselves, have in their very materiality, the possibility of a concerned resistance.

8. The conflict between the individual and the group is responsible for the introduction of the element of terror. It gives the individual the chance of his unfettered dialectic, and, a sense of sovereignty. It is also his solitude and his exile. But, he must act to realise his being, and his identity, which is possible only through an intimate interaction with the Other. The micro-structure is within the macro structure. The counterpart of terror is the sentiment of fear. None is certain of his place within. It must be won, and violence obviously is the surest means to achieve this goal: Sartre believes that the experience of terror is a circular experience. He asserts that the Girondins are totally responsible for the violence of the conflict; earlier for forcing the revolution to wage war, and later, for producing terror as the only means of government. The homogeneity of the Convention was false. The majority of the members were not willing to pardon Montagnards for the humiliation of the second June. There were a number of Girondins still in the Assembly. The antagonist groups presented their heterogeneity in the irreducibility of their political actions. The conflicts of interests were becoming more and more violent. The Girdondins were there to represent the interest of the conservative bourgeoisie and those of aristocrats; the difference of groups and individuals developed across a slow complex matrix. Neither federalism, nor the hostility of Paris, nor the social and political conceptions were responsible in the initial period. All this was constituted during the struggle through irreversible episodes. Terror, asserts Sartre, is never a system that is established by the will of a majority. It is due to a fundamental rapport within a group as interhuman relations. The study of these relations is the study of the two dialectics mentioned above.

9. Sartre criticizes the *apriorism* of the Marxists. It is not only in the domain of linguistics that such a malaise exists. André Martinet has often pointed out this basic fallacy of the binarist approach of Roman Jakobson and his followers. A considerable number of descriptivists and transformationalists fall in this category. Once a certain language, often English, was described with a number of stress and intonational patterns, we found the same conclusions for languages as far apart as Korean and Hindi. There are not only pseudo-Marxists, there are pseudo-structuralists all over, who find it convenient to analyse their objects in pre-fabricated moulds. Sartre calls them lazy Marxists, who do not take the trouble to study the various aspects of a given socio-political structure, who do not weigh all the possible factors which constitute a given situation. They try to fix events and persons in a framework that is already there.

These socio-political situations, where the individuals and the group interact, are much more complex than what the contemporary Marxists are used to. It is not possible to accept

the analysis of the Marxist Guerin that the revolutionary war of 1789 is another episode of commercial rivalry between the English and the French. This Girondin assertion is basically "political" though one cannot deny that this act, at the same time, serves the interests of their class. When Brissot forces France to enter into this war, it is primarily to "save" the Revolution, and, to reveal the treason of the King. This is the key to the Girondin s attitude in this affair. An internal crisis is, more often than not, averted by creating an external crisis.

10. The simplistic formalism of the Marxists is primarily an essay in elimination. This method, argues Sartre, is identical with terror, with its inflexible refusal to differentiate one situation from another. Its aim seems to be a total assimilation at the cost of least effort. It does not integrate the various elements of a structure by according to them a relative autonomy. It simply suppresses them. What cannot be handled or understood should be swept under the rug. This is the usual techniques of the descriptivists/transformationlists who believed in the homogeneity of structures, and, whatever did not fit in their a *priori* formulation was simply thrown out of the recorded data. It is interesting to see that such things have been happening in other domains of scientific enquiry. The specific determinations, according to Sartre, evoke the same misgivings that the individuals have in reality. To think, for most of the Marxists, is to pretend to totalise, and, under this pretext, the particular is replaced by the universal. Sartre believes that Marx never accepted this false universality, his method proceeded progressively from the larger determinations to the most precise. In a letter to Lassale, Marx maintains that he proceeds from the abstract to the concrete. And, concrete, for him, are the hierarchical determinations and the hierarchised realities. For example, the word, class, is a word without any significance if we do not know the various elements of salary, capital etc., which constitute it. For Sartre, in any determination, the human relations are the most concrete elements which situate a given interaction of the individual within his environment.

11. There is no doubt that Marxism enables us to "situate" a discourse of Robespierre or a poem of Baudelaire. But what does this situating imply? According to the writings of the contemporary Marxists, this means determination of a definite place of the object of study in the total process of material conditions, the class that produces it, the form of struggle with other classes etc. Every discourse and every move will be defined in these terms. This would amount to considering Montagnards as the representatives of a recent bourgeoisie. The discourse of Robespierre will also be considered to be conditioned by an economic contradiction. But an analysis in depth of interhuman relationships and group rivalries would reveal a more profound contradiction of authoritarian parliamentarianism. As such, the introduction of the arm of terror was also primarily a "political" act, to eradicate the voice of opposition. How many times do we hear the false cries of the deteriorating situation of law and order, or a conflict on the frontiers of our countries, when it is simply a question of an internal political disequilibrium?

12. This "concrete reality" discussed by Marx is ignored by contemporary Marxists. For them, an individual, a group, or a book, is a "chaotic representation of the ensemble". Every act of an individual or a writer is reduced to certain generalisations of his class determinations. The concrete relations which this class produces, and, the internal structuration that is due to the uneven distribution of various social and cultural factors, are not taken into account. Wild, Proust or Gide present as many different names, and the relations of the subjective with the concrete.

The ideology of Valery is a concrete and unique product of a being that is characterised "in part" by his relations with idealism, but it should be deciphered in its specificity from the concrete group to whom he belongs. This does not mean that his reactions do not represent those of his group, his milieu, or his class. Valery is a petit-bourgeois intellectual, this is certain. But, every petit-bourgeois intellectual is not Valery. Contemporary Marxism lacks the "hierarchy of mediations" which are indispensible to comprehend the individual and his work within a given class and a given society at a given time and place.

Marxist critics establish the realism of Flaubert on the basis of the rapport of reciprocal symbolism with the social and political evolution of the petite-bourgeoisie of the Second Empire. But, they never show the genesis of this reciprocity or of his perspective. We are not told why Flaubert preferred literature at all, why he lived as he did as an anachorete, why he wrote "these" books instead of those of Durany or of Goncourt.

Flaubert was a petit-bourgeois but his family had its own specific characteristics: his mother belonged to the nobility, his father was the son of a veterinary doctor of a village, the elder brother of Gustave, who was apparently more gifted became an object of his hatred, and so on. It is thus in the specificity of a given history, across specific contradictions of this family, that Gustave realised his being. A child becomes what he is because he has lived a specific life within the conflicts of the religious zeal with the monarchical regime and the irreligion of his father, a petit-bourgeois intellectual and a son of the French Revolution.

It is not only in the Flaubert family that the two brothers had different dispositions and "talents", it is a familiar situation in the so-called middle class families all over the world. It is not uncommon in India to have one brother a militant of the extreme left, and another, of the extreme right. The economic conditions and the class structure do not explain all. It is only a point of departure. The activists of the numerous communist parties whose ideological and political interests radically differ from each other come from the same class. This is true of the Sorbonne also where the militants of the right and the left who throw plastic bombs at each other are generally the kids of the same Parisian bourgeoisie.

At the time of the revolutionary conventions, the situation was quite identical. Most of the militants were young fellows from the "economic" middle class of all the French divisions of nobility, bourgeoisie and aristocracy. Their economic condition helped them acquire the necessary intellectual culture, but being young and carefree, they were primarily guided by their ideological leanings. They were possessed by the absolutism of Rousseau. Most of the leaders of the French Revolution were bachelors. Besides, the precursors of the Revolution, Descartes, Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot, the high priests of the movement, Robespierre, Volney, Garat and a number of others were all foot loose and fancy free. Their political engagements

and personal reactions in any given situation have to be comprehended in terms of their intellectual development and specific personal interrelationships since their childhood. But as Sartre remarks, contempoary Marxist critics deal only with "ready-made adults" and pay no attention to individual psychic developments. They leave this vast domain of scientific enquiry to the psyclo-analysts.

They do not realise that there are structures within a Structure, which are responsible for revolutions within a Revolution.

13. The historical rationality cannot be acquired without the priciples of the conflicts of classes and various other factors of economic determination, but this "economism" does not explain all. Without the living men, there is no living history. To understand a totality and the ensemble of the historical complex, one has to follow the unique adventure of the individuals who are involved in any diachronic structuration. The Marxist method is "progressive" from the abstract to the concrete. But the "lazy" Marxists do not take the trouble to follow all its series and orders, its syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations; they constitute the real a priori. They already "know" what they are going to find. The method proposed by Sartre is both progressive and regressive. Initially, it places man in his general context, in the conflicts of his class and society, in the contradictions of the movement of the ensemble. This gives us a totalising understanding of the given movement, but with reference to our object this understanding remains an abstract affair. It begins with the material production of the immediate life, and ends with society, State and ideology. However, within this movement "figures already" our object. For a Marxist, the object is in the historical process and the historical process is in the object. Both are "abstract" considerations. The existentialist method of Sartre is "euristic": it follows progressively the biographical details with the help of the conflicts of the period, and, traces the contradictions of the epoch with reference to biography.

The Case of Flaubert

1. In *L'Idiot de la famille*, Jean-Paul Sartre presents a specific application of his progressive-regressive method where the historical macrocosm and the individual microcosm are dialectically related, i.e. there is a constant interaction between the historical progression of socio-political structures, and, the life of the individual as lived across these events. Men make history within the material conditions of society. "Historicalisation" is a necessity, and, the "liberty" is in human praxis.

Whatever aspect we are considering, the rapport of the individual with his times is a rhetorical illustration of the relation of the macrocosm with the microcosm, and, in this precision, there is only the question of a unique, specific biography, a "condensed" history. History is a totalisation in process, but it continues to detotalise in the movement itself, and by the same token, even if it is to be concerned with only one subject, say the bourgeoisie since Etienne Marcel, or the proletariat since the Commune, this subject will be broken, divided in generations, where each of them has, for its past, the future of the preceding, even if they confront each other in the same lieu: the present. This present is understood as the "refused future". In other words, the term Humanity is not, and does not respond diachronically to any concept. What exists is the infinite series whose law is recurrence. And, it is defined by the well-known dictum: man is the son of man. With this reasoning one can say that History is perpetually finite, i.e. composed of broken sequences where each is a deviated continuation, not mechanically but dialectically, and at the same time, it is its surpassing towards the ends which are both "same and other".

2. The adventure of the French society and that of the young Gustave point out that it does not lead us to an ensemble of cultural determinations. These contradictions are inscribed in books and are totalised by the neurotic adventure of Gustave. But above all, it refers to the catastrophic event of June 48, which is a historic concrete moment, it is the tragic destiny experienced by thousands of lives as a conscious reflection on a real hatred, manifested across social structures, which are broken at several points. It upsets all conceptual knowledge, and, by its irreversibility, temporalises as a moment of praxis and as an inevitable orientation. The French society passed from Red Terror to White Terror. It is in this "historicity" that the society "charged" Gustave and some others to "liberate" it. But this nightmare which revealed inconsistency needed to be supported by a more profound verity. It is not possible that this dual rapport of "insincerity" of the author and the "bad faith" of the reader constitute a fundamental relation of Flaubert with his public. There is thus a sort of a field of "non-

communication" and "irreality". This bad faith finds in Madame Bovary, a conception of the world, a time swallowed by Eternity, an intemporality of human nature, and, an archetypal cut which presupposes succession in order to immediately dissolve the cyclic duration of repetition. The author and his reader understand each other very well. Both indulge in an absolute realism bordering on absolute irreality. Each of them is possessed by the same concern. They want to forget a "history" by destroying the historicity of human societies. And, the basis of this accord is that each of them has lived his adventure "historically". It is thus in this context of history that they attempt to break this cycle, to contest the praxis itself, to deliver them from all forms of responsibility, to realise their being in "liberty", that such a nightmare as Madame Bovary is created. But, it is the most "real" nightmare imaginable. And, Flaubert is considered to be the most representative author of the Second Empire.

3. Sartre continues his argument with an emphasis on the choice of the artist. The artist must decide, he says, to be the irreal Lord of irreality. This man of action can participate in this world only if he establishes a system of infinite relations and the ensemble of materiality with the mediation of men, and, the ensemble of men with the mediation of materiality. As such, he does not have a definite end. His objective is a specification of the imaginary, to present the irreal in its rigorous totality. With this irrealisation of the self, he becomes a universal witness of the imagination of the rigorous totality. After that, nothing is impossible. Each image should, and must be, the product and the expression of imagination as a totality in exercise, as an absolute negation of the real. This negation is due to the rupture of the artist with his class, i.e. bourgeoisie. It is born of the conflict between the victorious bourgeoisie and the autonomous literature. It leads him to absolute negation, i.e. to an art opposed to reality. The aim of art is to disqualify the real by inscribing in it the perfect center of irrealisation. The work, then, becomes the total irrealisation, in the form of a perfect work of imagination. The objective neurotic situation proposes its subjectivization as the only way to escape from the unsurpassable contradictions of the epoch. The choice for the irreal and for subjectivity is one and the same thing. It is not an affair of egocentricism, for these fellows are not proud of themselves. At the most, some of them suffer from negative narsicism. It is an affair of a spontaneous invitation of artistic thought. Since it is not possible to overcome contradictory imperatives, they are pushed into each other and are subjected to various transformations. A logic of Néant is evolved that moves from the realisation of the irreal to the irrealisation of reality.

4. Flaubert works within an institutional ensemble. It is an expression of the infrastructures. There is also the historical conjunctive which is conditioned by this ensemble, by its internal contradictions. The Flaubert family is a product of this disequilibrium. It inherits the past and serves as a witness to the future. His father is a mixture of both rural and urban cultures, both feudal and bourgeois tendencies. He is an agnostic at a time when faith is killed by Jacobinism and the new generation is influenced by the philosophy of rationalism. But these

abstract generalisations have already been individualised in the Flaubert family. The father is a tyrant. The mother respects her husband as a substitute for her father. This atmosphere contributes to the institutional determination of the concrete history of the irreducible micro-organism. The subjectivity of Gustave lies in the fact that the instruments with which he understands himself and his entourage are the symbols (malediction of Adam, paternal malediction), the myths (fatality, ultra-manicheism), false constructions and fantasms. For Gustave, the subject of literature is given *a priori*. He tells George Sand that one does not write what one wants. The content of the work is provided by the course of things. The only possible content is the judgement that the adolescent pronounces on the world with reference to his childhood. "The earth is the kingdom of the Satan". The content of the work is its "form". It is an affair of the reproduction of the world, as if it were the enterprise of liberty, with the realisation of the radical evil as the final aim. This enterprise requires rigour of writing, multiplicity of liasions between different elements of the narrative and the supression of all that is "considered" to be irrelevant, so that the Totality is presented naked in the final instant which is nothing but Néant. One has to be so careful that the radical evil becomes nothing other than an ethical designation of that other absolute norm called, Beauty.

5. The recurrential structure of history, man is the son of man, enables us to comprehend the notions of continuity and discontinuity of the sequences that it totalises. This structure is integrated in the events of birth and death. It is obvious that the relative finitude of historical series is based on the absolute finitude of historical agents. Inversely, argues Sartre, the finitude and the singularity of an epoch, rebound on the individual who is not only defined by its general characteristics, mode of production, relations of production, class, group and sub-groups etc., but also by its uniqueness, as a certain moment of a temporalisation which is both comprehensive and unique. The diachronic finitude of an individual is specified by the finitude of social projects which envelop him and give him his finite destiny of man. A life as that of Gustave, and an epoch as that of Louis-Philippe, can enter into a reciprocal rapport on a "real" basis. All that is required is that the same factors condition one and the other.

We can very well understand the effect of acceleration that transforms a life into an oracale, i.e. a condensed diachrony of the general evolution of society. There is, in fact, no reason why the catastrophy of the macrocosm should coincide with that of the microcosm. The presence of all the elements of the epoch in each of its parts does not mean that each of them cannot be an irreducible finitude, which distinguishes it as a part from the whole. At the level of the individual, there is a sort of a double historical movement. On the one hand, the individual is irresistably pulled towards the specific crises as those of February 48, December 2, 52, and September 4, 70. Thus Gustave is pulled towards the Revolution of February by the course of things and the praxis of men in spite of his frustrations, his violent moods, his dreams of glory and his preneurotic failures. On the other hand, the programme of life, which was planned on the basis of the same circumstances as the global sequence, determines the internal movement of the living individual and leads him to realise the diachronic reality of his times.

6. The model of Madame Bovary, the Paiva, was in fact a prostitute and an authentic marquise. She married the Marquis of Paiva. She deserted her stupid husband, who later committed suicide, but kept his titles and fortune. Flaubert and the Goncourts knew her well. They used to visit her fabulous mansion. What struck them most was the false and illusory nature of his place. Paiva, an old courtesan, well painted, with false hair and an artificial smile, gave the impression of an actress of the province. Her dining room was surcharged with luxury and had a taste of the Renaissance. It was more like a cabinet of a big restaurant than a cozy place to dine. The comparison with the genuine palaces of the aristocracy was obvious. This "fabulous" mansion was literally stuffed with "expensive" paintings, heavy candle holders of massive silver, and glittering furniture. All that went on there was false and deceptive; the conversation was frozen and the human relations were dead. The Paiva was the most disturbing person. With her false Russian accent, her blond hair, her grace inflected with considerable effort, her past that frightened everybody, she was the most irreal realisation of the real. But why did the Goncourts and Flaubert go there? They were attracted by the "myth" of the house which surpassed its reality, but continued, all the same, to give to this pleasure house, the "prestige" of the fabulous wealth. This myth, however, was in the air. It was without any roots. It did not coincide with the object perceived. But, it was exactly because of this absolute irrealism that it represented the reality of the bourgeoisie of the period. All this illusion of wealth was the failure of imagination. It corresponded perfectly with the mental transformation of the people. All this exhibition, these false teeth, this decoration without taste, was an index to the mental attitudes and the ambitions of the new rich bourgeoisie.

When Flaubert notices the ugly features of the Paiva, the nose like a peach, the lips without inflection, the uneven lines of her face covered with powder, the white spots accentuated by sharp and deadly light, he realises the corpse in her. Her life is only an appearance. Gustave played with this fascinating irreality. He liked to perceive the corpses behind the false faces of the living dead. These deceptive reflections led him to the reality of life. He loved to paint this "absolute failure of imagination".

7. The questions which are raised by Jean-Paul Sartre in the context of Madame Bovary and Flaubert pose obviously the problem of the interdependence of historical material contingence and the individual microcosm. On the one hand, Flaubert is considered "the father of realism", and, on the other, Flaubert is supposed to have said: Madame Bovary, it is me. It is also known that the father of realism wanted to write a history of the Mystic Virgin, Madona, of Holland. What is this feminism of Flaubert? What does this metamorphosis into a woman mean in the middle of the nineteenth century? The problem could be posed according to Sartre, in Kantian terms: What are the conditions of the possibility of the experience of feminisation? The style of the author can give us some clues to his conception of the world. One has obviously to go to the details of biography. The work poses questions to life. But it must be understood that the work as an objectivation is "more complete, more total" than life

itself. It refers to the biographical elements but it finds its explanation within itself. We see in this argument of Sartre the germs of the respect of totality and complete structuration of the text. This work sheds light on the solitude and on the narcissim of Flaubert. His feminism, his dependence, and his passive attitude are highlighted by the internal structure of the text. Flaubert's family life, his father, his mother, his bourgeoisie, the religious attitudes of his times and that of his family, his childhood relations -- all of these help us understand his inclinations, his interests in projecting what he did in this so-called realism of Madame Bovary. This text corresponds perfectly with the false realities of the nineteenth century bourgeoisie, both at the economic and cultural level, and at the level of mental structures. It represents all the contradictions of the petite-bourgeoisie that was looking for a foothold in the reality of this world which always escaped it. In this Negation of his self that represents Madame Bovary, Flaubert secretely avenged his class, his bad faith, and his non-relations. Besides the femininity of Flaubert, there is also a question of the "masculinity" of Madame Bovary. This man-woman being had lost its identity in the milieu it flourished. The whole exhibition was so real and so false. Madame Bovary thus became the most splendid and the most monstrous literary work of the period. It is said that Flaubert detested realism, he liked only absolute purity in art. In Madame Bovary, the camouflage was thus perfect. He gave to the people what they thought they liked, and, within the internal structuration, he metamorphosed realism into absolute irreality. It was so real, it just could not be. He exploited the "myth" of realism to the maximum. Madame Bovary, as such, was like the bourgeoisie it represented, both real and grotesque to the extreme.

Althusser and the Semiotics of Karl Marx

1. Jean-Paul Sartre introduced the notion of the interaction of the macrocosm of the basic determining features of social structuration with the microcosm of individual psychic comportments based on the unique adventure of each person. He thus accepted the general concept of structures within a Structure. And, his main problematics, obviously was to render to man his due place in the mechanistic determinations practised by the contemporary Marxists.

The most important, and to an extent, quite different, contribution to Marxist thought within the context of semiotics, is that of Louis Althusser. Emphasizing the epistemological cut operated upon by Karl Marx on the idealism of Hegel, Althusser interprets the theoretical framework of Marx as one of the purest forms of structuration in the complete reversal of the traditional historiography and the definition of the object of study, in terms of synchronic, dynamic relations. Althusser's arguments can be presented briefly as follows.

2. The traditional political economy considered economic phenomena from the point of view of flat plane where the elements were governed by a mechanical causality. The immanent nature of a given phenomenon could be understood within a given sequence. The homogeneity of the domain rendered to it a type of "linear" causality. This was obviously an empiricist problematics within which each phenomenon was analysed and defined. Althusser demonstrates on the basis of his close, structural reading of the Capital that Marx completely reversed this theoretical framework when he defined economy not by the economic universe, but by its "concept". An economic phenomenon occurs within an infinity of space characterised by its non-homogeneity, and an environment, or a "region" determined by a "*regional*" structure, within a "*global*" Structure. Thus, it interacts within a deep, complex and profound domain. This proposition of Marx amounts to a "rupture" with the traditional view of empirical approach.

3. To define the economic phenomena by their concept is to define them by the concept of complexity, i.e. by the concept of "structure" of the mode of production. It further defines the regional structure which is constituted of economic objects, and determines the phenomena of this definite region, situated at a given place in the structure of the whole. This "constituting" structure can be presented as a correlation of the units of productive forces: rapports of production. This structure cannot be defined outside the global structure of the mode of production. This definition leads us to three important theoretical consequences.

Firstly, the economy cannot have the characteristics of an observable phenomenon, for its identification presupposes the concept of economic structure, or in other words, the

construction of its "concept". Furthermore, the concept of economic phenomenon must be constructed for each mode of production. The science of economy depends upon the construction of the concept of economy and the theory of history. On the contrary, the theory of economy is a subordinate region of the theory of history, where one cannot understand historical phenomena in terms of their empirical "visibility".

Secondly, the fact that the domain where the economic phenomena take place is not homogenous, it is not possible to compare and measure them following a given standardised criterion. It must first be submitted to the conceptual definitions of modalities, of variations due to different environments and different relationships. The mathematical calculations must be subordinated to conceptual formalisations.

Thirdly, since the domain of economic phenomena is profound and complex, they can be explained only in their respective complexities. They cannot be apprehended in their linear contingence or causality. This new form of causality requires another concept of analysis, the concept of determinations due to its structure.

4. The economic phenomena determined by a regional structure are in turn determined by a global structure. This approach leads Marx to construct the very notion of concept and the ensemble of concepts which affect the basic forms of traditional rationality or scientificity.

The modification of the definition of economic object by Marx presents a number of theoretical issues. What is the nature of the concept with which one can think of the type of the new determination which is identified as the determination of the phenomena of a given region by the structure of that region? How can one think of the determination of the elements of a structure and structural rapports existing amongst them, and all the affects of these rapports? With which concept, or the ensemble of concepts, can one think of the determination of a structure, subordinated by a dominating structure? In other words, how can one define the concept of structural causality?

5. The third consequence is the most significant element of this theoretical proposition. The assertation that an object cannot be defined by its immediate visible appearance, or by its manifest level, leads us to its comprehension with a detour of its concept. This is an old thesis which has been the subject of reflection in all philosophies of conceptual enquiries. Descartes dealt with a transcendent empiricism, and Hegel with the so-called "idealism" of the objective reality. These were efforts of a kind of sublimated "empiricism", quite different from the anglo-saxon variety, yet within the framework of the theory of knowledge which had its own exigences. This conceptualisation of Marx represents a definite cut or rupture in the old domain of the Cartesian problematics of the subject (cogito) and the object. The knowledge of the real object is not due to its immediate "concrete" contingence, but due to the product of the concept of the object.

Cartesianism was based on a mechanistic system which reduced causality to transitive and analytical movement. The relationship of the whole with the element was conceived

with a considerable detour as in Cartesian biology. The second system was that of Leibniz, which was called the system of "expression". The Leibnizian model dominated the Hegelian thought. It reduced the whole to a principle of interiorisation or "internal essence" where the elements of the whole were the forms of phenomenal expressions. The principle of essence was supposed to be present at each point of the whole in such a way that one could present an equation of the type: element = internal essence of the whole. This category of the internal essence related with external phenomena presupposed a certain nature of the totality in question. Thus, both Leibniz and Hegel had a category of the whole influencing its elements or its parts, but this whole was not a "structure" in any sense of the term.

6. If the whole is "structured", it poses a problematics very different from that of the whole that is "spiritual", i.e. Hegelian. Within a structured whole one cannot think of analytical or transitive causality, or the category of expressive causality. To propose the problematics of the determinations of the elements of a whole, by the structure of the whole, is to propose an entirely different problematics. Before Marx, only Spinoza had raised this issue. In the introduction to Capital, Marx presented this problem by affirming that in all forms of society, it is the specific, determined production and the rapports generated by them, their rank (place) and their importance. It is the general exposure (light) where all the colours are formed, and where specific totalities are modified. It is a specific ether that determines the individual weights of all the forms of existence which emerge from it.

It is thus an affair of the determination of certain structures of production subordinated by a dominant Structure of production. This concept of Marx can be rendered intelligible in terms of the concept of "su(pe)r determination" borrowed from psychoanalysis. In both cases, the problematics is fundamentally the same : with which concept could be considered the determination of an element, or of a structure by another structure? Marx presented his concept of "Darstellung" the key epistemological concept of the whole of the Marxist theory, which is concerned with designating the mode of the "presence" of structure in its "effects", in the causality of the structure itself.

7. Spinoza had made a clear distinction between the "real" object and the object of "knowledge" with the assertion that one should not confuse the "idea" of the circle which is the "object of knowledge" with the circle which is the "real object". Marx believes (Introduction of 57) that Hegel was caught in the illusion of conceiving the real as a consequence of thought, enveloping, enriching, and, setting in movement by itself, while the method which enables us to go from the abstract to the concrete is nothing but the mode in which the concrete real, the real totality which subsists in its independence, and, the "object of knowledge", which is a product of thought, which produces it as the concrete realisation of thought, i.e. as an object of thought absolutely distinct from the real object. Marx, believes Althusser, goes still further and asserts that its distinction concerns not only these two objects, but also the processes of their production.

When Marx talks of the "thought" of the thinking process, he does not confuse it with the "idealism" of conscience, or spirit, or thought, which is the Cartesian absolute conscience, or with the faculty of a psychological subject, even if human subjects are its agents. This thought is a system or an apparatus of thought which is historically constituted, and, which is based and articulated in the natural and social reality. It is defined by the system of real conditions. As such, it is constituted by a structure that combines a type-object, the means of production of the theory, its method, its technique and its historical rapports.

8. Following the distinction between the real object and the object of knowledge, Marx proceeds to posit another fundamental differentiation between the "logical order" and the "historical order" of the appearance of the elements. In modern terminology, this debate is strictly within the context of semiology. Marx elaborates it in the Introduction of 57 : the order that governs the categories of thought in the process of knowledge does not coincide with the order that governs the "real categories" in the process of the genesis of real history. In a statement that explains further the dichotomy between these orders, Marx says that sometimes the correspondence between these two orders is just the "reverse" of what one expects normally. This reference to the notion of reversal has given rise to some ambiguity in the theoretical framework of Marx. Taking literally the notion of exact reversal, it has been suggested that even in this context the relation between the two orders remains primarily of a one-to-one correspondence or biunivocal. Althusser argues very convincingly that this does not make any sense. Marx himself states that it would be impossible and wrong to arrange the economic categories in the order in which they were historically determining (factors). Their order is, on the contrary, determined by the type of mutual relation which they have in the modern bourgeois society, and, this order is just the reverse of what appears to be their natural order, or what corresponds to the order of historical development.

This statement of Marx must, and can, be understood only in the theoretical framework where he differentiates between the real object and the object of knowledge, and, describing the mechanistic, linear causality, emphasizes the structural causality of elements. In both cases, he prefers, in modern structural terminology, the paradigmatic relations of semiology to the syntagmatic relations of the logical positivist school.

Marx asserts that it is not a question of the relation that is established historically within economic rapports, it is a matter of their "gliedrrung" (articulated combinations) within the modern bourgeois society. The order in which these concepts are articulated in the analysis is of the order of scientific demonstration by Marx. It has no direct rapport with the order in which such a category appeared in history.

9. The logical consequence of the preceding argument advanced by Althusser leads him to pose the fundamental question of the rapport between the object of knowledge and the real object. In the Introduction of 57, Marx further says that the whole, as it appears in thought, is a product of the thinking head, which appropriates (aneignet) the mode based on

the one and the only mode that is possible for it, the mode that is different from the artistic, religious and practico-spiritual modes of this world. It is obvious that Marx emphasizes the differences of the modes of production of different objects, and the corresponding differences of the modes of understanding of the objects of knowledge. But, however different these two may be, there is a definite rapport between them. It is always a question of the real world. The problem thus is to define and designate the mechanism that assures the appropriation of comprehension of this real world by knowledge even though this knowledge is entirely an affair of the "thinking" head. There is a direct relationship between the subject and the object, the nature of which varies from one theoretical framework to another, and the differentiation in these approaches is fundamental for any scientific investigation.

There is the philosophical subject (the philosophic conscience), the scientific subject, the empirical subject on the one hand, and on the other, the transcendental or absolute object, the principles of pure science, and the pure forms of perception.

These correspondences between parallel subjects and objects pose the problem of the process of the production of knowledge, and of the comprehension of a given real phenomenon by means of a specific subject. Althusser says that the question then is to find with which mechanism the process of knowledge, which is an affair entirely of thought, produces the cognitive appropriation of its real object, which exists outside thought, in the real world? Or, with which mechanism the production of the object of knowledge produces the cognitive appropriation of the real object, which exists outside thought in the real world? These questions, asserts Althusser, should be posed in terms of the concept of the structure of knowledge which is a specific and open structure.

The problematics of the "mechanism" with which the object of knowledge produces the cognitive appropriation of the "real" object is totally different from the problematics of the "conditions" of the production of knowledge. The theory of the history of knowledge explains "how" are produced the successions of different modes of production. This history takes knowledge as presented at different periods of history as the knowledge itself. It considers it solely as a product, as the knowledge existing at a given moment. It takes this mechanism of knowledge as a fact. It does not tell us the intellection of the mechanism with which the knowledge under consideration accomplishes its function of cognitive appropriation of the real object by means of its reflected object. A theory of the production of knowledge points to certain facts of knowledge. But these statements take knowledge as a "fact" whose, transformations and variations it studies, without ever reflecting upon the fact that these products are not just any products, but these are comprehensions. A theory of history must take account of the "effects of knowledge".

10. In the historical perspective, the concepts of "origin", "genesis" and "mediations" were introduced. These created a number of misunderstandings. Marx, however, is quite explicit on this issue, when he says that it is the knowledge of "Gliederung", or combinations which are articulated within a system of hierarchy of the "actual" society that one wants to

elucidate to be able to understand the primitive forms of the past. It is the system of the combinations of the contemporary real society that open to us the comprehension of the past formations, and, gives us the concept of the "variation" of these combinations. Similarly, there is the elucidation of the mechanism of the effects of the past.

When Marx studies modern bourgeois society, he takes this society first as produced by the historical resultant. This gives us the impression that Marx is in Hegelian domain of analysis where the resultant conceived is the inseparable result of its genesis. But according to Althusser, Marx, in fact, follows quite another path when he says that it is not a question of the relation which is established historically between economic rapports in the succession of different forms of society. It is an affair of their articulated combinations in the context of modern bourgeois society. The object of the study of Marx is, thus, the real synchronic society.

The actual society is both a "resultant" and a "society". This is the theory of the mechanism of the transformation of one mode of production into another, i.e. the theory of the forms of transition between a mode of production, and the one it succeeds. This actual society is not just any society, it is a specific resultant, a specific product which "functions" like a "society", compared to other products which function in a different manner. According to Althusser, what Marx studies in the Capital is the mechanism of the production of the "effects of society" in the world of capitalist production. The problem then is the cognitive appropriation of the real object by the object of knowledge, which is a specific case of the appropriation of the real world by different practices, which may be theoretical, aesthetic, religious, ethical, technical etc. Each of these modes of appropriation poses the problems of the mechanism of the production of "its effects": aesthetic effect, religious effect, etc.

11. With this rigorous analysis of the "mechanism" or the scientific methodology of Marx, Louis Althusser demonstrates the sequence of the structuration of this crystallisation. This is the most important contribution of Althusser. It is here that he could establish, with utmost rigour, the scientific path that was followed by Marx from his young student days until the period of maturity after 1857. The fundamental distinctions of the real object and the object of knowledge, the mode of production, and the effects of the mode of production, the logical sequence and the historical sequence, are found in their proper structuration only in the Capital. In the earlier writings where Marx was struggling with the existing mechanisms of analysis, there are traces of idealism, materialism, and even humanism. It is thus easy to refer to one of these texts to stake a claim to Marxist structuration. Althusser has not only reconstituted the Marxist thought but has also given a definitive criterion to differentiate the false from the true. According to Althusser, there are four periods in the scientific path of Marx.

From 1840 to 1844, we have the works of the youth which include his doctoral thesis and the Manuscripts of 1844. This includes also the Holy Family. In this period, the problematics of Marx can be stated as Kantian-Fichtian. After 1842, the texts follow the Feuerbachian

anthropology. The Manuscripts of 1844 are considered to be of Hegelian inspiration, but according to Althusser, this is a myth. Marx dealt with Hegel across Feuerbach. The doctoral thesis was the usual university exercise with Kantian-Fichtian problematics. Feuerbach represented the ideal of the eighteenth century, a real union of Diderot and Rousseau.

The year 1845 is most significant in the "methodological" history of the science of Marxism. This is the year of the epistemological cut, a concept borrowed from Gaston Bachelard. This cut is evident in German Ideology. This work represents a tension between the philosophy of conscience and anthropological philosophy. Marx had to make use of the old conceptual words even when he was struggling to disengage himself from the past semantic field. In German Ideology, we witness this spectacle of a new semiological structuration in a praxis of theory. As such, even this work can easily be quoted by interested Marxists in their support of positivism or humanism. This work, as we have seen in a previous section, has been the basis of Sartre's existentialism within the framework of general Marxism.

12. Althusser proceeds with the formulation of three theoretical presuppositions, which, he believes, are responsible for all the confusion in Marxist studies. The first presupposition is "analytical". It follows the theory that every thought could be reduced to its "elements" in such a way that these elements could then be considered separately and at times even distinct from the system they are a part of. In this process, the scholars go as far as comparing isolated elements of one system with that of another.

The second presupposition is "teleological". This approach is generally covered under the historical approach. It is based on the notion of a historical tribunal or historical judgement where all later texts are submitted for comparison with earlier preconceived notions. This approach does not respect the structural independence of the totality of thought. The criterion of verity is placed in a lieu other than where the text-object is being studied.

The third is related to the first. It gets its theoretical inspiration from the general history of the ideas. In this approach, the historical evolution of scientific thought is recognised, but emphasis remains on the so-called 'sources', and, not on the structural, systematic evolution of new periods of scientific methodology.

Althusser gives a cover name for this method, that of "eclecticism". It looks for specific elements in the texts of Marx. These elements are divided into two categories: materialist elements and idealist elements. With this method, one can even prove that the early writings of Marx, like the articles of the Rhenane Gazette, include materialist elements such as politics of censure, the nature of social classes etc. even though this is decidedly the Hegelian period of Marx inspired by Feuerbach. This detachment of the materialist elements from the overall pattern of the texts is due to, what Althusser calls, the "oriented" reading, or teleological reading. There is an effort at reading the writings of the young Marx in terms of the writings of the Marx of maturity i.e. after he had discerned his proper problematics in the Capital as discussed earlier. It is the tribunal of the End to which are submitted the writings of the Beginning. With this approach, even Feuerbach is considered materialist, simply because he

calls himself so, and, because he deals with materialist elements. But, dealing with materialist elements and having a "materialist conception" of a society are two entirely different things.

13. The problematics of the writings of young Marx had been posited earlier, and different cut dates were assigned to his writings when there is a separation between the idealism of Marx and his materialist conception. Unfortunately, notes Althusser, all this has been done in an eclectic manner. These arguments are based entirely on the 'discovery' of the idealist or the materialist elements. For Jahn, the cut date is the Manuscripts of 1844. For Lapine, it is 1843, and, Schaff considers it to be 1841 simply on the basis of a letter of Engles. This hestitation and this uncertainty is due obviously to the lack of a rigorous structural methodology which alone considers a text as a whole. The eclectic-teleological method destroys the unity of the text and looks only for specific elements. As such, there is no theoretical framework where an entire text is studied in terms of its constitutive whole. It is the global, structural significance of the effective unity of the text which alone can shed light on a specific scientific mechanism. The elements which are a part of a whole can be inflected to serve an idealist approach as is found in the earlier writings of Marx. The extremely rigorous and detailed analysis of Althusser demonstrates that even in the early section of the Capital, let alone German ideology, where there is obvious tension between the idealist and materialist tendencies, there are traces of earlier speculations.

Althusser presents this problem in its absolute clarity when he discusses the contradiction between the content and the form. The content of materialist elements set in an idealist form, or overall conceptualisation of a given text, end up being a part of the effective unity of the idealist approach. In the Manuscripts of 1843, Marx has, at his disposal, the Feuerbachian form, the Feuerbachian conceptual terminology. One can see the theoretical tension of Marx trying to convey another mode of analysis by means of a "language" that is not his own. It is a simple question of pragmatics. Between the Manuscripts of 1844 and the works of his maturity, Marx establishes a definite point of departure. He acquires his own terminology which is precise and cohesive. It is not simply a question of a few new words, but of a systematisation of a new conceptual meta-language without which no scientific discoveries are possible. In the Manuscripts of 1843, Marx presents a contradiction between the consciousness of his regularity, his specificity, and the language he is using. This contradiction becomes the motive force of the scientific development of Marx.

14. Opposed to the analytico-teleological approach, Althusser advances what he calls the Marxist approach, and which can easily be considered within the theoretical framework of modern semiotics. It is based on three basic principles:

a. Each ideology must be considered as a whole, united internally by its own problematics in such a way that one cannot change an element without bringing a corresponding change in the whole as such.

b. The significance of this whole does not depend upon its rapport with a whole that is different from it; but with the contemporary existing ideological and social structures. Its development within a field depends upon the corresponding mutations taking place in contemporary structures of the modes of production.

c. The motive force of the development of ideololgy thus does not depend on the specific ideology itself, but, outside it, on the rapports it has with the effective history, on the complex relations it entertains with the existing structures.

What matters is the structural totality and the effective unity. The Marxist distinction between the "real object" and the "concept of the object" is fundamental. Althusser's crystallisation of this dichotomy in terms of content as the elements within, and form as the conceptualisation in a whole, is an extremely significant dichotomy for any textual analysis. In this context, Althusser wants to sound a note of warning, that this approach is a "scientific" approach, and, not an "ideological" approach. In itself it does not contain any "verity" of the problem. It is an approach that "renders intelligible" the problematics of the text which is considered as a whole. It is precisely because of this methodological crystallisation that Marxism, argues Althusser, can comprehend the verities of the text-objects other than the ones studied by Marx himself. It is also in this context that one can realise the import of Sartrian Critique and its proposition of the dialectical relationship between the macrocosm and the microcosm, even though it must be pointed out, to be fair to both Althusser and Sartre, that there are some fundamental differences between these two points of view. At the same time, we cannot forget that Marx himself, talked of "different mechanisms" for the study of each of the "effects" of the modes of production. The analysis of a literary text such as Madame Bovary of Flaubert certainly falls into this different category.

15. The problematics of the works of the youth of Marx is due to the fact that each ideologue, however great he may be, has a beginning, a commencement. It is inevitable that a thinker begins to think within a contingence of ideology. No one can choose one's commencement. The process of intellection begins within a given ideological context with its current conceptualisations and its current terminology. In his young days, Marx began to think in terms of the contemporary neo-Hegelian thought, and not with reference to the Hegel of the libraries. He debated with it, and, he made a tremendous scientific effort to liberate himself from it. This is the process of the dynamics of semantic change or pragmatic semiology. If one wants to follow the structural patterns of the movement of the contradictions between the emerging, developing Marx, and his contemporaries, one must follow the contours of this methodological struggle. It is a question of following a very complex network of relationships with the contingence of neo-hegelian ideology, and the slow, step by step, differentiation that Marx acquired at the cost of a prodiguous intellectual effort.

The methodological and scientific import of this investigation by Althusser of the Marxist thought lies in the inevitable fact that such a course is the lot of all constituting ideological structures which arrive at establishing independent conceptual totalities.

The Phenomenology of Perception

1. In the domain of the semiotics of comprehension of signification of man's relation with the universe that envelops him, the theory of perception has played a very important role. The basic argument in the preceding sections has been the faculty of correlation that enables man to articulate the structural totality of the object of his study in terms of its internal relationships : "regional" structure for Marx, "microcosm" for Sartre, corresponding with the associative field of other interrelated structures of the semantic universe being studied : "global" structure for Marx, "macrocosm" for Sartre.

The possession of the faculty of language or the faculty of articulation or expression is the property of every "speaking" subject. A child learns his language in a situation. His words and phrases derive their significance from the social situation where the child is exposed to at the commencement of his contact with the world. From one situation to another, he develops a relationship with his vocables and the relationships of the meanings attached to them. This process of acquiring an instrument of communication is a slow process, without a deliberate conscious effort. The child grows in and into this world that is unfolded before him in terms of his references to the persons that surround him, and the things in situations with which he wants to satisfy his elementary needs.

This process is "cumulative". The child accumulates traces of language which help him understand a given present situation with reference to the ones he has already comprehended. Every situation is partly a continuation of the past experience, and partly an extension of the immediate semantic universe. All this, however, is well within the grasp of what Merleau-Ponty calls the "speaking subject".

The speaking subject is, however, passive and functions at an unconscious level. He builds a stock of meaningful elements of language in his memory which he employs to relate different semantic situations. The process of 'communication', is different from this experience of gathering associational symbolism. Communication presupposes the faculty of "reflection" Opposed to the "speaking" subject, the process of reflection on the same semantic universe requires, what Merleau-Ponty calls a "thinking" subject. It is the faculty of thinking, in the Cartesian sense of the term, that enables man to establish correlations and construct significant structures which provide signification to the different events of the world around. It is thus the thinking subject of Karl Marx who distinguished between the "real" and the "conceptual" objects of dialectics, and, it is again the thinking subject of Jean-Paul Sartre who established a correlation between the psychic componential individual structure of Flaubert and the nineteenth century bourgeois effects of social structuration in France. Language, or the faculty of articulation or reason, is the motive force of all communication.

2. When a patient is unable to talk, he does not have any problem with the organs of speech, the tongue or the mouth. What he has lost is the faculty of "reason". The problem of the patient is with his "intellect". It is common knowledge that after a head-injury, the victims are neither able to talk, nor recognise people, even though they have no physical problem with their tongue or with their eyes. They can produce sounds, but they cannot communicate. They can see but they cannot tell the difference between one object and the other. To differentiate in the domain of communication is to perceive differences in such a way that these variations become meaningful parts of a significant whole. With eyes one can see, but one cannot observe. And, without observation, without establishing a definite correlation with the past cumulative information on the object, it is not possible to reflect. The process of reflection is the process of intellection. And, it is with intellection that all "mediations" are possible, all classifications can be ordered within a significant whole. Following this argument, one can say that those who are unable to establish dialectical relationships between different objects, are comparable to those patients whose cumulative intellectual traces have become fuzzy. They can see the concrete or the real objects, they can see the real modes of production, but they cannot structurate meaningful wholes where the comprehension of the semantic universe is rendered possible.

3. The neglect of semantics, and consequently of semiotics, in traditional linguistics, continued in the anglo-saxon branch of descriptive-transformational analyses, is due to the lack of this faculty of perception. This approach has concentrated its efforts at finding differences between phonological or morphological entities without reflecting upon the "nature" of these differences. It is not enough to say that A is different from B, it is important to find out the exact nature of this difference and, how this difference is related with other correlated differences. Language functions not only because it represents a set of differences, but it is primarily the interrelationships of the "effects" of these differences which matter. The grammatical categories of past, present, future cover not only different time scales in different languages, but their internal organisations are also very complex. For example, the so-called "present" of the French grammar covers all the three time sitautions : past, while describing an old event as an accident; present, of course; and future as in "il part demain", just like its English equivalent, "he leaves tomorrow". One has thus to correlate this tripartite division with other grammatical categories of French which are "meant" for time scales other than "present". We must follow the internal organisation of the "effects" of the "concrete" elements, be they phonetic, morphological, or lexical. All linguistic functioning, whether one is concerned with synchrony or diachrony, is due to the structural totality within which these effects of linguistic behaviour interact. All linguistic evolution is also due to the interaction in the social and cultural situations which are responsible for both the "formation" of the respective domains of the linguistic categories, and, their evolution on the diachronic scale. This is the true Marxist-Structuralist approach to linguistic analysis. It is based on semiological researches in the realm of perception. It can operate upon the semantic universe

by means of "intellection" by the "thinking" subject; upon the semantic universe which is both "abstract" and "concrete", both "complex" and "simple". The linguists who see language only as concrete and simple phenomena of expression are like the patient described by Merleau-Ponty whose faculty of perception is lost.

The debate on this issue has been primarily on "ideological" lines which had its origin in the Stalinist era, while the basic problematics can be discussed, as demonstrated by Louis Althusser, only in "scientific" terms. What is at stake is not the communist ideology, even though this ideology, deprived of its conceptual content, will lead to its own disintegration, but the scientific mechanism which is an imperative to render the world of significance intelligible to man, who is dialectically related with it. It is not the analytico-teleological approach of defining isolated elements that can help man to comprehend his relations with the mode of production of both his infra and super structures, but the Marxist-Structuralist analysis which is the Semiological method, par excellence. The semiotics of a given text-object is presented to apply successive "mediations" in such a way that the effects of this organisation fall within its own conceptual formulation.

4. The theory of "form" and the theory of "meanings" imply a coextensive correlation between the complexity of form and the corresponding semantic field, but as has been discussed by Louis Hjelmslev and A.J. Greimas, both the *signifiant* or the signifier, and the *signifié* or the signified, possess the faculty of form, and the sign, properly speaking is considered as the reunion of the semiological field of these two aspects of the signifying act. The word is only an "envelop", in terms of Merleau-Ponty, whose content is filled by the thinking subject who constantly and continuously adjusts his field of reference to the world within and the world without. Through forms, we not only create differences, at times a hierarchy of differences, but also a universe of signification which is coextensive with the semantic mediations. As such, form is inseparable from its content. This simple statement also implies that since form is there only to serve as a means of communication, it is the content of the form, without which the form is an "empty" whole, an empty structure, which is the controlling feature of any structuration of signification. It is thus obvious that those who have been engaged only in the study of form and have used meanings only as a differentiating feature, as in anglo-saxon linguistics, have been dealing with empty wholes or empty shells. The concrete forms devoid of their essence can in no sense shed light on the main function of language, i.e. communication. This is the fundamental lesson of the Marxist-Structuralist approach which lays emphasis on the semiological praxis within a given time and space. The forms acquire and modify meanings across a field of human interaction or across existential situations of the correlation of expression and content. Without this inbuilt mechanism of causality, based on the dialectics of *parole*, the actual realisation of linguistic phenomena, and, *langue* the system in its totality, there can be no comprehension of the disequilibrium of the communication system which is responsible for any evolution or mediation.

5. What "motivates" change is not the interaction between forms but the consciousness of the semantic contradictions. It is the incongruity within the semiological field, where various forms of comprehension crisscross, that is responsible for diachronic mediations. One cannot describe the various tensions of the Revolution of 1917, from February to October, on the basis of the details of price index or the modes of production, but on the consciousness of the relations of classes between the new proletarian power and the old conservative establishment. It is the economy, or the form, that is integrated in history, or the significance, and, not history in economy. The evolution "manifests" itself by means of forms, but the motive force of the mediations lies at the immanent level.

The traditional linguistics dealt only with the change in form and explained this evolution in terms of the nature of the phonetic substance. This was the basic fallacy in whose dark depths, descriptive and transformational approaches fell blindly. The change in form, be it phonological or morphological, is due to the fact that different speaking and thinking individuals crisscross their semantic domains, by means of subtle differences in form, which eventually become major factors of linguistic change. It is at the immanent level of semantic interaction, intermingled with cultural differentiation, that one should look for the fundamental motivation. It is the communicative efforts of the thinking, conscious individuals which necessitate change. The domains of signification change due to the change of the significant situations which are created with a conscious effort to put across one's point of view, to communicate one's universe of signification. Since there are always distinctions, differentiations, and hierarchy in the micro and the macro universe, there are contradictions, or in other words, there is an inbuilt mechanism of dialectical relationships. This field may be covered by socio-linguistics or psycho-linguistics, or by any other newly carved out branch, but there is no escape from the compelling fact that the old style descriptions of homogenous structures built around the erroneous notion of ideolect will not serve any purpose when our interest lies in the understanding of the dynamics of human communication. All these new designations are, however, misleading, for it is not the change of the real object that matters. We have already seen that the materialist elements of Feuerbach did not provide him with a materialist conception of history. What is required is the structural conceptualisation of the semiological interaction, which alone can render the variations and mutations in form intelligible. The interplay of dialectics must be observed and analysed at the level of signification.

6. A linguistic sign is like an envelop, but it is not a closed envelop. The signification that it contains has a dynamic character. The speaking subject makes conscious effort at understanding the cultural and historical residues in his subsconcious, to be engaged in the process of communication. In this intersection of linguistic gesture, the insufficiency of the linguistic form reappears again and again. Thus, the compulsions of communication force a certain reorganisation of the relationships of semantic domains, and thereby, of the linguistic forms. A linguistic sign is not a prison, asserts Merleau-Ponty. In its very nature, it is an open, relational being. It is not only constantly subjected to internal modulations; by its

characteristics of interrelationship with other signs, it is always in the process of change or variations. An important conclusion follows from this hypothesis, which makes us recognise the presence of the new structures in the old structures : the past is immanent in the present, but this presence is "structural".

7. The psychological comportment of form aims at the conceptual descriptions of human experience. The support of the "formal" praxis is the "social" praxis.

In this praxis, the linguistic facts are "qualitative" and, the principle of "quality" necessarily implies that for their proper functioning, they need the "mediation of conscience". All the same, one cannot say that linguistic facts are the products of human consciousness. What needs to be underlined here is that their "use" in the process of communication follows a conscious effort, whether it is in terms of the maitenance of social or individual identity. The assertion or the realisation of a being is always acquired across linguistic signs which have their proper constancy, exigences, and constraints. There is an internal logic which is open to "initiatives". These initiatives give rise to subtle manipulations, modifications in significance, and functional substitutes. Like the notion of "Gestalt" in psychology, the linguistic structure has the same aspectual function. The form is not a pure manifestation of conscience, all the same, it follows a certain internal "theme" of equilibrium. G. Guillaume, who reflected upon the aspectual categories of French Grammar in the early years of this century, calls them "sub-linguistic schemas", which pass unnoticed normally, but are revealed when a linguist renders account of the coordinations of facts with these categories. These modifications are due to the subconscious interaction throughout the centuries. Their cognition in the present is the fundamental condition of the possession of linguistic faculty, which is both a faculty of "creativity" and "comprehension". The linguistic sign reposes on the multiplicity of psychic "intensions", which is, in a way, the secret on which is based the construction of language.

The differences in linguistic signs are the differences of signification. This means that each sign is a vehicle of a signification that is its own, but which remains "in suspense" until it is articulated in an ensemble of significant gestures. Each of them refers to a certain mental complexity, or a certain cultural whole. Without this reference, they are like blank cards yet to be filled.

What a child learns is not, contrary to what is proclaimed in the heaps of literature on child language, the sum of morphological, syntactic and lexical constructs. It is neither necessary nor sufficient for the needs of expresion. What a child does, as he grows in his semantic universe, is the manipulation of expression controlled by his significative "intensions", which is responsible for a certain style of parole, the "innere sprache" of Humboldt. There is a certain manner of signification of language which accomplishes mediation between the parole and the silent intention of the words. The organised signs have their immanent significance, which is not due to "I think", but because of "I can". The speaking subject has a rigorous consciousness of his gestures. He comports his physical appearance, of which parole is a part, in perfect coordination with the world with which he is in communication. The parole is

pregnant with a legible signification, in the very texture of the linguistic sign, to the extent that a minor hestitation, a subtle modulation of voice, the choice of syntax, are sufficient to modify the content. All communication leaves, as a psychic "trace", a certain transparent comportment, which fashions and modulates the path of parole.

8. In the domain of painting, there have been continuous experimentation with form. The impressionist painters like Cézanne paint natural forms in the process of their formation, of their becoming. Cézanne tries to realise the birth of the order of form rather than its geometrical organisation. He attempts to capture the world in its primordial form, in its movement. He differentiates between the order of things, as they are perceived, and the human order of ideas and science. His paintings thus give the impression of nature at its origin. They suggest the immanent presence of the paysage and the personages, their commodities and their relationships. As such, there is a certain deformation, a certain modulation, due to perception. The perspective of Cézanne, according to Merleau-Ponty, is the perspective of the human experience and human perception, as opposed to the material reality that can be examined in a photograph. In such a perspective, for example, the objects which are comparatively close are disproportionately enlarged; as in a cinema, an approaching train appears in a much bigger size than it actually is in reality, and the objects which are far away, are dimunitive. The same is with colours. The traditional school of painting tries to paint colours as they are. In the impressionist tradition, green is used on the base of the canvas, as opposed to the grey of the traditional school, to obtain a contrast that one perceives in open air. Colours are perceived differently in different lights. The impressionist painters deliberately paint false colours to arrive at proper perspectives. The same is true of forms. Under different atmospheric conditions, different weathers, at different times of the day, the perception of natural forms varies. The impressionist painters tried to establish a correlation of these forms with the forms of Nature where they emerge. And, painters like Cézanne tried to capture the very process of deformation, or perception, or one can say, human reality which can be apprehended only at the immanent level of forms.

9. It is not only the impressionist painters who attempted at reproducing forms as perceived by a sensitive being in definite correlation with other forms of Nature where they emerged, but the whole history of modern art is a manifestation of an incessant research in the coordination of forms motivated by an immanent universe of signification. Thus from Cubism to Abstract painting, we follow this sequence of presenting forms, not as they are, but as they are perceived in the form of psychic images. The juxtaposition of "unusual" elements of body or human figures with other "unrelated" natural objects is determined by the mental correlations to emphasize the emergence of the most significant texture. This artistic perception is an affair of intellection as opposed to the emotional responses of the traditional art. This "deformation" of forms is most evident in the folk art of different cultures. The researches in ethnography and anthropology of the primitive or the "original" people have

been the main source of this movement. The surrealist movement in art and literature is its best example, where the manifest reality and the psychic reality of the dream world are thoroughly mixed. André Breton, the founder and the main protagonist of the surrealist movement, emphasized the correlation of forms with "desire", or with the innermost drives of the subconscience. The outer forms are indicative of the dialectics of the latent psychic comportments. All transformations and modulations in forms must, thus, be seen as stylistic transpositions of an interaction between the deeper subconscious layers of the mind and the conscious realisations of the contours of this phenomenon. They are united in the confrontation of the mysterious exchanges of the material and mental universe. This dialectics is evident in the depth of the enveloping fog, or the sharpness of the burning sun, or the ambiguity of the linguistic sign. Whatever the human situation of communication with the Other may be, it always moves around the problematics of the inner needs of expression, and, the inadequacy of the expression system.

10. It is with the continuous "deformation" of the natural form that we communicate with each other. Everything in life is transformed and stylised, and, all relationships of the Being with the Other are based on these visible, deformed forms with which a being likes to be "seen" by the Other. It is at the level of creative "vision" that all relationships are established, and, all personal confrontations occur. Every day an individual deforms himself or herself through dress, through coiffure, through make-up, and, by means of various other forms that envelops the being of a person. Each of these transpositions is correlated with a certain desire or a certain mental complexity. The being of a person manifests itself in its appearance, in its vision. For each existential situation, or a situation of human relationship, the length of the robe, the hair style, the accentuation of certain facial contours, and, the linguistic comportments, present an ensemble of the modulated forms to create differentiations in existential semiology. The so-called "real" subject can transmit its "reality" only through an elaborate artifice of "irreality". The metamorphosis of the being is accomplished through a metamorphosis of the form, and, it is in this metamorphosis that the true is most evident. If a certain perception of form helps in establishing relationships, it is the continuous modulations in this envelop, which extends from head to feet, that are essential to maintain the perceptive height or intensity of this relationship. The repetition in form loses its power of significance. It is, thus, obvious that to maintain the continuity and consistency of langue, perpetual mutations in parole must be envisaged in their structural totality. Change, as such, is not only an affair of diachrony, synchronic structuration also requires continuous interaction between its correlated forms.

11. The perception of stylistic modulation requires a reflective residue in the Other. The reflection of the "past" is an obligatory condition both for identification and differentiation. That the person is the same, only the dress is different, is an affair of a previous knowledge. Unless there is something to compare with in the mental comportment of the one who sees,

the effect of the modulation will be lost, and, the change will serve no purpose. For an outsider who has not participated in the diachrony of an event, whether it is a question of the physical comportment or mental reflections, there can be no identification of the new forms. The structures of this synchrony make sense only to the one who has experienced diachronic mutation. In a pure, absolute synchronic state, one can see, but one cannot recognise. All those who participate in a given communication system, whether this system is cultural or linguistic, must not only constantly readjust and reorganise their semantic fields, but also follow the continuous dialectical movements of forms. Bereft of this semiological content, the words and phrases, or the new modes in dress and symbolism, will be empty wholes, or dead, static shells, without any movement of significance. The various experiments in modern art have shed light on the immense possibility of creation and coordination. By raising the mental level of the Other to a realm of pure, transparent imagination of forms and colours, of figures and their combinations in the absolute ambiguity of comprehension, they remove all obstacles of the "real", and, enable the Other to participate in the lucid realm of conceptual interactions. All these "impossible" coordinations are meant to "unmask" the real being, to arrive at the hidden reality which can, in the visible world, be projected only through these highly stylised forms.

The Semiotics of the Myths

1. In his monumental *Mythologiques* in four volumes, Claude Levi-Strauss has dealt with the structural characteristics of the myths of the American Indians with an analytical incision of intellection and dialectics of the highest order, with a talent comparable only to that of Jean-Paul Sartre but with very different conclusions. Myths represent the ethnographic and historical residues of ancient people across innumerable transformations exercised by successive generations. The study of myths, as demonstrated by Lévi-Strauss, leads us to an understanding of the mental complexities of human mind, of the intellectual incisions of both individual and collective order, and, of the correlations and confrontations of man with his environment. In its forms, a myth is "surrealistic", in content, it represents the materialist history of a people.

A myth is always a product of an individual in the beginning, but as soon as it is created, it undergoes a series of transformations due to further individual or collective reflections, or attempts at cultural mediations. Through this continuous process of generation of one structure into another, certain sections of the basic structure remain the same, others of the "probabilist" level are constantly altered through oral transmission. All individual works are potential myths, but it is their adoption by the people as a collective heritage, and, the realisation of the transformations on their probabilist contours that bestows on them the status and the dignity of myths. Since the myths of a culture are a product of incessant dialectical transformations, they represent extremely complex wholes of structures within a Structure. A myth is a combination of numerous residues of the past. In its diamond like crystallisation, it is a challenge to the human intellect to decipher its contours which have undergone changes over the centuries, and are presented to us in their utmost precision. A myth is thus a mosaic of extremely fine pieces juxtaposed in correlations which defy all attempts of descriptive statements.

The structures of the various versions of a myth explain each other. The dialectical process in the creation of myths leads us from one myth to another. As such, the myths "talk" to each other. They communicate with each other in terms of their combinatory systems which have necessary correspondences. Since in their different versions we observe the evolution of one structure into another, the study of myths sheds light on the very nature of human mental structures which are responsible for all these mediations. Myths are the most dense depositories of cultural symbols; a proper comprehension of their significance requires a detailed analysis of their various aspects, which, as has been well demonstrated by Lévi-Strauss, cover such vast domains as botany, astronomy, zoology, ethnography,

linguistics and anthropology. A thorough understanding of these branches of knowledge is imperative to comprehend what Lévi-Strauss calls the infrastructure of the myths.

It is with this infrastructure that the successive transformations of a myth are related. All modifications are operated upon outer contours. The inner core or the nuclear structure remains the same, the rest of the structure is in a perpetual state of disequilibrium. The understanding of the structuration of myths requires an insight into the nature of diachronic alterations. All transformations are conscious mediations and conscious reflections on the contradictions of life. To reflect upon these mediations, a social scientist follows the path of "knowledge", of becoming conscious of the material-object of his study. The role of the individual is that of the "thinking", "conscious" individual. It is the thinking, reasoning individual who reflects upon the Other object, the object-myth, the object-culture, the material object. As such, argues Lévi-Strauss, the role of the reasoning individual before the myths is the same as that of the physical scientist before his material objects. Mythologiques, thus strictly speaking, is a conceptualisation of the things of the world, is of the order of intellect, of logic. There is no place for the ambiguities introduced due to a vague subject under the camouflage of human "liberty". The liberty of man is his intellectual faculty which can mediate and transform one material structure into another.

2. In his *Mythologiques*, Lévi-Struass began from the southern hemisphere and progressively moved on to the northern. The infinite variations in the myths were taken as both a point of departure and as a co-reference. An extensive sum of information on geography, geology, magic, religion and art was utilised to decipher the various details. The texts of the myths were studied with as much care as it was possible, considering the differences in linguistic grouping and textual components. Lévi-Strauss, however, explains that the exact linguistic information was quite useful but not absolutely indispensable as the myths represent significant conceptual structures where the process of transformation on specific aspects of the structures fill all possible gaps. The myths are like surrealistic images whose epithets are of an order different from that of ordinary language.

The transformational process of the myths is in-terminable. A myth is an open system. It is incessantly and constantly in evolution, for the simple reason that human intellect never stops to function. As such, the mythical discourse follows the control of the Saussurian concept of langue. The mythical transformations are of the order of parole. During the process of transformations there are erosions and fragmentary drop-outs which condense mythemes into highly complex images. A myth is apprehended only in its "becoming", in its process of transmission where the probabilist aspects need to be isolated for a proper comprehension of the mythematic structures. The interrelationships of the different elements present different types of symmetries and a hierarchy of contradictions and their inversions. Such contradictions can be analysed following the theory of categories, as systems based on both the ensemble of terms and the ensemble of relations between these terms, argues Lévi-Strauss. It corresponds well with the notion of "morphism". These tools of epistemology can

be fruitfully used in the analysis of the myths provided the material nature of the text-object is not obliterated.

3. Lévi-Strauss deals with the objections of the existentialist philosophy at length, which attempts to introduce individual "subjectivity" in the name of finding a proper place for man in the scheme of things. The scientific investigation of man and his environment cannot, however, be conducted at a subjective level. The Cartesian cogito is a thinking cogito. The relationship of man with his universe is purely intellective. The study of the structures of myths aims at understanding the semiological functioning of man's relation with his material products. In the overall perspective of the mythologique, the science of the study of myths, what is at stake is not the abstract questions of the destiny of man or the problematics of the origin of mankind, which is generally the manifest structure of many a myth, but the ethnographic, cultural, religious and the material world, which is a "real" world. All mythical reflections have a sound basis in human nature, which is again, an empirical reality.

The problem with existentialist philosophy, centred on the imaginary subject, believes Lévi-Strauss, is its ethnocentricism. The "effects" of the means of material production and their relationships are different in different geographical and cultural regions. The existentialist philosophy attempts to explain all humanity in terms of the conclusions drawn from an analytical study of a given cultural complex beginning with the Hellenic tradition. The problematics does not centre around the place of man in this world, but of which man. Each culture defines its man by its own infrastructure and superstructure. Everywhere, it is man whose consciousness leads to historical and cultural mediation. The myths represent the history of each ethnic man for the last thousands of years. The mythical transformations are due to intellectual interventions, and, the study of the myths is squarely placed in the context of these hierarchies of structural modulations, which gives us information on man, not expected by existentialist philosophy.

The myths as vehicles of cultural mediations are concrete objects while existentialist philosophy tends to deal with abstract objects, says Lévi-Strauss. In a myth, we attempt to hear the great anonymous voice of its people, submerged in its profound depths. The existentialist philosopher is face to face with himself, instead of confronting, the real world around him. He leaves aside the universe of variations of history and ethnology on which are based the so-called savage societies.

4. After philosophy, Lévi-Strauss follows his argument with reference to literature, art and music. In this context, a very interesting phenomenon has been the underlying patterns of systems which have undergone successive transformations, and, as such, are structurally very significant. Not every object can be submitted to that kind of analysis, nor can the structures be artificially created. Structures are natural phenomena which have a diachronic evolution, and whose disequilibrium is a resultant of a long drawn out process. Ignoring this fundamental characteristics of cultural structures, there have been, in recent times, some

naive attempts at constructing artificial structures in literature, art, and even in music. These structures are, in no way, of the same qualitative order, which have been discovered and perpetuated over several centuries. They lack the fundamental inter-structural relationships. For example, the question of regional structures within a global structure cannot even be posited in this context. Structural analysis deals with already constituted structures, which have by definition, seen the ravages of history. The structures of myths and language belong to that category. They are natural structures with an inbuilt characteristics of human praxis. They are as such different from the structures of physical sciences. The physical sciences deal with the symbols of things as such, but the human sciences deal with the symbols of things, which have already attained the status of symbols.

5. Lévi-Strauss believes that the so-called original text of a myth does not exist. By the time a narrative attains the status of a myth, it is already a "translation" or an interpretative mediation of the original event. Either its earlier version is found in the neighbouring culture, or in another myth, whose transformation it represents. What an analyst deals with is necessarily a "deformed" version. However, the study of myths is concerned primarily with these deformations, for each of these transformations is a resultant of a dialectical juxtaposition of another transformation, and, their essence lies in the irreducible fact of this translation "by" and "for" this opposition. From this point of view, a myth is not situated in a given language or a given culture, but from the point of view of its articulation, in another langauge, and in another culture. A myth, as such, is never of the language, it is a perspective of an other language. Lévi-Strauss believes that the substance of a myth is neither in its style, nor in the manner of its narration, nor in its syntax, but in its "history".

This is why the comparison of myth with music is most relevant. A myth is translatable into another melody, which preserves a rapport of homology with it. It can be transcribed in different tones. It can be converted from major to minor, and, vice versa. It can act on the parameters which transform its rhythm, its resonance, and, its emotive charge. In music, it is always a question of "conversions" or transformations on the same theme. All the same, if it is possible to translate one melody into another, one music into another, one can never, as in the case of myths, translate music into something other than itself.

There is a striking parallel between mythical recitation and musical composition, argues Lévi-Strauss. He says that there are four types of objects for the study of structures: the mathematical "beings", natural languages, musical works, and myths.

The mathematical entities consist of structures of absolutely pure state. They entertain a rapport of correlation and opposition with the elements of languages, or following Saussure, they have two aspects of sound and significance, which are the products of their very interaction.

In music, the structure, in a way, adheres to sound, and, not to its significance. In mythology, it is just the opposite. The mythical structure derives its being from its significance.

The mathematical entities are independent of both sound and significance, both expression and content. A natural language represents a union of these two aspects. The musical structures depend more on sound, and, the mythical structures are based primarily on their patterns of significance.

Music and myths are thus sub-products of a translation of a given earlier structure, operated upon language. There can be no music without an underlying language. Music is a language without significance, a pure form of language. The significance of the form of music is provided by the audience. The transformations in myths carry parameters of semantic structures without necessarily carrying with them the precise linguistic articulations.

More than their rapport with language, the correspondence between music and myth is in the manner of their composition. The recitation of music depends upon alliterations and repetitions, upon the linear sequence, as well as the re-introduction of the same elements after certain intervals. The narration of a myth is supported by language, by intonation, and by several other gestures. In music, the significance is completely outside its sound, and hence depends largely on the "effect" it has on the auditor.

The successive transformations of the myths present their structures as boxes within boxes as a series of interconnected structures. These modulations are due to the semiological control of the dialectics of semantic categories which reorganise the ensembles of significance. In music, the two principal means of composition are (a) the confrontation of one structure with another, and, (b) their maintenance by transforming their significant support, or what is called, their development. The musical language detaches itself progressively from its distinctive character in a way that the latest structures are always employed as a means of their support. It is across the variations of sub-structures that the traditional music maintains its individual character. A structure is accessible by means of its homomorphism. A work of music is a system of sounds which is capable of introducing significance in the spirit of the auditor.

One can say that the musical communication and the linguistic communication presuppose the union of sound and significance, but the nature of relationship in both of these cases is not the same. Within a society, there is no dialogue about the myth, all discussion is excluded. The dialectics of comprehension is carried on through transformations. The same is true of music. These transformations develop images, symbols or intense structures, as in music, which overwhelm their audience by their density. They envelop the spirit of the one who participates in these images or melodies. Their very forms or their expressive articulations are their significance. In each case, it is an affair of cultural participation. Since it is primarily an affair of one structure leading to another, there can be no comprehension of either music or myth without a previous conscious contact with the earlier structures. Different transformations must be correlated for their proper understanding.

6. In its condensed form, a myth appears at two distinct modalities. At times, it is explicit as in its narration, and is explained in terms of its internal organisations. At others, a myth is

manifested in the form of fragmentary notes, in its implicit form, such as in a ritual. A myth is a combination of both the narrative as such and the ritual. Some social scientists separate the two and study them as different entities. However, one explains the other. The existence of the mode of mythology leads us to believe that in its implicit form, it resembles most the sacred music, the symbol and the image. The structure of the mythical narration is not only interrelated with that of ritual but most often depends on it. This ritualistic aspect of the myth is non-verbal. Its articulation is of a different order. It is integrated in the psyche and the intellect of a culture in a way different from the simple narrative which is a sort of a support that helps decipher the "frozen" images. The ritual is like the pure music which exists outside language. The structure of the ritual is studied like the structure of the instrumental music which gets occasional support from vocal music for its continuation; so is the role of the narrative in a myth.

This elaboration is produced at two levels : by the progresive decomposition of the syntagm, and by the crisscrossing of the paradigm. The one corresponds to an axis which can be called "metonymic". It substitutes for each totality, the parts that it separates, and treats each of these in turn as relative totalities of a subordinate order, where is exercised the same work of decomposition. Thus, behind each pair of primary oppositions, emerge secondary oppositions, and, behind them, tertiary, and so on, until the entire oppositional operation is complete.

The other axis, which is properly speaking that of the myth, is "metaphoric". It subsumes the individualities under a paradigm. It extends or contracts the concrete given facts, helping them cross the fragmentary discontinuities, which separate the empirical order from the symbolic order, and finally, from the imaginary and the schematic order.

The constant reference in the ritual to non-verbal expressions, to gestures and symbols, renders the task of understanding quite difficult, for the ritualistic thought progresses on the perpendicular axes, and as such, the distance between their "origin" and the actual realisation is extended with each new structuration.

It needs to be emphasized here that all forms of natural art correspond to this aspect of mythical structuration. It is always a structural complexity of the simple narrative, or the parts which are easily accessible to the synchronic reference with proper syntactic organisation and symbolic images which are impregnated in the cultural memory at a subconscious level. In this context, there is also the question of the archetype images of a given culture, and, the images which have a rather fluid nature, or are in the process of acquiring the status of cultural significations across various diachronic evolutions. The history of the transformations of the ritualistic, symbolic aspect of the myth as such is much more complicated, and as Lévi-Strauss has rightly pointed out, in structural analysis we deal not only with "primary" oppositions, and "secondary" oppositions, but behind each pair, there is a set of "tertiary" oppositions, and so on. The structural analysis is a continuous process.

The investigation of myths is an open end investigation. There is the overall global structure of the langue of the myth that ensures its consistency and continuity, but the incessant

transformations due to the dialectics at the level of parole leads an investigator in all possible directions. As Lévi-Strauss has demonstrated with brilliant detours, each reference to an animal, plant, planet, custom, mask, human behaviour, leads the mythologist in search of all possible physical, concrete and enthnographic information which is essential for establishing proper correlations amongst different elements of the myth. Also, since parts of the myth appear only in fragmentary notes, their cohesive relations of the past having been frozen, this vast ethnographic information of botany, zoology, astronomy, and religious pratcices will help fill the gaps. The comprehension of myths requires the skill of diachronic reconstructions of the highest order, for it is not a question of assembling together all sorts of information, but it is an affair of putting together all the jigsaw pieces in their proper setting. As such, mythologique is historiography par excellence. It aims at reintegrating man in his nature, the man who is lost, in terms of Rousseau, in the disorganised inequality of our culture, of our society.

History and Dialectics

1. In the analysis of the mythical conceptual structuration, the notion of totality is important where nature and culture, and, men, animals, plants and planets are in a continuous dialectical relationship. As a matter of fact, nothing that is human or related to human beings in one form or another, asserts Lévi-Strauss, is foreign to the mythical thought, and as such, the dialectical reason finds in it its true application. Lévi-Strauss opposes the differentiation that Jean-Paul Sartre makes between the analytical reason and the dialectical reason. At times, Sartre considers the former as an error, and the latter as a verity, and at others, he thinks that both lead to the same truth.

Sartre confers on the dialectical reason a reality, *suis generis,* i.e. it exists independent of the analytical reason, either as its antagonist, or as its complement. Lévi-Strauss believes that their reality is relative. The dialectical reason is always a constituting reason, and the analytical process works within it. Dialectical reason is nothing "other than" the analytical reason; it "adds" to its analytical relation. In its dialectical process, the mythical thought integrates man in nature and in history. It covers the entire semiological universe of man. The ethnographic investigations across various cultures bring forth the invariants applicable to man, and at the same time, demonstrate the tremendous differentiation in the so-called existential situations of different men in different societies. When the historico-cultural contingence differs, when the kinship systems vary, when the social relationships imply different parameters in different groups, it is but natural that the "human condition" on which the existential understanding is based follows suit.

The scientific reductions must first define their object of study in such a way that the individual characteristics of the object-phenomenon be clearly delineated. Its distinctions are noted and the relationships of its constituent elements are properly differentiated. Secondly, the extreme complexity and the unique characteristics of different cultural structures lead us to a concept of humanity quite different from that of the pre-ethnographic studies. The scientific explanations do not go from complexity to simplicity, as was held earlier, but from an unintelligible complexity to an intelligible complexity.

The "I" is not opposed to the "other", nor man to the world. The verities are comprehended across other men of this world. They are real verities. In ethnology, Lévi-Strauss finds the basic principle of all research, but for Sartre, it is only a point of departure, or another problematics which must also be taken into account. He wants to "make use of" the Marxist dialectics, Freudian psycho-analysis, and anthropological researches to further deepen the existential comprehension of man. He is interested in founding an anthropology which is

both historical and structural. But, as demonstrates Lévi-Strauss, the last two concepts are used within the Western context. Sartre defines man by dialectics and dialectics by history, a given, well documented history. The societies which do not have the correspondence of European history are classified by Sartre as "cold" societies, and with the first hypothesis, the application of the dialectical reason in such a context, according to Sartre, will be only partial, if at all acceptable. The ethnographic and linguistic evolution, where no conscious mediations take place, are excluded from the gamut of Sartrian history.

On the basis of the diachronic evolution of anthropological and linguistic structures for thousands of years in each society, however small it may be, Lévi-Strauss argues, the only way we can understand human phenomenon of man's relation with nature and culture is to follow the individual structurations, exemplified best in the forms of myths which attest the repository of symbols, images, and mythemes in the unconscious psyche of any people. This ethnologic evolution guarantees the moral inconsistency and existential realisation of man across the vicissitudes of his varied history. The comprehension of man lies in the differences with others.

2. Lévi-Strauss accuses Sartre of both ethnocentricity and ego-centricism. The Sartrian self is a prisoner of its own Cogito. The Cogito of Descartes enabled one to accede to the universal on the condition of its remaining psychological and individual; that of Sartre only changes the prison. Now the group and the epoch will keep the subject enclosed in his shell. The Sartrian opposition of the "I" to the "Other" is extended, strangely enough, from the civilised to the primitive. Descartes cut man off from his society. Sartre cuts his society off from other societies. As such, Sartrian existentialism remains captive of the problematics of its own society, and even when there is a discussion of anthropological differences, the primary concern is of the same nature as one finds in the society that has nourished him. In ethnology, and linguistics, the notion of totality goes by itself. Without it, there can be no anthropological investigation. In philosophy, there has always been the tradition of abstract, absolute verity, verified with the concept of totality in terms of symbolic logic, and, in terms of constructed structures. These constructs are absolutely perfect, but they do not render account of the totality of natural human structures which are only constituting, and are always in disequilibrium, or, in a process of continuous dialectical relationship. In structural analysis, a totality is first decomposed analytically, then recomposed following its general dialectics. The Sartrian approach is admirable, says Lévi-Strauss, but it is only a point of departure. It is an excellent example of a case study, of the French revolutionary dialectics of the individual and the group, in *Critique* and in *Flaubert*, but the method is so devised that with the difference in the nature of society, it becomes inapplicable. It is reduced to an inductive investigation while dialectics is primarily deductive. A Cogito that is enclosed in the individualistic empiricism gets lost in the impasse of social psychology. The text-objects of the analysis of existentialism and ethnography are very different from each other. When the scientist-subject places himself in a situation before the culture-object of different people, his

whole perspective changes. The dialectical process remains the same, but its application undergoes certain changes according to the nature of the object. Marx had underscored this point when he emphasized the differences in conceptual framework for different modes of production.

3. The qualitative distinction, proposed by Sartre, between the primitive and the civilised in terms of their "constituted" dialectics, vis-à-vis the constituting dialectics, is the real problem. Sartre, with all his sympathy for the underprivileged and his engagements to fight for their welfare, cannot accept that these primitive people have a culture which has undergone a series of mediations of the highest intellectual order. In ethnographic literature, there are numerous examples of the natives presenting complicated solutions of their kinship structures or mythemes. Sartre considers this knowledge as naive and synthetic. At the most, he accords to it the status of analytical reasoning, but as Lévi-Strauss points out, the analytical reason is a dialectical reason in progress.

4. The ethnographic, cultural structures are best represented in a language whose structuration of both diachronic and synchronic orders is realised in absolute objectivity vis-à-vis the subject. The rules of phonology or syntax are not due to any subjective mediation of the type referred to by Sartre. These linguistic structures are, in a way, situated outside the subject. They represent what may be called the unconscious heritage of a people. They are due to social praxis, and, their becoming is assured by collective participation. They are a resultant of interaction of parole, the speech variations within a community, with langue, the overall structure that ensures both continuity and consistency. This process of collective dialectics is common to language as well as other cultural vehicles of communication such as myths and symbols. Cultural symbols, archetypal or otherwise, are highly crystallised forms of communication structures which evolve over a period of centuries with the collective participation of a people. They englobe vast domains of semiotic complexes, and, are a product of intense intellectual activity. Their functions, like the functions of symbols in logic, are denotative which are comprehended at the level of cognition. The cultural heritage of man, like language or mythology, is a heritage whose logic or reasoning is not known to man. It represents a non-reflexive totality.

5. Sartre pretends to apply the "progressive-regressive" method which is quite common in human sciences. But, Lévi-Strauss believes that Sartre leaves this method at its first step only, whereas that of Lévi-Strauss is a continuous process. In ethnology, one begins with the contemporary facts followed by all possible information of the historical antecedents which can shed light on the synchronic structuration. Myths, for example, are both synchronic and diachronic at the same time. The historical prospection on synchrony is then observed across the transformations it undergoes horizontally. It is at the level of the transformational process that the hierarchy of historical mediations of different aspects of conceptual structuration is

most evident. The original, individual totality is examined with reference to, and across, other totalities which are structurally related to it. The discovery of dialectical reason submits the analytical reason to an imperative exigence, that of taking account of dialectical reason. This constant requirement forces a continuous extension of the programme of the analytical reason and transforms its axiomatics. The dialectical reason, however, cannot take stock of its own genesis, nor of the analytical reason.

This open-end structural method leads to a profound understanding of the text-object. Sartre has not followed Marx and Freud in their totality. He has retained only half of their method. From the point of view of Marx and Freud, man has significance only when he is placed in a context of significance. But this significance is not all that "good", not all that complete; the superstructures are lost causes which find their realisation in a social milieu. It is, therefore, futile to look for the "true" significance with the help of historical evidence. What Sartre calls dialectical reason is nothing but a reconstruction of hypothetical structuration which cannot alter the verity. Thus, Sartre makes use of his historicism to make a qualitative distinction between the primitve and the civilised. It is the so-called historical consciousness that defines the verity of social structures for Sartre. This is, in no way, a schema of concrete history, but an abstract schema of men making history as it can appear in its becoming in the form of a synchronic totality. As such, Sartre situates himself vis-à-vis history, says Lévi-Strauss, as the primitives vis-à-vis the eternal past. Consequently, in the system of Sartre, history plays precisely the role of a myth.

6. The continuous and simultaneous structurations and transformations are the distinctive features of the intellection of mythology. In it are condensed both the synchronic and the diachronic aspects of an object. It represents an intellective activity of "bricolage" where the prospective ensemble of significance is applied on the historical, and, more often than not, pre-historical residues crystallised in the form of symbols and images, which are inhabited or "possessed" by cultural significance. This structuration is prismatic. It resembles the infinity of images shown across a prism, each image presenting a totality that is interlinked with other totalities. These images are highly complex entities which can be collected and comprehended through parallel and corresponding transformations. Lévi-Strauss calls this process of intellection, "analogic". The "constituted" structure of Sartre is a point of departure on which are exercised the operations of "constituting" structures, ad infinitum. Each element of bricolage is apprehended in its "discontinuity", and, is placed in a situation of significance, that is accorded to it by the new structuration. The pre-historic residues are by definition found in a state of discontinuous equilibrium. This is, in fact, true of all other partial totalities that any history presents to man. These sub-ensembles are observed in a prospection of the global signifying ensemble. The mythical thought is thus situated at the cross-roads of perception and conception. It is always apprehended in its "becoming", in the process of its transformation.

7. The text-object of Sartre's *Critique*, the French Revolution, can be compared with the infinite images of a prism. It represents a multitude of events and their interactions at both the individual and the collective levels. These "automatic" reactions are motivated by an inner subconscious nourished by the intense intellectual activity of the pre-revolutionary France, and the historical determinations of class structure. The history of this revolution can lead to different prospections as we witness in the numerous "histories" of the French Revolution.

These are all the histories of the historians which are critically analysed by Sartre. Each historical agent selects, divides, and reorganizes the sequence of events he wants to describe and interpret. There is no other method. There is no history in the absolute, pure sense of the term; it is always a "history for". There is the history of the Revolution for the Jacobins, and the other for the aristocracy. Both may report the events in their exactitude, but each of them places the events in a different ensemble of significance, exactly like the transformations operated upon mythology. The mythology of the French Revolution has its set of transformations, and, it is across these transformations that one can observe the variety of prospections, and, perhaps arrive at the interrelationships of different ensembles of "truth". This is all that a scientist means by the "intelligibility" of an ensemble of significance. The individual action and reaction are placed in the significance of that of the group, and, their prismatic union is analytically reorganised to present to the dialectical reason, a prospection of its constituting aspect. The human praxis is not an isolated phenomenon. It is neither closed in a given social milieu, nor in a given historical-process. There is an inbuilt interconnection between corresponding histories, but this correspondence is analogic and structural, and, not genetic.

The Structure of the Unconscious

1. In the domain of the dialectics of the individual subject's relationship with knowledge, Jacques Lacan has followed the model of linguistics, and, has analysed the structuration of the unconscious in terms of the dialectics of langue and parole. This attempt is situated between the absolute subject of Hegel, and, its near obliteration in the physical sciences. It is projected in the researches of Sigmund Freud.

As a child grows, he accumulates a sum of significant relationships, which find an important place in his unconscious. This process continues. With the passage of time, some of the signifers are "forgotten" by the subject, but, the signifiers as such continue to inhabit the inner layers of the unconscious. The emergence of these signifiers obviously follows a temporal order of a sequence or a syntagmatic progression. However, there is a constant reference to the past events which manifest themselves as symbols, images, or dreams. The signifers undergo a stage of restructuration, following the compulsions of the referent. This structuration is a sort of a combinatory system of the type of music, where different units of significance are combined with all possible permutations and combinations.

Lacan says that the unconscious is structured like language. This means that the human unconscious is not just a one-unit-whole, it is a combination of different elements which are structured syntagmatically as in syntax, with its coordinations and its transformations. Lacan refers often to the linguistics of Saussure and discusses the structure of the unconscious in terms of synchrony and diachrony. As there is a constant reference to the past, new relationships between "some" of the present events, and, "some" of the past signifiers get re-established. The synchrony is structured, like the myths, on the basis of the residues of the past. And, this structure is not a simple unity, called individual. Thus, the relationship between the subject and the object is that of one structure with another.

2. The psychoanalyst follows the techniques of linguistics and attempts to comprehend all the intricate relationships of the unconscious. The processes of combination and substitution are observed on the basis of the "parole" of the subject. The subject is "hidden" in the parole, and, the parole keeps the signifiers intact as does any other form of expression. Only its structuration must be deciphered. Man forgets his signifiers, says Lacan, but, the signifiers never forget him. This is true both of the collective heritage of the signifiers of a culture, and, of the stock of the individual since his birth. Man is not always conscious of the logic of his reactions. But, even in the case of folly and neurosis, it is an affair of the mixture of the two. The conscious and the unconscious are in a dialectical relationship.

The subject has to be studied as an object. The psychoanalyst lets the patient talk. He records his parole which serves as the text-object. This text both hides and unfolds the contours of the "forgotten" relationships or "lost" contacts. The frozen symbols or signifiers present discontinuous entities which make no "sense". However, all the elements of the structure of the unconscious are present in the parole. The analyst has to look for the metonymic relationships of the signifiers which appear at different points of the spoken chain, and, also for the metaphoric relations which can be referred to only on the paradigmatic bases of substitution. These metaphoric relations are the most complicated. This is where synchrony and diachrony interact. This is where the discontinuities are integrated with the continuities. The subject is integrated in his unconscious past, and, man is integrated in his cultural history.

All human relationships are attempts at realising one's being, one's proper place in this universe. All contacts take place in the realm of semiology, in the realm of significance. And, in each of these situations, there is a confrontation of the being with the Other. It may manifest itself in the form of desire or violence. The so-called forgotten signifiers of the unconscious are the relationships which "failed", which could not be realised. The consequence of "failure" is one of the reasons of this "forgetfulness". But, the signifiers never leave the individual. They become a part of his unconscious comportment, and, are responsible for, what is called, the style of life, or psychic comportment.

The desire of the Other is the desire to realise one's own being through the Other. When this desire remains unfulfilled, it is transformed into violence. The annihilation of the Other – person, class, group – is motivated by this first psychic comportment of man. It is in this context that one can understand the structural import of the element of violence, or, as it was then called, Terror, in the French Revolution.

Desire or Violence, however, are not simple, emotional reactions of a subject. Their structure is highly complex. It is not based on simple love or hatred which may be manifested at a conscious level. The structuration of the unconscious cannot so easily be explained away. The psychoanalyst or a structuralist tries to uncover the mask of the parole-text, and deciphers the relationships of metonymy and metaphor. Apart from the metaphoric complexity, the problems of metonymy are also not so easy to be revealed. It is so because the metonymic manifestation is in a chain which can be extended to extremity. The mere fact that this relationship is syntagmatic and sequential, it poses problems of its correlation in a given place. The unconscious is structured like language means that this structuration is non-reflexive. Language has its grammar, its logic, but it gets structured over a period of centuries, and, the subject of this phenomenon is completely "decentred". As Lacan has rightly pointed out, this conceptualisation is of the order of Copernician revolution which decentred our earth. The structural revolution has decentred the subject. This, however, does, in no sense, imply that the subject is abolished, or man has not been given his due place in this universe, but its import lies in the recognition of the true nature of the structure of the unconscious of the subject. What is abolished is not the subject, but the naive concept of its simplified*It is replaced by the introduction of a subject of a highly complex structurality.*

3. The dialectics of the being with the Other begins, argues Lacan, at the Stage of the Mirror, when for the first time, a child looks at his own image in the mirror. This is the beginning of the introspection. The dialectics of the real self, i.e. the body of the child, and its "appearance" in the mirror, gives birth to a whole series of images. The "imaginary" world begins to structurate. In every situation, the self is correlated with the Other. Its outer manifestations may be clothes, make-up, parole, and the general style of behaviourial comportments. The self begins to realise itself across the "mirror", the Other. The individual's human contacts, and material forces begin to develop into a network of complexity, giving rise to the fundamental problematics of "identity", which is, in a way, the problematics of all human situations. All collective and individual acts are acts of the realisation of an authentic being, whose self is in continuous dialectics with the imaginary.

The "I" is defined across this dialectics of desire which may manifest itself in the form of a passive relationship, or an attitude of aggressivity. The subject "anticipates" on his maturity, and, on his imaginary project. He identifies himself with this object of the mirror, or the imagination, that is not his self, and yet is correlated with it. He "recognizes" his self across this imagery. This form, given by the body in the imaginary reflex, may be called "Gestalt", the way it structures the "I" of the subject. This attitude of aggresivity, or the attempt of the subject to identify and correlate the "I" with the "Other", or his environment, is presented by Jacques Lacan in the following theses:

a) The aggressivity manifests itself in an experience that is subjective by its very constitution.

b) The aggressivity, in experience, is given to us as the intention of an image of corporeal dislocation.

c) The outer form of aggressivity decides the reasons which motivate the techniques of analysis (cf. the differentiation of the mechanisms of dialectics proposed by Marx for different effects of the modes of production).

d) The aggressivity is the correlative tendency of a mode of identification that is called narcissism, which determines the formal structure of the "I" of man, and, of the characteristic entities of his world, his universe of signification.

e) Such a notion of aggressivity, as one of the coordinated intentions of the human "I", which is specially related to the category of space, helps us conceive its role in modern neurosis and the malaise of the world.

4. The state of neurosis is a highly dense and accelerated situation of the unconscious whose analysis can shed light on the nature of its structuration. The neurotic patient presents us with a text-object condensed in time and space, and, like the objects of the scientific laboratory, helps the analyst to observe the fundamental problematics of the complexities of

both metonymy and metaphor, "Verschiegung" and "Verdrangung" of Freud. There is no characteristic difference between the unconscious of an "ordinary" person and that of a neurotic. It is only a question of degree.

This is why the typical case of neurosis of Flaubert studied by Jean-Paul Sartre is highly instructive.

Political and cultural revolutions can also be considered in the same context of neurosis, only in this case, the neurosis is collective, and, the metonymic and metaphoric relations are extended over a very large canvas. However, in the highly accelerated situation of a revolution like that of the French Revolution, one can decipher the repository of historical symbols of the means of production of both the infra and super structures manifest in collective and individual consciousness. This is indeed the problematics of the *Critique* of Sartre, and the choice of the text-object is not a matter of chance. Like the parole of the neurotic Flaubert in the form of *Madame Bovary*, the cultural neurosis is articulated in the form of the revolutionary Terror, and, the extremely complex network of mediations whose quick succession in the micro spacing of the Revolution can be observed with the structural microscope.

The Archaeology of Knowledge

1. In the domain of historiography, a distinction is made between the "history of ideas" and "archaeology" by Michel Foucault, the successor of Merleau-Ponty at the Collège de France. The history of ideas deals with the beginnings and the ends, with the reconstruction of developments in a linear sequence, and in general, with the questions of continuity and origins. It also tries to correlate philosophical and scientific reflections with the general contingence of history and with economic and political developments. In all this, the presupposition is the homogeneity of the scientific discourse, and, the continuous succession of events which are directly deduced from each other.

Michel Foucault proposes the approach of "archaeology" which deals with the discourse-object as such, finds the coherence within, and analyzes the internal logic of a discourse in terms of its own unity in a discontinuous structuration. In the archaeology of knowledge, the unity of the epoch is sacrificed to the unity of the discourse. It may have references to events beyond the limits of a given period, and it may be correlated with conceptualisation of another formation. The three main themes of the hsitory of ideas are genesis, continuity and totalisation. The archaeology of knowledge, on the other hand, looks for system in discontinuities, ruptures, and differences. In the history of ideas, the contradictions are surmounted. In the archaeology of knowledge, one goes from one contradiction to another, from one transformation to another. In the history of ideas, the general continuities are searched. In the archaeology of knowledge, the specific differentiations are comprehended in their discursive originality.

The archaeological approach proposed by Foucault defines a discourse by its specific manifestation, and, not by its undercurrent, or by its hidden ideas. A discourse is defined by its rules of constitution. Archaeology is not an interpretative discipline. It does not look for a hidden discourse; it is not allegoric.

The archaeological method is not that of finding the sources or the missing links. By defining a discourse in its specific characteristics, it shows the solidarity of its constituents which are irreducible. It is not a doxology, it is rather a differential analysis of the modalities of discourse. Archaeology looks for the rules of the "discursive" practices which cut across the individual works. The discourse-object is the whole that is submitted to an archaeological research without any reference to the subject. Archaeology concentrates on the discourse itself, and, does not get involved in the imaginary world of its creator. It is, in no sense, a return to the past, to the secret of the origin; it is a systematic description of the discourse whose structural autonomy it respects.

2. In the history of ideas, each element is either new or old, unedited or repeated, traditional or original, conformist or deviant. These differences are qualitative, and, the valorisation of an element depends upon its antecedents. In archaeology, however, this distinction has no significance. It is the relative integration in the system that matters. Every element derives its individual significance from the ensemble of significance. The history of ideas describes the succession of events and thought in the first case, and, the uninterrupted layers of effect, in the second. In the latter case, the forgotten solidarities are established, and, the discourses are understood in their relativity.

These two states of the new and the old are described with reference to each other. The integration of the new in the field that is already structured is noted. In each case, the problematics of the "origin" remains primordial. All this is based on the hypothesis that one can establish a sort of great series where each formulation will be properly dated in an homogenous chronology. In other words, the history of ideas has an exact correspondence in traditional philology or comparative grammar.

The concept of continuity presupposes an erroneous notion that the apparently "identical" elements remain the same, even in new totalities. The partial resemblance in the succession of events or thought are misunderstood. Foucault argues that even the same formulation with Diderot and Lamark, or, with Benoit de Maillet and Darwin, refers to entirely different scientific statements and discursive events. Neither repetition nor identity is the criterion of continuity of the semantic components. The significative nucleus is apprehended not only across different words of terms, but also across different organisations of the semantic fields.

The archaeological description deals with the discursive practices where the opposition original-banal is not pertinent. Between an initial formulation and the syntagm, where it is repeated a few centuries later, there is the problem of the hierarchy of values, and, of the semiological level involved. There is thus a radical difference between the two stages. It is a veritable rupture, which has its own "regularity". Each discourse has its own regularity from which it cannot be dissociated. As such, there is no question of an opposition of the regularity of one discourse with the irregularity of another.

It is, in a way, the regularity or cohesion of the discourse that is its specificity, and, it is this that determines the partial integration of the so-called new elements. In language, there may be statements which are identical from the point of view of vocables or syntax, but are "enunciatively" different. Thus the quantitative rapport of price and the monetary fund in circulation can be articulated with the same words, but, they are enunciatively not the same with Gresham or Locke, or with the marginalists of the nineteenth century. They do not reveal the same formulations of concepts. One should therefore distinguish, argues Foucault, between linguistic analogy or logical identity and enunciative homogeneity. Archaeology is concerned most with this homogeneity where new discursive practices appear across formulations which remain linguistically analogous and logically equivalent. But there is no such thing as regularity in succession.

The homogeneity of enunciation does not guarantee the continuity of the implicit definitions. These homogeneities, in fact, crisscross with linguistic continuities, or with logical identities and differences.

There is another direction for this approach. The enunciative regularities have an internal hierarchy. Even the most regular forms cannot be considered to be pure and simple creations of the genius. Some aspects of the discourse are more "active" than the other, more "regular" than the other. Every utterance of a discourse is constituted of a network of modalities and uneven relationships. The rules of these modalities are never given in advance. They are derivative and constitute a space of co-existence of different modalities. In this context one can talk of a tree of the enunciative derivations, where at the base the formations are most extended, and at the summit, after a certain branching off, they are clearly delimited, though better articulated. Archaeology attempts to constitute this tree of derivations. As such, the archaeological order is neither that of systematisation nor of chronological successions. Each of these orders has its internal autonomy with its rapports and dependences.

Nothing could be more deceptive and false than to look for totalitary periodisation in the analysis of discursive formations. The homogeneity in archaeological terms cuts across periods and epochs. It has its own temporal cuts. There are periods of intense scientific activity in a given domain, and as such, the homogeneity is better defined. In other epochs, it takes much longer time and more prolonged philosophical speculation to bring a specific ordinance which is responsible for an exclusive synchronic structuration. The enunciative periods have their own internal logic.

3. The traditional history of ideas follows the principle of "cohesion" and makes every attempt to harmonise and surmount all internal contradictions. If differences reappear, they are swept under the rug. Its aim is to render to the new and the old elements their hidden unity and historical continuity. This law of coherence is a heuristic law. Its procedure is to avoid all "unnecessary" contradictions which multiply in spite of the "cohesive" tendencies of the historical process.

The archaeological approach brings out, to the maximum, the multiplicity of these contradictions. Every synchrony is replete with polemics. Every discourse of man is in a perpetual disequilibrium. The contradictions explain each utterance and each organsiation. Even when we find the so-called coherences, they are qualitatively very different from each other. The ideal architecture is a misnomer. Each discursive practice is full of ambiguities, of imaginations, of desires, which animate the internal correlations. This animation depends not on coherent but on opposing tendencies. Both thematically and systematically these coherences may be explicit or implicit. They may be found at the level of representations. On the other hand, they may be implicit; their postulates may be imposed upon the other. They follow the logic of fantasm. Also, these coherences may be individual, biographical, or, they may be collective and diachronical, representing an epoch, an ensemble of a tradition. In all such cases, they show that the immediately visible contradictions are only of the surface.

These contradictions are the illusions of a hidden unity. They are due only to the gap between the conscious and the unconscious.

The archaeological approach highlights these contradictions. In fact, the search for harmony is futile. The very existence of a discourse depends upon the existence of contradictions. They point out the basic principle of the constitution of discourse. It is due to these contradictions that a discourse emerges from a mass of related environment, across indifferent contingence. All changes and transformations are due to the existence of contradictions which constitute and differentiate totalities. These contradictions function all along the discourse, they are the very basis of its historicity.

The traditional history of ideas recognizes two levels of contradictions. The ones belong to the manifest level which are resolved in the profound unity of the discourse, the others are of the basis which are responsible for the existence of the discourse. From the point of view of the first type, the discourse is an ideal figure where the contradictions would be removed, and, from the latter point of view, the discourse is an empirical figure. The discourse is a path that leads us from one contradiction to another. What is visible is governed by what is hidden.

The archaeological approach is not concerned with overcoming the contradictions, it is involved in their description, in their comprehension. What is imperative in a discourse are its principles of emergence which depend entirely on finding out the exact nature of the internal contradictions. Instead of looking for coherence, the archaeological approach, according to Foucault, is in search of the discovery of the "levels" where these contradictions appear. There is no question of resolution. First of all, they determine the very being of the discourse. They juxtapose the irreconcilables, and bring out their true nature. It is the law of the incompatibilities of different discourses. It regulates their derivations and their coexistence. The contradictions are objects to be described. Their archaeological analysis does not look for a form of common thematic denominator, it moves in the direction of the basic differentiation, or, different spaces of dissensions.

There are different types of contradictions. Certain contradictions are localised at the level of propositions or assertions. They are archaeologically derived contradictions. The others are of discursive formation, as the "fixism" of Linné is contradicted by the "evolutionism" of Darwin, which neutralizes the difference between natural history and biology. These are "extrinsic" contradictions. In the eighteenth century, the contradictions that oppose "methodic" analyses to "systematic" analyses are not terminal. They do not represent two contradictory propositions about the same object, but two different manners of formulating propositions due to the choice of the objects and of the positions of subjectivity.

The phenomenon of intrinsic contradictions is a complex phenomenon which manifests itself at different levels. In the systematic and methodic natural history in the eighteenth century, one can recognise the inadequation of the objects. In one case, the general allure of the plant is described, in the other, only some of the variations which are determined in advance. In one case, the totality of the plant is described, in the other, only some of the arbitrarily selected elements are taken.

This procedure refers to the divergences in the enunciative modalities. There is the incompatiability of the concepts. In the "systematic" approach, the concept of generic character is an arbitrary choice; in the "methodic" procedures the same concept must cover the real definition of the object.

There are also differences of functions. Every opposition does not play the same role in the discursive practice. Some ensure an "additional" development of the enunciative field which enable us to determine and define new objects, open new sequences of argumentation, and invite new enunciative modalities. We see this in the discussions amongst naturalists on the frontier between the mineral and the vegetal universe.

The others introduce "reorgansiation" of the discursive field. They pose the fundamental question of the possible translation of one group of propositions into another. They do not refer to new objects or new concepts, but they deal with the objects of another level. They are concerned with the concepts which differ in internal structuration and in the field of their application.

The third type is that of the opposition between existence and "acceptability". Thus the description of organic solidarities and the functions which they exercise in definite conditions of existence, does not allow this acceptability in natural history, which would have been a taxonomic science.

A discursive formation which highlights this opposition is not an ideal text, which is continuous and without any heterogeneity. The multiplicity of contradictions is not resolved calmly in the unity of a coherent thought. It is rather a space of multiple dissensions. It is an ensemble of different oppositions whose levels and roles must be properly described.

4. The archaeological analysis individualizes the discursive formations. It compares one with the other in the simultaneity of their practices, it distinguishes them from those which are not of the same period, and, finds their rapport where they have an individual specificity with non-discursive practices. On the other hand, the epistemological or architechtonic descriptions analyse the internal structuration of a theory. The archaeological study is always concerned with the relations in their multiplicity, in the juxtaposition of different totalities.

These comparisons are always limited and regional. Instead of presenting general forms, archaeology, according to Foucault, looks for specific configurations, as for example, in General Grammar, in the Analysis of Property, and Natural History in the Classical epoch, all charged with expressive quality, which were neglected earlier. It is an affair of discursive formations, which have, amongst themselves, a number of descriptive rapports. These rapports enable us to recognise an "interdiscursive configuration" in the specific ensemble of General Grammar, Natural History, and the Analysis of Property. The archaeological horizon is thus not of one science, one rationality, one mentality, or, one culture. It deals with the interpositivities whose limits and interlingages cannot be fixed with one stroke. Archaeology does not aim at reducing the diversity of discourses, or at designating the unity of their totalisation, but at delineating their diversity in different figures. The archaeological comparison, says Foucault, does not have a unificatory effect: on the contrary, it is multificatory.

One must analyse how Rousseau transferred his knowledge of botany to the analysis of language; how Turgot applied common categories to the analysis of monetary system, theory of language, and etymology; how the idea of universal, artificial, and perfect language could be used by the classificators like Linné or Adanson. All these interrelations or analogies and differences appear with five distinct processes. (a) It must show how different discursive elements can be formed from analogous rules. The concepts of General Grammar such as verb, subject, complement, root etc. are formed from the same disposition of the enúnciative field, i.e. the theories of attribution, of articulation, of designation, and of derivation, as that of the concepts which are otherwise quite different and radically heterogenous which belong to Natural History and Economy. This process may be called the process of archaeological isomorphisms. (b) It must show how these rules are applied in the same manner, in the same order, or appear in the same model of each formation. (c) It must show the concepts which are so different and occupy an analogous place in the system of their positivity. (d) It must show how one and the same notion can cover two archaeologically different elements. The notions of the origin and evolution do not have the same role or place in grammar and natural history. (e) It must show how the relations of subordination and complementation can be established from one positivity to another. It must establish the archeological correlations.

5. Finally, we come to the fundamental problematics of change and transformation. Michel Foucault discusses the nature of discursive formations, the rules of synchronic systems, and the hierarchy of the positivities. In the context of change and transformation, we deal with successions and analogic correspondences but the question arises as to how they are produced and how they interact with other successions within the same period and epoch. It was noticed for more than a century that different objects of natural history, from Tournefort to Jussieu, followed identical rules of formation, and at the same time, the theory of attribution remained the same from Lancelot to Condillac and Destutt de Tracy. This observation only suspends temporal succesions, and in no way, ignores or abolishes them. In fact, it points to the successions where they are, instead of positing them everywhere in all situations even when there is no overt manifestation. The synchronic ensembles do not deny the concept of diachronic evolutions, they only present their logical correlations.

Archaeology defines the rules of an ensemble of prepositions which constitute a discourse. It presents situations where a succession of events, in a given order, can become an object of a discourse, and, can be described and explained in its becoming. Archaeology, according to Foucault analyzes the degree and the form of the permeability of a discourse. It does not ignore the monetary fluctuations of a given economy or the effects of general epidemics on the external events; it wants to integrate them properly in their mutual rapports. Archaeology does not deny the possibility of the emergence of new elements; it shows the conditions which are responsible for such a correlation.

The important factor for defining a positivity is that the rules of its formation do not have the same generality. Some are more specific and are derived from others.

This subordinate relationship may be hierarchical, or it may be suspended temporarily. Thus in General Grammar, the theory of verb attribution and that of noun articulation, are related to each other, where the latter is derived from the former, but it is not possible to determine their order of succession. The rules of formation do not necessarily have a uniform and simultaneous network. There are rapports and derivations which are temporally neutral, others have a clearly defined temporal direction. The model of archaeological research is neither syntagmatic, sequential successions, nor a purely logical schema of simultaneity. It attempts to demonstrate the crisscrossing of the two types. Archaeology is not indifferent to a sequence of successions, asserts Foucault, it establishes the temporal vectors of derivation. What is suspended is the theme that succession is absolute, and, that there is only one form of this succession. In archaeology, both these models are considered insufficient to take account of the reality of the ensembles: the "linear" model of language which is subordinated to syntagmatic laws of the discourse, and, the model of the "flux of conscience" where the present is always missing in favour of the past and the future.

6. Archaeology is not only concerned with a discourse as a series of homogenous events, but it also distinguishes, in the density of the discourse, different planes of possible events: the plane of the emerging propositions, the plane of the manifestation of objects and concepts, the plane of derivation of the new rules of formation, and, finally the plane where substitution takes place. The emergence of a discursive formation is correlated with the resurgence of new objects.

It is not enough to point out the modifications of the theological or aesthetic model of creation, psychological model of consciousness, or the biological model of evolution. The precise nature of these modifications must be clearly defined. The simple reference to change has to be substituted by the analyses of transformation. The archaeologist has to observe how the specific relations of the formation of a system have been transformed; how the rapports amongst different positivities have undergone specific transformations; how the interdiscursive configurations of different disciplines, like linguistics, natural history and economy, have been decomposed. Archaeology thus attempts at fixing the system of transformations which are responsible for "change".

Archaeology differentiates between various states of synchrony. An epoch is neither a unity of base, nor its horizon, not even its object. It refers to well determined discursive practices. For example, the so-called classical age cannot be taken as a fundamental unit of all the discourses of the epoch. The same is true of the notion of rupture. Its description is not the aim of archaeological analysis. It serves only to delimit certain ensembles of synchrony. Thus the French Revolution cannot be taken as a basis of all discursive analyses as in the *Critique* of Jean-Paul Sartre even if it functions as a complex ensemble, where a large number of transformations are articulated, where all sorts of positivities are constituted.

Semiotics, Semiology, Mediation

1. The concluding essay of this section deals with the three aspects of form, content and praxis of our communication systems. Whether the text-object is religion, literature, or economic means of production, there is a dialectics of forms due to super and infra structures of man in society. All forms differentiate and discriminate. They present semiotic organisations which control and regulate human relationships and the possible transformations applied on a given synchronic structuration of the forms of relationships. These forms serve as codes of social stratification, and, at the same time, trigger all creative activity in a social milieu.

The dialectics of semiology or the universe of signification is generated through a constant process of modulations, mutations and "deformations", which correspond to the changing needs of communication. What motivates an alternation in form is the semiological signification the individuals and groups transmit at conscious and unconscious levels; be it a change in the mode of clothes: hierarchy of uniforms in army, schools, religious sects; or in the forms of cooking and eating: vegetarianism, boiling, roasting, innumerable forms of presentation of meals, the whole gamut of cuisine from China to France via India; or different forms of speech which clearly point to class, social and political hierarchy; or the various designs of architecture of temple, mosque and church, or houses of rich and poor with regional and religious conditionings; or all sorts of kinship systems which do not necessarily follow the model of the family of Oedipus; or different forms of economic and hence political production. Each difference in form carries a corresponding difference in significance. However, this significance can be rendered intelligible only if the ensemble and the totality of a semiotic structure is comprehended in its global relationship with the ensemble of the semiologic universe.

Each form is a structured whole. Its different elements can be separated or decomposed from their totality only at the cost of destroying their significance. The question of its identity with an earlier form is meaningless. Both in terms of its "formation", and in terms of its new relationships, it must be observed in its "becoming". As such, each element acquires both its right place in the semiotic organisation of the new emerging ensemble, and, its integration in the semiological structure from the manner and mode in which it is structured at a given synchronic stage. This is true of the cultural prehistoric heritage of symbols and mythical units of significance with reference to mythological transformation, of sounds of a language with reference to its phonological system, of means of production with reference to a given political and social organisation, and all other possible historical residues with reference to the conceptual hierarchies established through collective mediatory processes.

In the preceding chapters, with different approaches due to differences in the objects of study, the fundamental problematics revolved around synchronic structuration and an extermely complex hierarchy of structures within a Structure. And it was also underscored by all these philosophers of Structure that it is because of this hierarchy that a communication system functions.

2. The semiologic doctrine is opposed to the positivist position where the syntactic order or syntagmatic sequence is the determining factor of all comprehension. The atomistic and combinatory conception of the system of cultural and linguistic signs is based on the absolute deductive logic of artificially well-defined forms with strict combinations of contextual semes. The semiologic point of view subscribes to the notion that the semes have their own plane of activity, and, their internal structuration very often crisscrosses the lexemes they are supposed to be attached to. In the ethnological mediatory process of intercommunication, the semes are redistributed. Hence, it is not simply a question of the new contours of the older lexems, but also, of the semes getting completely detached from their earlier nucleus. The evolutionary theories ignore these basic modulations. In epistemology we are not only concerned with the introduction of new elements, but it is also an affair of redistribution, reorganisation, and realignment of the "features of significance" that the semes represent. However, this strictly internal realignment must be considered in a conceptual whole. It is the ensemble of the new conceptualisation in epistemology, of the new phonological structures in language, of the new immanent relationships in the "effects" of the means of production, where the micro transformations must be placed. There are some alternations which determine the new contours, and, there are others which affect only the regional variations. But, in each case, the dialectics is not within the formal structure, but at the immanent level.

3. The problems of semiotic structures are most distinctly pointed out by the problems of "translation" or transmission of knowledge. There are two basic issues. First, there is the problem of the inadequacy of any expression system. The initial transmission or transposition is from the mental conceptualisation to its expressive articulation. Each new epistemology faces this problem. Each new artistic creation goes through this struggle of finding the exact words or expressions, of putting across what has been constituted by the thinking subject. The heritage of the linguistic comportment available to any thinker or writer is by definition circumscribed by earlier epistemologies. He has to think and articulate through the categories of the cultural repository. Yet, there has to be a new constitution, and this constituting process requires a mental effort at a restructuration of a synchronic semic organisation, through the categories of the cultural repository. There is no such thing as an exact equivalent between thought and expression. The history of language is the history of man struggling for his needs of communication. Since each form has inherent inadequacies, there is a constant urge for resurgence and the new modes of expression.

Secondly, there is the problem of the transpositions from one expression system to another, or from one universe of significance to another. It is primarily an affair of interpretation. It lies at the immanent level of semic organisation.

This fact has been demonstrated by Jean-Paul Sartre in the study of Flaubert and Madame Bovary, by Louis Althusser in the conceptual differentiation between Hegel and Marx, by Merleau-Ponty in the phenomenology of perception, and by Lévi-Strauss in the Mythologiques.

The units of significance which interact with each other are structurally complex wholes. They include not only the manifest collective structures but also the individual structures, which, as Jacques Lacan has shown, are structured like language, with their metonymic and metaphoric relationships. Hence, the existentialists' efforts at rendering man his due place in the universe are based on an erroneous definition of the subject. Like any other unit in the structure, the subject is also a product of a diachronic and synchronic interaction. We deal with a specific subject, like any other specific unit. Hence, there is a place for the subject - without which no structure is complete any way - in the organisation of the semiologic universe, but there is no place for subjectivity. It is the scientific objectivity that renders our universe intelligible.

4. The semiologic universe is constituted of semes, according to A.J. Greimas, which present a system of construction and division. This construction does not, however, follow the additive procedure where we begin with minimal units of signification to slowly construct a whole. Greimas asserts that this minimal unit called seme has no independent existence. It can be imagined and described only in relation to something other than itself, as a part of the overall structure of signification. The semes first follow a common totalising axis which depends only on the homogenous significance where a semic category is in hyperonymic relation with its other correlated semes, and, in hyponymic relation with a hierarchically higher category. The two levels of manifestation and immanence have their own specific internal organisations. The immanent universe is constituted with a manifest form which, in turn, can be further referred to an earlier semiology corresponding to the rules of generation of the manifest semiotic univrese. The metonymic and metaphoric relations help us make infinite numbers of propositions. It must, however, be pointed out that if the "creative" faculty is derived from a static concept of the object, as in descriptive or transformational linguistics or empirical sociology, all we get is a multiplicity of objects of the same nature. This is a completely erroneous understanding of creativity. The structural creativity is due to the realisation that the semes have different levels of "density", the semic organisations are unevenly manifested and the semic structures are always in the process of "becoming" This creativity leads to structural emergence, and, covers not only the synchronic organisations, but also their developments.

5. Greimas distinguishes between cosmological semiotics and anthropological semiotics. The cosmological semiotics are universal and deal with the physical world. The anthropological semiotics are specific, regional and culturally conditioned. Their qualitative specificity lies in the social mediation. The cosmological semiotics make statements of empirical facts, of existence even when they render account of the various articulations of their object. The anthropological semiotics concentrate on the significance invested in their semic categories due to human praxis within a given cultural milieu.

The cosmological semiotics are discriminatory and differentiative but the anthropological semiotics are discriminatory and qualitative.

The basic nature of structuration is the same in both cases. This is why the mathematical and logical models have been used in all structural analyses. The Gestalt philosophy also followed the same principles. Linguistics, however, has added a new dimension to this discriminatory analysis of forms. First of all, language, the model of linguistics, is a natural model, created by the collective consciousness of society. It manifests various hierarchies of semiotic formations. Secondly, it is structured in such a way that one can posit absolute scientific objectivity to the text-object. At the level of semiology, it represents a constant and continuous process of mediation. It is a perfect model of human reflection especially in combination with its purely semiological forms like mythemes, symbols and images.

6. The semiologic universe is primarily a universe of symbolic condition of thought. At the ordinary level of manifestation, the simple discriminatory method is used to diferentiate between different sets of signs and categories. At the semiologic level, we are concerned with the complementary functions of representation and communication. Representation is the first link and the primary code. It is the communicative function that determines the semiologic contours. The communicative function is intellective where symbolic representation is subjected to the process of reflection and logical coherence. Representation leads to expressive and aesthetic differentiations. It covers all aspects of style and the modes of expression. Communication presupposes specific designations and denotations. It covers all aspects of cognitive affectations.

7. The semiologic universe is organised with the help of mediatory processes of orders, sequences and successions of structuration. The semiotic forms are constituted in the economy of the signifying ensembles at the crossroad of articulatory disjunction and the correlations of cognitive propositions where man participates in the multiple ideologies of social, cultural, and political praxis. This praxis is based on both the thesis and the antithesis of human structures. There is no synthesis.

POLITICAL DISCOURSE

The Myth of the Great Professor and the Good Student

(The semiotics of the students' movement of May 1968 in France)

The events of May 1968 in France have been commented upon by numerous analysts, and all these commentaries can be justifiably considered logical in the French sense of the term. Before I attempt to present my interpretation of the affair, here is a brief account of the narrative.

In 1968 there were five main active groups of students in France. The UNEF or L'Union Nationale des Etudiants de France, which had been in existence ever since the end of the Second World War. It was a highly politicised and divided body of students which took part in the events of Algeria, Vietnam, and had reacted to numerous upheavals in eastern Europe. The rivalries in this Union had given rise to other groups.

One such group was CLEAR or the Comité de Liaison des Etudiants Révolutionnaires, which was inspired by Trotskism and the themes of the Fourth International.

Another group called itself JCR or the Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire. It also followed Trotsky but it was a separate group.

The fourth group was CVN or the Comité Vietnam Nationale, organized by Laurent Schwartz and Alain Krivine. Jean-Paul Sartre had also been associated with it.

And lastly, there were the UJCML or the L'Union de Jeunesse Communistes Marxistes-Léninist es, composed of the pro-Chinese Marxist students.

We can add to this list the movement of March 22, founded by Daniel Cohn-Bendit at Nanterre.

Our narrative begins on twenty-second of March when the students of Nanterre occupy the Tower of the Faculty, and declare war on French educational and cultural system. On March 28, Nanterre is closed, and, on the following day, the Nanterre campus, few miles away from Paris, is occupied by the students.

As the studies are discontinued, the students swarm the Latin Quarter, the lieu of the Sorbonne and the great battles of students against the authority since the twelfth century. One is immediately reminded of the romantic and tumultuous union of Abélard and Héloïse, and all the strikes of the monk students and the fierce battles on horsebacks against the established authorities of the Church and the King.

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* Paper presented at the Seminar on Political Discourse organised by the Department of Sociology, Delhi University, 1981.

The traditional May first demonstrations took place from the Republique Square to that of the Bastille by a combined force of the workers unions, the Communist Party and the socialists, CGT, PC, and PSU.

On May second, all work at Nanterre campus is stopped, and, on the third, the police occupies the Sorbonne, and all teaching is suspended.

The sixth of May witnesses the first barricades in the Latin Quarter, and, the students movement spreads to the campuses of the provincial universities, especially Strasbourg and Nantes.

Between May 7 and 9, the University rectorate tries to negotiate peace with the students but fails. On May 10, the whole of the Latin Quarter is occupied by hundreds of thousands of students. There are barricades all over, and, all night there are skirmishes between the police and the students. The molotoves and street stones are freely hurled at the bourgeoisie and its guardian police.

The following day, on May 11, several workers unions decide for a general strike on May 13. The Censier centre of the University is occupied by the students. The Prime Minister, George Pompidou, who was away in Afghanistan, returns to Paris. There are some measures of reconciliation, and, a few arrested students are released, but this has no effect on the movement.

On May 13, the Sorbonne is occupied by the students and the workers go on a general strike of twenty-four hours. Strangely enough, as nothing serious was happening in Paris, de Gaulle leaves on an official visit to Romania on May 14. The same day, the workers are on strike all over France.

On May 15, the students occupy the theatre Odeon. By May 17, ten million workers are on strike. In other words, one out of every five Frenchmen has stopped working. This is the biggest strike ever in the history of France.

On May 26, suddenly there is no petrol in Paris. So nobody can move. There is perfect immobility. The Sartrian hell is enacted for all to confront each other. Since there is no exit, there is violence. The revolution is let loose by the students and the young workers. All established parties, on the right or left, are taken by surprise, and are reluctant to take part in this tumult. The movement, however, is so overwhelming that they hesitatingly begin to join in the revolutionary fête. The Communist Party, PC, openly donounces the revolutionary adventurism, and pleads for the path of "legality". Pierre Mendes France and François Mitterand are also caught in the same predicament.

On May 30, de Gaulle dissolves the National Assembly, and announces new elections.

The established left forces are divided. The Gaullists win an overwhelming majority in the Assembly. The communists lose heavily. The good guys are rewarded, and, the bad boys are punished. For some, the old order was re-established. For others, the revolution was betrayed.

II

The events of May '68 have had microscopic analyses. Amongst the causes of this eruption of student revolt, there have been usual explanations, like the extremely rapid growth of student community, modern industrialisation, the alienating consumers society, and, of course the atmosphere of students contestation all over the world — Berkely, Tokyo, Peking are frequently cited as instances of this phenomenon. While we cannot deny the validity of any of these arguments, and, it is also obvious that all these oppressive and contagious factors had their influence on the French youth, one cannot stay within a given time and space of synchronic character, the conceptual structures not only interact with each other on the syntagmatic plane — they are not independent entities suspended in air, the dynamic character of the emerging structures must also be found in the historical depths of metaphoric relations.

There is no doubt that the French students were inspired by the events in Berkely and Peking, but once the students occupied the holy precincts of the Sorbonne, the French University tradition weighed heavily on them. The walls of Latin Quarter had echoed the revolutionary slogans since the twelfth century. Moreover, the problems that the French students were faced with were very different from those of any other university or country, and naturally the generating process also followed a different course. In no other country the students movement brought a total chaos in its body politic. Within two weeks of the barricades of the Latin Quarter, ten million young workers had forced the establishment of their unions to come out in the streets, and the whole administrative machine was completely paralysed. The concept of total revolution is a typically French phenomenon.

The French University system is a unique adventure. There are only chairs, and the professors are coopted by the assembly of the professors. There is no advertisement, no selection committee, nobody can apply. A scholar who has made a mark in a certain field is invited to grace a chair. At times, a chair may carry the traditional title, as for example, Histoire des idées, at others, a chair is denominated according to the discipline of the invitee, as for example, was the case with Roland Barthes whose chair was christened, the Chair of Semiology. There are no departments, there are only professors and assistants. Once a professor is appointed, there is absolutely no control over his teaching or his evaluation of the students. Until very recent times, there was only one professor in a discipline in the whole country, and his Chair was generally in Paris. A professor often pronounces his discourse before several hundred auditors in an amphitheatre. There is no tution fee, no enrolement to attend lectures. A professor gives a Cours Magistral. There are no boards of studies, no syllabus prescribing bodies. A professor is free to programme his lectures anyway he likes. At the end of the year, after delivering a maximum of four lectures a week for about five months, he gives his examination, which always consists of one question, called dissertation, to be answered in four hours. Traditionally, the evaluation results in ninety per cent failure, sometimes even more.

The doctoral theses for the State Doctorate take about ten to fifteen years of preparation, and includes two theses, the principal and the complementary. The defence or viva voce examination is conducted by a jury of at least five professors and usually lasts from five to seven hours. A doctoral thesis in Humanities and Letters is such a rare phenomenon that the reports of the defence are carried in all major newspapers.

While there are examinations at the Sorbonne for Licence, the freedom of teaching and learning is unlimited at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes and the Collège de France, where the venerable professors are supposed only to enlighten the auditors with their learning and intellectual brilliance. As the lectures are delivered in large auditoriums, and since there is no enrolement, the competition is merciless. For example, to listen to Michel Foucault or Roland Barthes, one had to go there at least an hour in advance to be able to get a place to sit on the floor. Very often in Foucault's lectures, besides the several hundred occupied seats, there was never any vacant place even to sit on the floor or to stand near the main gate. But the reverse is equally true. There are professors who address empty chairs. Even the great of yonder days have to struggle hard to keep up with their own reputation. While the situation described above for Foucault and Roland Barthes during the years 1979-80 was by and large true of Lévi-Strauss and André Martinet in the sixties, the audience for them during these years of my stay in France was just about respectable. It is a free world. One has to keep up with the changing times with considerable intellectual effort. As far as the government is concerned, the professors can teach for ever, they need not retire, so the actual retirement is mental and not physical. In other words, a professor can teach whatever he likes, for as long as he cares to do so, provided, of course, he can find an audience. As there is no prescribed course of study, the professors at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes and the Collège de France have to prepare a new course of lectures every year to keep the same pitch of intellectual discourse. This extreme mental strain can be endured only for a few years, and as the professor becomes repetitive or demoded, the disciples begin to desert the guru.

All this began in the year of Lord 1100 when Abélard defeated Guillaume de Champeaux in an open debate at the Ile de la Cité and walked over to the left bank of the river Seine with the students shouting, Maître Pierre avec nous, and founded the School of Dialectics in this quarter, later called, the Latin Quarter, for Latin was the medium of discourse. Somewhat on the lines of conceptual structuralism and empiricism, the intellectual debate during these days was around the Nominalists and the Realists. For the former, the notions of love, humanity and virtue have no tangible existance, they are simple vocables. For the realists the abstractions universal represent essence and thus have a positive life.

Abélard defeated the champion of the nominalists, the chanoine of Compiègne, Jean Roscelin, and the chanoine Guillaume de Champeaux, the substantialist. According to Abélard, the universal is not a simple word, nor it is a reality in itself which can have its proper life. What is it then? It is a conception of the esprit, replies Abélard. As Abélard does not have the Licence to teach; he leaves Paris and installs his little university at Corbeil, at a distance of a few miles from the Capital.

Guillaume de Champeaux is left alone, his discourses are listened to only by a few faithfuls. The large majority of the students, many of them foreigners from the different lands of Christendom, gather around Abélard, and soon the number grows to three thousand.

After a few years, Abélard gets the Licence to teach from the successor of Champeaux, and begins to pronounce his discourses on the Montagne Sainte-Geneviève. The students from Brittany, England, Germany, Picardy and even Rome flock to Abélard. The foreign princes recommend to the King of France the students of their dominions. Abélard revolutionises the teaching of dialectics and theology which had gotten stuck in the conservatism of the Church since Charlemagne. Abélard the dialectitian dethrones the great Anslem of Laon. He is the uncontested, unchallenged professor who is admired by the students. One such admirer of Abélard is the niece of the chanoine Fulbert, the beautiful and brilliant girl, named Héloïse. The chanoine requests Abélard to give private lessons to Héloïse which becomes the cause of his ruin as well as his celebrity. Their romantic liason becomes a public affair. Abélard is physically assaulted and exiled from Paris, and, the first "femme savante" of Latin Quarter is sent to the convent. Abélard is persecuted. He is accused of heresy.

As Abélard recovers mentally and physically, he sets up another centre of learning at Nogent-sur-Seine, and calls his domain, Paraclet. Soon Paraclet becomes the centre of all learning in Europe and the Church feels again threatened. The several thousand students from all over Europe are in search of verity which often comes in conflict with the dogmas of the established Church. In 1136 at the age of 55, Abélard returns to his Paris acclaimed by his disciples and faithfuls. The whole of Latin Quarter is surrounded by the admirers of the great Abélard. The immigrant students occupy every house of the area and a whole new quarter is raised to accommodate the growing student population.

Abbé de Clairvaux, the future saint of the Church, denounces Abélard: "We have in France a monk without regulation, a preacher without solicitations, an abbé without discipline, a serpent who moves around in his cavern... This persecutor of our beliefs, an outsider, a heretic is surrounded by a crowd of innocent people, he reasons on our beliefs in the streets and the squares, seduces children and women, and signs with his plume the most detested heresies on our most sacred dogmas."

His disciples proclaim: "The teaching is an affair of the youth. The students have the right to choose their own masters and they have the right to accept or criticize them. Knowledge is discovered and elaborated progressively, and, none has the monopoly of verity."

However, this does not help Abélard, and at the Council of Sens, Abélard is excommunicated and his writings are set to fire in public. Abélard finishes his last days in the monastery of Cluny. His disciples continue the fight. Jean de Salisbury, who is also condemned, declared: "My faith in liberty, my love for verity, these are my crimes." Arnaud de Brescia attacks the despotism of the Church. He crosses the Alps and heads a sedition against the Pope. He dies crucified, and, his ashes are thrown in the Tibre. The Bishop of Paris complains: "These young men have no respect for the hierarchy based on age and experience.

These adolescents have the impudence of occupying these "chairs magistrales", they have barely any hair on their chin, and they sit proudly in the places of mature men."

But the tradition of Abélard continues, and by the beginning of the thirteenth century, the University is recognised by the King as an independent body which, in the following centuries, makes and unmakes kings and popes.

Since 1378 two popes claim papal crown. The King of France is for Clement VII, the first Pope of Avignon, elected by thirteen dissident French cardinals. England and Germany defend the right of Urbain VI, the Pontiff of Rome. As the Pope of Avignon is in the pocket of the King of France, the Sorbonne favours the far-away Pontiff of Rome. The death of these two Popes does not solve the dispute. The Roman conclave elects Boniface IX, while the college of the cardinals of Avignon selects Benoit XIII. The University votes against Benoit XIII who threatens to close the University. The King wants an autonomous Church of France so that his nominated cardinals do his bidding, while the University cherishes independence from the King by siding with the Pontiff of Rome. Finally, Benoit XIII excommunicates the whole faculty of theology of Paris and deprives the University of its right to teach. When the Act of Benoit XIII arrives, the King Charles VI is present in the Assembly. The theologians tear away the Bull and the messengers are insulted. As the quarrel between the Popes continues, the University of Paris is able to get a third Pope elected at the Council of Pisa in 1409, where out of 120 electors, 80 belonged to the Sorbonne. The third Pope, Pierre de Condie, was an old student of the Latin Quarter. The Italians are furious: these French theologians have a basket full of Popes, they can bring out one whenever they so desire.

At the same time, a professor of Sorbonne, Jean Gerson, fights against the absolute authority of the Pope of Rome. He openly declares that the authority of the Church does not reside in the Pope, but in the Council, whose duty is to instruct the Pope. Gerson proclaims that the University is the real guardian of the verity of the Church. The University is more than the Kingdom, more than the Christendom. It generates all ecclesiastical and political wisdom. During the earlier years of the fifteenth century, the University of Paris played the political game of balancing of power between the Bourgingnons and the Armagnacs. Gerson teaches that the kings are not sacred; they depend upon the will of the learned. For the youth of the Latin Quarter, it is the signal of revolt.

At the time of the judgement of Joan of Arc, the Sorbonnists were caught in their own game. They saw in her the standard bearer of the enemies of the University, the Armagnacs, who in 1411 had proposed to the English that the University be transferred to the province. Joan was nationalist against the English while the Sorbonnists were internationalists against their own King. They wanted their own State within a State.

Within two centuries the Sorbonne became the citadel of conservatism and reaction. State within a State, it abandoned its role of avant-garde in thought and word, and, began to exercise its unlimited power of censure. During the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, the University of Paris was the dominant intellectual force in all Europe.

In the following period, it kept all new ideas away from its holy precincts. François 1er was obliged to open a parallel institution, the Collège Royal, the future Collège de France, in 1530, to combat the rigid attitude of the professors of the Sorbonne. Rabelais said that if he were the King of France, he would burn the den of the Devil, that the Sorbonne has turned into. As some of the professors were receptive to the ideas of Luther, he spoke of the Sorbonne as the most Christian, the mother of all learning, and, in all simplicity and faith, he chose Sorbonne for the arbitration of his quarrel with the Pope. The Tribunal of the Sorbonne deliberated over the famous theses of Luther for ten months, and with unanimity, condemned his ideas as heresy and recommended his excommunication.

The same fate awaited the most important French philosopher, René Descartes. In the beginning, there was enthusiasm for him. Descartes even dedicated his Meditations to the venerable institution of higher learning. But the Church got the upper hand, and Louis XIV got Cartesianism excluded from the courses of the Sorbonne. The professors who dared oppose this move were expelled. As a theologian later remarked about this process: the theatre of the Sorbonne where the Bull against Descartes was being discussed was a veritable hell. Fortunately, after the death of the monarch, the rebel professors were reintegrated. This was seventeenth century, the century of Enlightenment.

In the eighteenth century, Turgot could save his skin, for even though one of his theses was on the materialist progress of man, the others spoke of the benefits of Christianity. A year later, Montesquieu's *L'esprit des Lois* was condemned. So was the case with Buffon's *Histoire Naturelle*, Rousseau's *Emile* was subjected to the same fate.

One hundred years after its expulsion, Cartesianism was back in the Sorbonne, and surprisingly, now the Sorbonnists made use of Descartes' supposed spiritualism against the materialism of the encyclopaedists. Diderot could be cited in the Sorbonne only a century later. It is said that it always took a hundred years to enter the citadel of conservatism of the Sorbonne. Until 1870, the twelve Chair Professors of the Sorbonne were called the "douze Grands Dieux", the Twelve Great Gods.

From the seizure of the Bastille in 1789 to the fall of the guillotine on the head of Louis XVI in 1793, all the representatives of France, the Etats Generaux, participated in the most direct democracy in the world for the first time. The National Assembly was occupied, and, day in and day out, the citizens of France debated on the subjects ranging from the education of children à la Rousseau, the universal religion of Supreme Reason, the reforms in language, art, culture, philosophy, to the daily executions of the traitors to the revolution. Once the students of 1968 occupied the Sorbonne, they had before them the whole folklore of the French Revolution and of the history of the University of Paris. And, as always, beginning from the Middle Ages to the French Revolution, it was a universal phenomenon. The revolutionaries of all Europe always got together in Paris. The awakened spirits were never bound by the national boundaries.

Following the Revolution, the University was reformed, and Reason reigned supreme. However, as the Revolution was betrayed, and Napoleon usurped power; the things changed again. When the students of the Ecole Polytechnique refused to pronounce the ritual sermon of fidelity to the Emperor, he was furious. The next day, Napoleon remakred to Monge, one of the founders of the Ecole: "Your students do not like me." Monge humbly replied: "Sire, it took a lot of hard work to make them republicans, give them time to become imperialists."

When the old kingdom was restored and Louis XVIII sat on the throne of France, the students and most of the professors continued to adhere to the liberating ideas of the Revolution. The professors in the Faculty of Letters, Guizot, Villemain and Victor Cousin belonged to this University Critique, and they suffered for their views. A professor of Law, Monsieur Bavoux taught in 1819 that the criminal code of the State was favourable to the despotic rule, and there was no liberty to think and act according to one's conscience. His course was suspended, and he was brought to trial. The Faculty of Laws was derecognized. Later when there was trouble in the Faculty of Medicine, twenty-eight teachers were dismissed by Louis XVIII, and, a new constitution was proposed to govern the conduct of the students and the professors. So, what the University Grants Commission is proposing today is not new. The establishment always tried to control the erring students and the professors, but alas, they always failed. The successful revolution of 1830 in France gave back to the University of Paris its lost rights.

III

The little tale of the University of Paris is a part of the folklore of every French student of the Latin Quarter. Edgar Morin's analysis of the movement of May '68 refers to the revolutionary fête.[3] The ritual barricades of the Latin Quarter followed on May 10-11. The factories were occupied by the young workers beginning May 14. On May 22, the strike was all over France, and, on May 24, even the peasants came out in the streets. On May 30, de Gaulle pronounced his televised address. This period of one month corresponds to the next month of return to normalcy with the two tours of elections when the Gaulists won an absolute majority, and, the left lost heavily.

There was no economic crisis, there was no recession, and, there was no such thing as the classical struggle of classes. It has been proposed that it was a crisis of civilization, a crisis nourished by an amalgam of the ideas of Marx, Freud, Sartre and Marcuse, a crisis of Liberty, Ouverture, and Creativity.

The students re-lived their rich heritage of revolutions since the twelfth century. They enacted a revolutionary fête nourished by historical and imaginary folklore of the revolutions of yesterdays. It was a realisation of their historic concscience. They enacted a revolutionary theatre where both the cosmic and the historical undercurrents interacted.

There was the historical axis of the Sorbonne, and then, there were the contemporary movements represented by Mao, Trotsky, Vietnam. Che, etc., whose portraits were all over

the walls of the Sorbonne. It was in a way a prodigious ceremony of the cosmic revolution. May '68 was the movement of the crowds in the streets, and, as it often happened in the days of the French Revolution in 1789, the destinies of the university and the body politic of the country changed in a day. It was a total revolution of culture and liberty. It was the extreme example of popular democracy. The Chinese Cultural Revolution could not be considered as their model as it was not orchestrated by the President in power. The extreme wings of the students and the workers forced their leaders to come out in the streets. The leaders, for once, were led by the followers. As one observer remarked, the leaders ran in front of the shouting workers to maintain the façade of their leadership.

.In this system of extremely rigid hierarchy, the first target was obviously the professor and his Cours Magistral. This cours is fundamentally a monologue before a large number of silent students. Pedagogically, its character is global and emanates from the person of the teacher. As such, the professor is a model of identification, a positive hero, who holds and interprets the individual as well as collective verity. At the same time, the professor presents to the students a spectacle of liberty in the absolute sense of the term. In the French educational system since the twelfth century, there has been absolutely no constraint on the syllabus of the professor, and, no control on whatever way he wants to evaluate his students. The system is based on the postulate of responsibility, competence, and the conscience of the professor. There is no statutory obligation. Personally, a professor is considered to be infallible.

On the other hand, a student is always placed in the position of guilt. There is no contact between the student and the professor, except first as a silent spectator, and then, at the time of the examination, as the one who is interrogated.

The relation between the students and the professor is also regulated by means of the system of the selection of the students for the Grandes Ecoles. Somewhat like our institutes of technology, there are in France, Grandes Ecoles for every branch of knowledge. The competitive examinations, or concours where the places are extremely limited, give access to the kids of the French bourgeoisie to enter the higher echelons of the French social order. The French examinations are always in two parts: écrit (written), and, oral (viva). Every viva is conducted by a number of professors, called the jury. This prospect of facing the jury haunts every French student throughout his life, and, at the same time, gives to a professor unlimited power. The system as such becomes a system of "repression and negative sanctions."

Olivier Burgelin[4] argues that it is an authoritarian system at all levels. It never takes account of the will of the students. The authority emanates from a well-established hierarchy. Secondly, the relations of infantile attitude and guilt play a fundamental role in the alienation leading to anthropological movements within the society.

Thirdly, this system constitutes a highly hierarchised society where the relations between different categories are "frozen". At the same time, it results in extreme individualism and compartmentalisation. Fourthly, the university system gives the impression of stability and consensus. The society appears to be a purely external universe. As long as there is no

reform of the university, the power it depends upon remains invisible as the transformations or the new acquisitions of professors, credits, faculties, are always by cooption without any standardised regulations whatsoever. It is the "tradition" that regulates the working of the university system.

The traditional consensus began to break in the sixties. The old order could continue only if there was an undeclared understanding. The order had to be interiorised to be maintained intact. Those who dominated derived their authority from those who participated in this game of selections and rose to the privileged class. The hierarchical system depended upon a certain correspondence between the temporal power and the spiritual power. This correspondence began to change contours as there were changes in the class composition of the students. Traditionally, only the French bourgeoisie participated in this fête of the selections to the Grandes Ecoles. This class had not only accepted this system of evaluation, but its own position in the general social order was based on this system of examinations. With changes in society, with the advent of neo-capitalism, a whole new class of petite bourgeoisie entered this domain. These were the students whose parents had never participated in this system. From a certain point of view, there was a sort of decadence in the general social order. The entry of these new students affected all the traditional bodies of student organisations. There were qualitative changes in the main organisation of the students, the UNEF. This was true also of the communists, catholic, protestants, etc. Traditionally, the elders in the PCF, the Communist Party of France, could control the leftist students. This paternalism could no more work in 1968. There was a generation gap in all political and cultural organisations.

Another phenomenon in this period was that of the atmosphere of reforms. Several committees had advocated for interdisciplinary approach in the Faculties. For some, the model of the American universities was an ideal. This is where the Jewish intelligentsia plays an important role. Because of their demographic spread, the European Jews generally talk of the American system in Europe, and, in the American universities, the European immigrants in general, and, the Jews in particular, constantly harp on the excellence of the Euopean intellectual tradition.

Even though the American model was, by and large, discarded by all, there was progressive introduction of new disciplines like sociology, linguistics and economics in the Faculties of France. The old classical mandarin system was challenged, and, the French youth asked for substantial participation in the academic and administrative affairs of the University, but this reaction and programming was based primarily on the prevalent tradition of France. The themes of the pedagogy of participation, dialogue, and adaptation were the main topics of discussion.

The only way to open this dialogue was a recourse to violence. The movement of 22 March at Nanterre was started by a handful of students. The radical minority spearheaded this contestation. The authorities closed the Faculty of Nanterre and threw the students in the streets. The French students then followed the traditional routine of the barricades in the

Latin Quarter. The skirmishes with the police on May 10 and 11 sealed the solidarity of the students. The minority was overnight transformed into a majority. The government in panic withdrew, and, the students occupied the Sorbonne. This was a revolutionary fête with thousands of students discussing the modalities of their programmes and the methods of teaching and learning. Most of the professors cooperated with this venture. The eminent professors, who had until now given only Cours Magistral to the silent students, were engaged actively in a continuous dialogue. The model here was not the Chinese cultural revolution; even though the Red Book of Mao was the best seller in Paris for several weeks in 1967, it was primarily the French Revolution of 1789 that inspired them, and, this is why true to their tradition, almost all professors submitted themselves not only to severe interrogation but also to a meaningful dialogue with the aspirations of the French students. But once the dialogue began, the minority of the radicals had to cede to those who had thought about the fundamental problems of education. The violence achieved its main function however. The old university order disappeared and in its place the legitimacy of the student power was consecrated.

Two documents were submitted to the Commission de Pédagogie which proposed that the relations between professors and students be closely subordinated to the rapports that each of them had with knowledge[5]. Hence the, pedagogic methodology should always be inspired by the methodology of the corresponding discipline. In other words, insofar as the manner of teaching is concerned, a discipline finds its model in the manner it is constituted day by day. This principle implies the following:

(a) The professor is first of all a researcher, the act of teaching and the act of research must coincide, teaching and research must proceed from the same mental universe, the professor who is only a pedagogue would be a professional contradiction, the student who would expect only this from the professor, who as a teacher is at his disposition throughout the year, would be going against his own interest.

(b) The professor must associate the student, from his very entrance to the university, with his research. He should let him know the domain, he has selected to work in, and, if possible, to discover the results already obtained and the method with which the questions and the problematics are raised, his methods of work and his techniques of analysis, finally, his doctrine, for knowledge is not objective if it is true that all knowledge is always restructured by the one who announces it, and, it results from the fundamental opinions, discovered personally or understood collectively, but always assumed personally on the nature of things. The professor, in short, must try to integrate more and more closely the student in his team of research so that the student is gradually metamorphosed as a provisional or as a definitive researcher, and, after the phase of apprenticeship, the student is capable of proposing other problematics or other methdologies, even of challenging the doctrine of the professor.

(c) The professor should not depart from research when there are themes which do not belong to his domain of research but all the same they arise from his discipline about which the student has the right to be informed. The professor should accept that the themes of research or of reflection may be proposed by the student. He should share with the student

the task of the elaboration of the documentary materials which should cease to be private and individual and should become public and collective. He should not announce any result without, at the same time, the conditions under which it was obtained. The student may participate in the totality of the pedagogic act, and, not just in the last phase. The activity of the student, in short, should try to cover what is actually the activity of the professor.

If this principle is accepted, and also the orientations which follow from it, the rest would be to promote the practical modalities of its application. Undoubtedly, it is already possible to foresee the categories of the rapports between the professors and the students!

(a) The sessions of laboratory or the sessions of research could be organised in such a manner that the student learns how is his discipline constituted, and, how it progresses, and what path it follows, which mental operations and sociological determinations it is submitted to. These sessions may follow a progression enabling the student to pass from the status of an active spectactor to that of a total participant.

(b) The seminars of collective elaboration could be held regularly where the student could learn how one understands the knowledge of others. He could discover that this apprenticeship has value only to the extent knowledge is restructured and integrated in individual perspective.

(c) The Cours Magistral could be reserved for specific tasks. It would be justified only if the professor-researcher is in possession of unpublished information, or, he has new hypotheses which challenge the ones which are considered to be basic until then.

The pedagogic act must avoid giving false images of knowledge. Knowledge is neither all ready-made, nor definitive, nor even objective. It is always in the course of being achieved, and, it is due to a specific apprehension of the world. In this perspective, the contestation becomes a fundamental epistemological act. The veritable nature of knowledge is the real stake of the pedagogy of university teaching.

The second document referred to the professional formation and contestation. The reflection on the rapports of contestation and professional formation gives rise to several important questions. It is dangerous to organise studies by separating formation and contestation without any object, while it is a matter of achieving a veritable contestation which can review a real formation, and a formation which corresponds to the state of knowledge in a given domain. The professional formation is an ambiguous notion which may correspond to several contents. It is sufficient to know how to act, during the thirty or forty years of active life, to exercise one's profession, knowing its significance, remaining in contact with the progress of one's discipline in question and participating in its progress, and at the same time, maintaining two requirements, the intellectual dispensibility and practice for the development of knowledge, and the contribution to its elaboration.

Secondly, it is necessary to become conscious of the objectivity and the ideology of one's profession. The professional formation may cover two different domains. The domain of the profession inasmuch as it corresponds to a certain analysis of the objective reality, independent of social conditioning is the first domain. There is, in fact, a certain nucleus of

knowledge which uncovers or de-masks reality which takes account of both the reality and the ideological views. The contestation of knowledge is a mixture of scientific de-masking of the reality, and, the ideological occultation of the de-masking. One of the possible ways of this contestation is the analysis of the historical formation of this knowledge, and, this analysis can be an intrinsic part of teaching.

<h1 style="text-align:center">IV</h1>

It has been remarked by several analysts of the events of May 1968 that the industrial proletariat was not the revolutionary avant-garde of the French society. Jean-Marc Coudray believes that if the students movement touched the revolutionary skies, what brought it down was the attitude of the proletariat, its passivity towards the regime, its inertia, and its indifference to all that is not economic.[6] According to him, in May '68, the most conservative, the most mystified, the most blinded by the lurements of modern bureaucratic capitalism was the working class led by the PCF, the Communist Party of France, and the CGT, its front organization amongst the workers. It was the real victim of the society of consummation. Even when the young workers were on strike, they let themselves be led by the inactive leaders. Waldeck Rochet, the secretary general of the party, called the revolution adventurist, and asked his followers to remain within the framework of "legality". He called the propositions of Geismar, Sauvageot, Rocard, Barjonet, on the seizure of power in May as "irresponsible", even "provocative". For Waldeck Rochet, the torch-bearer of the workers of France, there was only one choice,[7] either act according to the essential demands of the workers and bring about necessary democratic change within the context of "legality", which was the position of the Communist Party, or , throw the workers out to struggle for power, i.e. to opt for insurrection, for an armed struggle to overthrow the political power. This according to him, was the adventurist position of certain ultra-leftist groups. It may be pointed out here that traditionally the Communist Party of France is composed of industrial workers. The left intellectuals by and large adhere to other groups. The situation in Italy, on the other hand, is quite cohesive. The revolutionary Waldeck Rochet continues his argument: as the army and the repressive forces were on the side of the established power (as if they are ever on the other side) and as the immense mass of people were absolutely hostile to such an adventure (he conveniently ignored the ten million workers in the streets of France), it was obvious that to be engaged in such a path was simply to lead the workers to the massacre and the suppression of the working class, and its avant-garde, the Communist Party. In other words, the Communist Party led by its leader Waldeck Rochet was simply scared of the revolution of the youth led by the students of France.

The attitude of the classical proletariat has changed in the modern capitalist society. It accepts hierarchy, whether it is political or of the workers unions. It is passive and stuck in inertia. Modern capitalism has changed the traditional Marxist classification, but unfortunately, it remains as the legacy of earlier years. If the workers had shown even one-tenth of the

initiative demonstrated by the students, argues Coudray, the bureaucratic apparatus would have fallen apart.

Another argument in favour of the new class is given by Alain Touraine. According to him, the movement of May forced a division between the two layers of society.[8] At the heart of the system of production, the managers are on one side, who are supported by the ever increasing number of bureaucrats exercising the functions of authority, which constitutes the administrative apparatus of the large private or public organizations. On the other side are those who can contest their technical knowhow and those who are subjected to this system. In earlier days, there was always a conflict between the technically qualified workers and others, today, the dividing line is between the experts and the bureaucrats, or, as it is often said in industry, between those who belong to a linear organization and those who occupy functional jobs. It is a question of a new sociological formation. The fact that a large number of workers were on strike should not give us the illusion of this working class. The principal actors in the drama, according to Alain Touraine, are what may be called the profesionals: the public or private enterprises, teachers, etc. The new class struggle brings in most direct opposition the techno-bureaucrats and the professionals.

According to Touraine there were in fact three large groups of left forces. First, the revolutionary students who were isolated in the beginning. The large majority was hesitant, and, joined the movement when the government closed the University and forced them all together in the streets of Paris. But this force of the left was never properly organized. They were no doubt against the established order and the society, but as they crossed the threshold of political action, they fell apart.

The second left, of course, was the Communist Party of France. According to the analysis of the party, the objective conditions of France did not allow a revolution. They were ready for the seizure of power—not in the streets—but legally, in elections, where, of course, they failed miserably. For once, the Communist Party had absolutely no idea of what was going on in its own country. It was mentally stuck in the mechanism of primitive industry. The continuous Marxist studies, so intensively being conducted in France, did not have any effect on its leaders. The party minimised the May movement to the extreme. It called the students irresponsible and adventurists. It is only when its own troups deserted the party, and the young workers, without bothering to what the paternalistic elder communists were advising, went on strike and paralysed the entire industrial set-up of France that its leaders began to run before their own cadres to keep the façade of leadership.

The third left was the usual socialists led by François Mitterand, who true to his ambitions, immediately declared himself a candidate for the Elysée palace. In fact, the left was literally afraid of this total revolution for which it was not at all prepared.

At the election, the communists lost a million of traditional votes. The votes of the socialists were reduced by half.

Some commentators of that period believed that the revolution was betrayed by the established left, for they could not take over political power in May '68. If the control of

political power is the sole criterion, does it mean that now after a decade, the victory of François Mitterand with the help of the communists has made the revolution successful? Certainly not. The seizure of political power at the helm of a revolutionary movement would have meant the restructuring of the entire university and social order. The present victory is a routine affair, perfectly in tune with the rules of the game of the bourgeois society. One can draw parallel with the JP movement, even though the exact conditions and the nature of the movements were quite different. The JP movement was betrayed by Messers Desai, Charan Singh, Jagjiwan Ram and co, the old residues of the Congress establishment. On their mental horizon, there was nothing but greed and hunger of political power. They were an integral part of a stinking, corrupt system.

The wave of conservatism continued in France. After the parliamentary elections of 1968 which brought de Gaulle back to power by an overwhelming majority, the French bourgeoisie reigned supreme. When de Gaulle quit the following year, the French electorate voted for George Pompidou, the candidate of the French banking houses. He was followed by Giscard d'Estaing, the representative of French aristocracy. Now we have the so-called left of François Mitterand and the Communist Party which is even more conservative at home and in foreign affairs. Last year when Mitterand expelled nearly forty Russian diplomats on charges of spying, a feat unparalleled even by the Americans, the Communist Party of France, the most pro-Soviet party in Europe did not raise a finger, and continued to stay in the cabinet of Mitterand.

The situation in May '68 was certainly revolutionary, believes André Barjonet.[9] The extraordinary power of ten million striking workers, engineers, technicians, and, hundreds of thousands of students in the streets had brought an unprecedented upheaval. The universities and the factories were occupied by the revolutionaries. There were barricades all over Paris, Lyon, Nantes, Bordeaux and several other cities of France. There was a complete political void. First, the Prime Minister, George Pompidou left for Afghanistan, and on his return, General de Gaulle went to Romania. Towards the end of the month, he left for Baden-Baden in Alsace on a secret mission, not known even to his close associates; the objectives of the visit are still a point of controversy in France. The Communist Party and the Confédération Générale du Travail, who had always talked of breaking the monopoly of the Gaullist regime, were caught in panic, and, instead of taking advantage of the objective revolutionary conditions created by this popular movement, denounced the "provocative and adventurous" character of the "insurrectionists". In fact, there was a revolutionary situation created by the initiative of the young students and workers, but there was no revolutionary political party of the masses to take advantage of it.

A tract of the PCI, Internationalist Communist Party, held totally responsible the Gaullist regime for the violence which was developing in all the cities of France. "It is the Gaullist power that has taken initiative in the fights and the savage suppression of the 60,000 young workers, students, teachers assembled before the railway station of Lyon... Today, in the struggle which is awakening all France, where Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Nantes, Bordeaux,

Strasbourg rise to face the forces of coersion of a State in the process of decomposition, plebiscitaire referendum is not the answer. The veritable referendum is the general strike. The power is in the streets, and, not in the ballot box."[10]

The Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of France declared that there are two sides: the power of the monopolists which unleashes violence on the people[11], and, on the other, the popular power of the workers, peasants and students who work for the revolution. "The victory will belong to the people only if there is unity of struggle... At present, the revisionist leaders of PCF, the Communist Party of France, and its workers wing, the CGT, are spending all their energy to divide the popular forces. They are trying systematically to push the workers against the students. Moreover, they limit their workers struggle to only the domain of petty gains, while the immense mass of workers aspire for socialism. Such manoeuvres have the only objective of serving the dominant ruling class, the monopolist bourgeoisie. The central committee of the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of France renews its appeal for the constitution of popular committees of action in all quarters, factories, villages, faculties, colleges. Such organizations should spearhead the revolutionary aspirations of the people and organize the necessary action to realise their victory. It is with the overthrow of the power of the monopolists, and, not by a plebiscitaire referendum that the great historical changes of our society can take place."

A tract of the Committee of Action reacted thus to the declaration of referendum:[12] To break our movement of ten million workers on strike which threatens to overthrow the Gaullist power, it has ordered re-election of the parliament as the only response to the unsatisfied demands of the workers. In spite of the fact that the established political organizations of the left are playing in the hands of the political power by submitting themselves to the bourgeois legality, the majority of the workers and students have understood that the election will not resolve any problem. The power of the monopolists has taken a step back only because the movement has developed outside the parliament. The parliament is only a tool of the bourgeoisie which makes use of it whenever it needs it. It is not a tool of the workers. For the workers, the only means is a struggle of the masses and the general strike. For the workers and the students, the election is a farce. The bourgeoisie will never lose power in the ballot box. It can be snatched only in the factories and in the streets.

The referendum proved that these young revolutionaries were right in declaring the futility of the elections. Whether they could generate a revolution in the streets in May `68 is another question which can never be answered. The revolution was lost but the revolutionary process continues. There have been several elections since and the bourgeoisie continues to flourish.

As the French Revolution of 1789 absorbed a new class of French bourgeoisie in the echelons of the privileged hierarchy, with May `68, France has accepted the aspirations of the emerging new class generated by the growth of neo-capitalism. Violence achieved its limited objective. Dialogue and participation are the key words of every establishment. The University has achieved a certain amount of autonomy. There are more posts of professors. The researchers and young students have considerable role to play in the organization of the university affairs. Of course, this is mostly true of the lower levels of education. The Cours

Magistral, however, continues at the Ecoles des Hautes Etudes and the Collège de France. The changes have taken place but they are in the general French tradition. There is no substitute for the selections to the grandes ecoles, and, the professors have to work hard to stay in the front line as leaders of thought. The myth of the great professor and the good student continues. The chairs continue and the notions of university departments have been discarded as American, and consequently, anti-national. Some twenty professors of the Collège de France, the living gods of higher education, still have absolute freedom to discourse on whatever they like without any restraint whatsoever of examinations or syllabus. The only control as ever is intellectual. The French society is a prisoner of the ideas of intellectual liberty perpetuated by Abélard, Descartes, Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot and their followers. This existential shell can never be broken.

V

The extent of the upheavals of the events of May '68 can be explained only in terms of the nature of the French society which is the most controlled hierarchy in the western world. The French polity and the French University correspond to each other in their function and the vicious circle of its immobility. Monopoly is the first law of this institutionalised system. It does not tolerate even the least competition. This explains the concept of one professor per discipline. This monopoly leads to the Cours Magistral, the obligatory discourse where the audience is captive, and, the refusal of all criticism of authority and influence in the administration of the university.

The intellectual style, argues Michel Crozier, that is closely related to this model of organization plays a considerable role in reinforcing its foundations. Clarity, coherence, formal rigour, abstract and deductive mode of reasoning—all these very French qualities are the expressions of the mode of its organization as well as that of its existence. Centralisation requires a uniform and standardised universe. Formalism is necessary for the bureaucratic order. Abstract and deductive reasoning ensures its protection against the external world.

The university teaching is based on the notions of the distance between the master and the disciple, and, the great intellectual power of the professor who unfolds the truth. The negative reaction which is its consequence and the distance to protect both the teacher and the taught follow from this system.

The Cours Magistral is the symbol of this relation and, at the same time, the expression of the didactic style of intellectual act. It is a vicious circle of passivity and opposition.

The mode of relation with the rest of the society is based on the primacy of selections as the primary function of education. Its social mission is to realise with rigour the traditional social hierarchy while pretending to give absolute equality for the most prestigious social professions. The primacy of the function of selection ensures the power of the system which is open and closed at the same time. The mechanism of political power keeps a little door open to all, and, shuts it back as soon as an outsider joins the privileged class. The class

apparatus regulates itself. Such a system is absolutely insensitive to any change, and, the only way to introduce any transformation within it is the way of total crisis.

The main crisis of May '68 had to be total and it had to aim at total and complete transformation, for all the elements of French culture were interdependent, and, whether it was a question of the Cours Magistral or of human relations or the content of the cultural message or the system of organisation or the selection of the students, they were all totally integrated in the system, and, could not alter one element without inviting a catastrophy of the entire social order. The French system can be changed only by means of a major crisis. The crisis, however, is always a temporary rupture, it never destroys the system. It is like an entracte or an interval. As the period of confusion disappears, the old order comes back with the necessary adjustment.

In a system of this extreme centralisation and the Cours Magistral, there is absolutely no communication between the one who talks and the other who listens. To break this absolute and total non-communication where silence reigns, one has to restore to anti-discourse and direct democracy of total speech. This process is just the reverse of the Discours Magistral. It is matched by the Anti-discours Magistral. The students occupy the place of the Discours, the Sorbonne, and, engage in total parole without any fear of any contradiction. But this violent discourse cannot lead to a dialogue. Once the aggression was committed, the government simply withdrew. The political power never negotiated with the students, it simply accepted all.

The problem of general culture was also seen in the same context of French tradition. The Sorbonne remained for centuries the temple of classicism with emphasis on literature, mathematics and philosophy. This general culture became completely inadequate for the modern world, but all those who proposed reforms did not understand the aspirations of the French students and the intellectual layers of the French society. All the propositions called for specialisations. The alternative thus was between the classical formalist culture and extreme specialisation. Both the alternatives were rejected. Professionalism was excluded. The role of the University was the transmission of total culture which keeps abreast of the contemporary movements of thought in the various branches of knowledge.[13]

The general culture is no more a useless luxury reserved only for a minority of the aristocrats and few marginal creative artists or writers. It has become an essential means of action in a rational world which can be controlled only through the use of these modes of reasoning.

The modern French reformers fascinated by the immediate needs of civilization, argues Crozier, contest the classical French culture without proposing anything in its place.[14] Anglo-saxon specialisation is not the answer. Grandes Ecoles are producing all the professionals, but modern man needs the intellectual tool much more than in old days as the modern world is more complicated, more international with all the intellectual interaction of ideas coming from all branches of knowledge and from different intellectual traditions. The classical culture has to be transformed.

This revolution of total culture and total knowledge with the University as its main source involved a new class of students. It was largely a revolt of the petite bourgeoisie aspiring to join the ranks of the privileged class just as the new bourgeoisie began the upheavals of 1789. One of the main reasons of the current events in the Punjab is also the rise of a new class. The Sikh peasantry with its newly acquired economic prosperity – through green revolution, through immigrant money, and through smuggling – has upset the political, cultural and educational structures of the Punjabi society. One has only to compare the class composition of all the political parties in the Punjab – the Akalis, the Communists and the Congress-I to see this transformation. Since the ambitions are great and the generative process is slow, there is violence, but violence and desire are psychic correlates.

In France, the contestation had to take place amongst the groups whose entry to all promotions and privileged spheres of culture was blocked. There is a system of competition in all countries but the severity of this merciless system of concours in France is unparalleled. The students revolution thus had a profound impact on the French society as a whole as the parents of the competitors were equally involved in this struggle.

It has been argued that the university revolt was a symptom and a result of the way the youth radically questioned the values of the modern industrialised society, or even modern western civilization as a whole. André Malraux, from his ivory tower of the Ministry of Culture, called it the crisis of civilization. Raymond Aron[15] called it the problem of the isolated provincial French students in the big city of Paris. For him, it was simply a problem of the alienated youth. How naive and simplistic can one be when one reaches the higher levels of establishment! There was also the paternalistic attitude of the leaders of the Communist Party who preferred the nice bourgeois habit of going to the ballot box in clean Sunday suits.

When the black Americans burnt Detroit, President Kennedy proposed the installation of swimming pools in the black ghettos to satisfy their frustrations. Marie Antoinette had asked for the distribution of cakes as the demand for bread of the hungry Parisians could not be met. General de Gaulle also talked of the crisis of French boys who put their feet on the tables, and, of the girls who come home late in the evening. The French youth laughed, but the General won, for the youth had no votes, and the parents took the advice of the General seriously.

The crisis of May found in the University a significance and a function, argues Olivier Burgelin.[16] This does not mean that it did not involve what was around and outside the university.

It does not imply even that the ideological models did not have a role to play, but all these conceptual propositions were crystallized only within the framework of the revolutionary activity of the students. The University was not an autonomous entity. It had its external rapports. There could not have been any university revolt without the mental extensions which covered all French intellectual and political history, but all this had to have a centre, a focus. It was provided by the intense intellectual pressure to which the students are subjected every day. The reaction was both violent and deductively logical in the true French tradition.

A new scientific culture was proposed in the place of the old order, and, this is where precisely lies the main significance of the Revolution of May `68.

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MYTHICO-LITERARY
DISCOURSE

The Semiotic Universe of Flaubert's Saint Julien

1. Introduction

In the beginning of the twelfth century Pierre Abélard commented upon the creative process in terms of *sensus, imaginatio* and *intellectus*. The point of departure is an empirical sensuous experience which is transformed into a mental image due to a certain distanciation in time and space. This mental reconstitution of the earlier experience is motivated by a specific desire or a state of mind. It is a conscious act which is controlled by intellection or the logic of the architechtonic structure of the articulated discourse that follows.

We have a real experience of a given hunger or pain, love or hatred. Then after a lapse of time, in another existential situation, we reflect upon that experience. We reconstitute it with certain modifications, altering the central elements of the experience into peripheral and vice versa. This reconstituted image acquires certain semiotic significance due to its evocative charge. The empirical experience is transformed into a sign. It is no more an exact transposition of the initial experience. It is now a highly charged semiotic composition that *triggers a psychic upheaval within and a physical outburst in the external world.* If this imaginative reconstruction is not to be followed by an articulated discourse, it remains passive. It is only a recollection. It is another experience, only now it is at the level of imagination.

The constitution of discourse which is the primary concern of Abélard inflects this imaginative reconstruction with an entirely different type of motivation. As this mental image is the object of *intellection,* it acquires, in the very *process of its prospection* a certain *order of presentation* and a certain *structure of signification.*

This is how Gustave Flaubert as a child sees the narrative of Saint Julien inscribed on the stained-glass windows of the Cathedral in his native Rouen. This is his first sensuous experience. He reflects upon it and reconstitutes, after a considerable lapse of time, the earlier basic images into an elaborate discourse. The images are altered, enlarged, new linkages are introduced, new prospections are presented. Without changing the elementary sequences of the engraved narrative, Flaubert inflicts a serious *ideological transformation* on the whole discourse. Let us follow the *creative process* of its new *architechtonic structure.*

Paper presented at the Semiotics Reunion, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 1985.

The first problematics of any discourse is that of its presentation, the *linearity* or its *logical progression*. Now this linearity in its linguistic, syntactic manifestation has a deceptive simplicity. In its *ideological composition*, it is a highly complex phenomenon. Every discourse must have a beginning but as there are infinite ways one can begin, this beginning acquires semiotic significance. In its syntactic order, one sequence follows another, and there is a certain interdependence. The preceding sequence determines to some extent the progression and the significance of the one that follows. So the creative artist has both the *freedom* to choose and a certain *constraint* which becomes more and more serious as the discourse progresses.

The narrative structure has to follow the obligatory linguistic linearity but *ideologically* it progresses more like the weaving of a carpet. In the beginning a number of strands – characters, events, sequences – are introduced which while being syntactically integrated in the linguistic chain serve more as interlinkages with events or sequences to appear later. And, just like the carpet structure, some forms acquire manifest contours early, some over a stretch of time and space. Then there are *flash forwards* such as astrological predictions whose function is to *superpose* information that is considered to be necessary for the general comprehension of the discourse. As such while the syntactic order gives the illusion of a linear progression, ideologically it is a movement of a *series of superimposed signifying contours*. As we follow the sequential order, we keep on mentally correlating the conceptual oppositions and we *reconstitute* our own mental images. The creative artist is thus forced on the one hand, to constitute the linguistic linearity, and on the other, he must have an over-view of the whole discourse if he wants to put the right pieces in the right places of the jigsaw puzzle that his discourse is going to be. If Flaubert wants to present a certain conceptualisation of the Being of Julien, he has to introduce very early a Julien killing a mouse or a pigeon and establish his specific relationship with the animal world, with the world of violence and solitude. The constitution of the second hunt not to be acquired significance only if the first hunt is carried to its extreme conclusion. Julien's relation with the rugged, violent nature must follow a certain evolutionary process from the very beginning of the narrative.

A narrative thus has two orders of consecution: the linear syntactic order and the superimposed semantic order. From the point of view of the reader, the first order is *semiotic* where the discourse is revealed to him in a specific progression. After the first reading, after having acquires an over-view of the whole discourse with the successive readings where he correlates signifiers across sequential constraints, the reader enters into the *semiologic* order of the text, the immanent order of the discourse. This order is immanent, for the signifying correlations are not so manifest or are not so obvious. The reader has to follow his own *archaeological* research and reconstitute linkages whose logic is only semiologic. It is at this level of understanding that several readings of the text are possible.

The semiologic level is primarily a psychic level. It is only in this domain of imaginative reconstruction advocated by Pierre Abélard eight hundred years ago that we begin to comprehend the psychic contours, where words, gestures, events acquire the status of highly charged semiotic signs, where nothing is understood literally. This is where, in Abelardian terms, words and objects are correlated only through the third dimension of ideas, or etymologically speaking, through "images", which do not represent a given reality, but which evoke a certain *crystallisation* of the initial experience. It is thus in the semiologic domain that we follow *the becoming of the being*.

From the semiotic and the semiologic orders we go to the domain of *mediation*. No text is created in a void. A literary discourse is necessarily constituted as a reaction to the prevalent ideological and literary forms. The legend of Saint Julien historically belongs to the Middle Ages but for Flaubert it was presented in a specific form on the stained-glass windows of his native Rouen. The ideological world of the post-revolutionary France in the middle of the nineteenth century belonged to a different cosmology. The reconstitution of this legend by Flaubert at this juncture of French ideology, and at a specific juncture of his personal biographical conceptualisation could not possibly escape a certain *phenomenological crystallisation*. In our study of Saint Julien, a comparison is made not only with the Rouen version but also with the Oedipus myth and with a legend from India to see how even across *typological* differences there are thematic universals. The discourse is thus presented not only in its historical mediatory role but also in its global context as a *cosmological thematic configuration*.

Our analysis begins with the *Semiotic order* where the discourse of Saint Julien is presented in its linear progression. The entire text is divided into a number of signifying ensembles with further divisions into sub and micro ensembles. These signifying units revolve around a proposition in *comprehension*, a proposition which includes a complete, independent idea, supported by a number of complementary or qualificatory propositions, or propositions in *extension. The progression of propositions and the units of signification are interlinked with pre-fixes, infixes and suffixes or the ideogrammes which while being perfectly integrated in the syntactic chain, continue to superimpose the signifying contours on the linear progression.* The proper identification of such ideogrammes helps us understand the criss-crossing semiological structure of the discourse.

The following section deals with the *Semiologic order* of the discourse where the text is subjected to three thematic prospections : nature and culture; the palace and the hut; the gift of death and the gift of life. We take one thematic configuration at a time and follow its architechtonic structuration throughout the text establishing *semiologic relationships across syntactic constraints*. This analysis reconstitutes the text following a certain reading of the discourse. This is the proper *archaeological* approach where new interlinkages are established, where new signifying contours are revealed.

The presentation of this analysis gives at times the impression of a certain repetition but it must be noted that in each prospection, the elements which constitute specific images do not play the same signifying role, hence semiologically, they are not the *same signs*.

The next section on *Mediation* follows the logical progression of the becoming of the being of Julien or what may be called Julien's *psychic path*, revealed by the semiotic and the semiologic orders of the discourse. We realise that contrary to what has been the practice in literary critique until now, Julien should be compared with *Oedipus at Colonus* and not with *Oedipus the King*. After this preliminary rectification of the myth of Oedipus, we trace the creative transformation that Flaubert inflicted on the Julien narrative of the stained-glass windows of the Cathedral at Rouen. It is then followed by a typological comparison with the legend of Puran from India. Thus, this section deals with *historical progression* in the creative process and also penetrates into the cosmological conceptualisation across time and space and across cultures, achieving indirectly a *certain universality of the Becoming of the Being.*

2. The Semiotic Order

2.0. *The Narrative*

The narrative of Julien is divided into three sections.

The first section describes the birth of Julien in a feudal household. There are predictions about his becoming a saint in a dream to his mother, and the glory of an emperor, to his father.

As Julien grows up, he is given the training of a prince hunter but he likes to go to the woods all alone without the royal paraphernalia. In one of these solitary hunts, he kills a large number of animals. Finally, he shoots a stag family, the child, the mother and the big black stag with sixteen antlers. Before dying this archetype stag curses Julien with the words that one day he will kill his father and mother.

In the second section Julien leaves his palace and becomes a mercenary. He helps a Christian king against an infidel chief. After the successful battle, the grateful king gives Julien his daughter in marriage and a palace to live in. Julien stops hunting but he is always obsessed by the curse of the stag. One evening he perceives the shadows of some wild animals and he is unable to resist the temptation. He goes in search of the beasts and then begins the second hunt of his life, the hunt not to be. As opposed to the first hunt where he could massacre beasts with extreme facility, he is not able to kill even one of the beasts now who ridicule him. Exhausted and exasperated, Julien returns home.

Meanwhile Julien's parents arrive at the castle. As the princess wife of Julien recognizes them to be his parents, she entertains them and gives them her bed to sleep in.

When Julien advances towards the chamber of the princess, he perceives in the darkness that someone is sleeping with his wife. Furious, he kills both of his parents. And, not being able to bear the magnitude of the tragedy, Julien leaves this second palace.

In the third section Julien wanders around as a beggar and finally, rejected by all humanity, settles down in a deserted place. He builds himself a little hut and a boat with which he helps travellers cross the vast and dangerous river. Julien is shown here as suffering from hunger and thirst and heat and cold.

One evening he hears someone calling him from the other bank of the river. Julien takes his boat and arrives at the spot. He sees a hideous leper waiting to be taken across. Julien brings him to his hut and offers him bread and wine and his bed of leaves. The leper is shivering and wants the warmth of Julien's body. Julien obliges and lies naked besides this most repulsive human being. When their lips touch and their bodies are interlaced, the roof gives way and Julien rises to the heavens to be received there by Lord Jesus Christ.

2.1. The First Sequence

In this section an attempt is made to represent the outline of the syntagmatic structure of the discourse. The semiologic contours of these ensembles and subensembles of signifying units will be discussed in the following section.

The first sequence is divided into seven signifying ensembles: 1, 2, 3 ...

The first signifying ensemble is further divided into four images or subensembles : a, b, c, d ...

The subensemble, a, begins with a *comprehensive* proposition, *1 a m* where in a sentence is described the residence of the parents of Julien, a palace situated in the woods, on a slope of a hill.

The following two paragraphs, *1 a n*, describe the surroundings and the composition of this palace. These two images of the four towers, and the fountains in the garden are images in *extension*.

So is the paragraph *1 a o*, which describes the adjuncts of kennel, stable, bakery, wine-press and barn, the *partial* signifiers of "self-sufficiency" of the household of the parents of Julien. This unit is also a micro ensemble in extension.

The next paragraph is a single unit subensemble, a complete proposition about the prevalent "peace" at the castle, a peace, which of course will be disturbed soon. This subensemble is an *infix*, a proposition in *comprehension* for the next subensemble continues the description of the castle, began in the first two units.

The micro ensemble, *1 c m*, is about the interior decoration of the castle, hence, a proposition in extension. On the other hand, *1 c n*, refers to the ancient arms of the family. It is again an infix, which will be taken up later in Julien's conquests as a mercenary in the second sequence. This unit gives the impression of an extension in continuation of the earlier description. However, it is a proposition in comprehension, extended only paradigmatically.

The micro ensemble *l c o*, begins with the description of the cuisine of the castle, but immediately following there is a Roman hot bath room, which Julien's father does not make use of, for he considers it to be a pagan custom of the idol worshippers. This is an important signifying unit as it opposes the Christian ethos to be followed later. As the narrative moves along, the micro ensembles not only form an integral part of the subensemble they are members of, some of them act also as infixes to be interrelated and integrated later. The comprehension of this metonymic structure is thus over-shadowed by the unity of the whole.

The subensemble, *d*, has two paragraphic propositions, one about the father of Julien, *l d m*, and the other, *l d n*, gives a description of his mother's piety and organisational work in the feudal household. The last sentence of this unit, due to the prayers to the Lord, "a son *came* to her", is a proposition in *disjunction*. It is *conclusive*, and *includes* the previous signifying micro units. It heralds the "threshold" of the dynamicity of the discourse.

2.2 The second signifying ensemble has two subensembles, *a* and *b*. The subensemble, *a*, has four micro ensembles.

The micro ensemble, *2 a m*, introduces the unit of festivities at the birth of Julien. It is a proposition in comprehension.

The micro ensembles, *2 a n*, and *2 a o*, introduce the futuristic predictions. Julien's mother dreams of an old man who predicts that her son would be a saint, and a Bohemian tells his father, *2 a o*, that his son's future shows lots of blood, glory and a family of an emperor. These two micro ensembles are infixes, integrated in the syntagmatic progression only as flash-forwards.

The function of predictions in a narrative is to allow the *whole* and the *parts* run in a parallel stream. These *flash-forwards* as opposed to the usual flash-backs reveal the conclusions in advance to superimpose the level of metaphoric comprehension on the syntagmatic denouement of the discourse. The last micro ensemble, *2 a p*, where little Julien is shown to resemble the little Jesus is an extension of *2 a n*.

In the subensemble, *2 b*, there are five micro ensembles, where the child Julien receives education and training for a career already predicted. Thus, considering the units of predictions, these propositions are in extension. However, they also lead to further flash-forwards, and hence can be considered as comprehensive infixes. *2 b m* refers to Julien's becoming courageous and learning to ride a horse. In *2 b n*, he acquires scholastic learning, reading, writing and painting. *2 b o* and *2 b p* carry forward these propositions with tales of adventure and bravery, but in *2 b q*, he is shown as a very religious child, his mother dreaming of Julien, the Archbishop.

2.3 In the third subensemble the narrative-discourse continues to spread its network by integrating new strands of significance. It has two main micro ensembles. We follow here

Julien's existential progress. The shadow of parents is already gone from the instincts of the child. In *3 m*, he watches a mouse in the church which *disturbs* him. He is *possessed with hatred* towards her, and at the first opportunity kills the little animal with a stick. The event *interiorizes the crime*, for Julien never recounts the scene of the blood oozing out of the little body of the mouse. The micro ensemble *3 n* is an extension of *3 m*, where he kills a pigeon, but the significant element of the discourse is that the *persistence* of life in the pigeon *irritated* the child. He strangled the bird and his heart was full of *savage and tumultuous pleasure*.

With this subensemble, we move very rapidly to the kernel of the discourse but in the syntagmatic progression there will still be several infixes. The actantial model of Propp, or even in modified form of Greimas does not take account of the simultaneous signifying strands of the narrative. *A narrative always begins with the introduction of multiple layers of a semiotic structure, which, in the unity of the whole, act both independently and in conjunctive integration with each other. The discourse structure is a network of strands, and, not just a linear progression of events.*

2.4. In the fourth subensemble, the father of Julien decides to give his son the training of a hunter. The very first micro ensemble introduces the setting up of nets, training of dogs, and the recognition of the beasts and the birds of the jungle, who will be hunted by Julien, and will acquire a semiotic significance of his passion for killing, whose first indication we had in the third subensemble. Existentially, the third subensemble is not at all related with the fourth, for in these training exercises, we do not see the reactions of Julien as an individual. Hence, the third subensemble is an *infix*, a strand to be integrated later. The fourth subensemble is another strand. It is not an extension. The micro ensembles, *4 b and 4 c*, are units of significance in extension. The elements of danger, violence, and undaunted courage of the furious looking hunting dogs and the perilous terrain of the jungle (the scenes will acquire existential significance later) are introduced in *4 b*. In *4 c*, the description is extended to the falcons of Babylone, the legendary places of great cold and heat. But all this is within control and highly disciplined. The fourth subensemble, as such, is only a precursor to what is not to be, and, at the same time, the environment and the setting for the wild adventures of Julien. Thus, this ensemble is both a complete unit of significance in itself, and, very indirectly, introduces a conceptual opposition, a threshold to be *transgressed*. It is like the infix *1 b* of *peace*, in the first subensemble, which was only marginally integrated in the first unit of significance.

2.5 The existential continuation of the third subensemble is located in the fifth unit. The first sentence is a proposition in *comprehension* and *disjunction* when it states that Julien did not bother about all these artifices, and, preferred to hunt *far from the world* with his horse and his falcon.

The signifier "far" is a complete signifier. The world of Julien's parents, the castle, the learning, the hunting techniques of royal expeditions did not exist for Julien. His world was *far* from that world. With this proposition, all the static propositon, of physical and cultural descriptions have been reduced to partial signifiers. Only the infixes of "peace" that is not to be, and the desire to kill remain directly related to the narrative.

The unit *5 b* introduces the micro ensembles of jungles and hills, the forlorn places, the merciless killing and the terrifying last moments of the dying stag. Already a *stag,* the key semiotic unit for the rest of the discourse.

In *5 c,* we are introduced to the real Julien, who follows the beasts to the most out of the way places, under the blazing sun, rain and storm, drinks water from the springs, eats wild fruits. He returns home, covered with blood and mud, full of thorns in his hair, and smelling the odour of the ferocious beasts. The discourse sums up this state in one comprehensive proposition: He *becomes* like them. There is a complete identity between the wild beasts and Julien, both physically and existentially. His passion, his violence, his wild hunts, have no specific purpose. They are not at all hunts in the ordinary sense of the term, hence all the training and discipline imparted by his father in the fourth subensemble are of no direct consequence. They acquire significance only in *opposition*, in what is "not to be." As such, some ensembles refer to what will follow, and others to what will not. The syntagmatic progression follows the two simultaneous processes of *conjunction* and *disjunction*.

2.6 The sixth signifying ensemble represents the first great hunt whose conceptually opposing hunt, the unrealised hunt, occurs in the second sequence, with a number of intervening subensembles. This unit could be divided into six subensembles, *a b c d e f,* all highly semiotically charged.

In *6 m a,* Julien leaves his castle one morning with a bow and arrows on his shoulder, a proposition in comprehension. The next paragraph describes his great Danish dog following with heavy footsteps. The atmosphere is *cold* and *violent.* The nature of the hunt is immediately announced when his dogs break the necks of the jumping hares, and, when more significantly, in *6 n a,* Julien cuts the two wings of a sleeping bird, and, *without picking* it continues his route. The *absurdity* of the acts of violence is writ large on the whole canvas of the discourse.

The subensemble *b,* leads us to the abyss of helplessness. In *6 m b,* Julien confronts a high mountain from where the sky looked *black.* On the other side, down the precipice, he notices two wild goats. Julien kills one of them. The second terrified, slips down, Julien follows, and, "falls flat with two hands wide spread" on the *corpse* of the other. What a macabre scene!. The micro ensemble *6 n b* is an extension of the preceding when he shoots down two cranes. Julien continues his wild goose chase, and arrives at a large lake, in the middle of which he sees a beast that he "did not know". Not knowing a beast of jungle is an extremely significant element in the constitution of Julien, the hunter.

The hunt is absurd, in a far away world, on the mountain, in the depths of the abyss, helpless and macabre, and, even beyond Julien's knowledge; his understanding of the world of the wild beasts, with whom he resembles so much, is challenged. Julien, a beast himself, does not know all his kins.

In the following subensemble *6 c*, the hunt takes a fantasmatic surrealistic turn. Julien enters an avenue of trees forming a triumphal arch. He watches the emergence of an "infinity" of animals and birds, deers, boars, goats, peacocks, pale-cats, hedgehogs etc., all jumping before him. He begins to shoot. The animals look at Julien with "eyes full of humility and supplication", but he continues to shoot. He is "not tired" of killing. This surrealistic massacre is accomplished with the *ease of a dream*. The second hunt will be conceptually just the opposite of this facility. This internal relationship is in a *crisscrossed* opposition.

From the point of view of the constituting process of the discourse, this first great hunt could not have been conceived without a corresponding *foreknowledge* of the second hunt. The syntagmatic progression follows the dictates of the unity of the whole of the discourse.

The unit, *6 d*, is an extension of *6 c*. The hope of such a carnage *suffocates Julien with pleasure*. He descends from his horse, pulls up his sleeves, and begins to shoot. With the flash of the first arrow, all the stags turn their heads and begin to run, but as the walls of the hills are too high, they are forced back, and, Julien continues to shoot. The furious stags fight with each other, and, their corpses make heaps of flesh under the *storm of the arrows*. Finally, they all die with saliva in their nostrils and the entrails bulging out. Then, everything is *immobile*. The proposition of immobility opposes the great tumultuous movement before the hunt but conceptually the combination of these two "ideas" leads to the third, the extreme tempest within Julien which is going to burst forth in a moment.

The fifth subensemble, *e*, opens with the scene of the *enormity of the massacre*, and *Julien not understanding how he could do it*. The signifying field is transparent. What Julien did was beyond his understanding and prowess.

It was a *super-beastly* act as opposed to normal *superhuman* activity. Julien a beast outdid even the beasts. The beast in him knew no limits. This proposition is a judgement in comprehension.

With *6 n e*, we are led to another image, the final scene of this great fantasmatic hunt, where Julien sees a stag family, father, mother and the child. The image, *6 o e*, presents Julien shooting down both the fawn and the hind whose shrieking, human voice is her last breath. This is a proposition in extension.

The image, *6 p e*, is a continuation of the earlier proposition. Here it is the big black stag with sixteen antlers who *sees* this massacre and jumps towards Julien, who, plants a sharp arrow in its forehead. The great stag *does not seem* to feel it. It *advances* towards Julien, who *retraces* his steps in an *ineffable* condition. The prodigious animal stop s, and, with *blazing eyes*, solemn like a patriarch repeats thrice: Accursed, Accursed, Accursed, one day you will assassinate your father and mother.

A horrible prediction, another semiotic device to supreimpose the semantic layer of comprehension on the linear progression of the narrative discourse, a complete interiorization of the following external events. Now, the manifest and the immanent movements will blend to arrive at the *third* unity of the discourse. In the hunting exercises, Julien had become *like* the beasts, but in 6 *q e*, he *surpasses* the beasts. It is no more a question of resemblance. This identity has been *transformed* into a *sur-beast*, within a surrealistic transformation, where *even a beast* curses the *beast within* Julien. The prodigious black stag with sixteen antlers, the archetype beast, transformed into a being who is deeply hurt, curses a prince, whose kindred beast within is not recognised. The human/beast conceptual opposition is reversed through the mediatory process of first establishing a sympathetic identity, followed by the crossing of the threshold of absolute absurdity, an absurdity not recognised even by the beasts.

The subensemble, *f,* administers another conversion. The cursing stag goes down on his knees, closes his eyes, and dies. But what this proposition, the Cartesian judgement, does not say is that while the stag dies, Julien *lives*. The curse is thus *irretrievable*. The one who is hurt is no more. The one who is responsible must now face his beast within. The *suffocating pleasure* of the possibility of a carnage must now be transformed into a *permanent psychic wound*, suffering not only from the pain of what has been done, but what might happen.

Julien is stupefied. He is overcome by a sudden fatigue and disgust. The head covered with his hands, he weeps for a long time. His horse was *lost*, his dogs had *abandoned* him, an immense *solitude* threatened him with *indefinite catastrophies*, a proposition in comprehension of an irreversible judgement, a *complete idea*.

2.6.a. *It can now be demonstrated at this stage of the syntagmatic analysis that each proposition is an extension, exactly in the same manner as the concept of attribute is taken with reference to subject, or what may be called the basic semanteme or kernel idea or image, beginning with the palace and peace in the first signifying ensemble to most of these semantemes in the unit just referred to, like abandoned, lost, solitude etc. It is thus a series of kernel semantemes around which propositions are composed in extension, which are the main pulsational forces for transforming one given existential situation into another. These kernel semantemes are conceptual images or signs, and the extended propositions play only explicatory role.*

2.7 . The seventh signifying ensemble has eight subensembles.

In *7 a,* we witness the tormented Julien who cannot sleep, who always *sees* the great black stag. Its prediction obsessed him. Julien obviously thinks that this cannot happen, but the kernel semanteme is included in the proposition: but if I did *want* it... and he was *afraid* that the *devil* may not *inspire* him to act. This terrible psychic compulsion inspired by Devil is *beyond* Julien's usual being.

The unit *7 b*, shows Julien's mother and father in *anguish* and *agitation* who pray for his health and try all kinds of medicinal remedies. The kernel semanteme here however is Julien's denial of any *desire* for love. This is one compulsion that Julien never submits himself to.

When Julien physically recovers from this shock, *7 c*, he *abstains* from hunting. His father is happy that Julien begins to walk around, and he gives him as a gift, a big Sarrasine sword, which was kept in an attic. Julien climbs to bring it down, the heavy sword *slips* through his hands and narrowly *escapes hitting his father.* Julien *thought*, he may have *killed* his father, and, fainted.

He was henceforth afraid of all arms, *7 d*, and the very sight of iron made him *pale*. But this "weakness" was a desolation for his family.

The old monk, Julien's master, invokes the *honour* of his ancesters, 7 f, and asks him to begin the exercise of arms like a *nobleman*. Julien tries his hand at the javelin and soon excels as a marksman, *7 g*.

And again he is in trouble. One evening, *7 h*, he perceives a bird with two white feathres, in his garden. Julien throws his javelin which hits the white spot. A shrieking cry resounds. It was Julien's *mother.* The javelin had hit her white hat. Julien *fled* from the palace never to return.

2.7.a. With this presentation of the seven signifying ensembles, we complete the first sequence of the narrative. Before a similar treatment of the second sequence is attempted, it would be fruitful to give a summary of the kernel semantemes whose propositional extensions are responsible for the syntagmatic progression of the narrative discourse.

1 a	:	Palace (self sufficiency)
1 b	:	Peace (which will be disturbed later)
1 c	:	Palace (the ancestral arms)
1 d m	:	Julien's father (adventures)
1 d n	:	Julien's mother (piety and discipline)
2 a m	:	The festivities at Julien's "arrival".
2 a n	:	The vision of Julien's mother (your son would be a saint)
2 a o	:	The vision of Julien's father (your son will have glory, bloodshed, life of an emperor).
2 a p	:	Julien resembles baby Jesus.
2 b m	:	Training of a hunter and a fighter.
2 b p	:	Julien's father sees in his son a great conqueror, and his mother, an archeveque.
3 m	:	Julien kills a mouse.
3 n	:	Julien kills a pigeon (the "persistence" of life in the bird "irritates" Julien).

4 a b c :	Julien learns the art of hunting.
5 a :	But Julien likes to hunt "far from the world".
5 b c :	Julien follows the savage lands; covered with mud and thorns of the jungle, he "becomes like them" (the beasts).
6 a m n :	The great hunt begins: Julien kills a cock with the reverse of his sword, and, "without picking it" continues his route (the absurdity of the hunt).
6 b m :	Julien "falls on the corpse" of a beast.
6 b o :	Julien sees a beast that he (the great hunter) "did not know".
6 c :	Julien is "not tired" of killing; he accomplishes this massacre with the "ease of a dream".
6 d :	The hope of such a carnage "suffocates him with pleasure"; the stags die with "saliva in their nostrils, the intestines bulging out, the stomachs squeezing"; "finally all was immobile".
6 e m :	Julien contemplated on the enormity of the massacre; "not understanding how he could do it".
6 e n o p:	Julien kills the stag family.
6 e q :	The big black stag with sixteen antlers curses Julien: one day you will assassinate your mother and father.
6 f :	Julien is "enveloped in solitude", "indefinite perils" threaten him.
7 a :	Julien is afraid, the Devil may not "inspire" him to kill his parents; he contemplates: maybe he wants it (a psychic compulsion, an autosuggestion already at work).
7 d :	He narrowly escapes killing his father with the sword that his father "gifted" him.
7 h :	He throws his javelin at a bird which turns out to be his mother's hat (the struggle within and the action without begin to crush Julien).

The Second Sequence

2.8. Julien leaves the palace and joins a troupe of *adventurers, 8 a.* In the infix *5 b c,* Julien had become like the beasts covered with blood, the odour of the beasts and thorns of the jungle in his hair. In *8 a,* he suffers hunger, thirst and fever. His skin acquires the tan of the sun and the savage winds, and his limbs harden with the contact of the arms. From one rugged identity to another, away from the leisure and peace of the palace, he becomes courageous and commands a regiment. Here the images of *sufferance* and *command* are interrelated, and together, they form a proposition in comprehension.

The description of Julien's exploits in numerous battles and acts of bravado in *8 b* is an extension of the proposition of *8 a.*

Many a time Julien was taken as dead, but he always *escaped due to divine grace, 8 c.* Obviously Julien must live to fulfil the visions of his parents and the curse of the stag. He *protected* the men of Church, the orphans, widows, and mainly, the *old.*

The protection of the first series correlates him with the predicted sainthood, and protecting the *old* is a proposition in extension of the curse in *6 e q*. This image is extended in *8 d*, where a single comprehensive proposition states that whenever he saw an old man or woman, he always wanted to know who they were, because he was *afraid* of killing by mistake. The kernel semanteme, *afraid*, is the immanent undercurrent of all other manifest syntagmatic interrelationships of the narrative discourse. The conceptual opposition here is fear/courage, both in simultaneity and in disjunction.

2.9. A number of runaway slaves, rebels, bastards without fortune, and all sorts of vagabonds join Julien, 9 a. Julien's search for *identity with the wild* continues; *5 b c, 8 a* and now *9 a*. All are interrelated across the syntagmatic chain. Julien composes an army of these *comrades in identity* and becomes *famous*, en route to *glory*, referring back to the infix of prediction to his father. All the kings and princes of far away lands of *Christendom* seek his help to fight against the *infidels*. The semantemes, glory and the fight for Christianity as the ingredients of sainthood, go together.

The subensembles, *9 c, d* and *e*, are propositions in extension, functioning as attributes to the proposition *9 b* in comprehension. But there are two strands of kernel semantemes evolving within one syntagmatic chain. The description of wild and exotic lands of Indians, Arabs, Negros, with savage habits and habitations, and the acts of bravery and help; the kings are saved from the infidels, the queens are released from prisons, the dragons are killed to save humanity.

Finally, he goes to help the besieged emperor of Occitany, and cuts off the head of the infidel Calif, *9 d* and *e*. The emperor gives Julien his daughter in marriage. He is charmed by the most beautiful princess, and at a *manifest level*, his long *chaste* life ends with another gift of a palace, *9 g*. From one palace to another, from one domain of peace to another restful place, which of course, is only an infix, a respite of no action, a place of *fear* and *reflection*, a dreadful place, leading to the other most desparate and frustrating hunt. The syntagmatic movement of the narrative discourse is still not sequential. The author continues to include new strands to be interrelated later, both with before and after. The transformational process of the discourse is both pulsational and crisscross which requires a continuous reference to past, present and future.

2.10. The tenth signifying ensemble represents the second palace in the narrative. The first palace was peaceful, where little prince Julien emerged in human *existence*. It was *immobile*, nothing had happened there for long. Julien's parents lived there in peace and plenty, and it took a number of ensembles to enter into the *tumultuous* life, Julien was going to lead. This second palace is also peaceful, rich, even richer than the earlier palace but Julien is already a highly disturbed being. This peace or respite is an interval, an infix, for reflection, for introspection and remorse. It is a halting place before the next avalanche, the next most disturbing event, the beginning of the fulfilment of the vision in the second ensemble, and the curse of the sixth ensemble, a crisscross of relations in the developing discourse.

We have the rich description of this palace of white marble, *10 a*, with high columns, decorated walls and mosaics in the courtyard. But it is known primarily for the *silence* that reigned there, the silence which is highly deceptive and which will soon be disturbed.

The second kernel semanteme refers to the fact that Julien did no more engage himself in war, *10 b*. This proposition is completed by the attributive semantemes of *rest* and *tranquillity.* But immediatley in 10 c, the existential situation is transformed. Julien *remembers* the good old days of his wild hunts, and he *wants* again to run in the desert, chasing gazells and ostriches, hide in the bamboo trees to surprise the leopards, traverse jungles full of rhinoceros, reach the most inaccessible mountains to aim at the eagles and to go to the oceans of ice to fight with the white bears. This image-sign, of *savage* hunts in the middle of the most peaceful palace of white marble, is a conceptual opposition which transforms tranquillity into extremely disturbed adventures.

The *memory* of and the *desire* for the wild hunts are followed in the extended proposition of *dreams, 10 d.* At times, Julien dreams of father Adam in his paradise, surrounded by all the beasts, from lions to elephants, entering the Arch of Noha.

Julien *refuses* all invitations to hunt by the neighbouring princes, for he *believes* that with this *penitence,* this *abstinence,* he may avoid the *misfortune,* as the destiny of his parents depended on the *murder of the animals.* He *suffers* for not being able to *see* them, and, this desire becomes *intolerable, 10 e.* The kernel semanteme is the last proposition, the preceding are extensions in prefixes.

His wife was worried. She tries to distract him with dancers and musicians, with her charm and grace, but Julien shows no *desire, 10 f.* There is not even a hint of Julien's desire for sex or feminine relation. This is very important for there have been attempts at comparing this narrative with that of Oedipus. The psychic pulsational desire is a persistent thrust for adventure and murder. Both dream and desire are correlated in this kernel semanteme, all others are partial signifiers, only attributes to the main subject.

Exasperated, Julien *confesses* his horrible secret to his wife, *10 g,* who tries to console him that his parents have probably already died, and in any case, since he *knows* it, why should he commit such a crime. Here the significant correlation is that of *foreknowledge* and the compulsions of tumultuous inner psychic layers, which obviously Julien's wife cannot understand, and, she advises him to go out to hunt to distract himself from such thoughts.

2.11. The eleventh signifying ensemble is the beginning of the second great hunt, after a repose of the second palace which is continued in the thirteenth ensemble with an infix in the twelfth. The same technique was used by the author in the first and the third ensembles.

Julien's wife had just gone to bed, and Julien was *praying* when he *hears* the footsteps of a fox, and *perceives* in the dark, the shadow of animals.

The semiotic relationship between *praying* and *perceiving* the shadows of the animals emerges from the psychic layers which lead to *temptation.* The proposition is now complete with the formation of an image that does not exist at the manifest level. The transformation

from praying to the massacre of the beasts is accomplished with the ease of psychic interpolation. Julien takes his bow and leaves. His wife is surprised. *It is to obey you,* says Julien. *I will be back at sunrise.* This *surprise* and this *obedience* deceives none. These two semantemes are a part of the same proposition-discourse, leading to Julien's wife's fear of a *fatal adventure*.

2.12. Before the second great hunt begins, a new strand to the narrative structure is added, a paradigmatic infix in the syntagmatic chain. An old man and a woman arrive at the palace, and, announce themselves to be Julien's parents. The princess serves them well. They are astonished and pleasantly surprised to see the magnificent palace, the predicted *glory of the emperor* son. They recount their *adventures* and their *sufferance* during the long search for their son. Everything related with Julien must be adventurous and full of hazards. The peace and tranquillity of the palace must be disturbed to establish any relationship with him. The hardships of the wild search are conceptually opposed to their images of beauty and piety. Julien's mother still has her long hair, and, his father with his tall figure and long beard, resembles a *statue of a church*.

The princess gives them her own bed, and, as they were tired, they sleep soundly. As in a number of earlier ensembles, the last semanteme is the kernel feature and the preceding semantemes act only in extension. At the same time, the semanteme, *her bed,* functions as an infix, a semiotic strand to be interlinked later after another non-sequential syntagmatic progression.

2.13. The second hunt began in the eleventh ensemble, is opposed to the first hunt of the sixth ensemble with which it is most directly related with a number of intermediate strands. In the sixth ensemble, Julien was able to accomplish the massacre with the ease of a *dream.* In the thirteenth signifying ensemble, we witness the great hunter, Julien, in extreme helplessness and absolute exasperation. The peace and education in the first palace had prepared Julien to acquire superhuman prowess. The reflection and introspection in the second palace had left Julien a completely shattered individual, where psychic compulsion related him with his former existential situation, but as he had already crossed the threshold of the most imaginable possible savagery, he was not destined to go beyond the laws of nature, he himself had contrived, for his extrovert behaviour.

As opposed to the thrust of his adventurous spirit and courage, Julien's very first steps in the second hunt are *nervous*. He *hesitates* to continue his search, *13 a.* The jungle is enveloped in *immense silence,* and, he does not *find* any of the beasts, he had just *perceived.* Opposed to the *reality* of the first hunt, we have here only the *perception,* the *illusion.* Opposed to the earlier clear vision, here Julien is confronted with *profound obscurity.*

After this nervousness, hesitation, silence and obscurity, suddenly there is movement. A black wild boar, *13 b,* passes before him. Julien tries to pull his bow, but the boar is already gone. Then he perceives a wolf. Julien shoots an arrow, the wolf stops, turns his head, and,

continues his route. He runs before Julien, keeping always the same distance. Each time Julien aims at him, he *escapes*.

Julien covers in this manner an *interminable* plain *13 c*, finally finding himself on a plateau dominating an *immense* space. There were *ruins*. Of and on, he walked on the *bones of the dead*. There were *crosses with a lamentable air*. Around the tombs emerging from obscure shadows, appear the hyenas. They advance towards Julien and when he draws his sword, they run in all directions. Julien follows their *lame* course, disappearing in the dust.

An hour later, Julien confronts, in a ravine, a furious bull *13 d*. He throws his lance which bursts as if *the animal was made of brass*. Julien closes his eyes waiting for his death. When he reopens his eyes, the bull *disappears*.

Julien was *ashamed* of his helplessness, *13 e*. A superior power *destroyed* his strength. To go back to his palace, he enters the woods. Suddenly, he sees more beasts: a panther, a serpent, a marten. *13 f*. There is a monstrous crow who *looks* at Julien, and here and there, everywhere, he sees large sparks. They are all *eyes* of the savage beasts *looking* at Julien, *13 g*. Julien tries to shoot them. His arrows *fall short of their targets*. He throws stones at them, *none of them reach the animals*. Julien is *furious*, he hurls insults at them, he fumes with rage, *13 h*. The beasts come close and make a narrow circle around him, *13 c*. Julien is in the middle, *frozen with terror, incapable of making the least movement*.

Julien tries to advance. The animals walk with him. The hyenas march in front of him, the wolf and the boar behind, the bull on his right, and the serpents on his left. And around them, are panthers, vipers, foxes, jackals, bears, *13 j*. Julien begins to run, the beasts run with him. They laugh at him, ridicule him. An irony pierces the atmosphere, *13 k*. The animals seem to contrive a plan of revenge. Julien closes his eyes and walks like a *blind* man. He is so helpless, he does not have the strength to cry for *grace*.

A cock's voice vibrates in the air. It is daybreak. He sees the towers of his palace. On the side of a field, he notices red patridges. He throws his coat over them like a net. When he takes it off, there is only one bird, *dead since long, and, withered, 13 l*.

This deception exasperated Julien more than anything else. His *thirst for carnage revived*, and for *the lack of the beasts*, he wanted to *massacre men, 13 m*.

As in the earlier signifying ensembles, these twelve subensembles with their kernel propositional elements, the partial signifiers, function as attributes to the last subject-proposition of exasperated . The preceding images serve only to crystallise the kernel semanteme of exasperation leading to the desire of massacring human beings. None of the twelve subensembles has an individual significance. They are like the solitary notes arranged in a certain order to reach a climax. Their individual lexematic significance is submerged in the wholistic signification of the ensemble whose comprehensive proposition is located in the thirteenth subensemble.

It completes the conceptual opposition with the first great hunt where Julien could kill with the facility that one has only in a *dream*. The second hunt is a *counterpart dream* of

absolute exasperation, leading to the most macabre act of Julien's life in the following signifying ensemble.

The architec:tonic structure of this signifying ensemble begins with *nervousness* and *hesitation*, immediately followed by immense *silence* and *obscurity*. When this extreme tranquillity is slightly disturbed by the *movement* of a boar, it lapses into missed target, leading Julien to an *interminable plain*. The image of silence and obscurity leads to tombstones, crosses and bones of the dead. There is silence, there is also *death*. But it is not the death caused by Julien's arrows. Even when he encounters life in the form of red patridges, he realizes that one of them was lying there dead since long. Julien is given no chance to transform life into death, his only human act, so overwhelming in the first hunt. The whole generative process is stopped. There is complete immobility. The brave and adventurous Julien is exhausted, afraid, and completely shaken. He moves from one dream to another, from one existential destabilisation to another. However, the transformational process is reversed in this sequence. After the first great hunt, the absolute massacre of the beasts of the jungle, there is sickness, there is disgust, and a terrible fear of a *known* act. The extremity of violence leads to a sequence of deceptive non-violence. Through this violence, Julien could *dominate* the world of the beasts, the only world he was interested in. In the second hunt, this domination is completely destroyed. On the other hand, when Julien crosses the threshold of this domination through violence, the *human being* within the big black stag hits the *beast* within Julien which pacifies him.

In the second hunt, the roles are reversed. This absolute desperation, this complete annihilation of violence to the beasts, leads Julien to the desire of violence elsewhere, in the realm of men. The world of the beasts, the real world of Julien, gives way to the world of men, the world he must encounter against his own will, but in full knowledge of its consequences.The most significant conceptual relation here is between *violence* and *knowledge*. Julien knows the beasts. He is himself a beast of the jungle, he *becomes* like them. He eats and smells like them. Even his reflection and introspection in the second palace force him to dream of the deserts and mountains in search of the wild beasts. Not even for a moment does he forget his kith and kin of the jungle, but when they, his own, the subjects of his realm, ridicule him, make fun of him, he turns inwards, and, commits the act, the crime, he *knows* since long, he would.

2.14. The generative process of the narrative continues. The next subensemble transforms exasperation into desire, which in turn, leads to jealousy and murder. This is the only situation where Julien's existential resolve is lost. This is the only moment in his life when he feels the urge to see his wife, a woman. He goes to her bed and bends over to *kiss* her, *a kiss of desire* and lust, a kiss that was never to be realised. The deception in the wild world of the beasts, his own world, had transformed him into a warm-hearted human being, a man with a desire for a woman, an inclination he had never shown before.

And, immediately this transformation had its logical thrust. When he realises, mistakenly though, that another man is sleeping with his wife, his woman, he wants to kiss for the first time in his life, he is furious, he becomes mad with rage, and, instantaneously, kills both. A most normal human behaviour on the part of a man who had become a beast. In the only existential moment of his life when Julien had indeed entered the realm of *humanity*, leaving behind, in exasperation, the realm of *beastiality,* he commits the most heinous crime of his life. This exasperation in the realm of *nature*, the world of beasts, is a progression from the beastly state to a human state, from a state of brutality and violence to a state of affection and peace. The generative process of the narrative-discourse, however, converts this warmth and desire into jealously and revenge, and, after the second violence, the violence emerging from the most genuine human relationship of a man and a woman, the violence diametrically opposed to the brutality of the jungle, Julien descends into another moment of exasperation, the exasperation of *culture*, the exasperation of the world of men, a complete reversal in Julien's odyssey. From one exasperation to another, there is a sudden fall. For the violence committed and the violence missed in the two hunts, Julien had a long period of preparation in the two palaces. There is no such gradual entry into the world of men. There is no period of adjustment to a *human condition.* Hence, fundamentally, the urge to kill is carried on from the previous state of mind even though the cause and the consequence are different.

2.15. The fifteenth subensemble is composed of three interrelated images, signifiers. Julien has before him his mother and father, with majestic *gentleness* on their faces, and an *eternal secret* in their hearts, *15 a.* The blood oozing from their bodies has covered the bedsheets and has continued along the wall where there hangs the *ivory Christ.* The second image refers to Julien's disbelief. He would still like to believe that this resemblance with his parents is only illusory, *15 b.* But this is not to be. The illusion and chance have given way to a definite knowledge, an existential realisation of the enormity of the event. Julien advances to make sure. He has a close look at the old man, his half-closed eyes and the extinguishing light within. He observes the old woman with long white hair. Drops of blood were falling gently on the floor, *15 c.*

After the ordained tumultuous act emerging from the confusion of jealousy and anger, there is calm. Julien faces the *eternal secret* that his parents will never be able to reveal.

But Julien *knows*, and, this realisation is intensified in the image of the blood touching the ivory statue of Christ. The jealous act is transformed into a *sacrilege.* The immobility and the gentleness of the bodies before Julien leave him stupefied. He falters within belief and disbelief, within knowledge, in this case, foreknowledge, and illusion. He thinks of *inexplicable resemblances,* but Julien *knows,* and, this is why, he is pulled down by the weight of the tragedy to have a good look at the half-closed eyes of the old man and the white hair of the old woman. He brings his burning torch closer to their faces and sees the drooping blood. The burning light of the torch does not help Julien escape the *darkness* that is slowly spreading around. The oppositions of knowledge/illusion and light/darkness are too transparent to be fused into each other by some unexplanable factor.

2.16. After a humiliating realisation of the tragic act, Julien recovers to face the world around. At the end of the day, he goes to his wife, *16 a,* and with a different pitch of voice *orders* her not to answer him, not to approach him, not even to look at him, with a threat of punishing her with damnation. His orders were *irrevocable.*

The obsequies should take place according to the instructions he has left on the table. He leaves her the palace, all his wealth, even his clothes, *16 b.* She should *obey* the will of God, and, should now pray for Julien's soul, for he does not *exist* any more.

The dead were buried with magnificence in the church of a monastery. A *monk* followed the cortege, far away from all others. Nobody talked to him. After the ceremonies, he walked away towards the mountains, and, disappeared for ever, *16 c.*

After the horrible crime, Julien seems to have recovered immediately. Strangely enough, he completely dominates the existential situation of the most severe crisis of his life. After the jealousy and anger of the previous subensemble, he now *commands* his wife. He orders her to obey his commandments. He is leaving the world of pleasure and wealth but he does it with a jerk, with a decision full of knowledge and courage. He was always indifferent to his wife in the peaceful situation before the *missed* hunt. Now that he is leaving her, he recognizes her as his wife, and, as a husband for the first, and of course, for the last time of his life, he orders the princess to behave as a wife, even when he does no more *exist.* This de-existentialisation is a conscious act. His wife should pray for his soul, for he is no more, for he has *decided* to be no more.

The last image of the disappearing monk is an interlinking trace of the things to be, of the mysterious nature of the tragic end of the parents and the following sequences which seems to be guided by a divine hand. The disappearing monk leaves a silver lining on the dark contour of the crime.

The subensembles of this sequence may be summarised as:

8 a	:	Julien leaves the palace of his parents, and suffers, hunger, thirst and fever.
8 b	:	Julien's exploits in various battles against the infidels.
8 c	:	He always protects the people of church, orphans, widows, and primarily, the old.
8 d	:	He is "afraid" of killing his parents by mistake.
9 a	:	Julien composes an army of the rebels, bastards, and all sorts of vagabonds— his "comrades", thereby establishing another identity; from the beasts of the jungle, 5 c, to the bastards without fortuné.
9 b	:	He becomes famous. The princes look for his help.
9 c	:	The various adventures of Julien in far-away lands – Jerusalem, Parthes, Abyssinia, Scandinavy, Calicut. Julien is always in forlorn places, jungles or towns, nature or culture.
9 d	:	Julien saves the emperor of Occitany from the infidels, his acts of a Christian soldier.

9 e   :   Julien destroys the armies of the infidels and cuts off the head of the Calif.

9 f   :   The emperor presents Julien his daughter.

9 g   :   Julien marries the princess and gets a palace.

10 a   :   The description of the palace: Compare the first palace of his parents which prepares him for the first hunt. These two preparations have diametrically opposed consequences.

10 b   :   Julien does no more hunt. He does not fight.

10 c   :   Julien remembers the good old days of his hunting expeditions, of the deserts, of the wild beasts.

10 d   :   Julien dreams of father Adam surrounded by all the beasts of the paradise.

10 e   :   Julien always refuses invitations to hunt, for, he believes, his parents' fate depends upon the killing of the animals.

10 f   :   His wife tries to distract him with love, dance and music but Julien is always sad.

10 g   :   One day Julien confesses his horrible secret.

11 a   :   Julien perceives, one evening while praying, the shadow of a fox. He is tempted to go out.

11 b   :   Julien's wife is afraid. She is scared of a funeste adventure.

12 a   :   Meanwhile, an unkown old couple arrives at the palace. They declare themselves to be Julien's parents.

12 b   :   Julien's parents are astonished and mighty pleased with their son' palace, and the princess wife, the daughter of the emperor of Occitany: the glory and empire.

12 c   :   The princess gives all hospitality to the old man, who, with his long beard and tall figure, resembles a statue of the Church (piety), and, the old woman, whose long white hair reflected the beauty of her youth. She gives them her bed to sleep.

13 a   :   The beginning of the second hunt. Julien is nervous. He hesitates. There is silence all over.

13 b   :   Julien sees a boar, a wolf. Julien tries to shoot but to no effect. The wolf turns, "looks" at Julien, and, walks away.

13 c   :   In this manner, Julien covers an interminable plain.

13 d   :   He sees a furious bull. Julien strikes with his spear, which rebounds as if the head of the bull was made of brass.

13 e   :   Julien is ashamed. A superior power has destroyed his force.

13 f   :   He enters the forest where panthers and serpents surround him.

13 g   :   The monstrous animals look at Julien. The savage eyes sparkle like stars and stare at him.

13 h   :   Julien shoots his arrows, throws stones. None touches the beasts.

13 i	:	The animals encircle Julien. He is "frozen" with terror, incapable of the least movement.
13 j	:	With supreme effort, Julien takes a few steps. The animals follow him, surround him.
13 k	:	The animals mock at Julien. An irony pierces the atmosphere.
13 l	:	Julien throws his coat on two red patridges. When he takes it off, he finds one, "dead since long".
13m	:	Deceived and exasperated, Julien's thirst for carnage takes over. Since he cannot kill beasts, he would massacre men.
14 a	:	Exasperated and exhausted, Julien thinks of his wife.
14 b	:	Julien bends over his wife to kiss her.
14 c	:	He realizes that a man is sleeping with his wife.
14 d	:	Furious with jealousy and lust, he becomes mad, and, shouting and yelling, he kills his parents.
14 e	:	In this most cruel moment, he recognizes, in the final breaths of his parents, the breath of the old black stag.
15 a	:	His parents are before him with an eternal secret hidden forever. Their blood touches the ivory Christ suspended on the wall.
15 b	:	Julien is suspended between belief and disbelief.
15 c	:	With a burning torch in his hand, Julien recognizes the bodies of his parents. He follows their oozing blood.
16 a	:	Julien recovers his composure. He orders his wife to follow his instructions for the funeral. He commands her not to question him, not to touch him, not even to see him.
16 b	:	Julien's wife must now pray for his soul, for he does not exist any more, for he has decided not to exist any more.
16 c	:	A monk follows the cortege of his parents and disappears towards the mountains.

The Third Sequence

2.17. With the seventeenth subensemble we enter the third and the last sequence of this narrative. Julien leaves the second palace of his life to lead a life of a beggar. He goes from village to village, stays immobile before the courts of the rich. His face is so *sad* that none refuses him alms, *17 a.* But Julien is not satisfied just with begging. Pulled with *humility*, he recounts his tale of the crime. This changes all, *17 b.* Now, people run away from him, curse him, even throw stones at him. The most charitable shut their doors on him.

Pushed and rejected everywhere, he *avoids men, 17 c.* He eats roots, plants, lost fruits and shells from *execution grounds.*

But the need to *mix with the existence of others* force him to descend to the city, *17 d*. Julien does not exist, but obviously he cannot ignore the existence of others, even though they no longer want to see him. He watches the festivities in the city, the water of the fountains. the children, the feasts, and, exasperated, he turns back.

When he approaches the horses in the fields, the birds in their nests, the insects on the flowers, they are all afraid of him, and run away, *17 e*.

Julien is in search of solitude. But the wind brings to his ears, the tunes of agony, *17 f*. The little morning dew drops remind him of other much more heavy drops. Every evening, he observes the traces of blood in the clouds, and, every night, he dreams of parricide.

Julien made an iron belt with which he climbed the hills to reach the churches at the summits. He thought of penitence, *17 g*. He did not *revolt* against God, who had inflicted on him this action, *17 h*. It may be noted that Julien is not guilty. He does not consider himself to be responsible for this horrible act of parricide. And yet, he is ready for penitence, for it is he who committed this crime, even though he was pushed into it. This is obviously no psychic introspection, no crystallisation of his basic impulses of absurd hunts, and the pleasure he derived from the massacre of the beasts.

He was horrified to see his own body, his own being, which had become so repulsive, *17 c*. He deliberately tortured himself, threw his physical being into innumerable perils to save people from burning fires and the depths of the gouffres. His body was always spared by the flames. He was rejected by the dangerous falls. He was destined to suffer. It was becoming intolerable. He decided to die, *17 j*.

The conceptual opposition moves from exasperation to disgust. Julien is still the master of his destiny. He believes that the parricide is not his fault. He does not revolt against God, even though it is He who is responsible for Julien's act, so thinks Julien. But he is disgusted with himself, all the same. The psychic cure he prescribes to himself is the torture of his physical being which betrayed him. At the extreme limit, he would now kill himself. But his physical being is not independent of his psychic compunctions. The suffering image of his father haunts him, and he retraces his awkward steps. He is obviously not a free man, he believes himself to be. Even at the critical moment of the parricide he commands his wife, he tries to dominate the situation with his authority. His departure from the world of the palace and entry into the world of thirst, hunger and physical torture is also a conscious act, but he is fighting an uphill task, to negate the inner urges by external determination.

2.18. A major transformation takes place in the eighteenth signifying ensemble. There are three images. Julien goes from place to place with the heavy burden of his souvenir, followed by his arrival at the bank of a river whose crossing is very dangerous, *18 a*. Besides the violence of its currents, there is its vast expanse. Since long nobody had dared traverse it.

Julien finds an old boat and repairs it. He thinks of employing his existence in the service of others, *18 b*. With tremendous physical effort he builds the departure platform for the boat.

He suffers hardships, transports heavy stones to the other side. Many a time, he·almost perished. Once the boat is ready, he builds himself a little hut with the branches of the trees, *18 c.*

Far away from the world of men, the cities, the world of *culture*, Julien re-establishes himself in the world of *nature*. Whether it is with the beasts of the jungles and the deserts, or, on the bank of a dangerous river, Julien always finds the realisation of his existence, 'his being, in the world of nature. This is where he begins to control himself, becomes the master of his destiny. The disgust and exasperation are only the negotiating links between the two states of Julien's mind. He always finds a place under the sun, however, forlorn and deserted it may be for normal human beings, the people of culture, and, makes another effort to stabilise himself, to locate a place from where he hopes to move the earth, the world of others, the world of culture. The violence and the dangerous expanse of the river are just the elements of Julien's generating conceptual structure. It is here that he will help others cross the uncrossable. It is only in such a situation that Julien can outdo others, help others, oblige others, place others at his disposal. Himself completely helpless, exasperated, he will now help others who have no hope of crossing this most dangerous point on their own.

2.19. The next proposition leads us to the image of Julien following a peaceful routine of a boatman, of his dwelling, a small hut with absolute bare necessities of life, but where he is in perfect control, where he establishes a correspondence between his personal self and that of his surroundings. This signifying ensemble, the proposition of peaceful preparation, is conceptually related to the previous two palaces, the first two halting places lead to a violent and a missed hunt. Each time, he recovers, he engages himself in new adventures, suffers, but he is never lost. This third and the last breathing space in this narrative-discourse trains Julien in perseverance and patience.

As the boat is ready and Julien the boatman is there to help people cross the river, travellers come to him. Julien is all service to everyone whosoever he may be, an ordinary traveller, a vagabond, a merchant of fortune. There are some who repay him, others simply abuse his service. But Julien is always calm, always ready to bless every person who needs him, *19 a.*

The second image is that of the little hut where Julien has a small table and a bed of old, dead leaves. Two holes in the wall served as windows. On one side was a vast, sterile plain, and on the other, the great river in all its majesty and its violence. In spring, the humid land had the odour of rotten plants. Next followed dust storms which entered everywhere. The hut was only a point of reference, a place of rest and reflection. Physically, it was a part of the vast desert, *19 b.* During the rainy season, there were clouds of mosquitoes whose stings tortured Julien day and night. And, yet Julien had carved a place for himself, much more sure of himself than when he was in the first two palaces.

As in the earlier resting spaces, this space of Julien is also filled with reflection and introspection. The memory of the parricide is still there, *19 c.* Often when Julien closes his

eyes, he sees his parents, and, he is afraid. The two dead bodies frighten him, and once again, he looses balance, and, once again, he prepares for the worst.

2.20. The space of reflection and remorse is over for Julien. The tranquillity of the hut in this deserted land prepares him to face the last act of his destiny.

One night while he was alseep, he heard a voice calling him from the other side of the vast river. It was rather strange that the voice was so clear in spite of the breadth of the river. When he heard the call, Julien, for the third time, it had *the resonance of the bell of a church, 20 a.* In this third phase of Julien's odyssey, the adventure and danger are, for the first time, mixed with *piety.*

Julien lights his lamp and goes to his boat, for someone on the other side of the river needs his help. The vast expanse of the river both separates Julien from the world of others, and, also keeps a constant link with it. The boat is the negotiating element in this new emerging conceptual structure that sustains this so highly determined being, for it is with his own physical, and at times, spiritual effort that Julien achieves, this harmonious blend of nature and culture. When Julien goes out to the river, he perceives a violent storm, *20 b,* but he must go. On the other bank is standing a hideous looking man with horrible skin and eyes burning like a coal. Julien notices that the man is a leper, but has an attitude of the majesty of a king. In the first image, the calling voice had the intonation of the church bells. Now, the leper is majestic.

The crossing proves to be the most difficult task of Julien's life. The water of the river is even blacker than the black ink, its currents shake and push the boat in all directions, the storm moves up and down. With a superhuman effort, Julien tries to keep his *balance.* His body aches, his hands refuse to pull the oars any more, but he somehow understands that the task must be done. The traveller must be taken across. It is an order that must not be disobeyed, *20 c.* Obviously this man is no ordinary traveller, and, Julien has realised it.

This realisation is both instinctive, unconscious, and conscious. The tremendous physical effort and the challenge of the violent storm are normal ingredients of Julien's way of life. This determined act serves as a catharsis to the otherwise tortuous psychic pains. This engagement with nature, an act of culture, i.e. helping others, is Julien's best antidote. He never fails in this travail.

2.21. Julien brings the traveller to his hut. The leper presented the most repulsive look with plasters of leprosy all over his body. For nose, he had a little hole in his horrible face, his lips produced the most nauseating breath, *21 a.* This skeleton of a human body was before him.

The traveller was hungry. Julien gave the few pieces of bread that he possessed. He was thirsty. Julien obliged with the little wine he *found* in a corner.

The traveller gulped it, *21 b.* Both bread and wine precede the final assault. The contact with the leper is negotiated through the intermediaries of the things of the world, however, ordinary they happen to be.

But Julien must now be ready for the closest possible contact with the most hideous of the beings so that he can transfer his own miserable state into that of the Other. So, when the leper asks Julien for his bed and the proximity of his body, Julien is mentally prepared. Nothing could be more disgusting and repulsive than his own body which is responsible for the parricide. He had tortured it, put it through the tests of hunger and thirst, fever and fatigue, but he could never forget it, in spite of the fact that he tried to engage it in the most arduous tasks, push it, in the most miserable situations.

The leper wanted Julien's bed. He readily offered it. The leper was cold, he asked for Julien's body. Julien came close to him. He asked him to take off his clothes. Julien lay with this most detestable body of a human being, naked like the day, he was born, *21 c.* The image of birth and death that is immanent with the contact of leprosy functions here not as a transformation from one state to another, but from the original state to its climax and back with a full circle. At the manifest level, Julien faces death. At the immanent level, the generative process leads Julien to another life, another birth, the birth of sainthood.

2.22. As soon as there is a perfect correspondence between the entire body of Julien with that of the leper, chest on chest, lips on lips, the hair of the leper are stretched, his nostrils breathe the perfume of roses and there is light in the dark caban, *22 a.*

Julien is overcome with superhuman happiness. The leper's arms become longer and longer. With his head, he touches the roof of the caban, and, with his feet, its walls. Suddenly, the roof gives way, and Julien rises in the blue spaces to be face to face with Lord Jesus Christ, who takes him to the heavens above, *22 b.*

With this last act of helping the Other, Julien accomplishes what he could not achieve within the ordinary profane routine of the world. In this wilderness of the jungle and the stormy river, Julien not only asserted himself in the otherworldly sphere but also crossed the threshold of the most cruel reality of life, the extreme suffering of a leper. It is with this supreme effort, which is a deliberate and conscious act on the part of Julien, that he finally becomes the master of his destiny.

The propositional images of the third sequence may be summarised as:

17 a	:	Julien begins his life of a beggar; his face is so sad that nobody refuses him alms.
17 b	:	As he recounts his act of parricide, people close their doors on Julien.
17 c	:	Rejected, Julien avoids men.
17 d	:	The need of mixing with others' existence forces Julien to come to the towns.
17 e	:	Even the birds and animals, once his own kith and kin, run away from Julien.
17 f	:	Julien looks for solitude.
17 g	:	Julien visits churches.

17 h	:	In spite of everything, Julien does not revolt against God.
17 i	:	His own being horrifies Julien.
17 j	:	As the suffering becomes intolerable, Julien decides to kill himself.
17 k	:	When he attempts a suicide, Julien perceives the reflection of his father in the fountain, and never thinks again of dying.
18 a	:	Julien arrives at the bank of a large, stormy river in the wilderness.
18 b	:	Julien repairs a boat to help travellers cross this large river.
18 c	:	He builds a little hut.
19 a	:	The new routine begins. Travellers call for Julien's help.
19 b	:	The image of Julien's hut, its frugality, its sterile and frightening atmosphere.
19 c	:	Julien dreams of the corpses of his parents.
20 a	:	One night Julien hears a voice calling him from the other side of the river: the voice has the resonance of a church bell.
20 b	:	A hideous leper is waiting on the other side of the river.
20 c	:	Julien welcomes this leper having the majesty of a king. He makes a superhuman effort to put his boat through the fast running currents of the river.
21 a	:	Julien brings the leper to his hut and gives him food and drink.
21 b	:	The leper wants Julien's bed.
21 c	:	The shivering leper asks for Julien's naked body to keep him warm. Julien obliges.
22 a	:	As the lips of Julien touch the lips of the leper and he is held tight in his embrace, there is fragrance of roses in the hut.
22 b	:	The roof of the hut gives way, and Julien rises to the skies to be face to face with Lord Jesus Christ.

3. The Semiologic Order

After a detailed semiotic analysis of the text following the syntactic sequencing of the events, we can now attempt at delineating the semiological patterns in this narrative-discourse. The conceptual contours emerging from this discourse lead us to the existential being of Julien, which is invariably realised in the realm of *nature* as opposed to the infrastructure of *culture* put at his disposal again and again. In the first sequence, Julien never follows the rules and artifices of royal hunting for which he is so well prepared by his parents. He loves to hunt in forelorn places, in the deserts, on the mountains, in the valleys.

His body is covered with blood and thorns, he drinks water from the fountains, when he comes home, he even smells like the beasts of the jungle, and, as Flaubert has aptly described, Julien even "becomes" one of them. His existential being is more akin to that of the beasts of the jungle, the creatures of nature, than the men of the palace, the guardians of culture. In the second sequence, as a mercenary, he confronts thirst and hunger and all kinds of hardships,

but he does not *suffer.* In the jungle, he becomes a beast. As a mercenary, he becomes the leader of all kinds of bastards and vagabonds. When he begins to live in the palace of his princess wife, he dreams of the deserts and the wild hunts, he is restless in the most restful place. In the third sequence, his place of rest and the desired wilderness are in perfect correspondence.

The second conceptual contour in this discourse points to the semiologic significance of *the preparatory periods* and places in Julien's odyssey. The training in the first palace, the palace of his parents, prepares him for the first confrontation with the big black stag. The second palace leads him to a hunt that was not to be. After the successful hunt, Julien is exasperated. He renounces everything. After the second most unsuccessful hunt, he is exasperated, but this exasperation leads to the massacre of his parents. The third resting place neutralizes the earlier oppositions and leads to absolute surrender, but a surrender which is a deliberate conscious surrender, and hence, the ultimate realisation of Julien's being.

The third semiological contour covers the transformational process of *life* into *death.* From the very beginning, Julien's main act of realisation of his existential being consists of transforming life into death, whether he acts as a hunter or as a mercenary. It is only in the third phase, after the rest and preparation in the hut in the wilderness that Julien transforms *death,* leprosy, into *life.*

3.1. *The first thematic configuration: nature and culture*

In the palace of his parents, Julien gets the training of a prince. He learns to read and write. His mother teaches him music to sing religious hymns. His father arranges for lessons in hunting, where numerous servants followed by hunting dogs and all the paraphernalia of nets and artifices of princely hunts help Julien with the necessary aids. He can recognise all the beasts of the jungle from their steps on the sands and he can tell one bird from another. But this detailed description of Julien's training as prince hunter in the fourth ensemble is nullified with the very first sentence-proposition of the fifth signifying ensemble: Julien did not *trust* these easy artifices, and preferred to hunt *far from the world,* with his horse and his falcon. He loved to follow wild animals in the hills, jump the streams and go up in the woods. In dense fog, he entered the most obscure corners of the jungle. Even when the old monk, his master, signalled him to return, he would not bother. Instead he went on and on under the blazing sun, in rain or storm. He drank water from the springs with his hands, ate fruits of the jungle. Tired, he rested under a tree, and at times, returned in the middle of night, covered with blood and mud, with thorns in his hair, and smelling the odour of the wild beasts.

Julien becomes like them. He was one of them. His identity with the beasts of the jungle was so complete that he would not even respond to his mother's hug. He was always dreaming of more profound things, *5 c.*

The significant conceptual factor here is that this identification of Julien with the beasts of the jungle is *conscious* and *voluntary*. The hardships which he seems to be undergoing are the fulfilments of his desires. The prince Julien is in fact the prince of nature, he abhores the realm of culture. He feels uneasy in the paraphernalia of the culture of the palace. Julien's being can only be realised in the jungle, amongst the beasts, in the realm of nature. Hence, the so-called hardships that he is supposed to be undergoing in the second and the third sequences resulting from the unfortunate acts of violence, only lead him to a realm of his own identity. This realm of nature with which Julien identifies his being is not, however, the usual peaceful place for rest. There is no love for nature in the ordinary sense of the term. There is invariably a wild goose chase, full of adventure, hardships and danger, which is an end in itself. The spirit of nature, its goddess, if we may use this term, is a *sign* that is an abstraction of a nature which is opposed to culture in all its manifestations. It is not running away from it all. It is not at all a cry for far away from the madding crowd. It refers to an *identity which corresponds with the most ferocious aspect of nature.*

We notice this aspect of Julien's identity as we follow him in the first hunt.

One winter morning, Julien leaves for the woods. Three hours later, he finds himself on the point of a mountain so high that the sky seemed all black. Before him was precipice. On the other side of this precipice were two goats. Julien shoots two arrows. One of the goats dies, the other runs away in terror. Julien follows, and stumbling, falls flat on the corpse in the abysse. Down in the plain, Julien follows other beasts in the river. As the sun rises and the air becomes warm, he perceives at a distance, a frozen lake where in the middle, there was a beast that Julien did not know. It is obviously most exasperating for Julien not to know a beast of the jungle, a place and a world that belongs to him. Julien continues to hunt for an indeterminate period, in an unknown land, *6 b.*, but with the mere fact of his existence, the terrible hunt was to be accomplished with the facility that one has only in a dream. The nature of Julien is not only wild and absurd, a wild goose chase, but also *fantasmatic.* The conceptual opposition is not *between the nature and culture of this world,* it is a certain *unknown frozen land* where even the knowledge of Julien which is almost unlimited, considering his routine hunts in the most far away secluded places, gives way to a certain indetermincay. It is only in this unknown, indeterminate land that Julien finally meets his destiny. The hunt continues the whole day, and, when the night was falling and the sky was red like a sheet of blood, Julien contemplates the enormity of the massacre, not understanding. how could he do all that. On the other side of the valley, he sees the stag family, and, once again, the killing instinct takes over.

The significance of the first hunt and the preceding hunting expeditions of Julien where he follows the beasts all along in far away places, under the most uncomfortable situations, need to be underscored for here there is no question of any compulsion. Julien is not pushed away from his palace.

His parents do their best to give him all the training and the facilities of a prince but Julien just does not want to lead the life of an ordinary prince. The hardships of the jungle are

a consequence of a deliberate, conscious choice. So, when we follow Julien's odyssey in the second sequence, and note that Julien faces hunger, thirst and fever, and that his skin is tanned under the blazing sun, there is nothing new in the existential constitution of Julien even though the circumstances have changed. He is under the curse of the big black stag, and his options are not so wide, as we see in the first sequence. In a way, it is the self-administered sufferings which prepare Julien for his life of a mercenary. Even his identity is not lost. In the first sequence, Julien resembled and smelled like the beasts of the jungle, in the second sequence, he is in the company of the *beasts of culture:* the bastards, the rebels, the vagabonds. In his fights against the infidels, he takes the maximum possible risk. He traverses torrid regions where the rays of the sun burn his hair. At times, he goes through such cold climates that his limbs seem to be falling to the ground. And, there were lands where in the mist, one saw nothing but fantams. Just the perfect natural environment for Julien.

It is no wonder then that when Julien is living in the second palace with his princess wife and has "renounced" all hunt and war, surrounded by a quiet and peaceful people, *10 b,* he dreams of chasing gazells on the sands of the desert, he wants to hide behind the bamboos to surprise the leopards, traverse forest full of rhinoceros, and, reach the most inaccessible peaks of the mountains, *10 c.* He dreams of father Adam with all the beasts of the paradise, *10 d.* Julien is the father Adam on earth. The world of the beasts of the jungle is his paradise.

The chase after this ephemeral paradise continues, and we follow Julien in the second hunt, *13 c,* crossing again, an interminable plain, followed by the dunes of sand, and a plateau, dominating a large space of an unknown land. There are old ruins where one stumbles on the bones of the dead. There are crosses bent in a lamentable atmosphere of the forgotten tombs. Julien sees hyenas emerging from this most horrifying place, and follows them.

But as opposed to the first hunt, here Julien is not able to kill any of his beasts. A superior power destroys his force. The little beasts of the jungle look at Julien and ridicule him. He is exasperated because he has lost his paradise, his existential world, for killing the beasts is not an act of a cruelty for Julien. This is his way of realising his identity with the beings of his world. The failure in the second hunt is not as such a failure of force, but a rejection by the community of his paradise, by his comrades. He is no more able to give them the gift of death.

The physical environment in the third sequence, 19 b, is not thus new to Julien. This wilderness and sterile atmosphere is what Julien always looked for. So, the description of the little hut with a small table and a bed of dead leaves corresponds well with his physical conditioning. What is different in this sequence is the mental state of Julien. In the second sequence, Julien was under the curse of the big black stag. He was frightened, he was apprehensive, but he had not yet committed the crime. In the third sequence, the psychic comportment of Julien is heavily laden with the weight of parricide.

It is this nightmare that is now mixed with the sterile plain, the humid land, and the clouds of mosquitoes. The whirlwinds of dust now engulf Julien with a deep cut within.

On the other hand, Julien is slowly dominating his existential being. He is beginning to realise his destiny across these manifest hardships. Since the act of parricide has already been committed. Julien is no more worried about any unforeseen happening. He organises his little world with a superhuman physical effort. He lifts the heavy stones to build a platform for his boat whose only function now is to serve others, without any renumeration, in any form, physical or spiritual. He completely identifies himself with this boat and the large river across whose violent currents he passes every day. The ruggedness of the physical environment, the hideous forms of the dust storms and the clouds of mosquitoes prepare him well for the final encounter, an encounter Julien is not envisaging. And this is exactly why after the first two failures, in both the successful and the unsuccessful hunts, he now succeeds, for accepting a hideous leper as his passenger becomes a most normal act on the part of Julien. So, what might have been considered a divine test, a most repulsive act of sleeping with the ugliest possible human figure, was no more that hazardous a threshold for Julien to cross. By the time the leper calls him from the other side of the bank of the stormy·river, Julien had already lived long enough both with extreme ugliness on the one hand, and, with the extremity of the violence, on the other. His being had already accepted this other which appeared on the scene on the stormy night. Julien was asleep when he hears the voice calling him, but abruptly awakened, he does not hesitate. He goes straight to his boat and struggles hard to bring the majestic leper.

The extreme physical efforts and the psychic turbulations within Julien had by now a perfect correspondence. What happened in the first or the second sequence could be considered a part of the scheme of destiny. What happens in the last sequence is due primarily to Julien's own conscious choice and freedom. It is in *absolute freedom* of his own *free will*, that Julien builds the little hut at a place chosen by him, to perform an act of supreme disposition. And, it is as a free man, a being who is master of himself, a destitute who controls his environments however rugged they may be, that *Julien now overwhelms nature to create a culture of his own*. Julien the child of nature, finally succeeds in the realm of nature, but only when he has mastered it, when he has completely dominated it. In the first and the second sequences, the hunts in the far away places showed only his love for nature and wild beasts, but here in the third sequence, the correspondence with nature, the affiliation with its spirit, its goddess, is complete, and, it is this correspondence that finally overcomes all the obstacles of culture, all the hazards of the world of the civilized man.

3.2. *The second thematic configuration: the palace and the hut*

Julien's first contact with the world of men and beasts is in the palace of his parents. When he was seven years old, his mother taught him to sing. To make him courageous, his father put him on a horse.

The child was never afraid, he soon mastered the steed. An old monk taught him to read and write. Soon he knew the Latin letters, and he could paint on silk scrolls. As the palace

was at a crossing for travellers, very often pilgrims would visit the place and recount adventures in far away lands, the dangers on the routes full of infidels, pagans, and, wild beasts. Of and on his father invited his old comrades-in-arms, and amidst festivities, the warriors told with great enthusiasm, their attacks on the fortresses and the great courage, they showed against heavy odds. On Sundays, Julien went to the chapel with his parents and prayed. As he grew to be a youngman, Julien was given the training of a prince-hunter with all the artifices and paraphernalia of dogs, nets, traps, etc.

The first palace prepares little Julien for great hunts and adventures. He is given all the training he needs for such deeds of bravery, but Julien does not follow the path hoped for by his parents. He listens to the pilgrims's tales of foreign lands. His imagination is let loose by these fairy tales and he yearns to see the forbidden territory. At the very first opportunity, he crosses the threshold of this princely domain. His hunts are wild goose chase in solitude, away from the world of his parents, the universe of a prince. They are not royal hunts, they are attempts at realising his self away from what he is supposed to be, a prince. The significance of the first palace lies not in what it is, but what is not to be. Julien struggles to break all bonds with its leisure and comfort. He follows beasts in the jungle to become one of them. These hunts in wilderness amongst fantasmatic landscape are not an escape from the palace, from culture, for if it were so, there would be no desire to establish an identity, a complete, harmonious association with the world of the beasts, the world of nature. A Julien covered with blood, mud and thorns is a happy Julien. His hunger and thirst could not be satisfied on the delicious tables of the palace, they are quenched only by the wild fruits of the jungle and the water of the springs. The comfortable beds of the palace prepared by his mother do not let him rest, he sleeps happily under oak trees, on beds of leaves, *5 c.*

The second resting and preparatory place for Julien is the palace where he spends the well-earned repose with his princess wife. But here again his palace becomes a *place of reflection and dreaming of a lost paradise*, the world of wild environment and the beasts of the jungle. In this palace, Julien stops hunting, for he believes that the fate of his parents is associated with those of the beasts, *10 e.* He refuses all invitations by his princes friends, but he cannot help dreaming of running after gazelles in the desert, hiding behind bamboos to surprise leopards, climbing the inaccessible hills to shoot the eagles, *10 c.*

He dreams of father Adam amidst the paradise of beasts. In this palace Julien lives the life of a prince. The glory of an emperor predicted in the beginning of the discourse is realised. This royal rest and this imperial glory prepare him for an adventure for which he would have been least interested. The intensity of the exasperation after the most unsuccessful second hunt is beyond the mental limits of the prince hunter of the first sequence where his identity with the beasts had been well established. The carnage had certainly crossed all expectations of Julien, but all the same, it followed the contour he had very carefully carved out for himself.

The extreme tranquillity in the second palace was a good mental preparation but obviously Julien had not taken it that way, for the exhausted, exasperated Julien falls into the trap of

committing parricide. No doubt Julien escapes from the surroundings, both physical and mental, of the palace of his princess, but this escape, this juxtaposition of tranquillity of the palace with the immense silence of the jungle *13 a*, at the commencement of the second hunt was beyond Julien's mental threshold. The obscurity and density of the woods, *13 b*, and the irony of the situation when the beasts ridicule him, enricle him, exasperate him, *13 i j, k*, sapped all the energy he is supposed to have conserved during the second resting place.

The third and the last resting place is chosen by Julien himself. In spite of its hardships and turbulations, *Julien is in perfect correspondence with his environment*. There is as such no question of escape from here. From the first palace, Julien wandered into wilderness like any unbridled prince who could not be retained within. In the second palace, he was suffocated. On the one hand, he was carrying the burden of the curse of the stag, and on the other, he dreamt of the lost paradise of the beasts. Now in this third environment of reflection and meditation on what had already happened, Julien is struggling to be at peace with himself. The most important factor here is that he has no *foreknowledge* of the event to confront. He is *not aware* of his mother's dream of his attaining sainthood. He is not even a very pious person. He simply wants to purge himself of the *guilt*, for which he firmly believes, he is *not responsible*. This is why the proposition in *17 h*, that he did not revolt against God for the action that was inflicted on him. In other words, he holds God responsible for his parricide, and, yet, does not blame Him. Perhaps he has unconsciously realised that his own instinctive urges generated this chain of sequences. And, the only way now left for him is to establish a harmonious correspondence between his physical self, with hardship and service to humanity under all circumstances of storm and rain. This is why when the most hideous and the ugliest looking creature needs his food and body, he so willingly offers all. The first and the second resting places represent the thresholds to be crossed, the temptation to go beyond the high walls of the palace. The third place, the hut in the wilderness, corresponds and coincides perfectly with the physical and the mental state of Julien, and hence, his immanent identity is merged with the manifest rugged environment and the conflict is resolved. There is also a very significant conceptual opposition of *knowledge* and *non-knowledge*. Non-knowledge, for it certainly is not an affair of ignorance. The inner psychic urges of Julien still haunt his outer self compelling him to exert himself physically, day in and day out, to keep the desired balance between the two opposing forces. In the first two resting places, Julien knew what he was doing, his actions, or, his inactions, for that matter, after every crisis, were well within his conscious knowledge. In the third resting place, this knowledge is already a thing of the past. The parricide has been committed. There is nothing left for Julien except to spend the rest of his life in the physical service of the others, or, this is what Julien believes to be his destiny now. Hence, the appearnace of the hideous leper is both *unexpected* and *normal*. Julien was so well prepared for the occasion that he does not at all seem to be surprised.

What is supposed to be the greatest test of his life, for which posterity conferred on him the title of a saint, occurred in his *mental state of non-knowledge, a state of coincidence and harmony, for knowledge, especially in the case of Julien, had been a state of conflict and disharmony.*

3.3 *The third thematic configuration: the gift of death and the gift of life*

The third conceptual opposition of this discourse refers to Julien's passion for killing beasts. The very first image is that of the mouse in the church that disturbed him when he was a small child. He just could not tolerate the very sight of the mouse jumping before him and escaping in the side hole. He was *possessed with hatred* toward it, *3 m*. The following day, he came charged with a stick and pieces of a cake, which he scattered around the hole. As soon as the mouse appeared, he hit it and remained *stupefied* before the still body of the creature. He wiped the drops of its blood, threw it out and did not say a word about it to any one around. This proposition of secrecy is a very significant gesture. Hatred and murder of the beast are Julien's extremely personal occupations. With these very secretive functional notes, he begins to develop around him a cloak of existential universe whose doors remain always shut for the civilized world which engulfs him, but which can never control him.

The second propositional image in the same signifying ensemble is that of the palpitating pigeon just hit by Julien, *3 n*. The persistence of life *irritates* the child. He strangles it, and the convulsions of the dying bird fill him with *savage* and *tumultuous pleasure*. But when the bird flutters for the last time, the child almost *faints*. This mixture of pleasure and intolerance, hatred and non-existence is a strange current of upheaval that characterizes Julien's relation with his beasts. It is based both on the *annihilation* of the Other, and *dependence* on this Other, for carving out a destiny that is Julien's exclusive affair. This annihilation of the Other then functions well within the inner immanent universe of Julien without which he can neither live nor die. It is a strange world within which Julien must step in with *confidence and awe*, with *secrecy and jealousy of a lover* who holds the effects and cause of life and death. This *gift of death that Julien gives to his beasts*, to the creatures of his innermost universe is a *gift of life to himself.* These two are interrelated and interdependent.

This syntagmatic mental development leads Julien to reject the normal routine of princely hunts when he grows up. He is a solitary hunter who comes home covered with mud and blood, thorns in his hair and the odour of the beasts on his body. He "becomes" one of them *5 c*. When his mother embraces him, he dreams of other *profound* things. This profundity of Julien's dreams is painted in the odour and blood of the beasts, and it is absolutely exclusive. In this profundity, he obviously cannot respond to his mother's affection.

This wild goose chase in the jungles to establish his identity with the world of the beasts is a relationship of existential domination. This Other in the form of the beasts is an Object that is undirectional, from the Subject to the Object.

It is the Subject of Julien who goes in search of the beasts, and when the occasion of a carnage presents itself to him, *6 c*, he is *suffocated with pleasure*. It ends in an *immobility* of the atmosphere, where all the beasts are massacred and there are heaps of mutilated bodies around. And, the climax. Julien contemplates the enormity of the massacre, and *does not understand* how he could do it, *5 m*. In other words, he crossed the thresold of his own

identity, and fell into the trap of killing the stag family to merit the curse. This is the first time when his relationship with the Other changes. The big black stag does not become immobile like all the other beasts. The prodigious animal comes forward and with his blazing eyes, looks at Julien, *5 e p*, and pronounces the horrible curse. For once, it is Julien, who becomes the object of a beast. The roles are reversed. *The Being becomes the Other, the passive object of the Other, who is transformed into the Subject of the Being.*

As long as Julien could dominate the world of the beasts, as long as he could give them the gift of death, the situation was normal, the relation was harmonious. The moment the roles are reversed everything changes. It is only in this context that we can understand the significance of the second hunt.

At the very beginning of the second hunt, *silence* reigns, *13 a*, as opposed to the tumultuous movement in the first fantasmatic hunt. Julien *hesitates*, he is unable to put his step forward. The woods are *dense*, there is *profound obscurity.*

As the animals begin to appear, Julien shoots his arrows, but none of them attains its target. The wolf turns it back to *look* at Julien and continues its route. Not only Julien misses his target, he is unable to establish his preferred relationship with the beasts, with the mediation of the gift of death. The wolf *looks* back at Julien, transforming him into an Object, an Other. The scenario continues. Julien comes across a furious bull, he hits it with his spear. It bounces back as if the forehead of the bull was made of brass. Julien closes his eyes waiting for his death. When he opens them, the beast disappears. Julien is ashamed. A superior power destroyed his force, *13 e*. This absolute disequilibrium, this disharmony, this *non-relation in the universe of the beasts*, Julien's universe, is complete when in the dark he notices hundreds of blazing eyes *looking* at him, *13 g*. The *transformation of the Being into the Other is total and irretrievable* when the beasts of the jungle surround and make fun of the *terrified* Julien *13 k 1*. Julien is exasperated with this utmost *deception 13m*, and, naturally, for lack of beasts, he thinks of massacring men. *He lost his existential world of the jungle, of nature, now he must exercise his being in the world of men*, a world that does not belong to him, but he must make an effort to dominate it, to make it his own. This urge of existential assertion, the realisation of his lost being explains his attitude of a master towards his wife that he manifests for the first time after the act of parricide has been committed, *16 a*. As the beasts have failed to be subjected to his will, his wife must obey him, even when he is renouncing all, when he is leaving the world of men for ever. With this dominating gesture, he transforms the most exasperating situation into an act of a deliberate, meditated choice.

Once this threshold is crossed, Julien is a completely transformed being. In the newly discovered universe of the third sequence, he systematically begins to establish a relationship with the Other with the mediation of the gift of life as opposed to the earlier gift of death. It is a universe of destitute, helpless travellers who need to cross the large stormy river, *the river of death*. Julien puts himself at the disposal of men to cross this river. The physical prowess that was earlier employed to follow the perilous paths in the jungle to convert life

into death is now used to build a boat and a hut amidst the most inhospitable enviornment. With tremendous physical effort Julien establishes a new harmony, a harmony where the relationship with the Other is dominated with the force of sacrifice and service. In this universe only Julien is subjected to deadly attacks, both by the swarms of mosquitoes and hunger, thirst and fever, the world of the beasts, and, the ruffians and vagabonds, the world of men, who abuse his service and insult him every day. But in this most tumultuous atmosphere, Julien acquires *a state of tranquillity* that when the ugliest looking creature, the leper, appears on the scene, and requests to be taken across *the river of death into the hut of life*, Julien so willingly obliges.

The newly acquired tranquillity and harmony is a resultant of a see-saw battle over a long period. As Julien leaves the palace of his wife, he is mentally held by the act of parricide. He hates himself. He is depressed. He even envisages suicide. He is mentally so disturbed that the sufferance becomes intolerable, and he decides to *die, 17 j*. With a tremendous physical and spiritual effort, he overcomes this state of mind, this encounter with death, for he does not consider himself responsible for the act. He does not revolt against God even when he knows that it is He who has inflicted on him this act *17 h*. As such there is no feeling of guilt, no responsibility, only he is disgusted with himself, for it is through him that the massacre took place.

Julien resolves to get over his culpability, and employs physical effort as a psychic therapy. He overcomes the instinct of death, and begins to live, but, this new life is mediated through violence and danger. He arrives at the bank of a river whose "crossing is dangerous because of its violence and width", *18 a*. Since long nobody had the courage to cross it. Julien builds a platform, repairs a boat and *transforms this dangerous river of death into a river of life*. Soon travellers begin to flock to get the help of this courageous boatman.

We notice the same contour of relationship with the leper. When Julien is struggling hard to overcome the violence of the storm in the river, he *understands* that this affair of taking this leper across is an important affair, and it is an order he cannot *disobey, 20 c*. This Other, this leper, is an object but, an object which exercises power on the Subject. Julien is in control of the boat, he is making superhuman effort to take it across, but he understands that he cannot disobey the command of the Other, who in spite of his most hideous figure, had an air of majesty around him, *20 b*. But the nature of this relationship changes as they enter the hut. Julien begins to fulfil the needs of the leper. He gives him bread to eat, wine to drink, bed to sleep. This is ordinary service. However, the last act follows when the leper *supplicates:* I am going to die, come near me, give me the warmth of your body, your entire body.

It is only when the leper makes a humble entreaty as a supplicant that Julien gives the gift of life to this dying being, thereby transforming completely the relationship of the Being with the Other.

4. Mediation

(Conceptual correlations with *Oedipus at Colonus* of Sophocles, stained-glass window version of Saint Julien's legend in the Cathedral at Rouen and the Indian legend of Puran Bhagat composed by Qadiryar)

4.1. *Of gods and man*

The narrative of Saint Julien has often been compared with that of Oedipus but this comparison is generally in terms of the murder of his parents with subconscious psychic overtones of Oedipus complex as explained by Sigmund Freud and propagated by his followers ever since.

I believe that this is a misreading of the Oedipus narrative which does not stop with the first play of Sophocles. In *Oedipus the King*, we have only the first cycle, the first step, the point of departure which unfolds the narrative. It reveals only the realisation of what gods had predicted but it does not tell us anything about Oedipus as a man, as a being who suffers all this and reflects upon his destiny to carve out a path that leads to a confrontation with the divine order, and a resolution, acceptance by the same gods, very similar to the end that awaits Julien. The Freud enthusiasts (which include even Jean-Paul Sartre, for in spite of his notion of freedom as freedom to act in this world and the freedom to be oneself, we witness his excessive obsession with Freud in his long writings on Freud published in *Oblique* 24-25, 1981, 83) have never bothered to consider the other half of the Oedipus narrative, *Oedipus at Colonus*,. The first half reveals only what is predicted, or in materialist terms what is there for man in the inevitable, dialectical progression of historical chain. It cannot be avoided. Man must submit to what is ordained but this divine or historical order is not the measure of man. The explanation of this order in terms of latent psychic interpolations has led a whole century of western thinkers astray. The measure of man can be perceived only from the moment the same man begins to reflect upon his destiny and acts accordingly. The first conceptual problem then is the problem of *responsibility*. The misreading of *Oedipus the King*, the Freudian reading, holds the sub-conscious responsible. The last scene of the play is deceptive where Oedipus curses himself and pierces his eyes with a sword, never to see the misdeed done by him. He holds himself responsible and suffers for it. But let us turn to the other half of the narrative. In *Oedipus at Colonus* we have his words:

> The first day, true, when all my rage was seething,
> my dearest wish was death,
>
> stoning to death in public—I could not find a soul
> to satisfy my passion. But then, as time wore on
> and the smoldering fever broke and died at last,
> and I began to feel my rage had far outrun my wrongs.
> (438-88)

And he tells Creon in no uncertain terms:

I've suffered it all, and all against my will:
Such was the pleasure of the gods, raging,
Perhaps, against our race from ages past.
But as for me alone—
Say my unwilling crimes against myself
and against my own were payment from the gods
for something criminal deep inside me ... no, look hard,
You'll find no guilt to accuse me of—I am innocent

And he continues:

Come, tell me: if by an oracle of the gods,
some doom were hanging over my father's head
that he should die at the hands of his own son,
how, with any justice could you blame me?

for

I wasn't born yet, no father implanted me,
no mother carried me in her womb—
I didn't even exist, not then

So how could an involuntary act be punished?

And if,
Once I'd come to the world of pain, as come I did,
I fell to blows with my father, cut him down in blood—
blind to what I was doing blind to whom I killed
how could you condemn that involuntary act
with any sense of justice?
(1098-1111)

As to the marriage with his mother, he has no remorse either:

And my mother....
Wretched man, have you no shame? Your own sister!
Her marriage forcing me to talk of that marriage
Oh I'll tell it all, won't be silent, not now.
You and your blasphemous mouth have gone so far,
She was my mother, yes, she bore me—

Oh the horror—I knew nothing, she knew nothing!
and once she'd borne me then she borne me children,
her disgrace.

And he squarely accuses Creon of his knowledge:

But at least I know one thing:
You slander her and me of your own free will,
but I made her my bride against my will.

And he asserts:

I repeat this to the world against my will. No,
I'll not be branded guilty not in that marriage,
not in the murder of my father, all those crimes
you heap on me relentlessly, harrowing my heart.
(1118-31).

It is interesting to see that the long psycho-analytical tradition did not listen to Oedipus-Sophocles but agreed with Creon-Freud. Sigmund Freud is clearly a modern Creon who holds man responsible for what he is not, especially for what he does not accept. The concept of responsibility leads to passivity or activity, néant or movement, neutrality or assertion. If the sub-conscious is responsible, all that one can do is repentance. This conceptualisation is an integral part of passive theological framework. Deep down within the innermost layers of a being is hidden the criminal, who kills his father and marries his mother. If this act leads to salvation, it must follow *sufferance* and *repentance*, and above all, a total *responsibility* of the act. This is what Creon wants Oedipus to do. This is obviously what Freud dictates in the early years of this century and this is what is willingly swallowed by a continuous tradition of Freudian believers since. Oedipus-Sophocles belongs to another tradition. He accepts that his body committed this act, for which it must suffer, but as far as the responsibility of the act is concerned, it is the gods who are to be blamed. This act was planned, ordained by them even before he was born, even before his father had planted him, even before his mother had conceived him. The same is true of his marriage with his mother. Neither his mother nor he knew. *No knowledge, no responsibility.* But Creon and Freud know that Oedipus-man is not responsibile, yet they inflict this injustice in the name of the sub-conscious act.

Another most important point in Sophocles-Oedipus is that he is accepted by the gods, or, he achieves salvation, or, that is the measure of man, when he is mentally *free of all guilt,* when he acts (suffers) on his own, not because he committed a crime but because his physical being is repugnant to him through which the gods are supposed to have taken revenge on his race. It is as a FREE man that Oedipus achieves his goal, that the same gods

who made him commit that crime finally surrender before his WILL, before his PERSONAL ACT. This sufferance of Oedipus-man cannot in any way be considered as his repentance.

4.2 When we deal with a narrative like that of Saint Julien, we see that these contours of sub-conscious are intermixed with the Original Sin and the resolution provided by the Christian tradition of acceptance of this *responsibility* followed by repentance-sufferance. This is salvation. This is what raises an ordinary mortal to the echelons of sainthood. Within the same tradition there have been attempts at reconciling Marx, Freud and Christ. The resolution is quite understandable even though one may not agree with it, and I for one do not, that all these reflections deal with the inevitability of the act, and, provide for freedom within, within the system, within Christ, within the sub-conscious, within the historical, dialectical progression. My analysis of the narratives of Sophocles-Oedipus and Flaubert-Julien and later of Puran and Heer leads me to the conclusion that neither of them accepts the responsibility for the act; in all these cases, they squarely blame or hold God responsible for the act they committed, yet they willingly suffer, and, in the mode of their sufferance they defeat the *project of God or History* or whatever other name one may like to give to this *inevitable chain of events*.

While Sophocles wrote two separate plays to complete the narrative of Oedipus, Flaubert's St. Julien is an integrated conceptual whole. Julien is very well prepared for the final confrontation. If one reads the third section of the narrative without establishing corresponding semiotic correlations, one does get the impression of sufferance, and may be, even repentance. But if one follows the *psychic path* of Julien, as I have tried to show earlier and as I will briefly retrace now, one sees clearly the basic contradiction in the conceptual juxtaposition and a complete transformation of theological overtones. It is also interesting to see that while in the stained-glass window of the Cathedral of Rouen, which was the point of departure and of inspiration for Flaubert, the first two sections of the narrative occupy only one "cross" each with minimum of the events presented, the third section has practically two "crosses". In the first section, the Rouen narrative deals primarily with the birth of Julien and the predictions, and, only one figure at the end shows Julien on his horse. There is no presentation of the great hunt which is so meticulously described by Flaubert. There is no comparison between prince Julien and the individual hunts of Julien's free will, nor there is any opposition between the life of the castle and the rugged life of the jungle that Julien so adores.

We see a similar depiction of the second episode. Again the conceptually opposed hunt is absent, so is the opposition between the palace and Julien's dreams of hunting in the deserts. The stained-glass window series show only the life with the princess, the arrival of the parents and their murder.

When it comes to the third episode, the situation changes drastically. Maximum emphasis is laid on depicting each detail of Julien's life as a boatman, his service to others, his sufferance, his welcome to the leper and all he does for him. The moral of the stained glass narrative of Rouen is clear. It is suffeerance and acceptance of the guilt that raises Julien, the criminal, to the status of a saint. And, even if one agrees that Julien's parricide was not deliberate, it

nevertheless corresponds with Julien the compulsive hunter or the compulsive killer who responds to his inner urge to commit this act. Deep down within Julien, within every human being, is submerged in the innermost layers of the subconscious, a sinner, whose only salvation, resolution, lies in submission and sufferance.

4.3 The Flaubert narrative reverses this order. The three sections here are also divided unevenly but in this case the first section covers nineteen pages, the second, seventeen, and the third, only ten pages. Flaubert is interested in Julien, the individual, whose psychic assertions are described in great detail. Julien develops a very special, exclusive relationship with the beasts. From the very beginning he does not accept the esablished order. The narrative begins with the description of the magnificent castle of Julien's parents where the seigneur's word is the law, where affluency prevails, where Julien gets the training of a prince hunter:

> "Inside (the castle), the ironwork shone brightly; the carpets in the chambers protected them from cold; the cupboards were full of linen, the tuns of wine were piled up in the cellers, the coffers of oak cracked under the weight of the bags of silver." (p. 86).

And for his hunting expeditions, Julien's father arranged for him all the paraphernalia of a prince:

> "The good lord at considerable expense had procured tercalets from Causase, sakers from Babylone, gerfalcons from Germany, and peregrine falcons captured on the cliffs of the cold seas in far-away lands... One could distinguish there twenty-four barbary greyhounds, swifter than the gazelles but subject to bolt, seventeen pairs of Breton dogs with white spots on thick red coats, confident of every move, strong in the chest and mighty bayers. For the attack on boar and other dangerous occasions, there were forty griffon terriers as strong as bears. Also, there were tartary mastifs as big as donkeys, of the colour of fire, with broad backs and strong legs, who were meant to pursue the wild ox." (p. 94)

Flaubert's Julien, however, does not accept the luxurious existential situation:

> "But Julien mistrusted (méprisa) these commodious artifices. He preferred to hunt far from the world (loin du monde). (p. 95)

> "Three squires waited for him since dawn at the foot of the steps; and the old monk, leaning from the window signalled in vain to recall him. Julien never turned back.

> He would go off in the burning sun, in rain, in storm, drank water from the springs with his hand, ate wild apples, and when he was tired, rested under an oak; he would return in the middle of the night, covered with blood and mud, with thorns in his hair, smelling the odour of the ferocious beasts. He became like them (il devint comme elles). When his mother embraced him, he accepted her hug coldly, and, seemed to be dreaming of profound things (il acceptait froidement son étreinte, paraissant rêver à des choses profondes)." (pp. 96-7)

This is Flaubert's Julien, the Son of Man, and it is in this existential situation that Julien kills both his father and mother, and, not where the physical massacre takes place. If *father* is conceptualised as the predestined, historical order, an obligatory authority and a suffocating patronage, then every child of man has an innate urge to rebel against it. If any psychic trait is an integral part of a continuous chain of subconscious vibrations, it is this irresistible pulsational force that manifests itself in various forms of assertion, in the multiple hues of the BECOMING of the BEING. The dialectical inevitability lies in *continuity* and *contradiction* and not in *continuity* and *conversion*. In this historical progression, father may be conceptualised as any order: parental, economical, political religious or cultural. The murder of this order is the *defiance* of this order. Naturally, its metaphysical realisation will depend upon the existing correlates. This metaphorisation of the metonymic sequences is only an illusion of a reality whose perception will alter with every given existential situation.

Julien resolutely refuses to accept the world predestined for him. He prefers to hunt *far from (this) world*. And this world is deliberatley, consciously chosen by him, by *his free will, by his individual existential choice*. He is the master of this world. He dominates its ambiance. He descends in its innermost depths to reflect upon things more profound than what he finds in the world of his parents, the seigneurs, the lords of the castle. The continuity of this psychic structuration is realised further when he finds himself in another palace, that of his princess-wife:

> "It was a palace of white marble, built in Moorish style on a promontary in a grove of orange trees. The terraces of flowers descended to the edge of a bay where pink shells cracked under one's steps. Behind the palace extended a forest in the form of a fan. The sky was always blue and the trees swayed by the breeze of the sea and the winds of the mountains which delimited the distant horizon.
>
> The rooms full of crepuscule got their light from the inlay work of the walls. High columns, thin like reeds, supported the coupoles which were decorated with reliefs imitating the stalactites of the grottes.
>
> There were fountains in the rooms, masaics in the courtyards, festooned walls, a thousand refinements of architecture, and such a silence that one could hear even the rustle of a scarf or an echo of a sigh". (p. 108)

This is the second palace destined for Julien, even more magnificent than that of his parents, but Flaubert's Julien is not a man of the palace, his home is elsewhere, his world extends far beyond the marble thresholds of the royal palaces:

> "Dressed in purple, he would rest with his arms on a window-recess, remembering the hunt of yonder days; he would have liked to run on the desert in pursuit of the gazelles and the ostriches or hide behind the bamboos to surprise leopards or cross forests full of rhinoceros or scale the summits of the most inaccessible mountains to aim at the eagles or to be on the drifting ice to fight the white bears." (p. 109)

"At times, he would dream of being Father Adam in paradise with all the beasts around; by just stretching his arms he would put them to death; they would file past two by two, according to their size, from elephants to lions, down to stoats and ducks, as on the day they entered the arch of Noah. Under the shade of the cavern, he would hurl infallible javelins on them; he could then overcome others; this march-past never ended; and he would wake up rolling his wild eyes." (p. 109)

It is practically in this dream state that Julien begins his second hunt, the hunt not to be, the hunt where Julien finally loses his paradise, where he is completely destabilised. But this disequilibrium can be conceptualised only with reference to his dreams, and, not *in accordance* with the reality of the white marble palace.

"In this way, Julien crossed an interminable plain, and finally, he found himself on a plateau dominating a large space of the country... (p. 114)

Surrounded by the beasts of the jungle, Julien tries to escape:

"Julien began to run; they ran with him. The serpent hissed and foul beasts slavered. The wild boar prodded his heels with its tusks, and, the wolf, the interior of his hands, with its hairy muzzle. The monkeys pinched him and made faces at him, the marten rolled on his feet....
    "An irony pierced through their sly movements. Observing him from the corner of their eyes, they seemed to be meditating on a plan of revenge. Deafened by the buzzing of insects, hit by the birds's tails, suffocated by their heavy breath, he walked with his arms raised and eye-lids closed like a blind man without even having the strength to cry for grace!" (p. 117)

And naturally:

"This deception exasperated him more than all others. His thirst of carnage took hold of him; for want of animals, he wanted to slaughter men." (p. 117)

And what follows is parricide but this physical annihilation of his parents is a foregone, predestined conclusion. *He had already conceptually annihilated them and their world in the very beginning of the narrative.* In search of carving out his own world, a world diametrically opposed to that of his parents, Julien had taken a number of existential steps in the wilderness, a wilderness where at times he found his psychic equilibrium, and at others, he lost all balance. But not even once does he hesitate. Not even once does he falter. As this existential world of Julien is full of turmoil and turbulations, there are ups and downs, there are moments of complete domination, as in the first hunt, and there are moments of complete exasperation, as in the second hunt. *The metaphysical contours of this world, however, never undergo any change. On the contrary, with every adventure, with every mishap, with every failure, the psychic incision gets deeper and deeper. The parricide does not*

lead to the subconscious unfolding of guilt, if anything, it reinforces Julien's resolve to shun this world of palaces forever. It is not for nothing that after the massacre, Flaubert presents *a most resolute Julien.* It is for the first time that Julien commands his wife. With a jerk, he completely dominates the situation:

"At the end of the day, he presented himself before his wife; and, in a voice different from his own, he commanded her, first, not to answer him, to approach him, to look at him, and that she must obey, under punishment of damnation, all his orders which were irrevocable." (p. 120)

4.4. This is where the comparison with the stained-glass narrative of the Cathedral of Rouen is most striking. While the Fraubert narrative traces a psychic path of Julien whose existential assertions constitute the main contours of Julien's conceptual world of independence, defiance and creativity, the Rouen narrative emphasizes the inevitability of the predestined sequences. The first "cross" (section) deals only with the birth and the festivities, scenes of predictions and piety, and finally, his hunt and sickness. There is not the slightest hint of Julien, the child, who carves out his own path, who rejects the world of his parents. On the other hand, he is shown as a pious, obedient son.

The second "cross" in the Rouen version is even more explicit. Literally, we have the following scenes : Julien's departure, his marriage with the princess, the princess in her bed (presumably Julien is out hunting but this absent juxtaposition is based only on the Flaubert version), the arrival of his parents, their welcome by the princess, Julien committing parricide, Julien furious with his wife, and the second departure.

Since neither the first cross nor the second depicts the rugged adventurous life of the wild hunts, nor there are any dreams or reveries presenting his alienation from the two palaces, *one cannot juxtapose the physical reality of the two situations with the mental cobweb that Julien is so meticulously weaving around his being.* The birth, the hunt, the parricide just happen. They are all predestined, they are all there in the very being of Julien, the son of man, who is born with these innate instincts. There is no escape from the Original Sin.

The subconscious is there even before the physical incarnation. It is then simply a matter of its realisation which automatically leads to the *resolution* of all the inherent contradictions. Freud was after all a highly religious man, only his object of study, sex, led people astray. Christ and Freud are reconciled in the innermost depths of our psychic base. All that happens is so natural, it is already writ large on the destiny of man, so where is the problem. All that is required is its comprehension and concordance.

Let us now turn to the last two *crosses* of the Rouen version. Of the ten scenes before the ascension to the heavens, there are four scenes where Julien is depicted as a boatman. In other scenes also he is helping others, meeting pious men, being converted to the spiritual path. As the first two *crosses* do not show Julien in the company of the beasts or returning home with thorns in his hair, smelling like beasts, covered with blood and mud, and, responding coldly to his mother's hug, dreaming of things more profound than that of the world of his

parents at his disposal, or, dreaming of Father Adam surrounded by the beasts of the jungle, killing them with a touch of his hand, or, being exasperated by a deception incomparable to all others he had experienced before, rejected by his own, thrown out of his own world, the third section in the Rouen version obviously does not have to continue what was not initiated in the first two sections. It is this under-current, this sub-narrative which is completely missing in the Rouen version, and hence, the Rouen and Flaubert versions operate upon two different conceptual parameters.

4.5 As far as Flaubert is concerned, the problematics is quite different:

"He did not revolt against God who had inflicted on him this action (Il ne se révoltait pas contre Dieu qui lui avait infligé cette action)" (p. 123)
Earlier, he did not blame his wife for this mishap for "she had obeyed the will of God in the execution of his crime (elle avait obéi à la volonté de Dieu)..." (p. 120)

So there is absolutely no doubt about who is RESPONSIBLE. Flaubert's Julien does not launch a tirade against the gods, for there is no Creon to confront with. The psychic constitúting process in this case is far more subtle and sophisticated than that of Sophocles-Oedipus.

It is a simple structure of conceptual juxtapositions, and, no commentary, no overt denunciation is envisaged. There is perfect harmony in the sub-narrative from the first section to the third through the vicissitudes of the second. When we realise how smooth and harmonious is the transition, the problematics of sufferance and repentance is automatically excluded:

"Three squires, since dawn, waited for him at the foot of the steps; and the old monk, leaning from the window signalled in vain to recall him. Julien never turned back. He would go off in the burning sun, in rain, in storm, drink water from the spring with his hands, ate wild apples, and when he was tired, rested under an oak, he would return in the middle of the night, covered with blood and mud, with thorns in his hair, smelling the odour of the ferocious beasts. He became like (one of) them. (pp. 96-97)

And now after the parricide:

"A small table, a stool, a bed of dead leaves and three cups of clay were all his furniture. Two holes in the wall served as windows. On one side were extended, as far as the eye could see, the sterile plains with ponds here and there; and the great river, before him, rolled its green waters. In spring, the humid earth had an odour of decay. Then a strong wind raised dust in cyclones.

It entered everywhere, muddying the water, it cracked under his teeth. Later, there were clouds of mosquitoes whose humming and stinging stopped neither during day nor at night..." (p. 125)

It is hard life, all right, but suffering, no. It corresponds perfectly with what Julien had always wanted to be. And, there is no question of repentance. In the understatement, he did not revolt against God for having *inflicted on him this action,* everything is eloquently stated. Julien accepts the situation as it is presented to him, and, once again, becomes the master of his destiny. He is no more in the palaces of *others.* It is *his* hut, however, rugged it may be. He had already *overcome* the ferocious currents of the dangerous river. He has constructed *his* boat with which he helps people cross the river of death. Julien who used to give the gift of death to the beasts begins to give the gift of life to the helpless humanity stuck on the other side of the river. It is in this existential situation of complete domination, of absolute harmony, that he obliges the leper who wants to cross this dangerous river, who is thirsty, who is hungry, who is dying

4.6 We began this note with a narrative from Greece, we may end it with one from India, from my native Punjab. A corresponding existential predicament is realised in the legend of Puran Bhagat. In the city of Sialkot is born a son to Raja Salwan. The child is immediately confined to a dungeon as the astrologers tell the Raja that he should not see the face of his son for twelve long years. It foretells doom and destruction for the kingdom. After twelve years of confinement, the son has an audience with the father which is immediately transformed into a confrontation. The Raja asks the prince to get married. Puran will have none of this way of life. The prince is then led to see his stepmother who tries to seduce him. Puran rejects her advances. The queen is furious. She tells the Raja that his son attempted to rape her. As the Raja was already angry with him, he calls the executioners and gets him delimbed and confined to a well.

After another period of twelve years, the great yogi, Guru Gorakhnath, appears on the scene, restores Puran his limbs and admits him to his fraternity of the yogis. As required by the Order, Puran goes to the palace of princess Surdran for alms. The young princess is charmed by the handsome Puran. She accompanies him to the Guru, and, asks for Puran as a gift when the great Guru seems to be highly pleased by the devotion of the princess. Puran has no choice. He follows Sundran to the palace but slips away at the first opportunity. Grief stricken, Sundran jumps from the palace to her death. Puran returns to the Ashram where the Guru does not seem to be pleased with his behaviour. The new adept is too much for his Order. He tells him to go back to the parents.

Depressed, Puran takes the road to Sialkot. Again there is a confrontation with his father, Raja Salwan. He forgives Luna, his stepmother, for she was carried away by the fire of passion, but for his father, there is no kindness. When the Raja "orders" him to come home, Puran hurls insults at him, and, abusing him and his palaces, leaves Sialkot for good.

Let us now retrace the basic existential moments of confrontation in the words of Qadiryar, the celebrated Punjabi poet of the early years of the nineteenth century, whose text is the basis of our analysis:

In the city of Sialkot
is born a son, Puran
to Raja Salwan
Informed of the birth of his son
The Raja called for the Brahmins
for the horoscope

The Brahmins consulted the texts
and advised the Raja
not to see the face of his son
for twelve long years!
Immediately the order is obeyed
and Puran is confined to a dungeon!
The Brahmins stated
What was written in the sacred Book
Puran emerged from one darkness
and entered another!

After twelve years of separation Puran is brought to the audience of his father:

Raja Salwan consults his advisers
Look for a bride for the prince
So, a year from this day
I may march in marriage procession!
After long prayers

God has blessed me with a son
May I enjoy the auspicious festivities!
But Puran has other views
He defies his father
without hesitation, he hurls back
Do not marry your son, my father
The desire which leads people to marriage
I have nothing to do with such urges
My mind is always in flight
Do not put chains on its free movements!

The Raja is very angry at this retort of his son but the ministers try to calm him down.
The prince is just a young boy. As he grows up, he will learn to obey. The prince is then led
to see his stepmother, Luna, where another confrontation takes place:

Luna succumbed immediately
to Puran's handsome figure

She was so charmed
She forgot the Raja
All her being was set affire
She took her "Son"
to be her lover
She lost all balance
This treacherous women, says Qadiryar
turned back
the flow of the river!

And

She had no fear
no hesitation
She held his robe
and invited him to her bed
Humbly, she prayed, she pleaded
A woman as pretty as a fairy
entreates you
You are no man
You are a simpleton!
Qadiryar, she was not at all ashamed
She urged him again and again
to share her bed!

Naturally, Puran will have none of this. Whether it is his father or his "mother", he would not participate in their world:

The prince is adamant
O "mother", understand
I'll never step on your bed
I'll never look at it
I'll rather be crucified!
He snatched his robe
and ran away
I'll die
rather than sacrifice my dharma!

The queen is no small person either. She accepts the challenge and concocts a story of Puran's advances towards her. The Raja has had enough of it now. In the morning, Puran insulted him, now he has attempted to rape *his* wife:

The Raja was furious
His forehead twisted and twitched
His heart became a stone
His body was burning
All night he was restless like a fish
He could neither sit
nor stand
Qadiryar, he was struck by this woman
And, Puran was the cause of it all!
The Raja bursts in rage
What a cursed day
You were born
If I knew the day
I sent you to the dungeon
I would have had you killed then
You have inflicted such a scar on my heart
What an inauspicious day
You are born ...

The Raja was burning in anger
His forehead was bloodshot
like that of a murderer
Get out of my sight, he shouted
I'll get your limbs torn
and hung in four directions

But Puran is a determined being. He is sure of the righteousness of his chosen path. If there is confrontation, so be it:

O father, if you want
to test my dharma
get a pot of boiling oil
when the temperature reaches the maximum
put my hand in it
the truth and the falsehood will be separated
You will know
who is right
and who is wrong
Even if my little finger is slightly burnt
You can put me to death!

Of course, the inevitable happens. The Raja orders the executioners to delimb Puran before throwing him in an abandoned well. Conceptually, Puran kills his parents before they have the chance to call for the executioners.

The legendary period of twelve years passes and Guru Gorakhnath appears on the scene:

Gorakh restored his limbs
and asked Puran to go home
No such doing, replied Puran
Pierce my ears and smear me with ashes
I must stay here!

Puran certainly cannot go "home". Nor will the great Gorakhnath realise where does Puran want to go.

The guru explains
This yoga is a difficult business
Fasting, patience are the norms
You have to leave this world
You'll be as good as dead
You have to avoid sex
You have to kill all desires
Qadiryar, the guru tells Puran
This yoga is no easy path!

Puran accepts all
and bows in obedience
The guru cuts a tuft of hair
and piercing his ears
puts in the rings of yoga
He gives him the yellow robes of his Order
and converts him
as one of his disciples!

And as required by the practice of the Order:

Puran smeared himself
with the sacred ashes
and left for the city of Sundran
The Yogis challenged him
we'll see if you conquer the princess
Many a yogi had gone there
Not even once did she descend
from her palace!

Again a "palace". Puran is at the footsteps of the famous palace. The princess descends but she would entertain Puran, the prince, not Puran, the yogi. He must enter the palace. For Puran, this cannot be. He is bound by his Order to come to the palace for alms, but he would never cross the threshold:

The faqirs don't enter the palace
says Puran
step out, princess, and give me alms
There is no hiding from the yogis
I am here to beg
No other desire hinders my path!

But for Sundran, this is not acceptable:

Come in, enter,
I beseech you
I am at your service
If you wish to dine
There are dishes aplenty
If you enter the palace
All luxuries await your word
Qadiryar, the princess stands there with folded hands
Enter and breathe life in me!

Give me alms
I shall not enter
I have just come out of one net
Do not spread another snare
These palaces are for the princes
I must go
Farewell
My guru will be angry
I must obey his commands!

The existential confrontation continues for sometime. Finally, Sundran gives in, only to be able to accompany Puran to his Ashram to see his guru. Gorakhnath is highly pleased with the devotion of the princess and offers her a boon. Sundran plays her cards well and asks Puran as his gift to her. The die is cast. Puran obeys and follows Sundran to her palace but at the first opportunity escapes. Deceived and dejected, Sundran commits suicide:

Drenched of all strength
her body shakes
grief stricken

The princess sings the songs of sorrow
I was mistaken
beware
Never trust these yogis
Once off to the jungle
They never came back to Sundran
These yogis are friends of none
Qadiryar, do not ask for
the deep cut within me
This cursed hour stands still for ever!

Before Puran arrives, the news of the tragic death has already reached the Ashram and Guru Gorakhnath has obviously not taken it kindly. Puran is admonished by the great master and is asked now to go and see his parents. In other words, there is no more place for such a disciple who takes the Order so seriously. Puran is too much of a right-doer for any normal group of ascetics and even Gorakhnath had misjudged the extreme streak in the psychic constitution of this prince-yogi. All these abstinence, patience and renunciation which were considered great tests by the guru were a normal behaviour for Puran. Even before he is anointed by Gorakhnath, he had already not only practiced these all but had certainly surpassed the outermost limits ever envisaged by the great guru of the yogis. Puran's search was far beyond the limits of these austerities for which there apparently was no room in the Ashram of Gorakhnath. Thus Puran goes back to Sialkote for the final confrontation. For his stepmother, Luna, he has kind words, but father-son tussle continues:

Why are you worried
Luna
That was none of your fault
It was all ordained
But for my father
For him there is no forgiveness
The way he dealt with me
No father ever reacted
With such cruelty!

The Raja tries reconciliation:

The Raja orders
come, let us go home
Take these keys of the royal treasury
And wear the turban of kingship
That I too may be happy after all
Let the fire within me extinguish

Let there be festivities
Lest the world call me sonless!

But there can obviously be no change in Puran's attitude. He is steadfast in the path he has chosen for himself:

Bound in your shackles
There is no happiness for me
Let your kingdom be looted
If you cannot manage it
I know who suffered for me
You are all hypocrites
Qadiryar, says Puran
I shall not stay here!

4.7. And Puran leaves the world of palace for good. But the most significant point here is that Puran has also left behind the Ashram of yogic austerities. The popular tradition presents Puran as the upright yogi who is not seduced by his treacherous stepmother, who upholds dharma, who is the only disciple of Gorakh who could stand up to Sundran. However, if one follows the psychic constituting process of Puran, one realises that such an interpretation is too simplistic. Like Julien, Puran cannot defy the astrological predictions, what is predestined will happen but within this cycle of events, Puran is slowly and steadily emerging as the master of his own destiny. Like Oedipus and Julien, Puran must also submit to the verdict of the gods, be confined to the dungeon, betrayed by his stepmother, be killed by his father, but before they could, he had already shown his cards. It is not simply because Luna accused Puran of rape that Raja Salwan is fuming with rage, he himself had been *raped* earlier, even before Puran goes to see his stepmother. Puran had already violated the will of his father, he now violates his wife. This double edged violence was too much even for a father who was blessed with a son after his long prayers and religious devotions. Puran violates the most basic institutions of father and king. Their world of palace is pushed into oblivision. When Puran meets Gorakhnath, the guru, in spite of all his spiritual powers, does not recognise the real Puran within. For him, the conceptual opposition could only be between the palace and the Ashram, between luxury and austerity, between all and nothing. But neither the walls of palace nor the discipline of yoga could hold Puran within their limited concentric circles. The confrontation with princess Sundran highlights this predicament where the threshold becomes an existential barrier. But here Sundran outwits Puran. Everywhere everyone punishes Puran. The confrontations are violent but they are uni-directional which help Puran sharpen the incision of the cuts that he in turn administers on the subconscious of others. Sundran turns inwards and punishes herself. The ideal of the sacrificial lamb that Puran, very much like his brethren, Oedipus and Julien, seem to enjoy and nourish, is conceptually transformed. There is a fundamental reversal of the Other in the Puran-Sundran confrontation. As the centre of gravity had shifted, even Gorakh realised that this prince yogi can no more stay in his Ashram. Before the Puran-Sundran encounter, there is only Puran within, the sacrificial lamb, the victim, the being who is immersed in the depths of the psychic contours of absolute righteousness. After this encounter, none is certain of his place within or without. So Gorakh simply gets rid of him. And, now that neither the royal palace nor the yogic Ashram can

withhold this strange prince-yogi within its manifest or abstract confines, Puran has a final meeting with his old adversaries, Raja Salwan and Luna. Apparently, there is no real problem. Everyone seems to know each other but much water has flown under the bridges, and, now nobody realises that Puran, in this new existential incarnation, is neither a prince nor a yogi. There is no specific goal. All the predictions have been met, all the punishments and sufferance have been borne, all the ordeals have been overcome, and now, there is Puran set on a path of his own, whose contours do not resemble any Order, this worldly or other. There is not much left for the stars or the gods to administer to Puran any more. This is where he resembles most his brethern, Oedipus and Julien. The Sophocles-Oedipus, the Flaubert-Julien, the Qadiryar-Puran, and as we shall see later, Waris-Heer, follow different manifest traditions, different overt psychic paths, but after a series of destabilisations, all these three achieve a certain existential equilibrium whose conceptual correspondence acquires a centrifugal precision which cannot be altered either by gods or by men. They seem to have located the Centre from where they are now able to move both Earth and Heaven, and, gods give in.

The Human Condition in Puran Bhagat

I

1.1. In this paper, I have attempted to analyse the human condition in a number of crises in the narrative of Puran Bhagat. The point of departure is the version of the legend of Puran, composed by a pouplar Punjabi bard, Qadiryar, in the early years of the nineteenth century.

The legend is constituted of six principal dramatis personae : Puran, his father, the Raja Salwan of Sialkot, (now in Pakistan,) his Guru, Gorakh Nath, and, the three women: the mother of Puran, Icchran; Salwan's second wife, Luna; and, the beautiful princess, Sundran. The disequilibrium caused by Luna's infatuation and Salwan's execution of Puran is sought to be balanced by the motherly affection of Icchran, and, the love of Sundran, whose gift to the psychic comportment of Puran is the supreme sacrifice of her life. This legend is an important conceputal discourse of our culture. It deals with the compunctions of public morality and collective consciousness. It moves along the development of individual psychic crises. The two meet and interact in a number of situations where the questions of duty, honour and revenge are raised, where the collective dharma confronts the existential assertions. The logical sequencing of the narrative is highly dynamic. The events move with extreme rapidity, and, invariably lead to their logical conclusions.

Condemned by the astrologers to avoid his parents, Puran grows in the darkness and deprivation of a dungeon for twelve years. Immediately after his advent in the life of human relationships, Puran is enticed by his stepmother, Luna, who, rejected by Puran's public morality, gets him executed by his father, Salwan. And, another period of twelve years in the forlorn darkness of the deserted well begins. Then comes Guru Gorakh Nath who restores Puran his limbs and sends him to beg alms at the palace of princess Sundran. The encounter with Sundran leaves Puran a complete wreck, for Sundran commits sucide when Puran leaves her for good. Luna subjected Puran to physical torture to neutralise his mental turbulations. Sundran tortured herself to inflict the sharpest cut on Puran's psychic wounds.

1.2. It is a discourse of extreme polarities. We move from darkness to light, from treachery to affection, from extreme laxity in principles to extreme austerity and discipline of yoga, from absolute detachment to absolute involvement. There are dehumanising factors which make Puran a monster of a man. There are humanising constituents which attempt to bring Puran back to social normalcy. The cultural discourse of the narrative is not a thesis, nor a statement of facts.

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* Paper presented at a seminar on "Social Transformation and Creative Imagination" organised by Jawaharlal Nehru Museum, New Delhi, 1983.

It decomposes the constituents within the context of a constituted whole. In other words, as it unfolds certain mysteries, it wraps up other predicaments. In the end, it manifests itself as another riddle to be solved with the help of other similar creative texts. But as I have tried to demonstrate towards the end of this paper, it is precisely the nature of the creative act that is at stake. It is a continuous dialectical process. Its contradictory strands lead to such compositions whose ends are always loose. They can be stretched in many directions. Several interpretations are possible, but each interpretation has serious consequences for our cultural development. The creative evolutionary process of a culture is not based on sentimental impulses, its development follows the incisions of intellective operations. I have attempted one such incision on the cultural discourse unfolded in the legend of Puran Bhagat.

II

2.1. There are six basic thematic units. The first theme refers to the birth of Puran in the House of Raja Salwan of Sialkot. The moment is surcharged with the confrontation of destinies. The Brahmins tell the Raja to avoid seeing Puran for the first twelve years, as the encounter of son and father portends disaster. The servants obey, and Puran is taken to a closed dungeon. The poet Qadiryar aptly refers to Puran's entry from one darkness (of the womb) to another. The oppositions of light and darkness, of mysterious depths and sharp truth are obvious. Both mental and physical atmospheres are disturbed. Characters and destinies are at stake.

2.2. The second theme refers to the main crisis of the narrative. After twelve years of confinement, where he had had the usual training of a prince, Puran steps out into the world of human relationships and intrigues. There are celebrations and sacrifices. Salwan is overjoyed. The proud father dreams of the marriage of Puran, and the happy days ahead. But this is not to be.

Once due reverences paid to his father, Puran is led to see his mother, Icchran, and, the stepmother, Raja Salwan's second wife, Luna. The sight of Puran so captivates Luna that she forgets the social relationship of being a "mother" and entices Puran with her charm and solicitations. Puran remains steadfast in his role of a stepson, and, withstands all temptations. Luna takes it as a challenge to her very being. She pleads gently, and offers all the pleasures of the world. She argues that as she did not give birth to Puran, she could not be his mother. When all this fails to move Puran, she threatens and cajoles. Puran at once accepts the challenge. He would rather die than leave his dharma. Luna is transformed immediately into a revengeful ogress. As Qadiryar puts it: she would drink his blood to satisfy her thirst of revenge.

2.3. The ball is set rolling and there is no going back. The third thematic unit of the narrative is a logical consequence of the second. Luna organizes a complot. She convinces

Raja Salwan that Puran wanted to seduce her. She has been insulted and disgraced by his tempestuous son, of whom he is so proud, who is the darling of his mother, Icchran, the other, neglected wife of Salwan.

The Raja is furious. How dare his young son lay hand on his favourite queen? Their passions crisscross. Their ambitions are in violent confrontation. He has Puran called to his audience, and, in spite of all protestations and arguments of truth and dharma, which only infuriate the father even more, convicing him of Puran's indiscipline and disobedience, the Raja orders the executioners to delimb Puran, and, to throw him in a deserted well in the wilderness. Puran's mother, Icchran, pleads to the contrary, and, appeals with the most powerful argument, according to our cultural norms, that if Puran dies, who would call him "father". The Raja's advisers also councel temperance, but none of this has any effect on the violent tempest let loose by Luna.

2.4. Puran is duly executed. He remains stuck in the deserted well for the legendary twelve years, when Guru Gorakh Nath, the great yogi, appears on the scene with his disciples. In this fourth theme, Gorakh brings Puran out of the darkness and death of the deep well into the light and life of yoga. His limbs are restored. He is initiated into the mysteries of yoga, but strangely enough, the main emphasis, as presented by the poet, is on the "honour" of the yogic discipline. Gorakh Nath is the Guru whose yoga has been "acknowledged" by the Almighty, and Puran, his disciple, is charged with upholding the high yogic tradition of steadfastness and discipline. Puran is the new prince-yogi, not just an ordinary adept. Puran narrates his tale of woes, and, Gorakh realizes the headstrong young fellow that Puran is. But both the Guru and the disciple are in tune with each other. Both deal in abstract principles, and are ever willing to confront any situation of mental disturbance that comes along.

And, there is no dearth of tests. The crowd of disciples hemming around the Guru for a few loaves of bread, encourage Puran to go for alms at the palace of princess Sundarn, who apparently had never descended from her palace for the little mendicants. The confrontation with Sundarn is the theme of the fifth unit of the narrative.

2.5. With the permission of the Guru, Puran sets out to the palace of princess Sundran. As usual, the maid servant of the palace offers him alms, but he refuses. He would accept them only from the princess herself. The maidservant is so exited that she describes the handsome figure of the prince-yogi in great detail. Sundran is obviously curious. She invites him in, but he refuses. As Qadiryar puts it : he had already crossed one threshold in such a palace, he dare not try another snare. Sundran obliges and gives her gifts of pearls and diamonds. When Gorakh Nath sees these precious stones, he remonstrates Puran. The yogis accept nothing but ordinary food. A mendicant is not a beggar. Puran and Sundran come back to the Guru with all kinds of delicacies.

The arrival of Sundran at the Dera of Gorakh Nath creates an atmosphere of extreme velocity. The presence of such a beautiful princess amongst the sadhus surcharges the

environment. All the mendicants are excited, and, as Qadiryar describes the event, only Guru Gorakh Nath and Puran are able to keep their balance. However, the Guru is pleased with Sundran's humility, and grants her a boon, which turns out to be Puran himself.

Once the dye was cast, there was no way out. The Guru's word had to be kept, and, Sundran, leads Puran away to her palace.

This is obviously too much of an ordeal for Puran. He slips away from the palace at the very first opportunity, and, deceived and depressed, Sundran commits suicide.

When Guru Gorakh Nath realizes what had happened, he sends Puran back to his parents. Puran goes from one woman to another. At each encounter, the bewitching woman is taken in by his handsome figure and self-assurance. He tells Sundran that he is no ordinary beggar sadhu, he is a prince of high caste. He had come to see her. He would neither accept any gift from a maidservant, nor would he cross the threshold of the palace. He would neither enter the palace, nor accept any one other than that of the palace. The dilemma continues

2.6. As Puran arrives in the dominion of his father, we come to the last episode of our narrative. He camps in a deserted garden on the outskirts of the city of Salwan. Puran's spiritual stepping in gives life to the withering plants. The whole city pays homage to the new yogi, whose generous touch heals all wounds, and destroys all miseries. The news reach the palace. Puran's mother, Icchran, who had become blind crying for her son, arrives in the garden for the yogi's solace. Raja Salwan and his queen Luna also come to see the renowned yogi for the boon of a son. When the son and mother meet, Icchran recovers her eyesight; with Raja Salwan and Luna, the encounter is of another order. The king would like to be blessed with a son, for he had had none to play in his palace, which is deserted without the laughter of a child. Puran probes the past, and reminds him of a son, named Puran, who was executed. When Raja Salwan begins his narrative, Puran exhorts Luna to come out with the true sequence, if she desires the boon of a son. As the truth is revealed, and Luna is humiliated, Puran advises Salwan to forget the past. She did what she could, but what he, the father, did, was never done by any other father. All the same, he gives him a grain of rice, with which Luna would conceive, and give birth to a warrior son, but after she would suffer like the mother of Puran. A gift of humiliation and revenge, all wrapped up neatly, in the yogic tradition of discipline and austerity.

And finally, the identity is revealed. Salwan and Luna are in the terrible presence of Puran. The Raja pleads and requests Puran to take over the reigns of the kingdom. Puran refuses flatly : if you cannot govern your dominion, let it go to the dogs. Who cares for me? You are only ashamed of your deeds, and want to cover up your crimes. Go home, my brother would sit on this throne, who would be a great warrior. I got what was destined for me. The way I was turned out of my city, no prince was ever so humiliated. What my father did was never done by any other father in any age....And, Puran leaves Sialkot for good.

III

3.1. The human condition in the narrative of Puran is the condition of sex and violence, of discipline and austerity. of heightened emotions and extreme egocentric personalities. Each sequence of the narrative is charged with existential crises of the being who can never forget himself. The self is above all emotions.

All the dramatis personae are wrapped up in the most unyielding cover of self – deceit and self – assurance. But it is also a narrative of extremely disturbed persons. It is a discourse of utter frustration and perturbed minds. Every sequence leaves a certain psychic trace which cannot be obliterated by all the physical violence that every one tries to subject the other to. There is also self – negation and torture. But the self never leaves. The ego predominates. The narrative moves from one crisis to another. It is not a discourse of resolutions. The underlying logic of physical or mental violence only pushes one sequence into another. As a cultural discourse, this narrative could be an attempt at a discursive confrontation of yogic upright steadfastness with the ways of the world, but not only Puran, all others who participate in this high drama of extreme psychic tensions, are always left high and dry in midair, with an acute sense of loneliness and frustration. The touch of the yogi Puran is not the touch that heals, it invariably ends up by inflicting another merciless sharp cut on the already open wound.

3.2. Let us retrace some of the sequences in this psychic context. Raja Salwan had been yearning for the birth of a son, but as soon as the son is born, he is told to avoid him. He is not destined to see the face of his son for twelve years. The son-father confrontation is predicted even by the astrologers. And, as far as Puran is concerned, he goes from one darkness to another. As Qadiryar puts it, the father imprisons his son on the day of his birth, on the day of rejoycing. By any reckoning, Salwan is not a happy man. During these twelve years of Puran's confinement, Salwan indulges in another amorous adventure. He marries a low caste but extremely beautiful young girl, Luna. Like any rich and powerful person, the Raja is able to have a beautiful woman at home, notwithstanding his age. But the marriage is only physical. She is not his companion. He desires her. She possesses him, but he does not posses her. As such, both Salwan and Luna are two highly frustrated beings, locked in the intolerable physical stronghold of the palace.

3.3. On the other hand, the everprevailing absence of Puran must always haunt Salwan. The son is growing. But the father is not destined to observe the developing child when he could have had an imprint on him of his fatherly affection. He would encounter only the young man with the frustration of twelve years of confinement. The son is already an adult when they first meet. And, obviously, they do not get along well. For minor enquiries of Salwan. Puran's answers are curt. As Qadiryar puts it, Puran does not hesitate to argue with his father. The ministers advise the Raja not to mind such impertinent talk. Puran would grow. He is an adolescent.

3.4. The encounter with Luna is a natural sequence. Luna is literally a captive of the wealthy king. His desire for her is obvious, but she cannot communicate with an old hog, however rich and powerful he may be. And, if there was any compulsion, the advent of Puran releases that. There is confrontation of social, conventional morality, dharma, and the psychic existence of the beings. Luna is courageous. Puran is steadfast. But there is a reason for Luna's will to cross the threshold. She has been a captive for a long time. Her human condition is miserable. She had probably been meditating on her destiny in the confinement of her palace. She is a wild bird in a cage. Puran seems to have opened the door, but apparently he shuts it back with a bang. The triangle of human relationship is, however, complete by now. Puran possesses Luna but Luna does not posses Puran. The relationships are misplaced. The desires crisscorss. But, all is not lost. The logic of confrontation gets entangled. Each of them recongnises his-her strength, and the desires and passions notwithstanding, they rely on the ill-gotten, false authority and possession.

Luna knows, she possesses the king. He is her prisoner mentally even though she is in his physical captivity. Rejected and insulted by Puran on the basis of conventional morality and collective consciousness, she challenges him on the basis of equally false and undesired hold on the Raja. When her existential being is challenged, she transforms herself into an ogress with the help of the man and his authority, she hates. On the other hand, condemned by the social customary authority of the astrologers and public morality, to first spend twelve years in a dungeon, and adopt a respectful behaviour towards those he has not grown up with, Puran accepts Luna's challenge, and is ready to die for his social dharma.

3.5. Salwan's mental state is no different. It is obvious from the Luna-Puran sequence that Salwan never really possesed Luna. His life with her could not have been very happy. For the first time probably, after this Luna-Puran quarrel, Luna seems to be the king's beloved queen, for whom obviously Salwan would do anything. In this absolutely false and concocted atmosphere of devotion and love, Luna sets out to practice treachery and revenge on the one she really adores.

The lopsided relationship between the father and the son cannot be easily ignored. The conventional, cultural morality obliges Salwan to consult the astrologers, and obey them whatever their prediction may be. And, what is their prediction? That the father and the son should have no contact with each other for twelve long years. But this non-contact is the most frustrating   mental contact that has apparently already broken their nerves under extemely heavy strain of keeping themselves separate. This unusual situation of presence-absence is tortuous. This astrologic non-relation had already set in motion, a psychic relation, which burst into hatred at the very first occasion.

During this period of non-relation with his son, and Puran's mother, Icchran, Salwan had tried to establish another relationship with Luna, mostly as a psychic cure. But the relationship was unnatural and unconventional. Luna was of low caste. She was too young to be his companion.

This only frustrated him more. Mentally, Salwan was already a wreck when Luna suddenly appeals to him in the name of love, which always escaped him. He fell into the trap, and went ahead like a mad dog to cut the roots of his own family tree. Puran's mother, Icchran, tried to bring back the balance and normalcy missing in the royal household for such a long time, but to no avail. Puran's advent was the only element that could normally harmonise the extremely imbalanced psychic situation of the entire family. But the backlog of heightened tensions was too powerful to let these dramatis personae stop, look, and, think. They were all carried away by the hurricane of passions against their own will, against their own best judgement.

3.6. And what about Puran, who is being brought up in a dungeon without mother and father? He knows, his father is the king, and he would one day inherit his throne, but he cannot have any contact with him. It is one thing for a child to be an orphan, and quite another to be very near, almost in the presence, close vicinity, of the parents, and yet to be without them. In this most inhuman situation imposed by public norm of the sacred texts of astrology, which are supposed to govern the lives of men, no wonder, Puran grows into a little monster. From twelve years of seclusion and privation, he is suddenly, without any preparation whatsoever, thrown into a world of human contact : confrontation with the authority of the father-king, and the infatuation of the young step-mother-queen. And, both these forced, sudden relationships are immediately transformed into non-relationships. In such a situation, violence was the only logical means of exit. In this mad house of extreme disequilibrium, nothing short of execution of Puran could pretend to resolve the problematics of the existentially blocked enclosure.

3.7. And, what a violence it is? Both Salwan and Luna are pushing their beings along the downhill. Puran who would perpetuate the House of Salwan, Puran whom Luna wants to possess, is sacrificed at the altar of passionate non-existence. In one way, it is the supreme sacrifice for both of them. Blinded by the tempestuous nerves of revenge, they temporarily seem to forget their very existence. Puran is Icchran's son. It is normal for her to plead for his life. But Salwan-Luna-Puran triangle brings about a certain upheaval in the relational accord. Salwan loves Luna, who loves Puran. The cycle of psychic possession is obviously in the reverse order. Puran possesses Luna, who possesses Salwan. The one on whom you have authority is not the one you love. However, the relationship is transparent, and none is deceived. One can only torture one's most loved one. And, as far as resistance is concerned, which is epitomised in the discourse by the most resolute stand of Puran, it can emanate only from the being who is at the crossroad of all the three protagonists. Naturally, Puran is the nucleus. He is the nerve centre. It is he who has disturbed the equilibrium, however tangible it was, hence he must quit.

3.8. The punishment administered to Puran by Salwan's executioners is in consonance with the turbulent situation he has gone through. He is not killed. Only his hands and feet are cut, and he is hung in the darkness of the deserted well. From the darkness of the womb, he was thrown into the darkness of the dungeon as a result of his contact with the sacred books of his culture. Now, from the dungeon, he goes to the darkness of the well in complete immobillity. In the dungeon also, he was immobile. He was mentally aware of the presence of his parents and the world around, but following the dictates of public morality, he was not allowed to move. After the jolts of the contacts with his father, and a woman, the two poles of human relationship, he is condemned to an immobility, where his body and mind are in tact, to meditate on his destiny, his non-relations as well as his relations. The world is still around. Salwan and Luna are alive outside the well. Nothing could obviously be more tormenting than this absolute helplessness caused by his own upright defence of public morality.

In this immobility, Puran must reflect upon his fleeting but most consequential contact. He would never forget Luna. He would never forgive Slawan. Guru Gorakh Nath would come and heal the physical wounds, but these psychic wounds will never be healed. Each turn in the logical sequence of the discourse will only increase the severity of the pain which would remain hidden and unspoken until the last encounter with Luna and Salwan, when the scores are settled, when these non-relations come in violent confrontation.

3.9. The seclusion, darkness, and the immobility in the deserted well is far more severe and acute than the darkness of the dungeon. In the dungeon, Puran was a child. He was deprived of his parents, but he had had the company of his servants and councellors, who helped him grow and acquire the necessary human awareness. In the deserted well, Puran is an adult. He has had a contact with sex, the most existential ingredient of manhood, and a confrontation with the authority of his father, an obligatory step in the development of individual consciousness. It is with this confrontation that the psychic umbilical cord is broken. Puran is now on his own. He must face the world without, and the world within, all alone. For the first confrontation, he made use of the cudgles of collective consciousness, now he must reflect upon the consequences of using this collective consciousness to assert and realise the urges of his individual consciousness. The world within the deserted well, and the world without, are in a strange contact. The extreme physical immobility, and unfettered imaginative, individual conscious psychic flights are in perfect harmony. The deserted well represents both the dark fathomless prison-hole, and the absolute freedom of mind.

3.10. The deserted well is also the symbol of nature as opposed to culture. Rejected and humiliated by culture, Puran finds himself in the world of wild plants and birds of the jungle. But it is not the traditional open free world of nature. Puran has the freedom of a prisoner. He is immobile. This is the gift of culture. His immobility is caused by human intervention. It is dictated by the norms of social consciousness. But in this immobility of cultural compunctions, he is the only witness to the wild nature around.

He observes the wild growth of plants. He watches the nesting of the birds, their births and their deaths, their amorous plays and their struggle for survival. In many ways, Puran is initiated into the order of nature which is no less ruthless than the one he has just gone through in the intrigues of the kingdom. This nursery school of nature is just the opposite of the school of the dungeon which was controlled by all the paraphernalia of culture. The contrast is extreme. In the dungeon, Puran was never alone. No doubt, it was a darkness of deprivation, but it was not really the solitary confinement he is now undergoing. In the deserted well, the adult Puran meditates on honour and revenge, individual sexual urges and the taboos of the society. As such, even before he encounters Guru Gorakh Nath, Puran has been initiated into the individualistic mysteries of yogic experience. It is here that Puran acquires the power of patience and meditation. It is in the solitary confinement of nature that Puran acquires new insights into the truth of culture. But obviously, this acquistion reinforces and reintegrates the already highly individualistic, and as it happens, highly egocentric, tendencies in the psychic comportment of Puran. This contact with nature is not complementary to cultural evolution as Rousseau would have it, it is in direct contradistinction to the ways and norms of ordinary behaviour. It certainly heightens the velocity of the confrontation of individual and collective consciousness. Like the twelve years of the dungeon, the twelve years of the deserted well is again a preparatory period, which both nurses and nourishes the psychic wounds inflicted by culture.

3.11. Gorakh Nath restores the limbs of Puran and brings him back to normal human condition. He asks him to go to Sialkot to see his parents, but Puran refuses. He is not yet mentally ready to face his adversaries, and pleads to be initiated into the Order of yoga. Guru Gorakh Nath accepts him in his fraternity and converts him to the yogic discipline. This step takes Puran still farther from the profane life and personal ambitions. The Order of yoga of Gorakh Nath requires extreme austerity and negation of all human impulses. In the beginning, Puran was a prisoner of public morality. Now, he is in the grip of even stronger norms of religious descipline. Gorakh preaches avoidance of all that is worldly, all that satisfies normal human appetite of sex and hunger. He is to be a mendicant for whom this world of senses does not exist. He has to follow the dictates of the highest dharma. As the disciple of Gorakh Nath, Puran has to lead a life under far more severe constraints than when he was a prince within the confines of public moral order.

And, yet he has to live in this world of flesh and ambition. As a mendicant, he is supposed to go to the city to beg for alms. There is a clear distinction and opposition between the monastic life outside the city, and the profane life of the city, but both are related. The yogi must live away from the city, but must depend on it for his physical existence. There is no cohabitation of the physical and the spiritual, but both are in consonance. Both must come in contact with each other. Both must confront their respective positions in complementary needs, but diametrically opposed ways and ideals of life.

The co-disciples of Puran tell him to go to the palace of princess Sundran for alms. They inform him that she never descends from her apartments and sends only her maidservants.

No mendicant of the Order of Gorakh Nath has ever been able to see her. They would be surprised if he, who claims to be a descendant of the mighty kings of Sialkot, can oblige princess Sundran to come down to his presence. And unwittingly, Puran follows their advice, and leaves for Sundran's palace with the blessings of his Guru.

At the palace, the inevitable happens. The maidservant of Sundran offers alms to Puran which he duly refuses, and insists on the audience of Sundran. The princess is furious, but relents as she listens to the description of the handsome figure of the new yogi. She invites him in. Puran resolutely refuses to cross the threshold. He was obliged by his Order to come as far as the gate of the palace, but beyond that he would not budge. He is of noble lineage. In other words, he is of the palace, but bound by the constraints of his Order, he cannot cross the threshold of the palace.

3.12. Princess Sundran is also caught in the same dilemma. She is not only of the palace, but she also leads the life of the palace. She is willing to meet Puran, the prince, but not Puran, the yogi. If she steps out into the world of Puran, she looses her identity, and then the meeting is of no consequence to her. However, as expected, Puran is steadfast in his role of a mendicant, Sundran hesitatingly condescends. She overlaids Puran with the gifts of pearls and diamonds. Puran is yet a novice. He does not realise the significance of these precious stones. These are not the usual offerings to an ordinary mendicant. These riches are the gifts of the palace to a prince, who is only disguised as a yogi. When Guru Gorakh Nath refuses to accept these glittering objects of the profane world, Sundran plays another trick. She prepares the choicest dishes of the House of princess Sundran, and accompanies Puran to the Dera of Guru Gorakh Nath.

The Guru is higly pleased at such a devotion of the princess, and grants her a wish. Sundran immediately cashes on the sacred promise, and gets Puran as her award. This is too much and too sudden for Puran. The Guru prepares him for renunciation and discipline, and at the first opportunity, thrusts him into the very illusory world, he commands him to avoid. Puran is compelled to move from one human condition to another, either by the force of public morality, or by the discipline of the highest religious Order. And, as expected, he reacts violently. No sooner than he is at the palace, he slips away, leaving Sundran high and dry, in the midst of her most ecstatic moment. No wonder, she succumbs to this terrible grief.

The same poet Qadiryar, who had blamed Luna for treachery and deceit, cannot help compose some of the most beautiful verses of his poem, describing the auguish of Sundran. Who is to blame for this tragic end? In the case of Luna, one could talk of the mother-son intrigue, the infatuated woman and the dutiful son, but no such accusation could be placed at the conduct of Sundran. Princess Sundran was enticed by the yogi Puran, however unconsciously it might have been. In the beginning, she had refused to descend from her guarded palace, but Puran had insisted on her audience. Did he want to prove to his comrade disciples that he was, after all, *the* prince-yogi, he had claimed to be, and princess Sundran could not refuse him his due place?

Any way, once they met, they did not want to cross the threshold of the palace. In other words, they refused to go to each other's world. And, yet none of them could resist. The first step, however, reluctantly it may be, was taken by Puran. It is he who goes to Sundran's palace. No doubt, at the threshold, there was hesitation. The yogic discipline reminded him of the higher obligations. But, Sundran was already there. The two beings were not only involved in a human encounter, it was also a confrontation of two egocentric attitudes. Sundran tries to resolve the dilemma by following Puran, but as Qadiryar puts it in one of the most beautiful lines of his narrative, Puran leads Sundran away with the finger of his charm.

And, whatever be the pretensions of the yogic Order, the yogi Puran, as described here by Qadiryar and remembered ever since by the Punjabi consciousness, is the fantasmatic romantic hero, who is handsome but unfaithful, who is austere and obdurate, but who deceives the innocent princess. The yogis are unreliable, they are stone-hearted. Sundran warns all other girls to beware of these mendicants who loot young hearts, and care not for their anguish. The whole town cries for her misfortune. When Sundran falls from the palace, the walls of the city are blackened, and the populace wails for the beautiful princess, who has been betrayed. Puran entered the city of beauty and happiness, he left it deserted and desolate.

3.13. Before Puran reaches the Dera, the news of the death of Sundran had already reached Gorakh Nath, who apparently did not approve of his disciple's behaviour. Perhaps he had conceived of a more prolonged affair. It could be a test of a yogi, to both live with the world of passion, and to avoid it, as it is quite usual in the rites of initiation. But Puran was made of another clay. Once he was told to conform to certain austerities, once he had taken certain vows, he was not going to let anything slip through his fingers. In any case, the monster of the dungeon and the deserted well was only further hardened by the yogic ordeals. There could be no let up in such a mind. And, the greatest shock of Puran's life was that this desertion of Sundran was disapproved by Gorakh Nath. There was no formal remonstration. Either Gorakh considers Puran now ripe enough for the final encounter with the world, or he is scared of this monster of a yogi, who has in a way, outstretched even the limits of Gorakh Nath's own yogic Order. Whatever the cultural or existential explanation may be, there is no more any place for Puran in the Dera of Gorakh Nath. He is too much for that assembly of ordinary mendicants. Thus shocked and baffled, Puran obeys his Guru, and leaves for Sialkot.

One can well imagine the predicament of Puran. He is being shuttled from one place to another. In each encounter, he leaves nothing but disaster. Either he is tortured, or some one else suffers because of his supposedly spiritual ideals. And, what obviously must unnerve him most, is that even his own Guru did not take kindly to his extreme posture. The sequences of events follow each other with such rapidity that he hardly has time to breathe. In the Dera of Guru Gorakh Nath, he seemed to have realised the ideal of his life. His past behavourial pattern was just the stuff that was needed for such an ideal, but this also let him down.

Before he could adjust to this new way of life, he had already crossed its limits. Before Sundran, the predicament was whether or not to cross the threshold of the palace. Personally, for him, it was not a difficult step. He simply followed the rules of the book, but he never imagined the consequences. He never, even once, stopped to think of Sundran as a person. The other disciples taunted him to oblige the princess to descend from her palace. His charm and his steadfastness combined with his noble lineage could easily achieve that. But, he was not mentally prepared to handle the psychic predicament of Sundran. It was quite easy to stand to the passion of Luna. The collective consciousness supported him all the way through. But the sentiments of princess Sundran were of different order.

3.14. Broken and disheartened by the farewell gesture of his Guru, Puran follows the road to Sialkot. When Raja Salwan asks the yogi Puran for the boon of a son, for no child plays in his compound, and his palace is deserted, Puran would have wondered on the strange opposition of the deserted well and the deserted palace. Apparently, where the son Puran is, there is life, where he is not, there is desert. But this was not so, not long ago. He was chased from the palace like plague, and thrown into the deserted well. Was the well in the wilderness, after all, not such a deserted place? Puran had taken the light of the House of Salwan with him, and had left behind, in spite of his supposed act of aggression, disobedience, and impertinence, the palace all deserted. The severest of punishments had after all, satisfied none. Luna must have been tormented both for the lack of a child, and due to her guilty conscience, for she lost both her beloved, and her household. Her life with Salwan even before was not a happy one. The little encounter with Puran left her completely shattered. Salwan had waited for twelve long years to see his son. Within a day, he transformed frustration into desperation. The angry and jealous Salwan had acted in hurry. It had left him completely empty and deserted. It was not just any palace, but Salwan's palace, which was like a desert. And, the cruelty of the situation is that he himself, however justifiable his act may be, is responsible for his tortuous state of mind.

3.15. The operation continues. Puran inflicts another cut to the wound he had just opened. He asks Luna to reveal the truth of the incident, if she desires a son to her. Luna bursts forth. The truth cannot be hidden from the yogi. What was personal torment until now becomes a public affair. For the last twelve years, she must have been tortured for the false accusation, which served no purpose, which did not yield any harmony in the Luna-Salwan relation. There was none before. Once Puran had destabilised whatever false conjugal union there was between husband and wife, there could not be any peace in the aftermath of the bloody incident. Now, that the truth is revealed, Salwan is furious. The triangle is again complete, but the roles are reversed. Salwan would have none of Luna, but Puran councels patience. It was not her fault. She did what she could, whatever her impulse commanded her to do. But Salwan, yes, his father, Salwan, did what no father had done ever before. Anyway, he gives him a grain of rice, the symbol of fertility, with which Luna would conceive, and give birth to a mighty prince.

3.16. Salwan must now keep his unfaithful wife, and lead a life of utter frustration. Until now, their marriage had not been consummated. The grain of rice of Puran would help the undesircd union, and a son will be born, naturally a son-brother to Puran. Indirectly Luna has also achieved what she longed for. The child of Luna will be due to yogi Puran's blessing. He will be born, fertilised by the grain of Puran. There is nothing that Salwan can do about it. In anger, he had gotten rid of his rival. In helplessness, he has to accept all in utter humiliation and disgrace. When the truth was not revealed, there was emptiness in the compound, and the palace was deserted. When the truth is revealed, the compound will be filled with the laughter of a child and the palace will abound with life, but this laughter and this life will not be due to Salwan. He will now be a ghost in the resounding environment of the high walls of the palace.

When Puran's identity is revealed, Salwan asks his son to inherit his throne and bring light to the dark house of his father. Puran refuses flatly : if you cannot govern your kingdom, let it go to the dogs. I would have none of it. For all these years, I have suffered the weight of tormenting memories, only God knows what I have borne. I will have none of you or your belongings. I am a yogi, I must go.

3.17. But what kind of a yogi he really is? A yogi, who has been nursing his wounds, a yogi who had held the norms of the highest exigencies of his Order, a yogi who has been completely dehumanised, a yogi who has suffered, and who now must make every one suffer for ever and ever more. The resolution to the crisis of the House of Salwan prescribed by Puran inflicts a permanent wound which will simmer and squeeze at the slightest movement, and continue to increse progressively in the severity of its pain. His blessings of a son to Luna include the curse that like his mother, Icchran, Luna too would be tormented when her son would leave her. He actually does in the second sequence of the narrative, not discussed here.

Puran's meeting with his mother, Icchran, is the only gentle and humane episode in the whole narrative, but it becomes a sideaffair in the general context of the sequences of relationships. In any case, it does not deter Puran from the path of psychic confrontations that he seems to have chosen for himself.

IV

4.1. This analysis of the sequences of the legend of Puran follows the constituting process of the narrative. It is quite different from the usual interpretations which move along either the collective social norms, as is the case with the poet Qadiryar himself, whose version is our point of departure, or the conditioning factors of our socio-economic course of history. All these factors have to be taken into account by any critic who ventures into such an enterprise, but for us, a cultural myth or a legend is primarily a cultural discourse, whose logic is not always apparent at the manifest discursive level.

The creative process is necessarily a semiotic process. The signs and symbols which constitute a given narrative represent, not only the traditional values attached to them, but they also derive their significance from the mutual interaction they have with each other. One can always condemn or approve a given act on the basis of the so-called public morality or collective consciousness, but this collective consciousness is constantly and obligatorily in confrontation with individual consciousness. And, this is precisely the motive force which brings about transformation.

Social change is inherent in the very constitution of the society. A social structure is never in complete harmony. Its different constitutents are invariably in a certain composition of disequilibrium, which needs to be deciphered, not only at certain specific points, but also in its entire framework. Every human impulse must, by definition, have a psychic history. One cannot just brush aside the confinement of a child to a dungeon on the basis of an astrologic prediction without properly analysing its possible repercussions. After all, Puran could not have acted the way he did, if this confinement had not taken place. If the little Puran had been playing in the garden of Salwan, he may not have even married again. Secondly, how far it is psychologically legitimate to expect of a child to have respectful attitude towards his stepmother? And, inversely, is it really natural for a young stepmother to consider another's child as her own? In any case, how can one expect normal public behaviour from a person who has been imprisoned for twelve years, who has grown up without the sight of his parents, whose psyche has developed under the curse of the traditional astrology? And, above all, what does it really mean that father and son shall not behold each other for twelve long years? The confrontation of destinies is writ large on the entire canvas of the painting, that is being slowly constituted, but whose contours are laid down on the very first day.

4.2. A cultural discourse is not a cultural resolution. It is an attempt to solve the riddle of human condition in the form of another riddle. What cannot be stated or explained in simple terms, in the form of language, is presented in the form of a semiotic constituion. As such, there are always several interpretations. After all, it is not the only legend of the culture. It is one of the several attempts at resolving the riddle of human condition which remains always an enigma in the general context of human creative activity of a given people. This is really the creative process. Man never stops constituting the logical sequences of his impulses. The process of decomposition is not only at the individual analytical level of comprehension, the collective consciousness also constantly participates in the continuous process of pulsational forces, which give rise to the evolutionary historical configurations.

4.3. The decomposition of a human situation involves the decomposition of all the psychic comportments which constitute a given personality. The interaction is at psychic level. The psychic constitution of a being is due to the cummulative process which begins from the very beginning.

This is why once Puran is condemned to the darkness and deprivation of his parents in the dungeon, and the parents are deprived of the laughter of the little child, the psychic compunctions, which will lead them from one sequence to another, are the logical consequences of the entire narrative. When Gorakh Nath restores the hands and feet of Puran and admits him to his fraternity, he should have known what was at stake. Puran was no ordinary disciple. He will not only learn and excel in the austere discipline of yoga, he would also carry with him, the twelve years of the dungeon, the confrontation with Luna and Salwan, and the immobility of the deserted well, into the traditional path of yogic constraints. One thing follows another. The interaction of impulses is double-edged. It is not possible for the human constitution of Puran to forget his contact with Luna, the only woman of his life, and the immediate consequential contact with the jealousy and the wrath of his father, Salwan. He had twelve long years to meditate on his human condition in the solitude of the deserted well. And, by the time he goes back to Luna, a logical compulsion and a sentimental journey back into the depths of his memory, he had another, but quite different, contact with a woman, in the person of Sundran. In the case of the first confrontation, he was supposedly the victim, at least at the physical level, if one ignores the tormented vascillations of Luna. In the latter case, the situation is of another order. It is Sundran who suffers physically, but how can one ignore the consequential fact that if Guru Gorakh Nath, the guardian of public morality and religious sanctions, was shaken at the demise of Sundran, Puran could not possibly escape the psychic fall-out from this tragic Sundran-Puran contact. Luna obviously did not know all this. In her psychic comportment, there is only the first confrontation and the following execution of Puran. No doubt, she also nursed her wound for a long time, but this period at Sialkot refers only to the deserted palace. It is bereft of the high drama that is now being played elsewhere. The nucleus is Puran. His scene of action changes place. The rest of the dramatic personae must wait and suffer until he comes back. But he is no more the same Puran that now Salwan and Luna meet. No doubt, he probes the past. He makes them swallow the bitter pill of the truth of the earlier incident. He is revengeful and cruel. But his cruelty is now cold-blooded. He does no more act on the impulse of the moment. His memory is surcharged with other deeper cuts, which he is obviously not willing to share with any one.

4.4. If one wants of come to this conclusion for the sake of argument, Puran emerges from this saga of internecine psychic warfare in the form of a new yogi, who perhaps not only outstretches the traditional limits of yoga, but also surpasses his Guru Gorakh Nath. This is also, of course, the only way, the tradition can continue in the dynamic confrontations of the discipline. The psychic monster of the darkness of the dungeon, hardened by the immobility of the deserted well, becomes a monster of a yogi before whom even Guru Gorakh Nath must bow in reverence. After all, in the normal process, there is always an inbuilt elasticity of adjustment in the contours of public morality, collective consciousness, and the highest ideals of spiritual austerity. No one really believes in their absolute adherence. And, here comes Puran, who not only follows them like the rules of a text-book, he far surpasses them in their uttermost outer limits.

This argument leads us to a blind alley. Do we then approve of Puran's reactions in each confrontation, and condemn and discard all other human impulses as low and unworthy of our cultural behaviour? Obviously not. If it were so, there would not have been this legend. This legend, like all legends, like all creatively constituted discourses, began with a certain problematics, it untied certain knots, but in the process of successive resolutions, constituted innumerable other riddles, which the cultural creative faculty will continue to decompose and recompose ever after.

4.5. The psychic imbalance of Puran is being restored by two women. The one is, of course, his mother, Icchran. The other is Sundran. Luna is responsible for the first major emotional disequilibrium, but she neutralises the effect with the physical torture that Puran is subjected to. In the case of Sundran, the situation is different. Not only, it is Puran who insists on her audience in the first place, it is Sundran who tortures herself for his sake. She makes the supreme sacrifice of her life. When Luna meets Puran for the second time, he is a grief-stricken yogi. Towards Luna and Salwan he has the sentiments of revenge. A great wrong was done to him. He can justify his act. The entire cultural consciousness supports him, but no matter what justification he probably had in the beginning, in the initial response of Sundran, he cannot blame the one who is no more, who had de-existentialised herself, who has apparently freed Puran of her obstacle. But what is not manifest is immanent. Since he cannot react to Sundran, he is psychologically immobile, and in this immobility, neither nature nor culture will help him. He must suffer her memory for ever. Her violence to herself has obviously cleansed her of all human impurity. If one ventures to say at this stage of the analysis, Sundran's sacrifice humanised the austere disciple of Gorakh. What the Guru could not do, she did. And, the Guru was not so wrong, after all. It is he who so willingly gives the gift of Puran to Sundran. Does it refer to one of the yogic percepts that woman is the greatest teacher of man?

4.6. The semiotic system of the legend seems to have been constituted of two main signs : distance and memory. The distance involves both space and time. The antagonists are separated in the dungeon and the palace or the deserted well and the palace, but this separation is never forgotten. Each actor of this drama is a prisoner, both phsically and mentally. The distanciation gives them time to think of oneself and the other at the same time. Since one cannot forget the other, the other who is present next door, who is planning and scheming, the other who is either a tyrant or a victim, the other who is there in the compulsion of the verdict. whose confrontation is also a foregone conclusion, as each period of forced separation is very clearly demarcated, one is existentially, completely, immobile. There is always the other end of the distance and the time.

In other words, in this distance, the memory of the other is the immobilising factor. One is never really free even in solitude.

The spatial distance is a period of introspection, but the deep traces of the psychic wounds inflicted by the other hinder the spiritual progress, if one dare use this expression in this context. However, one cannot escape this dilemma. After all, the hero is supposed to be a yogi or a bhakta, the one who should ponder over the absolute. The logical sequences of the narrative do not leave any door for a spiritual exit. Puran, as well as all the others, are bound to each other by the passions of love, hatred and revenge. They twist and turn each other's destiny. The apparent solution that the legend tries to provide is the deliberate separation of the opposites. The astrologers knew that the father and the son would collide, so the best way to avoid confrontation was to separate them. This is a normal judicial practice. The collective tradition could not foresee the aftermath of the slow cooking fire of twelve years. Fire is the image that Qadiryar uses again and again. When Luna meets Puran, she is consumed by the fire of sexual passion. When Salwan listens to the false story of Puran's advances, he is burnt with the fire of anger. Puran is the only one who never lets the flame of his inner fire emerge in the physical world. He controls his fire. This is the role of the yogi. But, his fire burns slowly and surely, and his victims find no exit ever. Sundran is the only one who outwits Puran. She is his victim, but she is not revengeful in the ordinary sense of the term. She turns inwards, tortures herself, and quits. For once, both the arcs of distance and the memory of the other, present on the other side of the wall, are broken. Puran is freed of this constraint which helped him constitute his psychic path until now. He can go back to Salwan and Luna, and react. But no such thing is possible for Sundran. She is gone. Her absence is irretrievable.

The immobilities of the dungeon and the deserted well were existentially controlled immobilities. They were within the grasp of Puran's psychic vision. There was always another end to it. This radical disappearance of the Other is a new phenomenon in the spiritual culture of Puran, the disciple of the great yogi, Guru Gorakh Nath. Hence, there are two types of distances in this legend : the distance of the dungeon and the deserted well, which is marked, and, the distance of the physical annihilation of Sundran, which is unmarked. Puran was physically surrounded by a certain configuration in the former case. He was still a novice. The mental training of the future yogi was controlled, it followed certain specific contours. Now, he has acquired the maturity of a pilgrim. He has been freed of all collective constraints. he can wander in the wilderness of the jungle, or in the vast spaces of the civilised world, he will always be existentially immobile. This newly acquired freedom will be far more difficult to keep within the spiritual grasp of the yogi Puran. But, now he has reached a certain stage of mental conceptualisation that he does not need the other end of the spatial distance, he frees himself even of the sentimental journey into the depths of his fathomless memory. He is able to existentially dominate the situation, and with a jerk, he breaks the last thread of the umbilical cord that still bound him with the world around. Now, he must be ready to face the world within.

The Cosmology of Heer Waris

1. Introduction

The legend of Heer and Ranjha in the poetic composition of Waris Shah (1710-1799) is the most popular text of millions of Punjabis, be they Muslims, Hindus or Sikhs, living in India, Pakistan and the various countries of the globe. It is a long narrative poem of about a hundred thousand words and is probably the only text in any literature which is appreciated both by the most sophisticate literary critics and the peasants who have heard it sung by the village bards in the evening assemblies of young and old. How crystallised is this discourse may be judged from the fact that it is preceded by nearly a hundred other poetic versions since the sixteenth century. At the slightest occasion Waris indulges in generalisations on the nature of men, women, the affairs of this and the other world which has given Punjabi language a vast treasure of its popular sayings. Within a general anthropological context of the mediaeval Punjab, Waris attempts at conceptual formulations which begin from the most ordinary, mundane affairs of this world and invariably move to a cosmological context where the highest principles of faith and friendship are underscored with divine sanction. But above all, it is the pristine purity in thought, word and deed on the one hand, and mind and body on the other, that mediates the conflicting ideological parameters.

2. Presentation of the Text

2.1. The ideological context of the discourse is existentially situated immediately by Waris Shah with an invocation to God, who made love, the fundamental principle of this universe, who is the first lover, *ashaq*. and Prophet himself is His first beloved, *mashuq*. God blesses those, says Waris, who live and die in love.

2.2. We move rapidly to the nucleus of the narrative. In the prosperous land of Takht Hazara on the bank of river Chanab live the Ranjhas. Mauju is the Chief of the village. He has eight sons and two daughters. Dhido, the youngest son is his darling. The elder brothers and their wives are jealous of this over-indulgence. They are envious of Dhido but can do nothing in the dominating presence of the father who is respected and feared by all.

As luck would have it, Mauju passess away and immediately the conflicting desires manifest themselves in open rivalry and downright exclusion of the other. As the land is divided amongst brothers, Dhido gets the worst tract.

He is ridiculed by all and sundry. Spoiled by an indulgent father, Dhido is not able to manage his affairs. He has no interest in ploughing and irrigating his fields. He has lived the life of a dandy of the village. Playing on his flute, he moves around the assemblies of young boys and girls. As long as his father was alive, Dhido's brothers were careful and their wives were always very affectionate. But enough is enough, the old man is gone, and now it is a matter of rights and duties, the affairs of the world with all their complex intrigues. Dhido Ranjha is a complete misfit in this new emerging social reality.

The sisters-in-law taunt Dhido. They have been at his beck and call but now he will have to lead the life of an "adult", a responsible householder. They are no more his "maid-servants". If he cannot manage his affairs, let him go and marry Heer, the already legendry beauty of the Chief of the Syals, in the valley across the river Chanab. Depressed and disgusted, Dhido says farewell to his childhood, to the land of his parents.

When the brothers come to know of Dhido's departure, they hasten to stop him. It is one thing to maltreat your brother and quite another to expel him from the village. It is a matter of their "honour". What would the "others" say? They request him to stay on, they plead in the name of their father and mother. How can one live without "brothers"? Without brothers no one cares for you. Without brothers there is no refuge in this world. Those who have brothers and their helping hands, they are strong and the world is afraid of them. Without brothers you are nobody. The world without brothers, says Waris, is a deserted world, a lonely world of the poor and the desolate. But Dhido Ranjha had had enough of these "brothers". He was betrayed, he was insulted and rebuked by the same brothers and their wives. He can stand this no more. He bids them a definitive farewell and leaves Takht Hazara for good.

2.3 Ranjha, as Dhido would now be called in the rest of the narrative, arrives at a mosque in the evening. As the melodies of his flute echo in the neighbourhood, a large number of peasants gather around him. They are all tuned to his divine rhythms. Soon the Mullah arrives and is furious to see all these undesirable folks hemming around the House of God. It is a sacrilege. He cannot tolerate this musical indulgence at this hour of prayer. He orders Ranjha to get out and find some other place for his enjoyment. Ranjha pleads in vain. He is expelled by his brothers. Desolate, he came to the mosque to spend a night in peace and tranquillity. He will play no more on his flute. He may be pardoned. But the Mullah does not entertain such vagabonds. Look at his dress, how unconvential it is. Look at his haircut and the beard. Has he followed the laws of the religion? He cannot have such young fellows in the holy precincts of his mosque where the elders and the chiefs pray, where authority reigns. As humility was never the principal characteristics of Ranjha, he begins to argue. Are the mosques only for the rich and the corrupt? This Mullah is no priest of God, his anger and lust do not behove a man of religion. He has transformed this sacred place into a den of lust and leisure. But this is not what Allah ordained and he has every right to pass the night. As the Mullah realises that all his remonstrations will serve no purpose, this young man is not going to leave the mosque, he gives in and lets Ranjha sleep in a corner.

2.4. Early morning when the world begins to wake after the rest and the conjugal indulgences of the night, Ranjha leaves for the country of the Syals. It is daybreak. The farmers are heading towards their fields to plough their fertile lands, the sparrows leave their nests in search of food for their offsprings, the brides and sisters-in-law get busy with the churning of the milk and with the cleaning of the courtyards. The hearths are heated, the bread is baked. The shopkeepers open their shops, the village elders get ready to manage the affairs of this world, to settle disputes, to negotiate contracts, to bring peace and harmony to this prosperous land.

Ranjha arrives at the bank of the river Chanab and requests the boatman, Ludhan, to take him across. But Ludhan is a respectable businessman, he does not deal with such vagabonds who pay nothing and spoil his reputation. The poor fellow is again insulted. Humiliated, he sets himself in a corner and begins to play on his flute. The sweet melodies of his music attract the travellers who gather around him in large number. This infuriates Ludhan even more. Instead of getting rid of this hippy to save his business, he begins to lose his clients. When the travellers insist that Ranjha should be taken along with them on the boat, Ludhan has no choice.

2.5. Across the river is the country of Heer, the beautiful daughter of Chuchak, the chief of the Syals. Heer comes to the bank of the Chanab with her friends to swing and dance in the valley. There is a resting bed which Heer uses to repose and relax. Ranjha choses this lovely place for his rest. Relaxing on Heer's bed, he contemplates on his fate and the ways of the world. As he was tired, he falls asleep. Meanwhile Heer arrives with her "sixty" friends, the young charming damsels of Jhang Syal. They are furious to see this transgression. How dare this young man rest on Heer's bed? Shouting and yelling they surround Ranjha and when Heer is about to thrash him with her stick, Ranjha awakes, and, beholden by Heer's celestial beauty and charm, says, O Dear! Heer smiles and surrenders! She regrets having made all this fuss. This archetype beautiful girl whose figure is described by Waris with all the metaphors and similies from the classical tradition of Oriental exaggeration, is taken in by this young man from Takht Hazara. Their eyes meet and they exchange sentiments of love and faith. Ranjha is sceptical, for one cannot trust women. Even the sacred texts warn that one should beware of the guiles of women. But Heer is not one of them. She invokes God, the highest principles of divine love and promises to be faithful under all circumstances, against all odds. She would die rather than relent from her faith. Nothing in this or the other world can stop her from being united with Ranjha. This is a word given in the presence of God and His chosen Five Sages.

To continue their romantic meetings, the lovers devise a plan. Ranjha is engaged as a cowherd, *mahi*, by the parents of Heer. Every morning, Ranjha takes the buffaloes and cows of the Heer household and wanders around in the thick forest along the banks of the river Chanab. Heer joins him with his mid-day meal prepared with love and affection and all the sweetness of sugar and honey.

They share this meal, the *churi*, together, and with the blessings of the *panj pirs*, the Five Sages, their union is sanctified. Ranjha plays on his flute whose bewitching melodies keep the herd of buffaloes bemused. They graze on the green grass of the forest and run around everywhere like young girls.

In this atmosphere of happiness and divine romance, everything seems to be in perfect harmony when an uncle of Heer, the lame Kaido, gets whiff of this affair. One day when Heer is away in search of water from the river, Kaido appears in the guise of a faqir and begs for something to eat. Ranjha is taken in by his humble supplication and offers Kaido, a part of the Churi that Heer had brought for him. When Heer returns and realises what had happened in her absence, she is furious. She runs after Kaido, and after a long chase, she catches hold of him and thrashes him with her stick, but Kaido is able to keep some of the bread, Ranjha had given to him.

Kaido goes to the mother of Heer and tells her that this cowherd Ranjha is no simple young man, he is supposed to be. He is a bandit who has stolen their Heer. Her daughter has ruined the honour of the family. It is time, Heer's parents take note of her sorties in the forest. The whole world knows what is going on, only the parents are in the dark. This is most immoral on the part of the daughter of the Chief of the Syals. The best solution, proposes Kaido, would be to marry Heer off to the son of the Kheras, the Chiefs across the river, on the other side of the Syal country.

When Heer returns home in the evening, her mother Malki, admonishes her. Her behaviour is most objectionable. Going around with this domestic servant that Ranjha is in the guise of a cowherd, is most degrading to the chiefs. If she knew her daughter would turn out to be such a whore, she would have put her in a box and thrown in a river. If she knew, Heer would ruin the name of their family, she would have pushed her in a deep well. If she knew that her daughter would indulge in such immoral acts, she would have had her cut into pieces.

Heer respectfullyreplies that O dearest mother, she is doing no such thing. Her relation with Ranjha is the purest of human unions. It is sanctified by God himself. She has solemnly promised herself to Ranjha. And, as the Holy Quran itself states, there is no more serious crime than backing out from one's word. This promise of hers is the most sacred word. If she betrays Ranjha, she will be pushed into the fires of hell for ever and ever more.

When Heer's father, Chuchak, and her brother, Sultan, admonish her, the same scenario is repeated. On the one hand, the honour of the family is invoked, and on the other, the sanctity of love blessed by God Himself. Heer does not believe that she is doing anything wrong against the family and the tradition. She invokes the great lovers of the religious and the secular traditions, who died for the sake of their highest principles of faithfulness and fortitude, whose actions were ultimately approved by the authorities of Church and State. But all this is in vain, and Heer's parents negotiate a marriage proposal with Saida, the son of the Chief of the Kheras.

2.6. At the marriage ceremony, the Muslim priest, the Qazi, reminds Heer of the rules of the Islamic tradition. Both sides must willingly agree to the nuptial bond, the Nikah, in the presence of two witnesses and a legal negotiator. Heer replies that she is already married to Ranjha in the presence of the Almighty God and her witnesses are the two angels. The Prophet Himself is her legal negotiator. The Qazi considers her story nothing but a figment of imagination. There is no religious sanction for such an argument. She must follow the will of her parents and the dictates of the sacred tradition. Heer replies that nothing is more sanctified and authentic than a solemn word given to another person. She reminds the Qazi that according to the sacred texts those who do not fulfil their promise are sure to go to hell. She invokes the highest spiritual principles of love which are supreme, which are not abandoned even by God Himself. The Qazi replies that Heer's arguments have nothing to do with this world where the honour of the family and the tradition is the only criterion. None has the right to set his or her own rules. Heer is adamant. She is not proposing another set of rules. She has the highest respect for her religion and her tradition, but above all, she has faith in the supreme ethics of divine love and the sanctity of the union approved by God Himself. The Islamic tradition clearly states that she cannot be married against her will, against her solemn promise given to another man. So it is not she who is transgressing the tradition but it is the Qazi who is misinterpreting the sacred texts. When the Qazi threatens that her parents would kill her if she did not obey them and the law of the land, she replies that what is the point of saving her life now if for her broken promise she will have to suffer the fires of hell for eternity after her death, for even if she does not die today, she will die some other day. What is the good of living a life of a damned person waiting for the punishment of God after life? Heer's revolution, if this fashionable word must be used in this context, is a revolution from within, from within the same ideological framework in which the Qazi and others are operating. It is interesting to note that while others abuse and admonish Heer in the harshest possible terms, she never even once loses her calm. Very respectfully but very resolutely she sticks to her principles. Against the abstract tradition of honour and faithfulness to the sacred laws of the land, Heer proposes equally abstract arguments of the sanctity of the principles of spiritual love and divine promise. In fact, both the antagonists are not at all interested in a marriage to one or the other person. For example, not even once it is argued by the parents or the Qazi that Saida with whom they want Heer to be married is any better than Ranjha who is the choice of Heer. Nor does Heer make any attempt at a counterargument. This is not at all the issue. What is at stake is the social structure perpetuated by the legality of the religious tradition on the one hand, and highly abstract spiritual significance attached to the principles of love and faith, also found in the same tradition, on the other. This is why time and again, Heer invokes the great lovers of the past whose authenticity has already been approved by the sacred texts. We realise now how Waris had existentially situated the ideological context of his narrative in the very beginning with an invocation to God, the first lover, the *ashaq*, and the Prophet, the first beloved, the *mashuq*.

When the Qazi realises that this girl is an absolute nuisance, and, arguing with her is a sheer waste of time, he calls for the usual "witnesses" and, marries her off with Saida. After all, this so-called condition of mutual assent is only a formality. One never really bothers about whether the girl and the boy are willing or not. Marriage is a union of the two families, it is invariably a social and economic contract held by the feudal virtues of honour and chastity. If every girl is allowed to marry the boy of her choice, what will happen to the social and cultural order without which no religious tradition can survive. If the witnesses begin to really take their witnessing seriously, the courts of the land can never function "smoothly". The socio-political order depends upon the equality of exchange. Of course, in the case of Ranjha, there is no problem. Heer knows that he is the son of the Chief of Takht Hazara even though for others he is a mere cowherd, a domestic servant. Heer is not transgressing the laws of the feudal order. Her high, abstract principles of faith and friendship fall well within the established tradition even if they do not suit others. But the problem is not just Heer. Heer can go to hell, argue the neighbourhood women with her mother, Malki, but this disease is contagious. They are worried about their own daughters. And, who knows other girls may not be so selective, may not be so blessed by the Five Sages. This would upset the whole world order as envisaged by the elders, and as perpetuated throughout the centuries. Hence, this slip of a girl must be stopped before it is too late.

Apart from the caste ridden Hindu society with religious sanctions, the Muslim social structure in the mediaeval Panjab is also based on distinctions due to what may be called the professional classes. There is a class of cobblers, a class of goldsmiths, a class of ironsmiths, a class of washermen, a class of potters, a class of fishermen and so on. These classes have no religious barriers and probably not much economic discrepancies but culturally these thresholds cannot be crossed. One is born into a certain class and stays there for ever. The problem with "love", *ishaq*, says Waris Shah, is that its "current" is too strong to be confined within these social slots. If the floods of the emotions of love are not controlled, the whole world order will be inundated, and obviously, this cannot be allowed.

If the daughter of a cobbler runs away with the son of a goldsmith, the goldsmith's daughter with the son of a potter, then what will happen to the purity and the excellence of these professions, for according to Waris Shah it takes thiry-one generations to acquire finesse in art and techniques in each domain. The mediaeval Punjab is a world where only the absolutes matter, where each person is supposed to be perfect in the sphere of his activity. The transprofessional mobility is unheard of in this world of unidirectional movements.

2.7. In the celebrated passage often sung in the assemblies of young girls, *doli charhdian marian Heer cheekan*, the Heer of Waris cries like all girls are supposed to at the time of departure from their paternal home. As Heer is put in the palanquin, the *doli*, she bids farwell to her father, *babal*, that she is being taken away by the carriers against her will, forced by the Qazi and the relatives. She is going empty-handed, all her wealth is left behind, her, Ranjha, her mother and father. She is desolate, for none would care for her Ranjha now.

She herself is going to an unknown country of the enemies. Her fate is sealed. With Ranjha she had dreamt of a blissful heaven of union and love, she is left with separation and frustration. She begs pardon of her father for all the mistakes she might have made during her short stay at his place, under the comforting shade of his tree. She requests to be excused by her mother whose love and affection she can never forget. She prays for her brothers. She wishes them peace and prosperity and all the riches of the world. This world is a short-lived dream and none should hope for a bright future, for God's ways are unknown to man. We desire one thing and we get another. We build imaginative heavens and we are pushed into hell. Even the prophets and the great lovers of the past could not escape God's wrath.

And, Heer weeps for his beloved Ranjha who is left alone in the care of God. The Qazi and the elders have acted like the butchers. She has become unconscious of everything. She did not have time even to bid farewell to her friends of childhood. She is leaving like a body without its soul. The relatives, the elders and the neighbours forced her into the planquin. The wealth of Ranjha is looted by the Kheras. Today, Takht Hazara and Jhang Syal are deserted and Rangpur is humming with celebrations. She cries in vain. What can a weak woman do against the cruelty of the strong and the powerful? She did not have time to have a good look at her Ranjha's face, she was absolutely helpless. There was time, a separation of a day would have been unimaginable, and now, nobody knows what is in store for her. She hoped for one thing and got another, these are the ways of God. The merciless God has separated the lovers. She prays for Ranjha. Even though all her hopes are dashed to the ground, she has faith in the bounty of God, who alone knows what is good for His creation.

But this physical separation cannot separate their souls. The Qazi, the parents, the brothers have strangled her but she is not going to live with the Khera. She will spend the rest of her life weeping for her Ranjha. God willing, she will one day meet him again. What an inauspcious day their love began? They could never foresee such cruel days.

2.8. Meanwhile Heer is getting used to her new state. Along with her mental purity she is able to protect her physical purity with the help of the Panj Pirs, the five divine sages, who respond to Heer's prayers and do not let Saida approach her bed.

As the parents of Saida realise that Heer had had an affair before her marriage, they decide to not to let her return to her *peke*, her parents. This forced separation increases Heer's anguish and she laments for the good old days of love and the devastating present mental state of having to live with those she hates. To describe her state of mind Waris composes the traditional Bara Mah, the twelve months, during which we follow the seasonal variations in correspondence with the fluctuating spiritual agony of Heer.

In *Sawan* (July) Heer expresses her helplessness. Her parents, her friends forced her to marry the undesired Saida. All other girls of the village welcome the refreshing air and the rains on the swings while Heer thinks of the days when she too was happy and could enjoy the pleasant weather and swing for hours on the sentimental horizon of love for Ranjha.

Sawan is the month when every girl is happy and enjoys the romantic elan of the seasonal change. But poor Heer cannot participate in this general atmosphere of gaiety. She prays to the Panj Pirs to help her bear this intolerable situation when her anguish knows no limits.

In *Bhadron* (August) Heer cries for she cannot see her Ranjha. She cannot sleep at night. She cannot spin during day. In the absence of Ranjha, Heer spends her time weeping in seclusion, for she cannot share her grief with any one. There are dark clouds in the sky. For some they are the symbol of hope and fertility. For Heer they are threatening with gloom and disaster. She is a captive in the camp of the enemy. Other girls are busy and preoccupied with their personal and family affairs but Heer is restless. In this separation from Ranjha, she is in perpetual motions of agony and desperation.

In *Assu* (September) Heer still believes God will help her. She prays for her union with Ranjha. This separation from her love is cutting her like a sharp knife. When she sees the full moon at night, she experiences an internal upheaval. This moonlit night, this cool atmosphere only sharpens her pangs of separation. It reminds her of the lovely moments her friends are enjoying. Poor Heer, she draws the lines of fate to see if her Ranjha would ever come to see her, to deliver her from this captivity. Her faith in God is not shaken and she tries to reassure herself that one day the things will change. God's grace would fall on her and there would be a reunion after all. But this moment of hope does not last long and she falls again into the valley of despair.

In *Katak* (October) there are floods of sorrow. In this month she would love to go to the woods to meet her cowherd Ranjha. Dear friends, when she was at her parents, she enjoyed the company of Ranjha during these days of mild, pleasant weather. And, now here at Rangpur, she would rather smear her body with dust. All her friends are away, there is none to share her pain, her anguish. Without Ranjha there is none to take care of Heer. She is ill but only the medicine-man Ranjha can cure this disease. There is no Ranjha around, none to respond to her dreams. This is the season when she would have gone with Ranjha for a swim in the river Chanab to cool her burning desires.

In *Maghar* (November) the severity of Heer's anguish deepens. She longs for her lost love. She assures him that she has kept herself pure in mind and body for Ranjha alone. For her, after the Prophet there is none other than Ranjha to whom she belongs, for whom she lives. She prays to both of them not to forsake her, for she has none other to go to. She hopes that maybe one day grace will descend from Jhang Syal to Rangpur and there will be a reunion of love after all. Ranjha is her love, her religion, her faith. Alternately, she prays to him and to the Almighty to have pity on her. Her faith will win on the day of Judgement and the Prophet will be her witness.

In *Poh* (December) Heer shivers alone in her bed. She is all alone, lonely in her thoughts and her words. She has no friend. She cries in vain for her love. The whole night she weeps and at daybreak she leaves her bed as if nothing is happening. She must suffer in seclusion, for the world is cruel and does not care for the honesty of the lovers. Her heart is wounded. When nobody is around, she wipes her tears of sorrow, for she dare not share her secret with any neighbour.

In *Magh* (January) Heer thinks of suicide. She can stand it no more, she would rather swallow poison than continue to lead this wretched state. In any case, all this youth and charm is only a dream of a few days. It cannot last forever. But her hope and faith do not let her die. Maybe he will after all come one day, perhaps God will finally relent and the good happy days will be there for the two lovers. She does not want to live any more in the mansions of her-in-laws. She would rather be in the woods with her Ranjha. But again she relapses and realizes that it is no use waiting for the one who would never come. It is better to rely on one's own faith and resolution.

In *Phagan* (February) there is spring. The flowers are blossoming all over. There is sweet smell in the gardens. Her friends are enjoying the company of their lovers but Heer is not destined to such happiness. she is being wounded by the sword of separation. She longs to be with Bibi Fatima with her hair down and on her knees praying for her grace. And, again. she is sad. She curses her mother who gave her birth, to a girl who is destined to suffer and spend her life in utter misery away from her love. There are the ones who laugh and be marry. They are blessed by the Almighty. And, here she is, all burnt within, in sadness and solitude. a cursed being, whom the Prophet has forgotten.

In *Chet* (March) all the young girls and brides are dressed up for the festivals. They are all decked with beautiful dress and jewellery. They are perfumed and their coiffures are most fascinating. They are happy with their lovers, they are enjoying their blissful unions. And. here is Heer, all alone, her heart sinks, her body aches. She dare not manifest her agony to others, she does not want to spoil this atmosphere of grace and beauty and love. She is afraid. She is depressed, but above all, she is alone, so miserably lonely in this most happy surrounding submerged in romance and reunion.

In *Waisakh* (April) Heer is bewildered at her deteriorating mental condition. She is afraid. her miserable state is no more a secret. Even earth and heaven have joined hands to torture her. She consults the astrologers, the Brahmins, the yogis to find out if there is any hope in the days destined for her by God. She curses herself, the day of her birth, she inherited nothing but sorrows and sufferings. Maybe one day, all this will be an old tale, for she believes in spite of all indications of her stars that her faith will overcome all the divine and human obstacles, and, she will meet her love.

In *Jeth* (May) the temperatures have shot up. The air is burning and Heer is consumed from within. She is burning in the fire of separation. The happy young married girls have descended in the cold basements with their husbands, and here is Heer standing on the roof top looking for her love. She waits in vain. As the sun rises and rains fire on Rangpur, Heer is all burnt. within and without. In this tortuously burning atmosphere even the birds have fled leaving Heer all alone to suffer her agony. She prays to the Almighty, to the great Sufi saints, to come to her rescue. for she has never offended them. She has always followed the path of righteousness.

In *Harh* (June) it is so hot that one cannot even breathe. Heer can stand it no more. Her breasts are burning. She is being cooked alive like a fish. She feels as if she is being pierced

by a sword. The pain is cruel and continuous. She succumbs to this terrible state. She asks travellers if they have any news of Ranjha, her cowherd lover. It is hot, she is thirsty, but Heer's thirst can be quenched only by the touch of the lips of Ranjha. Only he can cool her burning fire within. She thinks of Ranjha and she vibrates with desire. She longs to meet her love. But, alas, it is not to be, she must continue to suffer, for ever.

2.9. During this period of separation and utter frustration, Ranjha meditates on his destiny and the ways of God. Poor fellow, he was pushed out of the country of his father only to spend years in the wilderness of the jungles. But even though he had to lead the life of a cowherd and a domestic servant of the Syals, he had had the satisfaction of the company of Heer. The reunions of course were occasional. There was the omnipresent uncle, Kaido, and the whole neighbourhood that kept an eye on the sorties of Heer. She had to be careful. Once the secret was out, once the parents were duly warned by the society, the going became rough, and, the happy romantic days were over well before Heer's marriage to Saida. Heer had at that time suggested that they should elope but Ranjha did not want to go as far as that. He probably still thought that a straightforward union with Heer was possible. He was after all the son of the Chief of Takht Hazara and there was no reason why he could not marry Heer in the normal process. But what he did not realise was that while a regularly arranged marriage between these two feudal households was perfectly in order, it could not be so, once he and Heer, both had transgressed the prevalent social order and the scheme of things ordained by the elders.

Ranjha now conceives of another plan which is equally otherworldly. He decides to become a yogi to reach the country of Heer's in-laws. He arrives at the abode of Guru Bal Nath, the famous disciple of the great Guru Gorakh Nath. Bal Nath is pleased to see the handsome Ranjha all set to be initiated in the discipline of Yoga. In the beginning, the Guru hesitates, for Ranjha appears to be too adventurous a young man. He is eager, has all the initiative and inspiration but Bal Nath feels that the young boy may be only infatuated by the general allure of the yogis, he may not be able to stand the hardships and austerities required in the yogic Order. Above all, he is not convinced that such a young man can forsake the desires and passions of youth. The most important requirement is the avoidance of sex. For a yogi, all women are sisters or mothers. A yogi has not only to take the vows of poverty but also of chastity of mind and body. Ranjha is adamant. He is sincere in his wish to adhere to the discipline of yoga. He has left the pleasures of a feudal household. He has already renounced all wealth and vanity. There is nothing left for him in this world except to follow the path of God and Bal Nath is the great guru who has attained salvation and who can save all who fall on his feet. Ranjha is here at the abode of the great sage in all humility. His honesty is beyond any doubt most sincere and he would spend the rest of his worldly days in the service of the great master.

Bal Nath is pleased at this devotion and the initiation ceremony is prepared. After a ritual bath amidst the chanting of mantras, Ranjha's head is shaven. His long, beautiful,

black hair are cut off, and his ears are pierced for the yogic rings. His body is smeared with ashes. The Guru blesses Ranjha with the grace of the Almighty who has himself accepted him in the great yogic Order of Guru Gorakh Nath. Waris Shah remarks that within a few moments the Guru transformed the cowherd peasant boy into the pure gold of a yogi.

Once the ceremony was over, once Ranjha had satisfied himself that there was no going back, even Bal Nath could not withdraw his entry into the yogic Order and the blessings of the Almighty, he disclosed his real purpose. He had come to the great Guru for the gift of Heer. He could avoid all lust, all the worldly goods, all pleasures of this mundane world, even all women, but Heer was another question. He tells the Guru that it is long since he has surrendered himself to Heer. When he was young and handsome and Heer's breasts were full and she was the most beautiful girl, they fell in love, a sentiment and a union which was sanctified by the Panj Pirs, the five divine sages. It was not a worldly affair of sex and lust, theirs was the purest relation, a relation approved even by God.

Bal Nath is angry. He feels cheated by this jat boy but Ranjha immediately replies that had he known that the guru would forbid him from his Heer, he would not have even pissed on this so-called holy abode of the yogis. He had come to the great guru thinking that the divine sages were omniscient, they know all, hence his honesty and purity in thought will not be questioned.

Bal Nath realises his mistakle but also accepts the fact that the boy is sincere. He is not hypocrite like all the other disciples around him. Ranjha is sincere and true to his word. His devotion and honesty cannot be challenged. So Bal Nath decides to accept him as his most favourite disciple and prays for him for his Heer. After a long meditation when the guru opens his eyes, he blesses Ranjha that his prayers have been accepted by God, and the Almighty Himself has bestowed on him the gift of Heer.

2.10. Blessed by the great Bal Nath, the yogi Ranjha leaves for Rangpur, the town of Heer's in-laws. When he reaches the outskirts of the habitation, he meets with a shepherd, *ayali*, who informs Ranjha of Heer's new situation, of the family of her husband, and how he can reach there. While they were so engaged in exchanging confidences, a wolf takes away a sheep. The shepherd is alarmed and furious but Ranjha calmly gets up and with one stroke lays the wolf down on the ground. The shepherd is duly impressed by this brave young fellow whose yogic garb was only deceptive. Henceforth he becomes a willing accomplice of the yogi.

Ranjha tells the shepherd how he was deceived, how Heer, his beloved and his *right* by the grace of the Panj Pirs and his own righteousness, was snatched away by these folks of Rangpur, the Kheras. Now even the great guru, Bal Nath, has blessed him with the gift of Heer. His mission is thus sanctified by the highest authorities. The shepherd agrees with his new friend and is willing to give him all the secrets of the family of the Kheras.

The most important is that Heer's sister-in-law, her husband's sister, her *nanaan*, Saihti, is in love with a Bloch boy, Murad, and if handled properly, may end up being an accomplice in his enterprise.

2.11. And, here is Ranjha among the Kheras. The yogi encounters the young girls of the village on the common well where they have come to fetch water. They are bewitched by the handsome figure of Ranjha yogi. One such girl is Saihti, the sister-in-law of Heer.

In the now famous passage of Waris, *ghar a nanaan ne gal kiti...* Saihti describes the new yogi in the town to the bewildered Heer who cannot believe her ears. Dear Bhabi, there is in the town a new yogi with beautiful ear-rings and a necklace which sets his figure off like no one has ever been so adorned. This yogi seems to be looking for a lost jewel. At times he smiles, at times he weeps, it is a strange spectacle to watch him move around the village. He is handome like a moon, he is tall like a Saru tree. Some blessed mother has given birth to such a charming yogi. He is in search of something which one cannot understand. O Heer, he is not a yogi, he must be a son of a great lord, you cannot imagine, his charm is incomparable, even your beauty is no match, my dear. He is going around in the assemblies of the girls but is not taken in by any. With eyes bowed, he is a picture of humility. Some say, he is king Bharthrihari who has renounced his kingdom. Some say, he is a thief of beauty, some say, he is from Jhang Syal. Some call him the yogi from Takht Hazara. There are all kinds of rumours but none has been able to understand his behaviour. But one thing is certain, this yogi is no ordinary fellow, he is definitely going to create some trouble. Beware, my friend!

And, in the most feminine voice of the century, the Heer of Waris responds to this long awaited and yet unbelievable news. In absolute despair and anguish Heer weeps for her Ranjha. Poor fellow, what has he done for her. He got his ears pierced and head shaved to wear these rags. This prince of Takht Hazara is now torturing himself with yogic drugs. He was so young and handsome and now he has smeared himself with ashes. He has no father, no mother, no brother, no sister; who is going to stand witness for him? Accursed is the mother whose moon-like son has covered his body with dust. Accursed is the sister whose prosperous brother has become a faqir. Accursed is the woman whose husband has renounced this world. Accursed is the girl whose handsome lover has pierced his ears to rot like a wretched beggar. She will spend the rest of her life in utter sorrow and depression. Her weeping will never end, her tears will never stop. Why don't these people let him alone? Why are they after this poor yogi?

But she would rather not believe these rumours. She wishes that this yogi may be someone other than her love. She curses herself who is such a helpless prisoner. And, it is Ranjha after all, who has done all this, who has suffered all the humiliation of a faqir to be able to reach her. Covered in her veil, Heer weeps for her love. He was such a spoiled boy, was used to such comforts, and now as a yogi, as a faqir, he is going around the houses of others to beg for his daily bread. Poor fellow, what did he get out of this affair of love, laments Heer.

After a series of confrontations with Saihti where Ranjha and Saihti both accuse each other of the falsehood they are spreading, of the camouflage of the yogi, who is in reality looking for his beloved, of the vain pride of Saihti who herself is not so simpleton, being deeply involved in an affair with the Bloch merchant boy, Murad, Ranjha reaches the guarded

precincts of Heer and begs alms in the name of his guru, Bal Nath. Heer is emotionally perplexed, she does not know how to respond. Ranjha pleads that he is the true disciple of Bal Nath. His guru has bestowed on him spiritual powers with which he can cure all diseases, change destinies, administer the impossible, and unite old lovers.

Heer replies. O Yogi, you are telling lies, there is none to remove the misfortune, none to bring back old friends. She would offer her own skin for his shoes who can perform such a miracle, who can cure the disease of her heart. God has forsaken those who indulge in amorous plays, who yearn for their loves. I would sacrifice everything, my body, my life, who can alter these ways of God. The dead and departed can never meet again, this is the Order of the Almighty. A crow snatches away the game from an eagle, I wonder, what he thinks of it, how he cries for the lost treasure. The world makes fun of those, with fantasies of unions, who are wounded in love. The field of a peasant is on fire, nobody is going to extinguish it. I will lit lamps of *ghee*, and distribute sweet *churi* if ever I get the news of my love .

The yogi offers his blessings. God is great and one should have patience. For the true lovers, for the honest and the pure, the Guru is always ready to perform miracles. There is no dearth of bounty in the House of the Almighty. He has finally blessed their union and this is no occasion of remonstrations or complaints. They should rejoice in the blessings of the Guru whose yoga has enabled him to reach his love.

One day when Ranjha comes to their house on his daily rounds, Saihti is furious and breaks the begging bowl of Ranjha who curses her with eternal separation from her love. He is after all the yogi of the Order of Bal Nath whose word is law in this profane world. Saihti is scared. She realises her mistake of having annoyed the divine sage and pleads: *gya bhaj takdir de nal thutha, lai ja sathon qimat mat di we* ... It is by chance that your bowl is broken, she is ready to pay for it. The yogi should have patience with ordinary householders. They are ever on the wrong path, only the yogis can alter the destinies of the poor human beings. But the yogi is adamant : Saihti is a hypocrite. She is playing all these tricks to hide her own affairs, her own intrigues. She cannot take lightly the wrath of a yogi. The accusing words of wicked women like Saihti cut very deep. These wounds are not easily healed. She must repent. She must surrender to the will of the yogi. In it is her salvation, and of course, the salvation of all, also of Heer and Ranjha.

2.12. The yogi Ranjha settles down in the woods on the outskirts of the village where like a true medicine-man he heels the physical and spiritual diseases of the populace. Young boys and girls go to him for potions of love, the estranged women for talismans to capture their paramours, the daughters and sisters-in-law to resolve their disputes with the disciplinarian mothers and mothers-in-law.

Heer and Saihti are now friends with the common aim of reaching their lovers, of transgressing the laws of the householders. One day Heer pretends to have been stung by a "snake" and Saihti pleads that only the yogi of the black garden can cure her. The parents

relent and both the girls arrive at the garden of paradise. And, Heer finally meets her lover in this wilderness of nature, in this pleasure house of God:

Heer falls on the feet of the yogi
He presses her to his heart
A new miracle happened
The beetle went straight to the fire
In the sweet net of Heer's deception
The lover fell flat
Intoxicated, he talked madly
Blessings of faqir worked miracles
In the storm of lust
They lost all senses
Waris, thus God brings broken pieces together
And, the milk-pot overflows...

When Heer returns after the voluptuous union, the young girls of the village wonder what has happened to this girl who was always sad and melancholy, who never smiled, who showed no enthusiasm for the romantic seasons of the village. Today, all is changed:

The friends saw Heer
No more sad, all joy she was
Waris like *suhaga* on fire
She melt the gold of the Kheras...

Your cheeks are pressed
There are impressions of teeth
While the world was rolling cotton
You rolled the sticks of lust
You are molested
Your cheeks blush
Maybe, the dusty, dirty yogi
Has sat on your throne
A jeweller has opened the shell
That Saida could not touch...

As the beauties go around
the riches cannot be hidden
There was *Id* in the garden
The hungry had their fill of sweets
Their hopes are crowned
May the sisters-in-law be ever in the voluptuous gardens...

Your garlands of flowers
Are crushed by a bandit
A cruel, merciless fellow
Has broken the strings of your bow

What has happened to you
Your bangles, your necklace, your ear-rings
Are all in pieces
His will has changed
The Punjab has gone to the Kandharis ...

Meanwhile these voluptuous reunions of the lovers stung by the snake continue in the black garden. Ranjha helps Saihti to run away with Murad, and before the next daybreak, Heer and Ranjha also elope after a long night of celebration of their divine and profane love and lust....

2.13. After this the thread of the narrative is lost in confussion. There are several versions. One of the accounts states that Saida, Heer's husband, and his brother catoh up with the lovers and they are brought to the court of the prince of that domain. The Adli Raja, the just king, awards Heer to Ranjha and they return to Takht Hazara to live happily ever after.

Another versoin states that when Saida and company threaten to take away Heer, she swallows poison and dies. Ranjha cannot stand it any more and grief-stricken he also collapses on the corpse of Heer and they are buried together in the same tomb to be united for ever.

It is interesting to note here, however, that while the ends of other romantic legends of the region are so important, they represent the climax of the narratives, and the poets exaggerate that moment to the extreme, the end of Heer Ranjha tale is never taken seriously in any poetic composition.

3. Mediatory Prospections

3.1. The narrative of Heer operates at two levels of mediatory prospections : the anthropological level and the cosmological level. At the anthropological level, we encounter the cultural infrastructure of brothers' jealousies, the disputes about ancestoral property, the whole kinship system of the mediaeval Punjab, the feudal, social and economic structure with its intrigues and its exploitations. At the cosmological level, we encounter the same dramatis personae circumventing the realities of profane life with the sanctions of divine authority where all physical, social and economic factors pass through the sieve of spiritual crystallisation. Even religion which is the main undercurrent of the whole narrative is subjected to these pulls in different directions. On the one hand, we have the religious parameters which almost coincide with the anthropological cultural scheme of things, and on the other,

we are reminded of the higher, more sanctified references to the fundamental truths which surpass and transgress all thresholds of space and time. But it is interesting to note that even though these two parameters are in contradistinction with each other, one cannot operate without the presence of the other. They are bound in an obligatory framework of conceptual oppositions which derive their beings from each other. Hence, the narrative of Heer as articulated by Waris can neither be interpreted in Aristotelian terms nor in the spiritual space of Platonic fantasies. This text deals with an empirical reality which must be understood   within a conceptual framework that mediates between the two planes of anthropological and cosmological spatial translocation.

When there is a dispute between brothers, Ranjha is not interested in any settlement through the mediation of the elders of the village, the normal procedure in such cases. He simply decides to leave his native place. When the sisters-in-law and their husbands, Ranjha's brothers, come to know of this drastic action, they invoke the cultural importance of the unity of brothers, their joint strength, their solitary weakness, their union, their solidarity, but Ranjha does not operate at this level of universal, fundamental values of cultural or anthropological truth. His solution is otherworldly, he simply quits, for he knows that whatever may be the proposal of his brothers, it will bind him to the norms of the village life. He is not willing for any compromise. He must have either all or nothing. When his father was alive, he was not treated like one of his several sons, it was a special indulgence. But as long as the feudal lord was alive, the sons, Ranjha's brothers, dared not question his authority or his dispensation. There was no question of equality. It was his master's voice that mattered. And, Ranjha was obviously the chosen one, the one who was supposed to, or this is what Ranjha thought, inherit his wealth and authority. Interestingly, even this preference for Ranjha had already altered the normal cultural behaviour, for generally it is the eldest son who is supposed to continue the feudal estate, and Ranjha was the youngest son of his father. The old lord had already ignored the cultural norms of his society. Ranjha's brothers are jealous but they are helpless before the old man. When they and their wives decide to assert, Ranjha does not resist, he simply gives in, renounces all, and, quits. But the brothers had not bargained for such a solution. Even though materially they will benefit, they will now get all the land that belongs to Ranjha, they never wanted this undeserved share, for they operate within a cultural context where this is not permissible. One can quarrel with one's brother but one can never exile him. This is socially not acceptable. This is why they forget their dispute and invoke the highest principles of brotherly love and solidarity.

If the solution to the feudal dispute proposed by Ranjha is cosmological, his brothers counteract with equally powerful argument of anthropological truth but this is not to be, cosmology must overcome all obstacles of cultural anthropology whatever their level may be.

3.2. On his way to the country of Heer, Ranjha encounters the priest of the mosque where he wants to spend a night and the boatman to cross the river. In both cases, he faces

the same problem. Neither the priest nor the boatman welcome such vagabonds, such wordly irresponsible fellows who do not follow the normal parameters of culture. Instead of justifying in his own cultural terms, which was both legitimate and possible, Ranjha simply challenges their relation with God and Honesty, the two levels at which they are supposed to operate. The anthropological reasoning is opposed to cosmological logic. When Heer proposes a disguise of a cowherd, Ranjha accepts willingly, for this is the most ambiguous existence. To be cowherd of a feudal household is a normal occupation. So naturally, nobody has any suspicion. On the other hand, for Ranjha it does not matter. First of all, even anthropologically it is not in natural correspondence of the scheme of things of this world. Ranjha is the son of the Chief of Takht Hazara. He cannot be engaged as a cowherd in another equally important feudal household. Moreover, it is not even because Ranjha has been thrown out of his village and it is the economic compulsion that forces such a solution. As such, Ranjha is both *is* and *not* a cowherd. It is a cosmology intertwined with anthropology. Even their meetings in the woods outside the village where on the bank of the river Chanab, Ranjha grazes the buffaloes and cows of Heer, there is a geographical space which is both in correspondence with the profane village life and with the cosmological mental space which clearly presents a threshold of anthropological domain that is being constantly transgressed. It is interesting to note that not only there is a certain interlinkage between the profane and the spiritual, the anthropological and cosmological domains almost coincide. And, this coincidence, of course, is most deceptive, even at times, indistinguishable which gives rise to a kind of ambiguity superimposed on the whole narrative.

3.3. The existential condition of Heer is quite different. She has a much better understanding and a much stronger hold over both anthropological and cosmological planes. There is a qualitative difference. Heer remains squarely within the normal cultural parameter. As a Punjabi girl, she is confined to the family and home, hence there is no question of going beyond or fighting its basic tenets. For Punjabi boys it is different, even normally they are not expected to be such an integral part of the social structure. Their role is always peripheral. The social and cultural values are upheld primarily by the girls. The boys just fit in this overall structure but there is no conscious, deliberate effort on their part. Heer, as such, is closer to the cultural reality, closer to the bonds of family and religion. Even when all the possibilities are exhausted, all the doors are shut, she only invokes the cosmological principles but she succumbs to the ways of the world all the same. When their relation is no more a secret, when her mother and brother threaten her, castigate her, abuse her, she is most respectful. She tries to convince them with the usual arguments of love and honesty, faith and fortitude. When all this fails, she gives real historical evidence of the lovers of yonder days. Even when she is forced to sit in the wedding palanquin, she remembers the good old days she spent in affection and endearment at home, with her father, her mother. She leaves the home of her parents, her *peke*, like any Punjabi girl would.

Heer's disputation with the Qazi, the priest, is also of the same order. The Qazi seems to have reduced religion to the most ordinary rules of village life. Heer does not challenge his arguments. She only finds them ridiculous. She argues with the same logic. She reminds the Qazi that she cannot be married against her own will. This is the most fundamental principle of Islam. And, the witnesses, the Qazi calls, have to testify of her having accepted the contract that the religious ceremony *nikah* is supposed to be. This is simple anthropological logic. When nothing works, no reason moves the abdurate Qazi, Heer invokes the Prophet Himself and the universal principles of truth and love. Cosmology in the case of Heer is the last resort but once she has decided to force the resolution, there is no going back. The Qazi, the parents, the brothers can do whatever they like, she is a member of their social group and she understands the compulsions of the household and the family but neither anthropological nor cosmological counterarguments can weaken her resolve. She will physically submit to their will but she will never mentally accept their verdict. And, when all is lost, she invokes the Punj Pirs, the five divine sages, to protect her chastity in body and spirit, and obviously they come to her rescue.

3.4. One may conceptually perceive the two aspects of Heer phenomenon : Heer before marriage, the daughter of a chieftain, the sister of brave brothers, the spoiled child of a feudal household, an active and assertive Heer who takes all risks, who challenges all; and Heer after marriage, a bride within feudal constraints, a daughter and a sister-in-law who must submit to others' authority, a submissive and weak woman who can only weep or pray, lament or think of good old days and be more and more depressed and helpless.

Until her forced wedding, all the initiatives are taken by Heer. It is she who proposes to Ranjha to be her cowherd. She goes out to see him in the woods. Challenged by her wicked uncle, Kaido, she resolutely faces his anger. When parents question her bahaviour, her sorties with Ranjha, she continues to advance one argument after another. It is another matter that they all fail. The disputation with the Qazi is most illuminating. She has a sharp wit, she is resolute, she has logic, she knows the fundamental principles of religion. She is not only assertive, she is also a brilliant dialectician. It is within the parameters of Islam that she logically defeats the Qazi. She is not at all transgressing the threshold set by the Prophet, it is the Qazi, on the other hand, who is not true to his own mission of a priest of God. She never challenges the tenets of any parameter, profane or religious, she always measures swords at the level of truth and logic. The only difference is that while Heer is absolutist, she wants everyone to believe in what they profess, others always opt for a conciliatory middle path for fear of disturbing the normal social order rather than insisting on what should be the righteous path. As such, Heer's revolution, if this term is to be used at all, is a revoultion from within. She remains well within the framework of anthropological rules set by the society. She only insists on their adherence to the logical end.

As a bride at her in-laws, Heer is a different person. She is lonely, she is sad, she is depressed. She is no more active or assertive. Her only recourse now is to pray to the divine forces to come to her rescue, for she has never betrayed them. She was always true to their

principles. If she gave herself to Ranjha, her love for him was sanctified, pure and honest. There is nothing she can do against her husband, her sister-in-law, her mother-in-law and all the social guardians of a bride, but she can pray to God, she can reach the One who was always most dear to him. And, naturally, the divine sages are with her. Heer's purity in thought and deed, mind and body, is preserved. And, now all she can do is wait for her love.

And when the yogi Ranjha does arrive with torn ears, shaved head, and body smeared with ashes, we hear the most feminine voice of the Middle Ages. It is as a mother, sister, bride, beloved all rolled in one being that Heer weeps for her Ranjha who has renounced all, who has tortured his mind and body to become a yogi, to descend to the level of a beggar sadhu to meet his love. Heer weeps, cries, laments at this existential condition of her lover. She invokes an accursed mother, an accursed sister, an accursed bride, an accursed beloved who have lost their son, brother, husband, lover to the yogic Order, to the group of mendicants whose only earthly possession is their begging bowl, who must suffer heat and rain, thirst and hunger, always on the move from one wilderness to another.

3.5. Ranjha is made of another clay. When there was trouble at home, he simply decided to leave. Even with the priest of the mosque and the boatman, he had but a very minor confrontation. When he meets Heer and they fall in love with each other, it is Heer who takes all the initiatives. It is she who suggests that he should become their cowherd. She convinces her father and thereafter Ranjha simply follows Heer until her marriage. When Heer realised that she will be forced to marry Saida, she suggests that they should elope but Ranjha is not very enthusiastic. He tells Heer that love in deception is no love and they must not lead the life of dishonesty and falsehood.

But all this changes when Heer gets married and Ranjha is separated from his love. This prolonged separation transforms a lazy and spoiled Ranjha into an assertive, active lover who must plan and execute his schemes with absolute accuracy and maxium risk, for going to meet Heer at her in-laws involves a dangerous adventure in that era of feudal mediaeval Punjab. He decides to become a yogi and when Bal Nath is reluctant, he employs all the strength of his arguments and his sincerity to convince the great guru. When Heer was active and assertive, Ranjha showed no sign of an active lover. When Heer was helpless and confined to the house of her in-laws, his existential condition changes and he is transformed into a resolute man.

His confrontations with the yogis, the shephered outside Heer's village and with Saihti, the sister-in-law, all show how Ranjha slowly acquires a new being, a new responsibility to change this world, this world where lovers cannot meet, where the prisoner brides are confined to the dungeons of their in-laws.

3.6. And finally the voluptuous union in the *kala bagh*, the black garden, the black forest, the garden of Eden and the snake. The semiological contours are consistent all the way through. Ranjha crosses the river to reach the country of Heer. He becomes a cowherd

and they meet in the woods on the bank of the river Chanab, and now, the black forest. The river, the woods and the forest on the one hand, and the cowherd and the yogi on the other. The village, the society, the religion, all function within an anthropological context. The river and the forest represent both a correspondence and a threshold to be crossed. The anthropological world is never transgressed, it is always circumvented. The lovers simply go beyond the limits set by the social structure.

This is not even an opposition of nature and culture in the ordinary sense of the term. The black forest is outside the village but as there can be no village without a forest, they are in a complementary relationship. The routine conjugal life of the householders continues and the lovers continue to meet in the garden of Eden. The union in the black forest is not a sexual reproductive union, it is a voluptuous celebration, even a violent voluptuous celebration as has already been noted in the earlier section. It is almost a confrontation of two cosmological beings separated by anthropological norms. Hence, the celebration is cosmological in every sense of the term. This is an extremely important threshold in the narrative of Heer, for after this voluptuous upheaval, the story nearly ends. What happens later is not of much importance. And, this is exactly the reason why the end of this narrative is not very clear but nobody really bothers. This voluptuous cosmic celebration is really the climax.

This also explains the existential status of Ranjha as a cowherd and as a yogi. As the son of the chief of Takht Hazara in the guise of a cowherd, Ranjha *is* and *is not* a cowherd. So is the case at Rangpur. Normally, the relation between the householder and the yogi is that the householder is stationary, the village where he lives has a fixed locale and even though the yogi depends upon the village and the housholder for his living, he keeps on moving. But Ranjha is not a yogi who wanders from one place to another. He is a yogi *only for Heer* and for Rangpur. Hence, he is not a true yogi. On the other hand, a yogi is involved in the anthropological structure of the society, for he plays a complementary role in the whole scheme of rituals which must move within the anthropological and cosmological space. This space is not respected by Ranjha. He is not at all interesed in what goes on in this interlinkage. His mission is purely cosmological. He is neither complementing the social fabric of the village nor transgressing it. He simply sets up another parameter where he meets his beloved stung by the snake of love in the black forest, which is in fact not even a forest, for it no more functions as a link between the village and the outside world. Both Ranjha as a yogi and the black forest as a lien of voluptuous cosmic celebration represent exactly their opposite. There is a definite conceptual divide that defines the threshold they cross, a threshold that corresponds with a movement from the worldly to the inner depths of human predicament, the predicament of a non-being and being. Going to the black forest for Heer is not going from village to the garden or going from culture to nature. This journey of Heer from the house of her in-laws where she is a prisoner, forced to marry Saida against her will, and according to her, the will of God, to the black forest where she meets yogi Ranjha, her love, is a journey from the existential condition of a non-being to the realisation of her cosmological being, for after this cosmic celebration, Heer and Ranjha simply disappear.

They are dissolved in the unknown. This is why the rest of the narrative loses all semiological signification.

3.7. Finally, it is interesting to make a typological comparison with other legends of the Punjab. They always end in the death of the protagonists. Sohni used to cross the river at night with the help of an earthen pot to see her love. As the intrigue is revealed, her sister-in-law replaces the baked pot with an unbaked pot. When Sohni is on the bank of the river, she realizes the deception but it is too late, she must continue. She jumps in the river and tries to swim across against the strong currents. The unbaked pot dissolves and as Mahinwal hears the cries of his love, he also jumps in the river to be united with her for ever. The climax is death in the darkness of the night and the violent currents of the river in storm.

The potter girl Sassi falls in love with a merchant boy. When the elders in the caravan realise the folly of their boy, he is taken away by force on the back of a camel. Sassi follows her love on the burning sands of the desert. She is thirsty, her feet are swollen but she must continue in search of her lover on the camel. Exhausted, she collapses and her lover follows suit.

On the eve of the forced marriage of Sahiban, her lover, Mirza, takes her away on the back of a fast horse. Sahiban's brothers catch up with the lovers when they were resting under a tree. Mirza is asleep and Sahiban cannot make up her mind whether she should awake Mirza or not, for she hesitates between the death of her brothers and her lover. When finally Mirza gets up to fight, it is too late. He is brave and strong enough to kill a large number of the fighters of Sahiban's brother, Shamir, but in the end he is killed and Sahiban dies in grief.

All these legends end in martyrdom and the last passages describing their heroic deaths are the most celebrated compositions. As a matter of fact, the texts of these narratives are quite short as compared to the Heer of Waris or any other poet. Sassi and Sohni are ideal martyrs and Mirza is the great fantasmatic hero of Punjabi men, who has the fastest horse, who can single-handed fight against heaviest odds. Sahiban's existential condition is different but here also there is a real Punjabi predicament. Sahiban is not able to cross the threshold that separates her brother from her lover.

3.8. Heer and Ranjha do not die. Even if some versions lead to their death, the passages describing the event are extremely weak poetic compositions. In any case, the popular Punjabi consciousness neither remembers nor commemorates their death. They are certainly not the martyrs of Punjabi folklore. And yet Heer is the most popular heroine of the Punjab. Unlike Ranjha who moves from one disguise to another, who is neither a real cowherd nor a real yogi, who is a fantasmatic hero living on the margin of anthropology and cosmology, Heer is a proper anthropological being whose consciousness steers her path through the normal vicissitudes of a feudal household, who plods through all the upheavals of family and religious strifes, who is in confrontation with all the social and cultural structures of the

mediaeval Punjab. She is a brilliant dialectician who is able to crystallise the most complex existential situations created by kinship structures and the fundamental religious principles of tradition and history. At each occasion, she accepts the challenge, she argues, she tries to convince her adversaries within the mental framework of anthropological norms with utmost respect for the protagonist and advances cosmological argument when all sociological parameters fail. She is down to earth, a realist who functions within the limits set by the others with whom she must coexist. On the other hand, not even once does Ranjha bother about the social intrigues. He simply ignores the anthropological cobweb. Ranjha's strategy is very simple. Since this society cannot be changed, just ignore it. He tries to constitute a cosmological universe where these anthropological beings, these ordinary folks of feudal, or any other hierachy—for him this distinction is meaningless as he does not want to play their game—just do not exist. They all belong to a lower human race. He is in communion only with the Panj Pirs, the divine sages, and the great gurus of yoga. He operates at an entirely different wavelength.

No such thing for Heer, for she must both coexist with her adversaires and reach beyond the threshold set by their intrigues. If she challenges them, she stays within their mental framework. She never ignores them and consequently they too, be they her parents or the Qazi, the priest, cannot afford to disengage themselves from the high pedestal of their own ideals of universal truths.

And when all fails, Heer does not opt for an easy solution of death. Like any ordinary girl she succumbs to the historical weight of centuries of anthropological repression. No wonder, every Punjabi girl can easily identify herself with Heer, for her martyrdom, if this word is still to be used, is in her suffering, in the tortuous existence she leads at her in-laws. But her struggle is crowned in the cosmic voluptuous celebration in the *kala bagh*, the black forest, the garden of Eden. This celebration is a victory of mind and body, of cosmic forces of virtuous steadfastness over the stubborn undercurrents of anthropological world. And, here again, Heer is in perfect consonance with the mental flights of every young girl of the Punjab, who must suffer, but who must also succeed!

INTERPRETATIVE
DISCOURSE

On Translating Flaubert

The semiotic analysis of Saint Julien led me to a very interesting problem of translation. During my M.Phil Seminar on Semiotics at Jawaharlal Nehru Universty (1985-86) the students were given the Penguin edition of the English version. Since my analysis was based on the original French of Flaubert, the students pointed out a number of discrepencies. This led me to a full scale investigation of the problem and I realised that the English version represented an entirely different discourse.

The biographical note on the translator states:

> "Robert Baldick was a Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford, and of the Royal College of Literature, and Joint editor of Penguin Classics (1964-72). He translated the works of a wide range of French authors, from Chateaubriand, Flaubert, Huysmans and Verne to Montherlant, Sartre, Salacrou and Simenon. He also wrote a history of duelling, a study of the Seige of Paris, and biographies of Husymans, the Goncourts, Frederick Lemaitre and Murger".

In other words here is a case of an archetype translator who had all the qualifications mentioned in the traditional manuals of translation. He had maxium linguistic competence but obviously had not done a semiotic reading of the text that would have enabled him to apprehend the corresponding conceptual structure of the discourse. He invariably misjudged the immanent, introvert undercurrent of the discourse of Saint Julien and made "mistakes" where there was absolutely no problem of "language", thereby transforming the highly pitched existential discourse of extreme psychic internalisation into an extrovert semiotic structure. It is not even a case of "another reading" of the text, for as we shall see later, he is not conceptually consistent in his rendering. He worked very hard on "the linguistically difficult" portions of the text with excellent results but generally overlooked the significance of the existentially charged situtions which were consistently presented by Flaubert in very simple French. The translator took inexplicable liberties in all such cases and came out with a text conceptually opposed to the discourse of Flaubert. This disjunction can be illustrated by the following examples:

1. F. On vivait en paix depuis si longtemps que... (p.86).
   E. peace had prevailed for so long that... (p.57).

On the face of it there does not seem to be much of a problem yet it leads to a very serious distortion of the later movement of the discourse. Literally, we have : they lived in peace for such a long time that...Now, peace had prevailed, is a direct reflection of the prevalent atmosphere while the discourse is about the parents of Julien who lived in peace, whose peace will soon be disturbed. Even within a general peaceful atmosphere one may not be at peace with oneself. We will understand the signification of this disjunction as we follow the narrative. The subject or the active agent of this proposition are the parents of Julien whose castle is being described in the earlier passage, peace is only the "objectivity" in which they live.

2   F. mais le bon seigneur s'en privait, estimant que c'est un usage des idolâtres...   (p.87)
     E. but the noble lord made no use of it as he held it to be heathen institution...   (p.58)

Seemingly there is no problem also but it does point to the kind of casual attitude with which the English rendering is handled. Literally, we have : the seigneur (lord) abstained (from it) as he considered it to be the practice of the idolators. The introduction of "heathen institution" probably does not alter the over-all meanings but if Flaubert had indeed intended this introduction, nothing in French language stopped him from doing so. Even if such an alteration does not make any difference here, this casual attitude and this tendency to take liberty with the text leads the translator in serious trouble later.

3.   F. à force de prier Dieu, il lui vint un fils... (p.87)
      E. in answer to her prayers a son was born to her... (p.58)

Literally, to her came a son. Now the discourse of the opening chapter points to the piety of Julien's mother and to the marked resemblance of the child Julien to the baby Jesus, who of course, is going to attain sainthood at the end of the narrative. The "coming" of the divine child that Julien certainly is cannot be reduced to "birth". If Flaubert, following Catholic tradition, did indeed introduce ambiguity with the verb "come", it was not by oversight.

4.   F. un soir, elle se réveilla, et elle aperçut, sou un rayon de la lune qui entrait par
      la fenêtre, comme une ombre mouvante...   (p.88).
      E. one night she awoke and, in the moonlight which shone through her window,
      she saw what appeared to be a shadow moving...   (p.58)

Julien's mother is not really awake, her mental state is half-way between dream and sleep. She does not "see", she only "perceives" (aperçut) a moving shadow under a ray of the moon. The disjunction between seeing and perceiving can hardly be overemphasized

French Text: *Trois Contes*, Garnier-Flammarion, Paris, 1965.
English Text: *Three Tales*, Penguin Classics, London, 1967.

especially in the context of the psychic transformations that are taking place in the discourse. The notion of perception is further clarified when a little later, we have : songe ou réalité, cela devrait être une communication du ciel...When the tension is between dream and reality, one does not see, one only perceives .

5. F. toujours heureux...   (p.89).
    E. always fortunate...   (p.59).

I do not see any reason for rendering "heureux" as "fortunate" and not as "happy". As we will see later, these minor casual slips will in due course result in serious misunderstandings.

6. F. il doutât même de l'avoir entendue... (p.89).
    E. he was not even certain that he had heard it...(p.59).
    F. que sa mère comptait bien le voir...   (p.91).
    E. that his mother was certain that she would live to see... (p.61).

In the first example, "doutât" has been rendered as "was not even certain" when it refers to a mental state of "doubt", and in the second, when "comptait bien" refers to a state of hope and expectation, the translator introduces the element of absolute certainty. In this discourse of St. Julien nothing is certain. The psychic tension revolves around doubts, hopes, expectations, fears...

7. F. et demeura stupéfait devant ce petit corps qui ne bougeait plus...   (p.92).
    E. and was astonished to see the little body lie there without moving... (p.61).

Stupefied and astonished are entirely different states of mind. The little child is stupefied; and not at all astonished, he stands before this little body that moves no more, that moves no more because of "his action" that has stunned him, that has left him stupefied.

8. F. Le pigeon, les ailes cassés, palpitait, suspendu dans les branches d'un troène. La persistance de as vie irrita l'enfant. Il se mit a l'étrangler; et les convulsions de l'oiseau faisaient battre son coeur, l'emplissaient d'une volupté sauvage et tumultueuse. Au dernier raidissement, il se sentit défaillir...(p.93).
   E. the pigeon, its wings broken and its body quivering, was caught in the branches of a privet. Its stubborn refusal to die infuriated the child. He sat about wringing its neck, and its convulsion made his heart beat wildly, filling him with a savage, passionate delight. When it finally went stiff in his hands he felt he was going to faint... (p.62).

This passage shows most clearly what indeed has gone wrong in this rendering. A highly internalised existential situation has been trasformed into an extrovert state, inflicting a major psychic deviation on the kernel theme of the discourse of St. Julien. The "palpitating" (heart)

is rendered as "quivering body", and "suspension" is taken as "caught". It is interesting to note that throughout the English translation, the "movement" is rendered as a static state. "The persistence of its life" is somehow understood as "its stubborn refusal to die" and "irrita l'enfant" becomes "infuriated the child". The persistence of life is an internal affair, a state of hyper tension from within as is the notion of irritation. Both of these concepts are interrelated and lead to a unified psychic interpolation. On the other hand, the stubborn refusal to die and the infuriated state point to a conscious act, an external behaviour, almost an outburst, a state of mind most unfamiliar to Julien. This English rendering demonstrates a complete misunderstanding of the discourse of St. Julien. "The convulsions of the bird made his heart beat" has become "its convulsions made his heart beat wildly". Why this addition of "wildly"? And, the translation goes on with "filling him with a savage, passionate delight" where the French verison refers to a "volupté sauvage et tumultueuse". How on earth can one equate "savage and tumultuous voluptuousness: with "savage and passionate delight"? Passionate delight and tumultuous voluptuousness refer to two very different psychic centers of external and internal mental states. There is no question of a passionate delight, there is within the innermost layers of Julien's mind, a state of tumultuous upheaval which makes him feel "défallir", disintegrate, decompose, faint. It is only from a storm within that one disintegrates, and not from a state of passionate delight.

9. F. mais Julien méprisa ces commodes artifices; il préférait chasser loin du monde, avec
        son cheval et son faucon...p.95)
    E. but Julien despised these facile contrivances and prefered to go hunting on his own,
        with his horse and his falcon... (p.63)

To méprise is to mistrust and not to despise. There is no question of despise or hatred or dislike; it is an affair of "mistrust". Julien does not trust this world of the prince where the royal hunt is conducted with all the paraphernalia of artifices, he prefers to hunt "loin du monde", far from this world, and not "on his own", which does not evoke the conceptual opposition of the princely world and the world far from it. The translator missed both these kernel semantemes of "mistrust" and "far from the world", and presented a proposition contrary to the basic psychic theme of the discourse.

10. F. Il devint comme elles. Quand sa mère l'embrassait, il acceptait froidement son étreinte,
        paraissant rêver à des choses profondes... (p.97)
    E. He grew to resemble them. When his mother kissed him he submitted coldly to her
        embrace and seemed to be pondering over weighty matters.

To devenir is to become and not to resemble. Becoming is an existential state set in the psyhic transformation of the being; to resemble is only an external likeness. Living with the beasts, Julien becomes a beast, he does not simply resemble the beasts of the jungle, Julien the prince is no more a human being, his being acquires the state of the beasts. And, when

his mother embraces him, he responds with a cold hug, dreaming of things profound, and not pondering over weighty matters.

Julien the beast does no more respond to the motherly affection, he is cold, lost in another world, dreaming of profound things which do not belong to the world of his mother. Profundity refers to depth, mystery; weighty matters are the matters of this world, this external world, the world which no omore belongs to Julien, to Julien who does not trust it.

11. F. et ne pensait à rien, n'avait souvenir de quoi que ce fut. Il était en chasse dans un pays quelqonque, depuis un temps indeterminé, par le fait seul de sa propre existence, tout s'accomplissant avec la facilité que l'on éprouve dans les rêves... (p.99).

   E. he had no thought or recollection of anything at all. Only the fact of his being alive told him that he had been hunting for an indefinite time in s ome indeterminate place, for everything happened with dreamlike ease...(p.66)

The transposition of the subject, as in the very first example for "they lived in peace" into "peace had prevailed there", has changed the basic emphasis of the kernel semanteme. Instead of "he did not think of anything, did not have a souvenir of whatever there was", the translator has transposed the subject and unnecessarily shortened the sentence as "he had no thought or recollection of anything at all". The French version is assertive and emphatic, the break in the phrase is deliberate and should have been respected. The second part is a major distortion. Flaubert writes "he was hunting in some country, since an indeterminate time, with the mere fact of his existence, he accomplished all with facility that one has in dreams". The subject is "he" throughout the proposition which has been transposed into a non-personal category. It is "he", Julien, who had been hunting in some unknown country for an indeterminate time, and it is the fact of "his" existence that is responsible for the accomplishment of all with the facility that one has in dreams. In "everything happened with dreamlike ease" the subject is not Julien, which alters the basic existential parameter.

12. F. Des cerfs emplissaient un vallon ayant la forme d'un cirque; et tassés, les uns près des autres, ils se réchauffaient avec leurs haleine que l'on voyait fumer dans le brouillard ... (p.99).

   E. Before him lay a valley shaped like an amphitheatre and filled with stags. They were crowded close together, warming each other with their breath, which he could see steaming in the mist... (p.66).

Again the same problem of the transposition of the subject. There is no mention of "before him", and the subject is not the valley but the stags. "The stags filled the valley which had the shape of a circus (theatre), and huddled one over the other, they warmed each other with their breath that one could see steaming in the mist". It is a continuous sentence in French with proper phrase coordinations of relation and emphasis. Secondly, it is not "he", Julien, who could see, but it is the impersonal "on", "one" that could see in the mist. Flaubert's

use of the subject of the sentence is an extremely important stylistic device that delineates certain contours of existential emphasis in Julien's discourse.

13. F. L'espoire d'un pareil carnage, pendant quelques minutes, le suffoqua de plaisir... (p. 100).
    E. For a few minutes the prospect of such carnage as this left him breathless with delight... (p.66)

Why couldn't the translator render the sentence as "the hope of such a carnage, for a few minutes, suffocated him with pleasure"? "Left him breathless with delight" and "suffocated him with pleasure" are certainly not equivalent propositions. Julien was "suffocated" because the hope of such a carnage was a mixed hope, a hope that suffocates, that leads to an abyss. The present and the future are encompassed in this kernel semanteme, suffocated. This hope is a suffocation, it is not a hope of an ascending psychic order.

14. F. Puis tout fut immobile... (p.100).
    E. Then all was still... (p.67).

There may not be much external difference between "still" and "immobile", but in this context of the discourse, immobility as opposed to movement acquires a very specific connotation, which will be futher opposed in the second hunt where no such immobility is achieved. In the second hunt, the hunt that was not to be, the undesirable external movement makes Julien immobile from within.

15. F. il contemplait d'un oeil béant l'énormité du massacre, ne comprenant pas comment il avait pu le faire...(p.100).
    E. considering with wide-eyed wonderment the magnitude of the slaughter, unable to understand how he could have carried it out... (p.67).

One can understand the change of words when the cognates have different connotations in the two languages in question but a deliberate effort at such a substitution does not make any sense. Julien is "contemplating" and not "considering". He may be considered to be meditating or reflecting. Julien is struck by the "enormity" of the massacre, which he does not understand, how he could have done it. The recurrent pattern in this translation is that every effort seems to have been made to externalise the interiority of the discourse. The discourse of Julien takes place at a contemplative, immanent level, the translator transforms it into a manifest superficiality.

16. F. Il plia les genoux, ferma doucement ses paupières et mourut... (p.102).
    E. The stag's knees gave way, its eyes gently closed, and it died... (p.67).

Again the same problem of transposition of the subject of the proposition. It is not the stag's knees which give way or its eyes which are gently closed but it is he (the stag) who bent his knees, closed gently his eyes and died. An active construction transformed into a passive proposition loses its basic thrust.

17.   F. Julien fut stupéfait, puis accablé d'une fatigue soudaine, et un dégoût, une tristesse immense l'envahit...(p.102).
   E. Julien was dumfounded and then suddely overwhelmed with fatigue,disgust and a feeling of infinite sadness took hold of him... (p.67).

Julien was "stupefied" and not "dumbfounded" as the translator would have it, and he was not suddenly overwhelmed with fatigue, (he is) then overwhelmed by a sudden fatigue, and a disgust, an immense sadness attacked (enveloped, covered) him. Apart from the problem of not paying enough attention to the kernel semantemes like "stupéfait" and "immense", the translator's consistent mutilation of sentence structures, transpositions of subject-object relationships, so important for every existential confrontation signalling a given "condition humaine", side-track the basic thematic undercurrent of the discourse.

18.   F. la soliltude qui l'enveloppait lui sembla toute menaçante de périls indéfinis... (p.102).
   E. the solitude which surrounded him seemed pregnant with indefinable perils... (p.68).

Two kernel semantemes have again been casually treated. The solitude "envelops" him and does not simply "surround" him. The intense, internal relation of the envelop is not equivalent to being surrounded. Solitude is an abstract element of the psychic structure, it envelops like a shell, it penetrates the being of Julien. And, this solitude is not "pregnant" with indefinite perils, but it is "threatening (menaçante), again an active proposition.

19.   F. il criait pour connaître sa figure... (p.105).
   E. he would call out to him to show his face... (p.70).
   F. où il le traitait durement... (p.106).
   E. where he was treated very harshly... (p.71).

Here are two examples of the transposition of the subject. In the first sentence, he shouted (called out) "to know" or "to recognise" his face (for he was afraid of killing by mistake). The object is not called to show his face. The second sentence has the same problem. The French proposition is "where he treated him harshly". It is an active voice. It has been transformed into a passive proposition by "where he was treated". "He" refers to the Calif and "him" to the Emperor.

20.   F. il avoua son horrible pensée... (p.110).
   E. he told her of his dreadful fear... (p.73).

Even though it does not alter the current of the discourse, I do not see the purpose that is served by changing "horrible thought" into "dreadful fear". Moreover, "avoua" is not told, it is "cofessed".

21. F. et il entervit dans l'ombre comme des apparances d'animaux.... (p.110).
    E. in the half-light he saw what appeared to be animal forms... (p.73).

Here we have a case of the transposition of semantemes from one sign (word) to another. There is no mention of "half-light", the word, l'ombre, refers distinctly to "the shadow" but the semiotic point which is significant here is "entrevoir", "to notice across". Julien noticed across the shadow. He did not really "see", he only "noticed or perceived", he had an illusion of, for what he notices has only the appearance of.

22. F. C'est pour t'obéir... (p.110).
    E. I am obeying your orders... (p.73).

An unnecessary extension from "it is to obey you" and also another transposition of the subject, from impersonal to personal.

23. F. cependant elle redoutait une aventure funeste...(p.111).
    E. however, she feared some disaster... (p.73).

Here is a case of a contraction from "a fatal adventure" to "some disaster", these two semantemes may be semantically similar but they are semiotically quite different from each other.

24. F. et il marchait dans la forêt d'un pas nerveux...(p.113).
    E. and was walking through the forest with a springy step...(p.75).
    F. et il hésitait à s'avancer... (p.113).
    E. and he would pause... (p.75).
    F. le bois s'épaisait, l'obscurité devint profonde...(p.113).
    E. the forest became thicker, and the darkness deeper...(p.75).

We have here a series of problems of the comprehension of the discourse. Julien is not walking through the forest with a "springy step" but with a nervous step. The conceptual nature of this beginning of the second hunt, that is not to be, is opposed to that of the first hunt. Here Julien is nervous, he hesitates, il hésitait, (it is not a pause), he is not sure of himself. This nervousness and this hesitation to advance in the forest is due to the "obscurity" that is becoming "profound", it is not due to "deeper darkness". Moreover, nervousness, hesitation and obscurity, all have a common kernel semiotic undercurrent. Darkness as opposed to light has a connotation of clear, definite state, but the atmosphere which envelops Julien is

obscure where he is nervous, where he hesitates. These semantemes refer to Julien's state of mind and hence acquire an unusual significance for the comprehesion of this discourse of existential threshold.

    25. F. il aperçut un loup... (p.114).
          E. he saw a wolf... (p.76).
          F. Julien parcourut de cette manière une plaine interminable...   (p.114)
          E. In this way Julien crossed an endless plain... (p.76).
          F. des croix vermoulues se penchaient d'un air lamentable..(p.114).
          E. word-eaten crosses leaned over in a pitiful way...(p.76).
          F. un pouvoir supérieur détruisait sa force... (p.115).
          E. some higher power was rendering his strength ineffective... (p.76).

Here are a few cases of misplaced existential emphases. Julien is enveloped in obscurity where he hesitates to advance. He "perceives" there the appearances of animals, he does not "see" a wolf. In this obscure, uncertain atmosphere of anxiety, he crosses a plain that is not just "endless" but "interminable", this wild goose chase cannot be terminated, and, this helplessness exasperates him. The crosses here leaned over in a "lamentable" attitude which is not just pitiful. It is interesting to note here that in these examples, the translator has employed "clear" semantemes in place of "obscure" signals whereas in the last example, the semiotic direction is reversed. The translator has taken all the pains to come out with an indirect correspondence with "some higher power was rendering his strength ineffective". Rendering his strength ineffective, and, destroying his force, may be semantically equivalent but they operate at two very different semoitic parameters. All these four examples show how a slight deviation can alter the basic undercurrent of the existential thrust of the discourse.

    26. F. les bêtes manquant, il aurait voulu massacrer des hommes...(p.117).
          E. since animals were lacking he would gladly have slaughtered men... (p.117).
          F. il allait la surprendre... (p.117).
          E. he dicided to take her by surprise... (p.78).
          F. et il avançait vers le lit, perdu dans les ténèbres au fond de la chambre... (p.118).
          E. and he went on towards the bed, which was hidden in darkness at the far end of the
              room... (p.78).
          F. il se recula, croyant devenir fou... (p.118).
          E. he started back, thinking he was going mad ... (p.78).

Here is another set of our four examples with serious semiotic deviations. Since Julien missed the "beasts" (and not animals), he wanted to massacre men. This desire to kill in this macabre atmosphere results from an inner compulsion of dark psychic forces, this is certainly not a proposition where the semanteme "gladly" could be used. Similarly, in the next sentence he was "going to" surprise her, he does not "decide" to surprise. Julien is in no psychic mood to take decisions. He is not the master of the situation. The atmosphere of obscurity and

uncertainty continues, and Julien advances towards the bed "lost" in "obscurity". "Lost" and "obscurity" are kernel semantemes which form the basic semiotic parameter of this psychic threshold where Julien "retraces" his steps, "believing" he was "becoming" mad. Julien was not just going mad, he was becoming mad, his entire being was shaken, hence a more powerful, existential semanteme was necessary to describe the psyhic state of Julien. Also, he is not "thinking" in this atmosphere of extreme confusion, he is "believing". It is an existential state of believing and becoming and not of "gladly" wanting to do something or taking "decisions".

27. F. elle avait obéi à la volonté de Dieu... (p.120).
    E. she had done God's will... (p.80).
    F. il s'en alla, mendiant sa vie par le monde ... (p.121).
    E. he went his way, begging for his daily bread all over the world... (p.80).
    F. répoussé de partout, il évita les hommes... (p.121).
    E. rebuffed on all sides, he shunned mankind...(p.81).
    F. le besoin de se mêler à l'existence des autres... (p.122).
    E. the craving to take part in the life of other men...p.81).
    F. il contemplait avec des élancements d'amour..(p.122).
    E. he felt pangs of love as he gazed at... (p.81).
    F. il rechercha les solitudes... (p.122).
    E. he sought out lonely places... (p.81).

These six examples belong to the same textual context. They describe the mental state of Julien who has just committed parricide and is now struggling with himself to find an internal peace and tranquillity. This is a state of mind where the notions of obedience, existence and solitude acquire a semiotic significance beyond their normal semantic correspondences. Hence, all the deviations from the kernel semantemes disturb the existential ensembles which hold the discourse together at an immanent level. It is in this context, the context of extreme internal upheaval that "obéi à la volonté de Dieu" cannot be considered to be equivalent to "had done God's will". "Had done" and "obeyed" are two different mental correspondences. In the next example, in "mendiant sa vie", mendiant and vie are two kernel semantemes. It is an affair of "begging" and "life". It cannot be trasposed into "begging for the daily bread". That is what this proposition amounts to in a normal situation. But here Julien is engaging his life in the act of begging. It is not simply a matter of getting something to eat, it refers to the total involvement or engagement of his life. It is in this mental state that Julien "évita les hommes", avoided men, and not "shunned mankind". Shunned is an assertive act, avoidance is an act of submissive absence. When this psychic state weighs on Julien, there is "le besoin de se mêler à l'existence des autres", the need to mix himself with the existence of others. The kernel semantemes here are "besoin", need and "existence". They cannot be rendered into English as "craving" or "to take part in the life of other men". Life and existence are not corresponding semantemes. It is in the same psychic state that we

have, "il contemplait avec des élancements d'amour", he contemplated with the pangs of love. Julien is not just "feeling" the pangs of love, he is "contemplating", reflecting. Similiarly, in the last example, "lonely places" is a very low key substitute for the existentially highly charged, "solitude".

This note is not an exhaustive comparative analysis of Flaubert's text with that of Robert Baldick's English version. I have presented only a few examples to show the importance of the understanding of the semiotics of discourse for such an enterprise. In his enthusiasm to transform the French text into an idiomatic English version, the translator did not pay enough attention to the immanent undercurrent of the discourse that controlled the articulation of the text. It seems he concentrated only on the specific sections or even sentences he was translating. In this process, he missed the importance of the kernel semantemes which were existentially highly charged semiotic signals responsible for the coordination of the discursive ensembles of the discourse. As a result, we have a series of wrong semantic emphases and transformations of internal psychic interpolations into external, overt behaviourial patterns. The translator obviously did not follow what may be called the "psychic path of Julien", the movement from his initial being to the eventual becoming. This is why he invariably missed the most crucial situations of psychic tensions which were the existential thresholds leading Julien from one state of mind to another. The very casual handling of the subject-object relation, whose importance can hardly be over-emphasized in any encounter of the being with the other, also points to the same tendency. We have seen that the translator very frequently indulges in this transposition of the active subject-oriented propositions into passive object-oriented sentences without realising that it is not just a matter of rendering a semantic equivalent, this relationship is a semiotic device used by Flaubert to delineate a given existential situation. The third deviation results from the usual extensions or contractions of the French phrases where there was absolutely no need even for presenting a readable text in English. The stylistic devices empolyed in the original text should be faithfully maintained as far as possible. After all, even when one reads the English version of this narrative, one is interested in "reading Flaubert", and not Baldick.

EPILOGUE

The Abélardian Tradition of Semiotics

"Ces amants célèbres et malheureux, en un sens le premier couple "moderne" celui qui a préféré la passion "pure" à toutes les formes de l'embourgeoisement..."

M. Gandillac, *Oeuvres choisies d'Abélard*, 1945. p.5.

"Il est la première grande figure d'intellectuel moderne - dans les limites de la modernité du XIIe siècle - c'est le premier professeur."

Jacques Le Goff, *Les intellectuels au moyen âge*, 1960.p.40

"Abélard rentre en triomphateur et s'établit sur la montagne Sainte-Geneviève. Le sort est jeté. La culture parisienne aura pour centre à jamais non l'Ile de la cité mais la montagne, mais la Rive Gauche : un homme a fixé, cette fois, le destin d'un quartier."   Ibid. p. 42.

"L'Université de Paris est au moyen âge la grande école de l'Europe. Or, l'homme qui par ses qualités et par ses défauts, par la hardiesse de ses opinions, l'éclat de sa vie, la passion innée de la polémique et un rare talent d'enseignement, concourut le plus à accroître et à répandre le goût des études et ce mouvement intellectuel d'où est sortie au treizième siècle l'Université de Paris, cet homme est Pierre Abélard."

Victor Cousin, *Philosophie du moyen âge*, 1866. p.1.

"We have in France a monk without regulation, a preacher without solicitations, an abbot without discipline, a serpent who moves around in his cavern... This presecutor of our beliefs, an outsider, a heretic, is surrounded by a crowd of innocent people, he reasons on our beliefs in the streets and the squares, seduces children and women, and signs with his plume the most detesed heresies on our sacred dogmas."

Saint Bernard in a letter to the Pope.

"I am struggling to discover the turth, not to show arrogance, I do not dispute like a sophist, I examine reason like a philosopher, and above, all, I am in search of the salvation of my soul."

Abélard in *Dialogue*.

"The teaching is an affair of the youth. The students have the right to choose their own masters and they have the right to accept or criticize them. Knowledge is discovered and elaborated progressively, and none has the monoply of verity."

A student of Abélard.

"Saint Augustine exercized a cardinal influence on all speculation from the earliest to the last phase of medieval thought. From him, more than from any other authority, sprang the pronounced Realism

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Being the keynote address for the International Seminar on Theories of Signification since the Middle Ages held at the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris, in November, 1993.

that persisted into modern times. In the eleventh century there appeared a new view of knowledge that conflicted with the spiritual theory of Augustine and with his Neo-Platonic Realism. The first and foremost critic of the older tradition was Peter Abaelard..."

M.H. Carré, *Realists and Nominalists*, Oxford, 1946. p.vi

"Abailard's treatment of mental images (as we now refer to the likenesses of "imaginary forms") is extraordinary and has, so far as I know, no precedent in Western philosophy."

Martin M. Tweedale, *Abailard on Universals*, North-Holland, 1976. p.187.

Pierre Abélard, Petrus Abaelardus, (1070-1142) thus played the role of a precursor in a number of domains. For Gandillac, Abélard and Héloïse represent the first modern couple who followed their "pure passion" and shunned the temptations of bourgeoisie. Jacques Le Goff considers him to be the first "professor" of modernity, and the one who, once for all, fixed the destiny of the Left Bank, the Latin Quarter, as the Cultural Centre of Paris as against the religious hub of Ile de la Cité. For Victor Cousin, Abélard is the real founder of the University of Paris in every sense of the term – academic, revolutionary, the lieu of all contestations. In fact, Abélard did much more than dislocating symbolically the intellectual mental space by crossing over to the montagne Sainte Geneviève. As Carré and Tweedale have pointed out, Abélard administered a veritable epistemological cut in the Western tradition since Augustine. By dialectically negotiating a middle path between the two extremes of Neo-Plantonic Realism and Aristotelian Nominalism, Abélard not only established for ever the montagne Sainte Geneviève as the Cultural Centre of France but also laid down the philosophical space of French tradition which has always avoided the extremes of Anglo-saxon empiricism and Germanic idealist metaphysics. Abélard's theory of signification has been denominated as "conceptualism" by Victor Cousin[1] and "non-realism" by Jean Jolivet[2], and by various other epithets by other commentators, but all scholars of medieval studies agree that if Abélard criticized Neo-Platonic Realism, he did not fall in the trap of Nominalism of the order of later thinkers like William Occam. And, I intend to demonstrate in this paper that this Abélardian intellection on the nature of signification or semiotics later became the distinctive feature of all French philosophical meditations, the two most important landmarks being Condillac in the eighteenth century and Merleau-Ponty in modern times. All these thinkers laid heavy emphasis on language as the most significant and the only lieu of reflection and articulation. This is the phenomenology of language which is neither stuck in its stark materiality nor it is lost in the extreme ambiguity of ideal spiritualism. The historian of linguistic thought, Sylvain Auroux, has already described the enterprise of Condillac in Abélardian terms by stating that instead of nominalism, one should designate the doctrine of Condillac as a "linguistic conceptualism"[3]. We have also the testimony of Herman Parret who states that the Cartesian paradigm and the Condillacian paradigm represent important variations within the classical episteme. The question of the relation of language with thought depends upon the way one considers language as expression or as articulation of thought.

The Port Royal Grammar is an amended logic, a speculative metaphysics, while the Grammar of Condillac is a true philosophy of language, a new metaphysics. The interest shown for Locke in this opposition is due to the fact that the Lockinian semiotics is not a semiology as that of Condillac. The mentalism of Locke, even though it is framed within the empiricist epistemology, cannot correspond to a conception of language constitutive of knowledge and reason. In Condillac, language dominates : there is nothing but language, there is nothing outside language except its articulatory force[4]... And, in modern times, for Merleau-Ponty, every thought comes (is derived) from the words and to the words, it returns; every word is born in a thought and ends in it[5]. The word and the thought that it designates should not be considered as two external terms... the word carries its signification as the body is the incarnation of a comportment.[6] Moreover, the signified is not in the signifier as the pearl is in its shell. It should be recognised as a fundamental fact of expression that there is always a certain surpassing of the signifier by the signified. The significance emerges as much from the secret and masked relations between the signifying units as from the units themselves. Every expression is only provisionally fixed; provisionally, for the signified like the signifier is inscribed in the indefinite movement of differentiation and articulation, which characterises the thinking thought, *pensée pensante*, and the speaking speech, *parole parlante*.[7]

We can now describe the theories of signification of these thinkers in chronological order.

For Abélard there are primarily six modes of signification.
1. By imposition. The word, man, signifies mortal rational animal, for this signification is imposed on the word, man. The signification is thus due to human or cultural fact.
2. By determination. Rational or man referring to the substances whose predicates they are, also determine the characteristics of rationality. This is why Aristotle states in his *Categories* that the genre and species determine a quality with reference to a substance, a substance on which their names are imposed because of a given quality.
3. By generation. The intellection constituted in the word pronounced generates a similar intellection for the one who hears it.
4. By negation. A thing designated by a definite noun is in a way signified by an indefinite word. The word, non-man, attributed to an object becuase it is not a man, signifies in a way also the notion of man. It may signify many other things not covered by the word, man.
5. By adjunction. The name Socrates, signifies also a number of his accidental characteristics. The barking of a dog refers to its anger.
6. By consecution. When I say that I am his father, it is understood that he is my son. The signification is created within a relational space of reciprocity and simultaneity.[8]

It is in the discussion of the nature of universals that we follow the development of Abélardian theory of signification. The problematics revolves around the relation between the signifier and the signified, the word and the thing, and its numerous implications for the general theory of semiotics.[9] To signify or to designate is the function of words, to be signified

is that of the things. A universal is that which by nature can serve as a predicate of several subjects, a singular, which cannot. It seems that both words and things can be considered as universals, one has to see how the definition of universal can be applied to things. Abélard states that some thinkers attribute universality to things by arguing that there is essentially the same substance in things which are different only in form. If we take away the forms, there would be no difference in things. The difference lies in form or accidents and not in essence. There is the same substance of man which becomes here Plato, there, Socrates, due to their respective accidents.

Abélard argues that this theory does not stand the test of "physics". Suppose that there is in fact a being essentially the same, even though it appears in different forms, exists in different subjects. It must follow that the thing that is within this form be the same in another form. For example, an animal inhabited by rationality be also the animal inhabited by irrationality, thus the rational animal is at the same time, the irrational animal; as such the two contraries exist in the same subject. Moreover, they will not really be contrary as they would co-exist in the same absolutely identical essence. In fact, the contraries cannot be together in the same subject, even under different rapports, as it is the case with relational and other attributes. These contraries are presented by some thinkers under different prespective by stating that one should not formulate the proposition as "rational animal is irrational animal". A being can be rational from a certain point of view and irrational from another, the forms which correspond to the same subject are no more opposing forms. And, one does criticize propositions such as "rational and mortal animal" or "white animal and animal that walks", for man is not mortal inasmuch as he is rational or he is white inasmuch as he walks. The one and the same animal can have two properties under different rapports.

Then we come to the Aristotelian theory of ten essences or ten most general genres, for in each case we find the same essence diversified only due to different forms. Thus substances are absolutely the same beings, the same is true of all qualities and all quantities. The realities signified by Socrates and Plato are absolutely the same for essentially they are no more different than the substances to which they are attached as the quality of Socrates and the quality of Plato, for both are qualities. They do not differ from each other in the nature of their qualities or the nature of their substances as the essence of their substance is the same.

Abélard refutes this theory. First of all, why should one restrict only to ten essences. There can be more or less. And, how can we perceive a numerical multiplicity in substances if only the forms are different? We do not consider Socrates as numerically multiple just because he may have multiple forms. Another affirmation that does not stand the test of verity is the statement that the individuals are made by their proper accidents. If the individuals derive their being from their accidents, the accidents should precede them. If man differs

from other species because of the difference in form, the individual named, Socrates, is distinguished by his accidents. Socrates thus cannot exist without his accidents nor man without his differences. Socrates is not the substratum of his accidents. If the accidents are not in the individual substances, they are not in the universal substances also. The theory that states that an absolutely identical essence is found simultaneously in different beings is illogical, asserts Abélard.

There are others who have a slightly better theory of universality when they state that the individuals do not differ from each other only due to their forms, they are also individually distinct in their very essence. Matter and form are both different in every individual. Even if the forms are suppressed, their individual distinctions stay because of the diversity of essences. But there is an impasse, for the theory of universality is not abondend in this case. It is argued that the distinct beings are the same thing, not by essence but by non-difference. Thus the individual men are distinct from each other but they have the same being in man. They do not differ in the nature of humanity. This universality is due to this non-difference.

Abélard continues to present the divergent views within this doctrine of non-difference. There are some thinkers, he says, who perceive this universal element in the collection constituted of several elements. For them, Socrates and Plato by themselves do not represent a species, but all men taken together constitute the species, man, and all animals together form a genre. A certain unity is attributed to this collectivity, for without this one cannot have a predicate of several individuals. A universal thing will not have multiple subjects and the universals will not be as numerous as the singulars. As such, Socrates inasmuch as he is a man is dissociated from himself as Socrates. He cannot be his own genre or his own species if he is not in one way or the other different from himself, for the relative terms must oppose each other.

Abélard thus refutes this theory of collection. How can a collection of men taken together as one species be a predicate of several subjects and thus be universal while taken in its totally we do not attribute it to subjects taken one by one. If we accept that there is a predicate of different subjects according to its parts, it has nothing to do with the community of the universals, which according to Boethius, should entirely be in each subject. It is this that distinguishes it from the common base, which following its parts, is like a field whose different parts belong to different masters. We could then attribute the predicate, Socrates, to several subjects which would be his different parts, and he would himself be universal. Moreover, we will have to consider a universal any plurality of men put together. Similarly, we will make a unique universal substance from any collection of bodies and souls, and in that case the entire collection of substances will be one of the most general genres. In fact, argues Abélard, if one of the substances is subtracted, the remaining collection is not the most general genre while it is a universal substance. It must be a species of the genre of

substance and should have a species which corresponds to it under the same genre. A part is not identical with the whole but the species is always identical with the genre. How can then the entire collection of men be equivalent to an ensemble of animals?

Finally, Abélard presents the theory of those who consider individuals as universals inasmuch as they correspond with others, and accept that they are predicates of several subjects not because they are essentially multiple, but because these multiple subjects correspond with them. But argues Abélard, if to be predicated of multiple subjects is equivalent to corresponding with these multiple, how can we say that the predicate individual is accorded to another that is isolated? How the fact of being predicate of several subjects distinguishes the universal from the singular? For, man, inasmuch as he is a man, corresponds with several subjects, but neither man, inasmuch as he is Socrates, nor Socrates inasmuch as he is Socrates, corresponds with others.

Man in Socrates and Socrates himself do not differ from each other. Nothing can be different from itself. This is why Socrates as white and Socrates as grammarian, even though with two different characteristics, is not different from himself, for he is not a grammarian in a way that he is not himself, nor when he is considered white. When they say that Socrates and Plato correspond with each other in "man", how can we believe this, for it is certain that all men are different from each other in matter and in form.

It is obvious that the things, whether they are taken one be one or together, cannot be considered universals, i.e., predicates of several subjects. Thus we must attribute this universality, argues Abélard, to words alone. The grammarians consider some nouns as "appelative", others, "proper". Similarly, for the dialecticians, some simple terms are "universals", others, "particulars", or "singulars". The universal is a vocable that is instituted to serve as a predicate of several subjects taken separately, as the noun, man, that one can join with specific men due to the nature of the real subjects to whom it is attributed. The singular is that which can be a predicate of any one subject, like Socrates.

After presenting and refuting different theories of Realism from the extreme Realism of Augustine to the various modifications of non-difference, essentialism, collectivism, correspondence etc., prevalent in the end of the eleventh century, Abélard squarely situates the discussion within the theoretical space of language and dialectics. Ultimately, it is an affair of the nature of signification, the relation between the signifier and the signified. It is the problem of language par excellence. According to Abélard, apart from the proper nouns, all other words of language which refer to nature, essence, being of an object, animate or inanimate, are imposed by man for a variety of reasons, which is not only the problematics of signification but also and primarily that of the very creative process in which man is engaged as a cultural being. It is also the problematics of communication, of understanding

and of misunderstanding, of the constitution of the text and of the reader's understanding of the intellection generated therein.

Abélard states that the relation of "construction" that is the concern of the grammarians is different from "predication" that the dialecticians deal with. In correspondence with the property of the construction, words such as "man" and "stone", or any other word in nominative case, can be connected with the verb "to be" as well as "animal" and "man", as long as it is a matter of expressing an idea, and not of designating a real status. Thus the relation with construction is always valid when it refers to a complete significance, whether in reality it is so or not. But the relation with predication concerns the nature of things and must adhere to the reality of things. When we say, "man is a stone", the construction is valid; grammatically, ' is correct. However, this construction is logically incorrect and this predication is not lowed. When we talk about the universals, we are in the domain of dialectics and predication. . ne modern American linguistics of the so-called Chomskian revolution is thus ruled out in Abélardian theory of signification. For Abélard, a sentence must not only be grammatically but also logically correct.

The universal word is never the same thing as the appelative noun, neither the singular as the proper noun. They are more or less the same for one or the other. Appelative and proper nouns do not only include the nominative but also the oblique which cannot be predicated and are excluded from playing any role when we define the universal by its being predicated. All appelative or proper nouns are not necessarily universal or singular, for the universals are not only nouns but also verbs and indefinite nouns.

The word, man, designates individual men for the denominator that is common to all, i.e., they are men. Individual men, distinct from each other, differ due to their proper essence and their form. However, they correspond or encounter each other in that they are men. This does not imply that they correspond "in man", for man is nothing if not individual, but "in being-man". The being-man or the being of man is not a man or thing, similar is the case with "not being in a subject" or "not being susceptible of a contradiction". The correspondence is not "in" a thing. Socrates and Plato resemble each other "in being-man" just as a horse and a donkey correspond "in not being-man". We call "state of man" this "being-man" which is not a thing, it is due to a common reason that a name is given to individual men. Generally, what is not a thing is called a cause. We say, he was beaten because he did not want to go to the public square. "He did not want to go to the public square" is a cause, it is not an essence. We can also call, "state of man", the things placed in the nature of man. The one who imposed this word man, "conceived a common resemblance", which is neither a thing nor an essence.

Abélard's theory of signification is further crystallised in *Logica Nastrorum*[10] where he

makes a distinction between *vox* and *sermo*. The universals are neither things nor sounds *voces*, they are due to *sermones* which may be singular or universal. A noun or a term is due to human institution but a thing or a sound is due to nature. The signifying act is thus a human fact, a cultural fact, as opposed to the physical aspect of the word that is purely natural. Abélard compares this phenomenon with the creative act. A stone and a statue ar one and the same "thing" but they are derived from different sources. The stone is the w of God (nature) while the statue is the work of man (culture). The sermones are uni· because they are created by man, they are predicates of several subjects. The sou· things are not at all universal even if in physical reality *voces* and *sermones* are no'

Abélard's theory of signification is presented in an important article by L. ' where he distinguishes between Abélard's views on the signification of words ar To signify, *significare*, with words, *dictiones*, is to generate an intellection · hearer. The same is applicable to the denotation of external things and in ' synonymous with *appelare, nominare, demonstare, designare*. To si sentences, *propositiones*, is to generate an intellection which is constit ited with the liaison of the intellections of its parts, *dictiones*. For Abélard the words first signify intellections, then the things which correspond them. The words generate intellections and with these we arrive at the knowledge of things. Intellections thus play an intermediary role. We have now to enquire about the exact status of things. For Abélard, the race, *cursus*, and he runs, *currit*, refer to the same things as it is considered in essentia, the race, and in *adiacentia*, he runs. Jean Jolivet believes that this linguistic approach is more concerned with the mental activity than with the exact nature of things. This is true if we think only of the external aspect of things. In this case, Abélardian theory is different from that of Aristotle. Aristotle's emphasis is on the external things and Abélard is primarily interested in the domain of the spirit or the domain of intellections. As such, we can say that the things signified by words are things as thought of or as produced by intellection. This difference with Aristotle is manifest most clearly in Abélardian theory of the proposition, *propositio*. Even though for Abélard the signification of a proposition is definite, its signified, *significatum*, is not a thing, it is a sort of a half-thing, *quasi-res*. It depends upon three aspects of the proposition. One may consider it as a verbal phrase, as an intellection expressed by words, or as a thing that is the object of the verbal phrase or the intellection. Abélard states that our expressions have a *consignificatum* rather than a signification so-called, and the task of the proposition is to present a mode of conception, *modus concipiendi*. It does not have a specific content, *in istis nulla imagine nititur intellectus*, but it is derived from it.

The signification of a proposition is further explained by means of the logic of implication, *si rosa est, flos est*. The logic of this necessity lies in the fact that what is stated by the antecedent, *rosa est*, cannot be stated without what is stated by the consequent, *flos est*. If the antecedent is taken either as a grammatical construct or as an act of intellection, it can be without the consequent which can be taken separately as a grammatical or an

intellective construct. On the contrary, the antecedent taken as a fact of logic implies the logical existence of the consequent. This necessity is purely relational, *quidam rerum modus habendi se* and it does not concern the relation between the external aspect of things, nor between intellections taken as psychological or rational acts. It is a relation between the contents of intellections. In other words, these relations are purely logical or formal. The *dictum* of Abélard is neither an external thing, *res*, nor a mental act as such, but the objectivated content of this act, which being neither a thing nor an act, is called half-thing, *quasi-res*.

In Dialectica (II, 150) Abélard states that in the expression *verum est Socratem*, the dictum, *Socratem curre*, is not an incomplete sentence, *oratio imperfecta*, but a quasi noun, *quasi nomen*. And when one writes this proposition in the form, *Socrates currit verum est*, the subject *Socrates currit* is not a proposition but only a noun to which the predicate *vrai* is attributed. In other words, *Socrates currit* does not refer to a real running of a real Socrates. It is a sort of a noun, *quasi nomen*, that provides a content to an empty formulation. It does not have a denotation, but it has a signification. The dictum of the proposition is thus far from being an external thing, *res extra animam*, it is a thing that derives its existence from the soul or intellection, *res in anima*, which we must distinguish from the act of intellection as such, *res in anima subiective*, and recognise its proper identity in the objective content of the intellection. This dictum of the great logician of the twelfth century, believes De Rijk, is of logical nature par excellence.

For Jean Jolivet there is a paradox in this theory of dictum.[12] What is not a thing not only has a significance but also establishes the rapports of significance. Abélard had considered *status* in the same manner which without being things are the causes of the imposition of the universal nouns as in the example, he was beaten because he did not want to go to the public square, is a cause without being an essence. Thus the dictum even if it is not a being, has a consistence. But Jolivet argues that in that case there is another paradox due to its "non-essentiality"; the proposition that signifies it does not constitute an intellection. From the point of view of the psychology of thought, the dictum is beyond conception just as it is beyond things. It can be a subject of a proposition, but taken in itself as in a proposition, *verum est Socratem currere*, the significance is impersonal and no intellection can be constituted.

Initially the word corresponds to an idea and through this idea a correspondence with the object is established. The rapport between the word and the thing being mediatory is complicated with several aspects of grammar and dialectics. These differences however remain at the level of the analysis of the intellection and do not alter the fundamental axiom that the words are meant to designate things. When we come to phrases, the things get more complicated. As the idea takes precedence over the thing and the idea of the thing refers to

multiple intellections, the sentence that describes this grouping of words has multiple significations. The distinction between "the significance of things" and "the significance of intellections" is quasi contradictory, for the number of significations is never the same. The thing (object) is one but it is apprehended through a number of intellections. If the words are not the objects of thought, for as signs their function is to direct the spirit of the auditeur towards the things, it is the same for the intellections. We constitute intellections in the spirit of the auditeur and at the same time we take care of the things. Our spirit does not stop at the intellections that our words signify, its veritable aim is to apprehend the things. The intellections then play a mediatory role between the spirit and the world. *The word leads to the idea, the idea to the thing*, says Abélard.[13] For Abélard even though what is expressed through a proposition is not a thing yet it is an object. It is as described earlier a half-thing, *quasi-res*. He goes as far as to say that it is nothing, *nil omino*, absolutely nothing, *nullam omnino rem*. It is not an existing thing, *essentia*. It is all due to the fact that the intellections do not have the same status as that of the elements of the proposition, for the proposition is not homogeneous with its parts. In isolation, the noun and the verb signify intellections but these intellections do not constitute others. The intellection that corresponds to a proposition is not an intellection of this given proposition but of the manner in which the thing is apprehended, *oportet per propositiones non dicta intelligi, sed res in intellectu complecti*. This *intellectus compositus* exists at the psychological level. This existence is ambiguous. The words do not disappear even when they are elements of a proposition. There is a certain existence but this existence, believes Abélard, tends towards its non-being, to an image of what the proposition expresses. It corresponds with the state of things, but a state does not exist in the strict sense of the term, it is purely mental or psychological. This "non-existing" signified, however, is not less important, for the logical true and false depend upon it. It is also true of the necessity of consequence. In fact, this necessity is neither in the proposition taken in its singular existence, *in essentia*, which is transitory, nor in the intellection, nor even in things, for they can be destroyed without eliminating the necessity of consequence. If the dictum plays this dialectical role, it is precisely because it does not exist; outside the being, it escapes its becoming. It is thus not a surplus with reference to things and ideas. What it loses on the ontological plane, it gains on the logical plane. All the mechanism of dialectical consequences is developed in this domain external to both things and ideas. If the necessity is excluded from existence, it is due to the fact that the real is individual, dependent upon time and contingence. We come back to the doctrine of the universal, which is, as arqued earlier, not a thing, and which like the dictum, is expressed quasi-nominally by an infinitive proposition. When we say that Socrates and Plato meet in "being-man" or "being-substance", *Socratem et Platonem convenire in esse hominem vel in esse substantiam*, we cannot, if we remain at the plane of things, *si hoc in rebus accipimus*, designate any thing in which they meet. Being in the thing is not identical with being a thing as being in the house is not the same thing as being a house.

For Abélard, the controversy over universals is above all a problem of language. What does the word, man, signify that it can be applied to an individual, say Socrates. This simple question is of ontological order. But it also poses a problem of dialectics in the context of predication. What is the content of a universal predicate that is attributed to a given subject. In other words, what is the relationship between the Sausurrian *signifiant* and *signifié*, the fundamental problematics of semiotics.

Once he had presented the extreme complexity of signification with his theory of *dictum propositionis*, Abélard wrote *Sic et Non*, where he juxtaposed the writings of the fathers and the saints of Christianity under specific theological themes and showed how there were contradictions from one ecclesiastic authority to another, and also at times, within the same author. The main purpose was to demonstrate that as the signification of propositions did not correspond to specific things, there were ambiguities in the domain of intellection and the imaginaire where the significations were constituted. The truth of the theological dogmas could not be absolutely definite, for absolutely definite can only be a thing, an individual thing. At the level of ideas, at the level of universals, one enters into the realm of perceptions and imaginary constructs. Abélard tried to justify this variation by saying that it is possible that even the prophets were not always inspired by the holy spirit. And with a sense of humour, he stated that as a rich man gives his gold to different artisans to create various ornaments, God inspires authors with various aspects of the Holy Spirit. The ornaments are different but they are all beautiful and add to the splendour of the one who wears them. The ecclesiastic authorities were not amused by this colourful metaphor. They refused to accept multiplicity of interpretations and Abélard was duly excommunicated twice in 1121 at Soisson and in 1140 at Sens.

Abélard's theory of signification can be followed in its various details in his theory of knowledge or the thory of creativity based on the tripartite division of *sensus, imaginatio, intellectus*, presented in *Logica Ingredientibus*.[14] The senses, *sensus*, is a force of soul which is exercised by means of corporeal instruments, touch with hands, vision with eyes and other senses by other parts of body. After senses we have imagination and not intellection, for with intellection we reason. With reason we are able to distinguish an object and reflect upon it, upon one of its characteristics. This is so when we examine a thing as a thing, or as a substance, corporeal, sensible or coloured, or formulate an idea of one of its properties or natures even when that thing may not exist, as the day of tomorrow or a laughing statue. Imagination and intellection neither need corporeal instruments nor sensible objects, they perceive what is insensible, incorporeal, like soul or paternity. Often our spirit with imagination or intellection examines the nature of things with the help of imaginary forms that it constitutes of its own. For example, the one who is away from Rome cannot see it any more. However, he has in his soul a certain tableau of the city within which he observes the city that is no more there.

If the question is posed whether these imaginary forms are things, the answer would be in the negative. They are neither substances nor the forms supported by substances. If after having seen a tower, I think of it when it is away, or destroyed, this immense tableau, ablong and quadrangular that my spirit constitutes in a way before my eyes is neither a substance nor a form. Some believe that it is the soul that can provide to itself these forms to express resemblances of things. But the soul is indivisible. How can it represent the length or the breadth or the quantity of the tower when it cannot stretch itself in all these directions? Often the soul thinks of several things at the same time, for it cannot transform itself if it stays in the same state all the time.

Abélard does not agree with Aristotle that these forms are identical with things. The intellection that is a form of the indivisible soul cannot go beyond the possibilities of its subjects to be able to accomodate all things or all forms. These images or simulacres of things that the spirit constitutes to be able to contemplate on the things which are absent are absolutely nothing. As long as the thing is present, we do not need its image. It can be apprehended through our senses. The imaginary similitude is conceived in the absence of the thing. Abélard says that Plato calls these similitudes insensible but amongst these similitudes some are sensible, especially those which are perceived by senses, as that of a given statue, others are insensible, as the simulacres of things which are constituted and offered to thought alone, not to senses. Some assert that they are primarily designated by words. In fact, it is neither due to the similitudes of things nor due to the similitudes of intellections that the words are imposed; it is rather due to the things themselves and their intellections, to discuss the nature of things and not their images but only through images that we constitute to replace the things absent. Some images are constituted to correspond with a given substance, others are common, they refer to a plurality of things. The name, Socrates, presents us with a fixed image, but the word, man, with an image common to all men.

There is no human intellection without imagination. When our spirit begins to think, this application and this beginning of thinking is called imagination. When it aims at a certain nature of a thing, inasmuch as it is a thing, a state, a substance, a body, whiteness, Socrates, it is called intellection. It is led by reason to intellection from the confusion that the imagination represents. By imagination we reach at the thing and not its nature. When the thing is present, the three faculties, sense, imagination, intellection are all at work at the same time. But they apprehend a thing in different ways. By senses we see or touch a thing. We do not imagine it or reflect upon it. It happens often that when we are preoccupied with one thing, we also see other things, we feel them in a way. However, the senses apprehend one thing, without, and the spirit thinks of another, within. If now it applies also its thought to what it feels, the first step of this application to the thing felt is imagination, which is common to us along with animals. And then after application, fixing our spirit on one thing

excluding all others, we examine rationally a nature or property that belongs to it, it is intellection. Thus to imagine is to fix our spirit on the thing, to think, is not to aim at the thing itself but at its nature or property. If the thing is not present, we can more easily distinguish between imagination and intellection. Imagination is a perception of the spirit with which we perceive the image of the thing without distinguishing within it its natures and properties. When we aim at a nature or a property, we have intellection. It is like if we hold a piece of wood in one hand, and with another we sculpt or we paint it. By intellection we give it a form what we imagined in our imagination. The one who paints begins with a few lines one the space which is still neutral and empty. Then by extending the colours and lines, he begins to give a form to what was first enclosed within the limits of certain space. Thus what was perceived indistinctly and which was not endowed with any specific property was subjected to intellection without imagination. We must begin with imperfection to arrive at perfection. But the important point here is that the imaginary froms which have no specific reality and which the spirit constitutes for itself before our intellection begins it application are the basis of all creative activity. These are the forms with which the artists and the artisans, and according to Abélard, also God, deal before the realisation of the creative act. These forms are fictive, they are not only universal, they are beyond all space and time. It is this imaginary form of beauty or truth that enables us to recognise specific things beautiful and true, however different they may be from each other, and to envisage and create things beautiful and true which have not yet been created. It is in a way the phenomenology of transcendence. We begin from specific existing things, the sensuous world, and we transcend this world in the domain of imaginaire to finally constitute intellections in the realm of dialectics and logic. On the relationship betwen the word and the thing, Abélard states that the signification that the thing bestows on the word, the thing itself does not have. A given statue of Virgin Mary leads us mentally to an imaginary sublime form of Mary, her innocence, her piety, her motherhood, in a word, a form beyond all specific forms, for there are numerous statues of Mary, all physically different from each other. At the level of imaginaire, they are all Marys. At the level of statues, the things, none of them is. In other words, the signification that the statue confers on the signifier, the word, the statue, the thing, does not have. And Abélard is right in asserting that only the words are universals, but not as *voces*, as sounds, but as *sermones*, as signifiers.

Abélard's position is most interesting from the point of view of the artist, the creator, the author. Apart from the physical constraints of carving a young woman, what the artist really creates in the statue of Mary is a certain imaginary form of the divinity and purity which in fact cannot have any form. That is why for Abélard this form is ambiguous but it is precisely this ambiguity par excellence that the artists have been exploiting since the beginning of all cultural activity. As there is no definite form of Mary, there will be incessant attempts at creating the imaginary sublime form to which the devotees respond. It is a sort of a formless form that is within a specific form that we can perceive and feel. Abélard

emphasizes this distinction between the form without and the form within in the context of senses and imagination. The Abélardian theory of signification or semiotics deals with these forms within.

We must not forget that Abélard was not only a great theoretician of signification, he was also a great poet. The songs he wrote for his beloved Héloïse and sung on his harp before his bewitched students were very popular. His interest in the domain of imaginaire is also manifest in the *Dialogue* that he wrote based on a dream where he is visited by a philosopher, a Christian and a Jew. In the extreme fundamentalism of Christian Middle Ages, only Abélard had the courage to argue in this text that the sin is only in intention and not in act. And, as the Jews did not crucify Jesus with bad intention, they did not commit any sin.

In his long poem addressed to his son, Astralabe, Abélard was more rational and revolutionary than most of the philosophers of the so-called enlightened modern times where he told his son that all religions were respectable, it would be difficult to know which is the best. But one need not worry, without interrogating, without any specific reason, one believes in a religion one is born in. This in any case, is not a sin. What is sinful is not to have faith in God. This statement deserves to be quoted in detail:

Tot fidei sectis divisus mundus habetur
ut quae sit vitae semita vix pateat
Quod tot habet fidei contraria dogmata mundus
Quisque facit generis tradione sui.
Denique nullus in his retionem consulere audet,
Dum quacumque sibi vivere pace studet.
Contemmendo Deum peccat solummodo quisque;
Nil nisi contemptus hunc facit esse reum.

In fact, more than his daring realtion with Héloïse, more than his opting for non-realism, conceptualism, or middle path, madhya marga, betwen Platonic Realism and Aristotelian Nominalism (between Germanic idealism and Anglao-saxon empiricism), more than his being the founder of the Left Bank as the Cultural Centre of France, it is this most revolutionary statement in the *Dialogue* absolving Jews of all sins and this advice to his son to pay equal respect to all religions that establishes Pierre Abélard as the real founder of modernity and French Culture in all its intellectual, philosophical and political dimensions. And, all this happened eight hundred years ago when tortured by repeated excommunications by the most fundamental authorities of the Middle Ages who burnt his books in public, Abélard thought of migrating to more tolerant Muslim lands where he could continue his studies of dialectics and theology in peace and tranquility.

It is also interesting to note that the very life of Abélard and Héloïse has inspired a number of authors to write novels about their adventures. Abélard who literally invented the extraordinary and unique domain of the imaginaire as commented upon by Tweedale, quoted earlier, himself became the subject of that very imaginary space. The author of one such recent novel or fictional biography, Suzanne Bernard, writes:

'Pierre Abélard, qui fut le premier "intellectuel", de notre histoire, au sens de J.L. Goff, a osé penser, chercher, ouvrir des chemins nouveaux. On le lui a fait payer cher. Par son courage face à la persécution, son obstination à ne jamais renier les valeurs fondamentales auxquelles il avait consacré sa vie, son exemple n'a pas fini de rayonner à travers les siècles.

Pendant la sale, la honteuse Guerre du golfe, qui fit des centaines de milliers de victimes, et qui, au lieu de résoudre les problèmes, les a au contraire dramatiquement aggravés, je vécus, en écrivant ce livre, d'étranges rencontres. Pas si loin de nous, malgré les siècles, le conflit Abélard-Saint Bernard : d'un coté Bernard de Clairvaux, intransigeant, fanatique et dominateur, qui célébrait la Guerre Sainte, exaltait le Combat, encourageait les Croisés à tuer et à mourir et qui, en mystique inspiré, entraînait l'adhésion quasi générale à la Guerre, au nom du Droit! De l'autre, une minorité de "pacifistes" dont Abélard, qui écrivait son "Dialogue entre un Philosophe (un fils d'Ismael'), un Juif et un Chretien" et qui avait même pensé, pour fuir la persécution, se retirer en terre d'Islam."[16]

After this brief introduction to Abélard's theory of language and creativity in terms of *sensus, imaginatio, intellectus*, we come to the second landmark in the history of ideas in France in the eighteenth century with Condillac whose doctrine of language has been christened "conceptualism", the same nomenclature that is often used to describe Abélardian theory, by the historian of linguistic ideas, Sylvin Auroux.

Certain passages of *L'Art de penser*[17] of Condillac give the impression of almost literal paraphrasing of Abélard's *Logica Ingredientibus*. Our reflection has two objects, says Condillac, the actual sensations and the sensations that we are reminded of. These two mutually interact with each other. As the sensible objects are highly complex, we can compare them only through abstractions. We see what is common to all, what distinguishes them. This method helps to put them in different classes. When the ideas are general, however, they cannot be subjected to senses. We cannot see a body in general, a tree in general. We cannot even imagine such a general thing. The ideas considered in this manner become intellectual, for even though to begin with these ideas were due to sensations, they are no more objects of the faculty that can feel, they are now the objects of the faculty of intelligence, i.e., the faculty that abstracts, that compares, that judges.

If the objects are present, we can touch them, see them, we can observe them from all aspects. If they are absent, we have their images before our eyes, our imagination constitutes their from, our memory reminds us of what we had seen. With the help of memory and imagination we try to concentrate on an object that is absent. We are continuously confronted with sensible and intellectual ideas. At times they help us fix our attention on a given object, at others there are contradictory effects following the manner in which each faculty perceives that object. One can thus neither depend entirely on sensible ideas nor on intellectual ideas. The most difficult is to have control over own imagination. In the domain of imagination, the objects become more and more obscure. We have to then depend upon all our faculties.

One has to penetrate deep into one's own self to reflect upon the objects being analysed. One must note the impressions that the faculty of senses has left on us, the way our spirit was influenced, the circumstances which are responsible for these ideas. In such cases, imagination is of great help. It is only with the help of images that we can mentally reconstruct the objects for our reflection and analysis.

We have here the most important definition of analysis given by Condillac. *To analyse*, says Condillac, *is to decompose, compare and apprehend rapports*. But analysis decomposes only to demonstrate as much as possible the origin and the generation of things. It must present partial ideas in a way one observes the reconstruction of all that one analyses. The one who decomposes haphazardly deals only with abstractions, the one who does not abstract all the qualities of an object, offers only incomplete analyses, the one who does not present the abstract ideas in the order that facilitates the knowledge of generation of objects, deals with analyses which are not very instructive and in fact are very obscure. Analysis is thus the entire decomposition of an object and the distribution of the parts in the order in which the generation of the objects becomes easy. There is thus a striking parrallel between the three way method of *sensus, imaginatio, intellectus* of Abélard and *senses, imagination and intelligence* of Condillac. Both of them begin from the senses but do not depend entirely upon the corporeal faculties. The next step is memory and imagination, especially in the case of general ideas of body, rationality, humanity, where no corporeal resemblance is possible. But the domain of imagination has its limitations and the final and the most dependable faculty is intelligence, and reflection. The intermediary state of images however is indispensable, it plays an exteremely important role in the theory of signification in both Abélard and Condillac.

In Chapter VII of *L'Art de penser*, Condillac illustrates his theory of language with the help of an example of a young man of Chartre of twenty-three years, deaf and dumb since birth, who suddenly began to speak. To begin with he uttered three or four words only. A liquid came out of left ear and he began to hear perfectly with both his ears. He did not speak much for a few months. It was followed by a very restricted speech, just a few phrases that he had heard around him. Surprised, theologians began to question him on the

principles of God, soul, moral laws. Even though the young man was born of Catholic parents and he visited the Church with them, he could not answer such questions. Until now he had lived purely at the corporeal level. He had never reflected on such issues. He had never engaged himself in abstractions and comparisons. Condillac says that the spirit of a man deprived of communication with others is so little exercised and cultivated that he can think only of the external aspects of things. The greatest richness of the ideas of men is in their reciprocal commerce. Condillac states that for these twenty-three years, the young man paid no attention to objects around him. Brought up by and being amongst men he could relate some ideas to immediate actions and signs. He could probably satisfy his immediate needs. But he did not know the names of those ideas for which there was no special rapport with him. Even when he saw something, he did not subject that experience to his reflection. Whether he could exercise his faculty of reason even in this limited domain is an important question.

To reason is to apprehend rapports with which two, three or more judgements are related with each other. For example, when I withdraw my hand from the burning coal that is coming close to me, I judge that this coal burns, that it will not burn me if I stay away from it, and consequently, I should withdraw my hand. A logician does not require anything more to formulate a syllogism. I should avoid, he would say, all that burns. As this coal burns, it should be avoided. But the decomposition of these judgements and the syllogistic form do not make a reasoning. It is only a manner of speaking. However the same development becomes absolutely necessary when the reasoning is highly complex. We consider separately its different parts, we develop them one after the other, we give specific signs to each idea, to each judgement, to each rapport. The young man of Chartre was used to look after his needs, to judge whether the things were useful or not, to conclude whether he should avoid them or not. He did not distinguish successively these operations, they all occured in one instant. He lived purely at corporeal, sensuous level. Condillac asserts that the sensations are only sensations, they are tranformed into ideas only when our reflection considers them as images of something: *les sensations ne sont que des sensations, et elles ne deviennent des idées, que lorsque la réflexion nous les fait considérer comme images de quelque chose.* (p. 236). Compare Abélard in *Logica : Sicut autem sensus non est res sentitia, in quam dirigitur, sic nec intellectus forma est rei quam concipit, sed intellectus actio quaedam est animae, unde intelligens dicitur, forms vero in quam dirigitur res imaginaria quaedam est et ficta, quam sibi, quando vult et qualem vult, animus conficit....*[18]

In Chapter VIII Condillac presents his critique of Realism without, like Abélard, falling in the Nominalist category of William Occam as earlier quoted from Sylvain Auroux. To abstract, says Condillac, is to draw, to separate one thing from another whose part it was, consequently, the abstract ideas are partial ideas separated from their whole. There are two views on these ideas. Some consider them innate (Descartes), others believe that they are the result of the spirit. The former are mistaken, the latter are not nearer the truth. The

action of senses is sufficient to produce some abstract ideas, the spirit helps to produce more. Senses and spirit coordinate to constitute abstract ideas. All our ideas are only different combinations of these two types. If we judge the sensible qualities, which our senses perceive in the subject immediately or with the help of instruments, we formulate ideas of mathematics and physics. If we judge by analogy the spiritual qualities which belong to the subject, we discover the rapports of resemblance and difference between the subject. An abstract noun becomes a general or a summarised idea when it is a denomiantion of several things which have common qualities. Colour, sound, odour are all both abstract and summarised ideas : abstract ideas, for they are partial ideas which we separate from the objects, summarised ideas, for each of them designates a certain number of sensations. It is from these points of view that we should consider abstract or summarised ideas. Otherwise, we could attribute to them more reality than they actually have. It must also be noted that it is less with rapport to the nature of things than with rapport to the manner in which we know them that we determine the genre and the species : *"Mais il faut remarquer que c'est moins par raport à la nature des choses, que par raport à la manière dont nous les connaissons, que nous en déterminoms les genres et les espéces..."* Compare Abélard : *Quidam rerum modus habendi se.* All our ideas in the beginning, states Condillac, were particular ideas. They were certain sensations which we considered as modifications of our being, or as the qualities of subjects. These ideas represented a true reality, for they were only due to a certain being modified in one way or another. We cannot perceive any thing within us that does not belong to us, to our being in one form or another. But our spirit cannot reflect on a large number of modifications, it considers one at a time. It separates it from its being, it takes away all its physical reality. However, we cannot reflect upon nothing. How can then it be the object of our reflection? It is because it continues to consider it as a being. As it is used to consider it within an object, with a given reality, it continues to perceive it with the same reality. There is a contradiction. On the one hand, it envisages modifications without any rapport to their being, and as such they are no more anything, on the other, as one cannot reflect on nothing, it continues to consider it as a thing and attributes to it a reality with which it percevied it in the first place. Whatever may be the contradiction, it is all the same necessary. Our spirit cannot reflect upon every thing at the same time. It must distinguish one quality from another and formulate abstract ideas, and even though these modifications lose all reality that they had, it must be presupposed, otherwise it can never be an object of our reflection.

It is this necessity that is the reason why many a philosopher did not see that the reality of the abstract ideas was the work of our imagination : *la réalité des idées abstaites fût l'ouvrage de l'imagination.* Compare Abélard : *res imaginaria quaedam est et ficta, quam sibi, quando vult et qualam vult, animus conficit.* The philosophers (realists) considered these ideas as something real. As they did not follow the progressive analysis of abstraction, they considered these ideas as real beings. At times, these ideas were attributed to different degrees of reality. The ideas of modification were considered less real than those of substance

and those of substance less than those of the beings. These philosophers perceived some realities even under the words, body, animal, man, etc. They considered these words as the signs of some reality even though a given substance may have undergone some alternations, they do not question whether they may still belong to same species. This question would be superfluous if they placed under differnt collections of simple ideas the notions of substances and species. When they ask whether the ice or snow are water, a foetus, a man, whether God, the spirits, the bodies or even void are substances, it is obvious that the question is not whether these things correspond with the ideas gathered under the words, water, man, substance. One has to know whether these things include some essences, some realities that one supposes that these words, water, man, substance siginify. With this prejudice, the philosophers imagine that one should define the substances by the difference that is the closest and proper to explain their nature. Abstractions are generally the phantoms that the philosophers have considered as things. What they have said with reference to space and duration is another example of this type of thinking. The pure space is only an abstraction. One can reflect upon such ideas with the help of certain suppositions. When one says, suppose a body that is no more and keep those objects which surround it at equidistance, instead of deducing existence of pure space, we can only infer it, and we can continue to consider the space within a given time and we no more consider the other partial ideas that we have of this body. This is all that a supposition can do. The fact that we can distinguish between different notions, it does not follow that there are in nature the beings which correspond to our partial ideas. It is an effect of imagination that even when the body is no more, we constinue to posit a space that surrounds it. It does not mean that this space does not exist. It implies that the idea that we constitute of this space does not demonstrate its existence. The same is true of duration. It is only an abstraction. It is in following the succession of ideas of duration that we represent the duration of things which are outside us. This means that we know neither the nature of space nor of duration.

The names of substances have the same space in our spirit that subjects have outside us. They are the lieu and the support of simple ideas as outside subjects are the qualities. Condillac continues his argument which gives the impression of almost literal paraphrasing of the similar argumentation presented by Abélard in his *Logica*. It is a mute point of contestation whether Condillac was aware of Abélardian thinking on the subject. By the eighteenth century, Abélard's choice of the middle path between the extremes of Realism and Nominalism had become an integral part of French intellectual culture. The same is true of Abélard himself. There are endless debates on how much of Plato and Aristotle was available to Abélard in the beginning of the twelfth century. The Middle Ages had inherited the entire Greek tradition through Augustine and other commentators. After all the heat generated by the support and opposition of Realism and Nominalism is a proof enough that no thinker could escape these philosophical axioms. We must understand the Abélardian heritage in the same manner. Otherwise there is no other explanation of such close parallelism between Abélard and

Condillac, and as we will see later, with Merleau-Ponty. Condillac continues. We can know all the simple ideas which enter the notions which we constitute without any model. But the essence being, according to the philosophers, what constitutes what it is, it is a consequence that we can in such cases have ideas of essences and give them names. For example, that of justice signifies the essence of justice, of wisdom, the essence of wisdom etc. It is perhaps the reason that the Scholastics believed that to have the names which express the essences of substances one can follow the analogy of language, and they coined words like corporeality, animality, humanity to designate the essences of body, animal and man. There are only two ways of making use of the words : to use them after having determined all the simple ideas which they would signify, or after supposing them to be the signs of the very reality of things. The first is embarrassing, for the usage is not always clearly decided. Men see things differently, have different experience of them, and they do not always agree on the simple ideas which they must attribute to them. Even when there is an agreement it is not easy to see the exact nature and extension of different qualities included there.

We would like to conclude the discussion on Condillac's theory of signification with a presentation of his doctrine on the necessity of signs described in Chapter VI of *L'Art de penser.* Condillac begins with an example from arithmetic where if after having given a name to a unit, we do not imagine successively all the ideas that we constitute with multiplying this first, we will not be able to make any progress in our knowledge. We can differentiate only if we have distinct numbers for them. If these numbers or signs are not there, we cannot follow their ideas. The numbers two or three are represented by two or three objects. When I move on to four, I am obliged to imagine two on the one side and two on the other, for six, I may distribute them in twos or threes. And, if I want to go any further, I will have to consider several units as one unit and put them together as one object. Condillac says that Locke talks about some Americans who did not have any idea of the number, thousand, because they had numbers only upto twenty. Condillac asserts that they could probably not count even upto twenty-one. For a system of calculus one needs only the primary numbers. Once the primary signs are given, there are rules to invent others. Those who do not have this method are obliged to have signs which do not have any analogy amongst them. The progress in the knowledge of numbers comes from the exactitude with which we add a unit to itself and give to each progression a name that distinguishes it from the one that precedes and the other that follows. One should not have any illusion in imagining that the ideas of numbers, separated from their signs, is something clear and determined. Condillac says that Mallebranche thought that the numbers perceived by pure intelligence are superior to those which are attached to senses. Saint Augustine (in Cofessions), the Platonists and all the partisans of innate ideas (Cartesians) had the same prejudice. If I am asked what is a thousand, my only answer can be that this word fixes in my spirit a certain collection of units. I begin with adding one unit to another and come up with a sign for two. I add another and we have three. I continue until ten which represents a hundred. And, from one tens to another, we arrive at a unit of a thousand.

There are three successive steps : the idea of a unit, that of operation with which we add one unit to another, finally, the order in which this whole operation takes place. There are two methods of constituting simple ideas as one sign. The one following a model, the other without any model. I find a body. I see its length and breadth. it is divisible, solid, hard, yellow, fusible, heavy, it can be melted, etc. It is obvious that I cannot describe all the qualities distinctly and separately. I can think of only one quality at a time. However, with one sign, gold, I am able to represent all the simple ideas or the qualities under one sign-word. The sigificance of this word would depend upon my classification and abstractions of all the characteristics of this object. This is the problem when we have a model, a given object. The problem with abstract objects like morality, virtue, justice, humanity is far more complex. They are composit sign-words whose significance depends entirely on the specific perceptions of the simple ideas which compose them, which can be numerous in each case. We cannot however remember all these ideas. We communicate only by means of word-units, and it is on these signs that we reflect. Condillac says that it is the regular use of these signs which facilitates our reflection and helps us to multiply the signs. The signs and reflection interact with each other contributing to the reciprocal progress of language. We can augment the activity of our imagination, memory and reflection only if we concentrate on the object within which we correlate the largest numbers of signs and ideas. One can never exercise equally one's memory, imaginaton and reflection on every object, material or abstract. This operation depends upon the attention one pays to an object with different rapports and different qualities. It all depends upon our interest in one or the other specific characteristics of the object. We can never thus make use of the signs with the same clarity, the same precision and in the same order. It is thus obvious that those who aspire to reach the universal beings are bound to be unsuccessful. To have ideas on which we can reflect we need to imagine signs which serve as liens for different collections of simple ideas, and our notions cannot be exact until we have constituted signs in a proper order that establishes exact correlations. Unfortunately, we learn words before we know their ideas, says Condillac. The reason comes only after memory and it does not always comprehend ideas which correspond to our signs. Moreover, there is a considerable interval between the time a child begins to cultivate his memory and learn words whose significance he is not aware of, and the time he becomes capable of analysing its notions to properly comprehend their significance. Generally, we have neither the time nor the competence to analyse each sign we make use of and we usually employ them with an approximate significance. Finally, just as Abélard emphasized the ambiguity of words used by different prophets in his *Sic et Non*,[19] Condillac explains that the obscurity and confusion are due to the fact that while using the same words we believe to have accorded to them the same ideas though normally some add a few partial ideas to these words and others take away. And, we end up having different combinations of ideas for the same signs, and, almost literally paraphrasing Abélard, Condillac asserts that often the same words in different mouths, and even in that of the same person, have different signification. *L'obscurité et la confusion viennent de ce qu'en prononçant les mêmes mots, nous croyons nous acorder à exprimer les*

mêmes idées, quoique d'ordinaire les uns ajoutent à une complexe des idées partieles qu'un autre en retranche. De là il arrive que différentes combinaisons n'ont qu'un même signe, et que les mêmes mots ont dans différentes bouches et souvent dans la même des acceptions bien différentes.[20]

The third landmark is Maurice Merleau-Ponty in modern times. His work is known primarily from the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century. Merleau-Ponty is a philosopher of phenomenology with the relation between language and thought being one of his major concerns. With the Saussurian distinction of *langue* and *parole* as the point of departure, Merleau-Ponty juxtaposes *parole parlée* and *parole parlante*. There is the language already spoken, fixed, standarised, given, and the language that is being spoken, in praxis, which is ambiguous, which is in search of signification in the very act of speaking. Abélard had insisted that with words the speaker generates intellections or ideas for the comprehension of the hearer who is also a thinking being. Communication, for Abélard, takes place between two thinking beings. Hence, it is in the very act of communication that the significance is constituted. For Merleau-Ponty, the world is present like a horizon. One has only its representation. It enables one to orientate oneself, aiming at the manifestation of things, but at the same time, transcending them. The significations of culture are never absolutely transparent.[21] The signification is both present and absent at the same time. The significative intention is defined by the excess of what one wants to say on what has already been said. Parole is this eternally recommenced effort at transforming the silent and latent presence into explicit and manifest presence. The significance emerges within the signifying unit as much as in their secret relations. All expression is a provisional fixation. Fixation, for we do understand something. Provisional, for the signified like the signifier is inscribed in the indefinite movement of differentiation and articulation that characterizes the thinking thought, *pensée pensante*, and the speaking speech, *parole parlante*.

The emergence of significance is understood in the distinction between the spoken and the speaking speech. There are two levels of signification in the communication process. Parole, for Merleau-Ponty is that paradoxical operation where we try to relate, with the help of words whose significance is already at our disposal, an intention that by definition goes beyond it.[22] To speak is to introduce differences where there were none before. Parole realizes or creates significations, it does not translate the significations already given. Parole, as distinct from langue, is that moment when the significative intention, which is as yet silent, is able to incorporate new significations in the culture of the being and the other by transforming the instruments of culture. Merleau-Ponty states that the author and the reader believe that as they speak the same language they are on the same terrain with given significations. As such the author installs himself in the world of the reader. And, just at that moment of faith, the author administers deviations in the significations of the signs and leads the reader to another horizon without his being conscious of it.[23] Merleau-Ponty discusses at length the signification

of situation. In the context of the acquisition of language he says that to aquire a language, of a culture or of an author, is to be engaged in the whole and follow the movement of differentiation and articulation. However, this movement continues indefinitely. This is why we say that language is acquired as soon as one begins to speak, and at the same time, it is being acquired eternally. Langue and parole are related with the experience that has been and the experience that will be.

For Merleau-Ponty there is a coherent deformation of the signification of the spoken language. This emerging significance is created not only for the auditeur but it is, believes Merleau-Ponty, a decisive step for the speaking subject.[24] If there is an identity of parole and thought, it is only at this moment of communication. Before and after, they mutually surpass each other. Between the sound and the significance, parole is what is supposed to be communicated. The relation between the speaking speech, *parole parlante*, and the thinking thought, *pensée pensante*, is obvious. One is immediately reminded of the Abélardian distinction between *vox* and *sermo*. The fundamental problematics of linguistic communication is exactly the same for Merleau-Ponty in the twentieth century Saussurian French tradition as it was for Abélard in the twelfth. It is situated squarely within the communicative act, between the beings actively engaged in speaking and understanding. The physical nature of the word and its signifying function, the relation between the word and the thing, and between the word and the thought are central preoccupations, and in spite of different metalanguages, different expressions under different intellectual ambiance, there is essential convergence and continuity from the twelfth to the twentieth centuries. And, just like Abélard, Merleau-Ponty follows the middle path in the phenomenology of perception remaining equidistant from spiritualism and materialism : *Il n'y a pas une signification unique de l'histoire, ce que nous faisons a toujours plusieurs sens, et c'est en quoi une conception existentielle de l'histoire se distingue du matérialisme comme du spiritualisme.*[25]

The problematics of signification is also its indeterminacy and ambiguity. In the comprehension of the other, says Merleau-Ponty, the problem is always indeterminate, for only the solution of the problem will retrospectively delineate the convergent contours; only the central motif of the philosophy, once understood, gives to the text of the philosopher, the value of adequate signs. It is thus necessary that the significance of the words be created by the words themselves, or to be more precise, their conceptual significance is constituted on the basis of the gestural signification, which is immanent to parole. Every language, metalanguage, of the speaker or the author, is taught by itself and creates its significance in the spirit of the auditeur. The significance of a literary text is less in the common given signification of the words than in the generation of significance in its act of modification. There is, for the one who listens or reads, for the one who speaks or writes, a thought in the speech, *une pensée dans la parole*, that intellectualism does not expect.[26] Merleau-Ponty insists that we should recognise that thought is not a representation for the speaking subject,

it does not consciously pose objects and relations. The orator does not think before speaking, not even while he is speaking, his parole is his thought. It is the same for the auditeur. We do not have a thought on the margins of the text, the words themselves occupy all our spirit, we are totally involved in the discourse, we are in a way, possessed by it. The end of the discourse or the text is the end of an interlinkage. It is at this moment that the thought and the discourse emerge. The discourse is understood as one thought. The significance is nowhere, at any given point. It is everywhere. The words are behind us like the objects behind our back or like the horizon of our town around our house.

Parole is not the sign of thought, says Merleau-Ponty, if we compare it with the phenomenon where the smoke indicates fire. Parole and thought will accept this relation if it is thematically given. In fact, they are envelopped with each other, the significance is in the parole and the parole is the external existence of thought. Merleau-Ponty does not accept the argument that parole is only a means of fixation or an envelop of thought. We easily remember words and phrases but not the thoughts. Words cannot be the fortress of thought, and thought can find the expression only if the words themselves constitute a comprehensible text. Parole possesses a power of expression that belongs only to it. Words and parole must cease to be a simple manner of designating objects or thoughts to become the very presence of this thought in the sensible world, its emblem, its body. There should be a linguistic concept or a verbal concept, an internal expression which is specifically verbal with the help of which the sound heard, pronounced or written becomes a fact of language. When an expression is successful, it does not leave simply an aide-mémoire for the reader or the writer, it enables the signification to exist as a thing in the every heart of the text, it enables it to live in its organism of words, it is installed in the reader or the writer as a new organ of sense, it opens a new field, a new dimension of our experience.

This power of expression is well known in art and music. The musical significance of a sonata is inseparable from the sound it carries. Before we have heard it, no analysis enables us to forsee it. Once the composition is terminated, for our analysis we can refer only to the moments of experience. During the composition, the sounds are not only the signs of the sonata, it is there, across them, it descends in them. In the same way, argues Merleau-Ponty, an actress becomes invisible and it is Phèdre (whose role the actress is playing) appears. The signification devours the signs. Phèdre completely takes possession of Berma. The aesthetic expression is installed in nature as a thing perceptible and accessible to all, or inversely, tears away the signs themselves, from the actress, from the colours and the canvas of the painter, from their empirical existence, and places them in another world. It is obvious here that the act of expression realizes or effectuates signification, it does not translate it. There is nothing internal to thought. It does not exist outside the world, and outside the words.

What misleads us and makes us believe that a thought exists before our expression is the thought already constituted and already expressed that we can remember in silence. In fact,

this pretended silence is the noise of the paroles, this internal life is internal language. The pure thought is reduced to a certain void of conscience. The new significative intention is recognised only when it is covered by the signification which is already there, which is a resultant of an internal expression. These given significations interact with each other following an unknown law, and once for all, a new cultural being begins to exist. Thought and expression are thus constituted simultaneously when our cultural acquisition is mobilised in the service of this unknown law as our body suddenly cedes to a new gesture in the acquisition of habits. Parole is a veritable gesture, it contains its signification as the gesture contains its own.[27]

Merleau-Ponty believes that the phonetic gesture realizes, for the speaking subject and those who listen to him, a certain structure of experience, exactly as a comportment of one's body invests, for him and for the others, the surrounding objects with a certain signification. The significance of the gesture in not within the gesture as a physical phenomenon. The significance of the word is not within the word as a sound. It is the human body that appropriates it in an indefinite series of discontinuous acts of significative nuclei which surpass and transcend its natural powers.

To see traces and parallels of Abélardian theory of signification in both Condillac and Merleau-Ponty, we may conclude this paper with some of the Abélardian propositions presented in Jean Jolivet's *Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard*.[28] To begin with Abélard insists that the words first signify ideas, not the things. Furthermore, to say that a word signifies is to say that it manifests an intellection of the one who pronounces it, and it generates, for the one who listens, a similar intellection. To signify is to constitute an intellection. As communication takes place between two thinking beings, it is in the very act of communication that the ideas or intellections are generated. This aspect of Abélardian theory of signification is presented even more distinctly in his theory of dictum where he states that the significance of a proposition is understood in a relative independence of the words which constitute it. In any case, even the formation of words and sentences is, for Abélard, a resultant of a certain mental activity. The construction of words, regulated by simple grammar, corresponds neither exactly to the logical structures nor to the nature of things, it refers to. Intellection serves as a negotiating term between the language and the world. Abélard distinguishes between the signification of things and the signification of intellections. The thing is one but it is apprehended across different intellections. We have here the phenomenology of perception of Merleau-Ponty and the distinction between senses and ideas of Condillac stated in most unambiguous terms. What is expressed by a proposition, for Abélard, is not a thing. It is only an intellection of the object, a sort of a half-thing, *quasi-res*. Words are not the objects of thought, they are only signs and their function is to lead the spirit of the auditeur towards the real objects, the things. The intellections are constituted in the spirit of the auditeur and they play a mediatory role between the spirit and the world.

Within a proposition the individual significance of the subject and the verb is blurred. They do not cease to exist, for the words do not disappear, their respective intellections can be referred to, but argues Abélard, they tend to slide into non-being, in the image of what the proposition expresses. It corresponds to the states of things, but only the things exist, the states of things do not. This is why Abélard distinguishes between the manner of signifying, *modi significandi*, and the manner of thinking, *modi intelligendi*, on the one hand, and the manner of thinking and the manner of being, *modi essendi*, on the other. And, to conclude we can say that this Abélardian distinction is also the most fundamental problematics of modern French semiotics.

It is interesting to note that in spite of the fact that Condillac was inspired by the English scholar, Locke, and Merleau-Ponty was influenced by the German philosopher, Husserl, both chose to follow the middle path initiated by Abélard. The historians of ideas of the empiricist tradition would obviously question such an ideological linkage. However, how can we justify the striking parallelism between Abélardian dialectical incisions and those of Condillac on the one hand, and Abélardian theory of imaginatio and the phenomenology of transcendance of Merleau-Ponty, on the other. As I have shown at numerous occasions in this paper, there are contexts where Condillac as well as Merleau-Ponty seem to be almost literally paraphrasing Abélard's arguments. It is a historical fact that as Carré, quoted ealier, says, with Abélard we have a definite epistemological cut in the Neo-Platonic Augustinian tradition, and almost all commentators agree that Abélard was critical of both Realism and Nominalism, and had forcefully argued for a middle path of conceptualism or non-realism. It is also a fact of the history of ideas that since Abélard, the entire French intellectual tradition has avoided the extremes of Anglo-saxon empiricism and Germanic idealism. During the eight centuries that followed the tumultuous upheavals of the twelfth century, Abélard and Abélardian thought became an integral part of French intellectual tradition in every sense of the term. In Lévi-Straussian terms, it acquired the status of a myth, and like any mythical thought, it entered the unconscious of French Culture. Following Saussure we can say that like the structures of language the structures of culture are also evolved by men without their conscious knowledge. To prove or to disprove an intellectual lineage, one should look for the traces left in the authors who follow. This is how an Anglo-saxon scholar, David Luscombe, has tried to establish a continuity in Abélardian thought in his book *The School of Peter Abelard*.[29] In this paper, I have followed the same method to demostrate a continuity that goes far beyond the earlier enterprise.

It is also interesting to note that the Abélardian myth has become the archetype in every aspect of French intellectual life. Régine Pernoud writes that when Jean-Paul Sartre proposed to marry Simone de Beauvoir, Simone argued exactly in the same terms as had been used by Héloïse.[30] And, another biographer of Abélard, Suzanne Bernard, drew her inspiration from the archetypal figure of Abélard in as recent times as the Gulf War.[31] The historian Jacques Le Goff has called him the "first professor of modernity", and the classicist Victor Cousin

has considered him the true precursor of the University of Paris, as the lieu of all intellectual disputes and the fights for the freedom of spirit and body. In other words, Pierre Abélard along with Héloïse, represent the archetypal mythical characters in the intellectual tradition of France who once for all laid down the broad parameters of intellectual behaviour and thought in the Hexagon.

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
The injured stag advanced towards the frightened Julien: accursed, accursed, accursed, one day, you will assassinate your father and mother.

Heer and the shepherd Ranjha.

Puran at the palace of Princess Sundran.